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Autor Tópico: A mão invisível dos arquitectos do euro  (Lida 33106 vezes)

hermes

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A mão invisível dos arquitectos do euro
« em: 2012-08-08 20:02:02 »
Robert Mundell, evil genius of the euro

By: Greg Palast
guardian.co.uk,
Tuesday 26 June 2012 13.30 BST

http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2012/jun/26/robert-mundell-evil-genius-euro

For the architect of the euro, taking macroeconomics away from elected politicians and forcing deregulation were part of the plan

The idea that the euro has "failed" is dangerously naive. The euro is doing exactly what its progenitor – and the wealthy 1%-ers who adopted it – predicted and planned for it to do.

That progenitor is former University of Chicago economist Robert Mundell. The architect of "supply-side economics" is now a professor at Columbia University, but I knew him through his connection to my Chicago professor, Milton Friedman, back before Mundell's research on currencies and exchange rates had produced the blueprint for European monetary union and a common European currency.

Mundell, then, was more concerned with his bathroom arrangements. Professor Mundell, who has both a Nobel Prize and an ancient villa in Tuscany, told me, incensed:

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"They won't even let me have a toilet. They've got rules that tell me I can't have a toilet in this room! Can you imagine?"


As it happens, I can't. But I don't have an Italian villa, so I can't imagine the frustrations of bylaws governing commode placement.

But Mundell, a can-do Canadian-American, intended to do something about it: come up with a weapon that would blow away government rules and labor regulations. (He really hated the union plumbers who charged a bundle to move his throne.)

"It's very hard to fire workers in Europe," he complained. His answer: the euro.

The euro would really do its work when crises hit, Mundell explained. Removing a government's control over currency would prevent nasty little elected officials from using Keynesian monetary and fiscal juice to pull a nation out of recession.

"It puts monetary policy out of the reach of politicians," he said. "[And] without fiscal policy, the only way nations can keep jobs is by the competitive reduction of rules on business."

He cited labor laws, environmental regulations and, of course, taxes. All would be flushed away by the euro. Democracy would not be allowed to interfere with the marketplace – or the plumbing.

As another Nobelist, Paul Krugman, notes, the creation of the eurozone violated the basic economic rule known as "optimum currency area". This was a rule devised by Bob Mundell.

That doesn't bother Mundell. For him, the euro wasn't about turning Europe into a powerful, unified economic unit. It was about Reagan and Thatcher.

"Ronald Reagan would not have been elected president without Mundell's influence," once wrote Jude Wanniski in the Wall Street Journal. The supply-side economics pioneered by Mundell became the theoretical template for Reaganomics – or as George Bush the Elder called it, "voodoo economics": the magical belief in free-market nostrums that also inspired the policies of Mrs Thatcher.

Mundell explained to me that, in fact, the euro is of a piece with Reaganomics:

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"Monetary discipline forces fiscal discipline on the politicians as well."


And when crises arise, economically disarmed nations have little to do but wipe away government regulations wholesale, privatize state industries en masse, slash taxes and send the European welfare state down the drain.

Thus, we see that (unelected) Prime Minister Mario Monti is demanding labor law "reform" in Italy to make it easier for employers like Mundell to fire those Tuscan plumbers. Mario Draghi, the (unelected) head of the European Central Bank, is calling for "structural reforms" – a euphemism for worker-crushing schemes. They cite the nebulous theory that this "internal devaluation" of each nation will make them all more competitive.

Monti and Draghi cannot credibly explain how, if every country in the Continent cheapens its workforce, any can gain a competitive advantage.
But they don't have to explain their policies; they just have to let the markets go to work on each nation's bonds. Hence, currency union is class war by other means.

The crisis in Europe and the flames of Greece have produced the warming glow of what the supply-siders' philosopher-king Joseph Schumpeter called "creative destruction". Schumpeter acolyte and free-market apologist Thomas Friedman flew to Athens to visit the "impromptu shrine" of the burnt-out bank where three people died after it was fire-bombed by anarchist protesters, and used the occasion to deliver a homily on globalization and Greek "irresponsibility".

The flames, the mass unemployment, the fire-sale of national assets, would bring about what Friedman called a "regeneration" of Greece and, ultimately, the entire eurozone. So that Mundell and those others with villas can put their toilets wherever they damn well want to.

Far from failing, the euro, which was Mundell's baby, has succeeded probably beyond its progenitor's wildest dreams.
« Última modificação: 2013-03-21 11:58:49 por hermes »
"Everyone knows where we have been. Let's see where we are going." – Another

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Re:A mão invisível dos construtores do euro
« Responder #1 em: 2012-08-08 20:08:51 »
Euro to Beat Dollar? Draghi's Genius

Tuesday August 07, 2012 09:57
By: Axel Merk

http://www.kitco.com/ind/Merk/20120807.html

Investors have not woken up to it, but last week may have been a game changer. European Central Bank (ECB) President Draghi took tail risks out of the Eurozone, while at the same time forcing closer fiscal integration. He did it all while keeping the ECB out of some political minefields. It's pure genius. The initial market reaction suggested he might have lost a battle, not realizing that he is winning the war.


Dismayed by a dysfunctional process caused by a lack of leadership and the increasing risk of some of the worst case scenarios playing out, we have been staying away from the euro in our hard currency strategy. As of late last week, those dynamics changed: we are giving the euro another chance, not only because of substantial short covering potential, but also because Draghi’s “whatever it takes” approach might bring about seismic changes in how European integration, fiscal and monetary policy move forward.

In essence, Draghi told the world that the ECB will act like a central bank of a United States of Europe if the integration of European fiscal policy accelerates. The “integration” process hasn’t worked particularly well. In the early years of the Eurozone, peripheral Eurozone countries used cheap access to financing to live beyond their means. Now, the markets have serious doubts about the sustainability of the finances of weaker Eurozone countries. To regain the markets’ trust, governments have nibbled with austerity measures. While the respective governments will take offense to us using the term ‘nibble’ at their hard fought progress, governments have not been able to reduce their debt loads. Politicians blame the high cost of borrowing and speculators. Unfortunately, as long as debt is merely shuffled around, no matter how big any aid package may be, it is unlikely to bring long lasting relief. In an effort to regain the trust of the markets, governments must engage in credible structural reform. Ireland has successfully gone down this path, but politicians have so far been unable to do the same in Spain, Italy and Greece. In Spain, Prime Minister Rajoy enjoys an absolute parliamentary majority and has no excuse. Italy is run by a technocrat; as such, the market is rightfully suspicious. Greece, well, is in a category of her own.

To break the debt spiral of these weaker countries, the European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF) and European Stability Mechanism (ESM) have been put in place. Accessing these facilities comes with a hefty price tag: giving up sovereign control over one’s budget. However, that’s exactly what a United States of Europe needs: tight fiscal integration. While access to the bailout facilities reduces the immediate cost of borrowing, it may also shut the door to selling bonds in the markets at palatable cost.

That raises the question of what is a palatable cost of borrowing? In the 1990’s, paying 6% for 10-year debt was just normal for some countries. Yet, because so much more debt has piled up, paying 6% is now considered unsustainable – at least unless such draconian budget cuts are introduced to balance budgets even with such high interest burden. And just in case anyone is wondering, the U.S. would be in just as dire a situation, if not worse, if it had to pay 6% on its long-term debt. We are currently concerned about the “fiscal cliff” in the U.S. – but even if the draconian cuts and increased taxes introduced by the fiscal cliff were implemented, the U.S. budget deficit would still be above 3% of GDP (the level that Eurozone nations are intended to stay below). The difference between the U.S. and peripheral Eurozone countries is foremost that the bond market lets the U.S. get away with its deficit spending.

We have long argued that the market provides the best incentive to stop governments from overspending. Spain, Italy, Ireland, Portugal, Greece – all these countries have engaged in astounding reforms, all with the “encouragement” of the bond market. Politicians, however, are most creative in avoiding making tough choices. So how does one square the circle, how does one live with political realities while at the same time provide a path to fiscal sustainability? Politicians have called for the ECB to step in, to buy bonds of weaker Eurozone countries, thus lowering their cost of borrowing. But when the ECB has done that in the past through the Securities Markets Program (SMP), policy makers have lost their motivation to pursue structural reform. Policy makers choose between the cost of acting and the cost of not acting: the moment there is relief in the market, commitment to reform fades. It also puts the ECB into the uncomfortable position of playing judge of whose reform plans are worthy of support and whose are not.

The argument for market intervention is that the “monetary transmission mechanism” is broken. That may be correct, but becoming a political hot potato is no attractive alternative for a central bank.

So ECB President Draghi announced a new philosophical framework last week: the judge of whether sufficient austerity is implemented to warrant ECB support is the conditionality of EFSF/ESM, i.e. the types of rules the International Monetary Fund (IMF) introduces on countries. It’s the best one can hope for if policy makers don’t accept the market’s judgment. In our view, accepting the market pressure would be preferred, but this is the best course of action given the realities presented. Indeed, we consider Draghi’s action nothing short of pure genius.

Draghi’s action is pure genius because it dramatically accelerates fiscal integration in Europe. Already Spain and Italy are contemplating joining the bailout regime, if in turn Draghi will help lower their cost of borrowing. There will certainly be a lot of horse-trading; we also don’t expect all austerity measures to necessarily be fully implemented. But that’s not the point. The point is that weak countries subject themselves to a political body (not a central bank) that negotiates and sets terms. It is the United States of Europe we have been waiting for. With the framework set, the ECB can engage in market operations targeting securities that are part of the program. Draghi already indicated that the focus will be on the short-end of the yield curve (shorter dated Treasury securities); this is akin to what other central banks, like the Federal Reserve (Fed) do; well, the Fed has since moved out the yield curve (longer dated Treasury securities). Longer dated debt will be affected, although significant risk premia over German bonds may continue for some time.

Based on other comments we have seen, odds are that not many others, if any, will agree that Draghi’s actions were “pure genius.” After all, he did not provide the immediate relief all those stimulus addicted market participants have gotten used to. But Draghi understands that the best short-term policy may be a good long-term policy. The short-term policies advocated by many pundits, an aggressive purchase program of peripheral bonds would only achieve that holders of such debt can dump their bonds; buyers would be guaranteed to buy such securities at inflated prices, setting them up for almost certain disappointment (and thus scaring them away from future bond auctions).

Instead, Draghi achieved a great deal: as fiscal integration in the Eurozone may be dramatically accelerated. Importantly, a political process has been put in place. Ironically, it took a monetary policy maker to put a fiscal process in place; yet, Draghi allowed the ECB to be used merely as a catalyst, not as a political pawn.

Draghi also correctly shifts the focus going forward on the increased “fragmentation” in the Eurozone where market participants increasingly focus on domestic rather than intra-European activities. While more needs to be done, other central bank activities under consideration would have amplified rather than reduced fragmentation, would have made the demise of the euro more likely. To address fragmentation issues, work on many fronts needs to take place. Market participants are doing their part by rewriting contracts to clearly state what law they are subject to in case a member country were to leave the Euro.

As such, we started buying the Euro again in our hard currency strategy. Make no mistake about it: we are only putting our foot in the water; we are not yet wholeheartedly embracing the Euro. But we are giving this new framework a chance, as we judge it to be the greatest progress in the Eurozone debt crisis we have seen to date. The coming months will show whether this is to be written off as a trading opportunity or whether it is the new strategic direction that it has the potential of being. Greece may still drop out of the Euro, but such an exit is much less of a threat to Eurozone and global financial stability than it was as recently as a week ago.

Given that currencies trade against one another, this analysis would not be complete without looking at the U.S. dollar. In the U.S., too, many pundits have been disappointed at the lack of action by the Fed. Indeed, we also think the Fed under Bernanke’s leadership is likely to provide more stimulus. But just as Draghi has presented a new philosophical framework for future action, Bernanke may feel he is obliged to provide a new framework for “QE3”. That’s because many have rightfully pointed out that any new action might have limited impact, yet risk ever more unintended consequences. The obvious opportunity that presents itself will be in Jackson Hole, where he will be speaking later this month. The Fed is focused on different issues, notably a sustained recovery after the housing bust. As such, the Fed – and we are putting words into Bernanke’s mouth here – may need to err on the side of inflation. No responsible central banker – never mind closet central banker and chief Keynesian cheerleader Paul Krugman - would ever openly advocate inflation. Let’s just say that Bernanke’s upcoming Jackson Hole speech should be interesting to watch.

For now, with the prospect of ECB action – even if with delays and no guarantee - a number of tail risks have been taken out of the Eurozone. In our assessment, that alone warrants a significantly stronger Euro versus the U.S. dollar. As we discussed, we believe there’s a new wind blowing in the Eurozone. That wind may well take the tailwind of recent months out of the U.S. dollar.
"Everyone knows where we have been. Let's see where we are going." – Another

camisa

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Re:A mão invisível dos construtores do euro
« Responder #2 em: 2012-08-08 22:48:13 »
So that Mundell and those others with villas can put their toilets wherever they damn well want to.

esta frase diz tudo sobre o seu autor...

enquanto não perceberem que as pessoas têm o DIREITO de meter uma casa de banho onde bem entendem, sem que haja um burocrata que decida sobre isso, não há nada que se possa discutir

hermes

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Re:A mão invisível dos construtores do euro
« Responder #3 em: 2012-08-08 23:31:26 »
So that Mundell and those others with villas can put their toilets wherever they damn well want to.

esta frase diz tudo sobre o seu autor...

enquanto não perceberem que as pessoas têm o DIREITO de meter uma casa de banho onde bem entendem, sem que haja um burocrata que decida sobre isso, não há nada que se possa discutir

Sim, o autor tem colocadas as suas lentes, mas está a apontar para coisas importantes, nomeadamente para as ideias de um dos arquitectos do euro que conhece em primeira mão. Além disso, parece-me ser a melhor abertura para uma thread que tem como propósito ir expondo o sistema monetário alternativo ao dólar que os europeus criaram.
« Última modificação: 2012-08-08 23:32:26 por hermes »
"Everyone knows where we have been. Let's see where we are going." – Another

camisa

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Re:A mão invisível dos construtores do euro
« Responder #4 em: 2012-08-09 11:23:00 »
Sim, o autor tem colocadas as suas lentes, mas está a apontar para coisas importantes, nomeadamente para as ideias de um dos arquitectos do euro que conhece em primeira mão. Além disso, parece-me ser a melhor abertura para uma thread que tem como propósito ir expondo o sistema monetário alternativo ao dólar que os europeus criaram.

pois eu parece-me um excelente sistema aquele que tira o poder aos políticos e o entrega aos mercados; aquele que impede os políticos de prejudicarem os aforradores e os criadores de poupança através de inflação/criação monetária e torna transparente o desastre dos défices estatais

neste processo todo o que não concordo é com o carácter não democrático das instituições europeias... a Europa está a ser gerida por um conjunto de burocratas não eleitos e não directamente responsabilizáveis perante os eleitores europeus; todos os saltos em frente na construção europeia têm sido à revelia das populações europeias que estão completamente alienadas do processo e é esse o verdadeiro calcanhar de aquiles por onde todo o projecto um dia poderá ruir, porque é algo construído nas costas dos eleitores e não resultante da sua vontade expressa

valves1

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Re:A mão invisível dos construtores do euro
« Responder #5 em: 2012-08-09 12:05:28 »
... Mão invisivel essa que arrisca no que toca a  Países com economias mais debeis como a  Portuguesa  a destruir  pura e simplesmente o  estado Social   tal como o conhecemos até hoje, pondo em causa tarefas tão basicas como   como por exemplo  o pagamento de pensões de reforma num futuro não muito distante ... A prestação de cuidados de saúde na abrangencia que hoje é conhecida etc etc
Portugal deveria pura e simplesmente abandonar o Euro, se não avançar  para uma União fiscal, Orçamental. e não iria deixar saudade ...
Por outro lado o   processo de destruição criativa é virtuoso mas sería anti civilizacional se fosse com " mortos e feridos " pelo caminho,
as pessoas não são descartaveis como na Idade média ... A politica do Fed é bem melhor, sobretudo porque olha para o quotidiano das pessoas coisa que o a politica do BCE não olha ...
« Última modificação: 2012-08-09 12:11:43 por valves1 »
"O poder só sobe a cabeça quando encontra o local vazio."

camisa

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Re:A mão invisível dos construtores do euro
« Responder #6 em: 2012-08-09 12:17:15 »
... Mão invisivel essa que arrisca no que toca a  Países com economias mais debeis como a  Portuguesa  a destruir  pura e simplesmente o  estado Social   tal como o conhecemos até hoje, pondo em causa tarefas tão basicas como   como por exemplo  o pagamento de pensões de reforma num futuro não muito distante ... A prestação de cuidados de saúde na abrangencia que hoje é conhecida etc etc

a mão invisível é que é responsável pelo fim do Estado Social???? O estado social nunca foi sustentável, foi apenas uma bolha que se aguentou enquanto foi possível emitir dívida...

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A politica do Fed é bem melhor, sobretudo porque olha para o quotidiano das pessoas coisa que o a politica do BCE não olha ...

a política do fed resulta apenas nos EUA derivado da sua hegemonia mundial a vários níveis (militar etc.) Se fosse noutro país estava igual ou pior que a Europa...

valves1

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Re:A mão invisível dos construtores do euro
« Responder #7 em: 2012-08-09 13:08:22 »
Vai ser vai ...
 
nota que o  estado Social é sempre mais sustentavel com uma economia que cresce ,  A grande verdade é que a economia  Portuguesa  nunca foi capaz de  cresceu com a moeda unica ...
em Portugal se rebentar o estado social lá se vai o tecido empresarial Português como o conhecemos até hoje ...
"O poder só sobe a cabeça quando encontra o local vazio."

camisa

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Re:A mão invisível dos construtores do euro
« Responder #8 em: 2012-08-09 13:45:00 »
Vai ser vai ...
 
nota que o  estado Social é sempre mais sustentavel com uma economia que cresce ,  A grande verdade é que a economia  Portuguesa  nunca foi capaz de  cresceu com a moeda unica ...
em Portugal se rebentar o estado social lá se vai o tecido empresarial Português como o conhecemos até hoje ...

a economia não cresceu na moeda única porque fomos inundados de uma torrente de crédito barato que induziu a distorções graves na nossa economia, nomeadamente num sector não transaccionável sobredimensionado; por outro lado os défices estatais tornaram-se cada vez mais pesados uma vez que não existia manipulação monetária para os reduzir

a destruição de emprego brutal que se assiste no nosso país é precisamente o desinflar do sector não transaccionável que vivia numa bolha insustentável

como foi referido no artigo, a falta de controlo da política monetária exige reformas estruturais que os políticos não querem fazer o que resulta num crescimento anémico ou nulo enquanto essas reformas não forem desbloqueadas

hermes

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Re:A mão invisível dos construtores do euro
« Responder #9 em: 2012-08-10 00:01:34 »
... Mão invisivel essa que arrisca no que toca a  Países com economias mais debeis como a  Portuguesa  a destruir  pura e simplesmente o  estado Social   tal como o conhecemos até hoje, pondo em causa tarefas tão basicas como   como por exemplo  o pagamento de pensões de reforma num futuro não muito distante ... A prestação de cuidados de saúde na abrangencia que hoje é conhecida etc etc
Portugal deveria pura e simplesmente abandonar o Euro, se não avançar  para uma União fiscal, Orçamental. e não iria deixar saudade ...
Por outro lado o   processo de destruição criativa é virtuoso mas sería anti civilizacional se fosse com " mortos e feridos " pelo caminho,
as pessoas não são descartaveis como na Idade média ... A politica do Fed é bem melhor, sobretudo porque olha para o quotidiano das pessoas coisa que o a politica do BCE não olha ...


A alternativa é o abismo: http://piie.com/publications/pb/pb12-20.pdf

Ningém quer o abismo.
"Everyone knows where we have been. Let's see where we are going." – Another

valves1

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Re:A mão invisível dos construtores do euro
« Responder #10 em: 2012-08-10 09:33:04 »
Sim se for acompanhado de um retrocesso na integração economica ... em todo o caso a situação como ela está não é sustentavel para países como Portugal e  quem diz que ou "  a Europa muda ou  mudamos nós  fala verdade "

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a economia não cresceu na moeda única porque fomos inundados de uma torrente de crédito barato que induziu a distorções graves na nossa economia, nomeadamente num sector não transaccionável sobredimensionado; por outro lado os défices estatais tornaram-se cada vez mais pesados uma vez que não existia manipulação monetária para os reduzir

 O  credito barato  á economia não é uma caracteristica   do Euro, na verdade   foi indo  em crescendo    ao longo da decada  90  sem  nunca ter posto em causa a economia ... 

O sector dos não transacionaveis pode ter aumentado o seu crescimento durante o Euro, no entanto já vinha em crescendo da decada anterior sem que isso tenha posto em causa a economia

muito do credito que veio foi para ser  investido ... e   nunca se investiu tanto por exemplo  em obras publicas  como nos ultimos 10 anos,   nunca como dantes  este tipo de investimentos deu tão poucos frutos,

 O que foi  caracteristico do Euro e provavelmente determinante desta letargia economica   foi Portugal ter perdido  sex appeal no que toca  a atracção do  investimento directo  estrangeiro no sector produtivo ( Bens transacionaveis ), e o ter-se acentuado o fenomeno de deslocalização nalguns  sectores tradicionais para as economias emergentes com mão de obra barata ...


Cumpts

"O poder só sobe a cabeça quando encontra o local vazio."

hermes

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Re:A mão invisível dos construtores do euro
« Responder #11 em: 2012-08-10 10:23:45 »
Sim se for acompanhado de um retrocesso na integração economica ...

Os imbalanços do Target2 são a aoutoestrada não só para o retrocesso, como tb para a desintegração económica.

Seguem alguns excertos do artigo:

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One of the big questions of our time is whether the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) will survive. Too often, analysts discuss a possible departure of one or several countries from the euro area as little more than a devaluation, but I argue that any country’s exit from the euro area would be a far greater event with potentially odious consequences. Exit from the EMU cannot be selective: It is either none or all.

The breakup of a currency zone is far more serious than a devaluation. When a monetary union with huge uncleared balances is broken up, the international payments mechanism within the union breaks up, impeding all economic interaction. A new payments mechanism may take years to establish, as was the case in the former Soviet Union. Meanwhile, the collapse may lead to a host of disasters. Almost half the cases of hyperinflation in the world took place in connection with the disorderly collapse of three European currency zones in the last century: the Austro-Hungarian Empire, Yugoslavia, and the Soviet Union. It is easier to establish a monetary union than to break it up. In this policy brief, I focus on lessons that can be learned from the breakup of the ruble zone, in which I participated actively.

[...]

Second, the critical argument for a domino eff ect is that the EMU already has large uncleared interbank balances in its so-called Target2 system. Target2 stands for Trans-European Automated Real-Time Gross Settlement Express Transfer System. It is simply the second version of this payments system now in use (Bindseil, Cour-Th imann, and König 2012, 85). Exit of any country is likely to break this centralized EMU payments mechanism. These rising uncleared balances are a serious concern because nobody can know how they will be treated if the EMU broke up. Any attempt to cap them would risk disruption of the EMU. These balances need to be resolved but in a fashion that safeguards the integrity of the EMU. However, as I show, this can hardly be done by anything less than fully securing the sustainability of the EMU.

[...]

The three other European examples of breakups in the last century are of the Habsburg Empire, the Soviet Union, and Yugoslavia. They are ominous indeed. All three ended in major disasters, each with hyperinfl ation in several countries. In the Habsburg Empire, Austria and Hungary faced hyperinfl ation. Yugoslavia experienced hyperinfl ation twice. In the former Soviet Union, 10 out of 15 republics had hyperinflation.

The combined output falls were horrendous, though poorly documented because of the chaos. Officially, the average output fall in the former Soviet Union was 52 percent, and in the Baltics it amounted to 42 percent (Åslund 2007, 60). According to the World Bank, in 2010, 5 out of 12 post-Soviet countries—Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan—had still not reached their 1990 GDP per capita levels in purchasing power parities. Similarly, out of seven Yugoslav successor states, at least Serbia and Montenegro, and probably Kosovo and Bosnia-Herzegovina, had not exceeded their 1990 GDP per capita levels in purchasing power parities two decades later (World Bank 2011). Arguably, Austria and Hungary did not recover from their hyperinfl ations in the early 1920s until the mid-1950s. Thus the historical record is that half the countries in a currency zone that breaks up experience hyperinflation and do not reach their prior GDP per capita as measured in purchasing power parities until about a quarter of a century later, which is far more than the lost decade in Latin America in the 1980s.

[...]

In important respects, the EMU is reminiscent of the three difficult cases, the Austro-Hungarian Empire, Yugoslavia, and especially the ruble zone. It lacks rules and procedures for exit, and it has a centralized payments system, which is an essential part of a real currency union, but it is also a true poison pill. There is no reason to believe that an exit would be easily accepted by all the parties concerned. The EMU may have an advantage in comparison with the other monetary unions as long as the European Central Bank (ECB) manages to retain a firm monopoly on the issue of money.

[...]

The best resolution would be the adoption of the complete US Federal Reserve System, which is much discussed. Sinn (2011b) agrees: “Only the American alternative is viable.” A step in that direction would be the formation of a banking union, that is, the establishment of a European correspondent to the US Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation with its deposit insurance, bank regulation, and bank resolution as well as a European bank bailout institution.

Such a solution was outlined at the Euro summit on June 28–29, 2012, but the decisions were not complete. A fullfledged banking union should weaken the rationale for the current steady bank run in Southern Europe. Yet in order for a banking union to become credible, EMU members need to offer a joint and several guarantee that they will do whatever is needed to maintain the EMU. The risk of any exit from the EMU must be firmly denied (Portes 2012). The chronic current account deficits need to be resolved by other means— stricter fiscal control in the southern countries and some fiscal easing in the northern countries. The European Union and EMU have suffi cient means to force any member to pursue rigorous fiscal and structural policies.
« Última modificação: 2012-08-10 12:46:30 por hermes »
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camisa

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Re:A mão invisível dos construtores do euro
« Responder #12 em: 2012-08-10 13:08:14 »
O  credito barato  á economia não é uma caracteristica   do Euro, na verdade   foi indo  em crescendo    ao longo da decada  90  sem  nunca ter posto em causa a economia ... 

a crédito barato logo a partir dos anos 90 deveu-se também ao euro na medida em que até ao final da década se registou uma convergência das taxas de juro de todos os países da futura UEM

camisa

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Re:A mão invisível dos construtores do euro
« Responder #13 em: 2012-08-10 13:14:31 »
The European Union and EMU have suffi cient means to force any member to pursue rigorous fiscal and structural policies.

a grécia é um exemplo que contraria isto...

hermes

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Re:A mão invisível dos construtores do euro
« Responder #14 em: 2012-08-10 14:35:25 »
The European Union and EMU have suffi cient means to force any member to pursue rigorous fiscal and structural policies.

a grécia é um exemplo que contraria isto...

Dentro do artigo supracitado...

Citar
If Greece were to leave the EMU, it would have to cut public expenditures viciously. Considering that Greek GDP per capita at current exchange rates is still three times larger than in neighboring Bulgaria and Turkey, a two-thirds cut in Greece’s GDP would not seem implausible. Within the EMU, by contrast, Greece might have to endure a GDP contraction of 10 percent or so on top of the 15 percent already incurred, which is a far more attractive option. In addition to bailout funds and the costs of EMU disruption, Greece would lose a few percent of GDP annually in EU structural funds, agricultural subsidies, and other grants. For all these reasons no Greek government should even think of abandoning the euro.
"Everyone knows where we have been. Let's see where we are going." – Another

camisa

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Re:A mão invisível dos construtores do euro
« Responder #15 em: 2012-08-10 15:07:53 »
Citar
If Greece were to leave the EMU, it would have to cut public expenditures viciously.

pois, mas pelos vistos eles não querem saber do médio prazo, apenas do curto prazo, i.e, só irão cortar na despesa em última instância e quando a isso forem MESMO obrigados

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Re:A mão invisível dos construtores do euro
« Responder #16 em: 2012-08-16 21:00:16 »
isto é só rir ...

  Merkel que anda a esticar a corda até ao limite  agora vem dizer que não há tempo a perder para salvar o Euro   ... 
se há  alguem que na pratica mais tenha adiado a resolução do problema é a Sr.ª Merkel  ... e se nos pormos no lugar dela uma solução lenta do problema é o que mais lhe interessa, isto porque a Alemanha está melhor do que nunca
 e qualquer que seja o solução do problema Euro a Alemanha irá para pior ...

Citar
Merkel: "Não há tempo a perder" para resolver a crise do euro
16 Agosto 2012 | 17:42
Rita Faria - afaria@negocios.pt
  Imprimir|Enviar|Reportar Erros|Partilhar|Votar|Total: 1 VotoTamanho

Chanceler alemã acredita que os responsáveis políticos estão a caminhar na direcção certa para salvar o euro. No entanto, alerta que "o tempo está a pressionar".
A chanceler alemã, Angela Merkel, afirmou esta quinta-feira que "não há tempo a perder" no processo de resolução da crise do euro. Para a responsável do governo germânico, o avanço em direcção a uma união mais "estreita" na Europa é um passo importante na prossecução desse objectivo.

No entanto, sublinhou que os responsáveis políticos dos Estados-membros da Zona Euro estão “comprometidos em fazer tudo o que puderem para manter o euro”.

"Em muitas destas questões, sentimos que estamos na direcção certa. Mas claro, o tempo está a pressionar", acrescentou a responsável alemã, citada pela Bloomberg.

Na conferência de imprensa que se seguiu ao encontro com o primeiro-ministro do Canadá, Stephen Harper, Merkel afirmou ainda que a insistência do Banco Central Europeu (BCE) em impor condicionalismos aos países que precisem da sua intervenção para baixar os custos de financiamento vai ao encontro das convicções do seu país, no que respeita a combater a crise da dívida.

"O Banco Central Europeu está completamente em linha com o que dissemos até agora", frisou. Por outro lado, considera que a Comissão Europeia devia ter "poderes mais fortes" para intervir nos orçamentos nacionais dos Estados-membros da Zona Euro.



Tags: MerkelAlemanhaBCEEuropaZona Euro    0   
 
« Última modificação: 2012-08-16 23:01:35 por valves1 »
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hermes

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Re:A mão invisível dos arqitectos do euro
« Responder #17 em: 2012-08-25 21:23:22 »
O coveiro do padrão ouro

Não obstante ser pouco plausível os EUA voltarem a submeter o resto do mundo ao padrão ouro, pois estes são uns párias a nível internacional e ainda continuarem a dever ouro a quase toda a gente [possivelmente à excepção dos franceses :D] incluindo aos seus próprios cidadãos, nunca é de excluir momentos de loucura dos dirigentes americanos, pelo que os arquitectos do euro tomaram as devidas providências...

Comecemos por rever a História. No fim dos anos 70 início dos anos 80 o resto do mundo teve a oportunidade de voltar ao padrão ouro e ninguém o quis, pelo que não é agora que o vão querer, apesar dos sonhos [delírios] dos Socialistas do Gold Standard.

Ora os arquitectos do euro desenharam-no de tal forma que este se tornou a Nemésis do padrão ouro. Vejamos as evidências / mecanismos.

1º As reservas de ouro do Eurogrupo são marked to market:


Tal significa que o euro não só se protege da desvalorização das suas reservas em dólares, pois o enforcement da Lei de Gresham por parte dos cidadãos americanos valoriza as reservas de ouro do Eurogrupo, mas tb e ainda deixa nas mãos dos arbitragistas o trabalho de sapa sobre qq padrão ouro que os americanos queiram voltar a impingir ao resto do mundo com a vantagem do Eurogrupo não poder ser acusado de estar a destruir o padrão ouro, pois o Eurogrupo não está a fazer absolutamente nada, a culpa é toda dos especuladores.

2º A total auxência de impostos via directiva comunitária sobre o ouro monetário, retira qq atritos que pudessem limitar a acção dos arbitragistas.
« Última modificação: 2013-06-15 22:28:58 por hermes »
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Re:A mão invisível dos arqitectos do euro
« Responder #18 em: 2012-08-29 13:07:54 »
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The instant reaction to Mario Draghi's decision to ditch his Jackson Hole speech (see 10.27am) is that he is planning a big new announcement next Thursday, probably a bond-buying spree to take the market pressure off Spain and Italy, despite the Bundesbank's opposition.

But, as Ian Traynor writes from Brussels, the ECB president has other issues to deal with:

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A few days after next week's meeting, the European Commission is also to unveil proposals for a new eurozone banking supervision regime, expected to confer or recommend vast new powers for the ECB as the main supervisory agency.

In his speech in Hamburg on Monday evening, Jörg Asmussen, a member of the ECB's six-strong executive, revealed several things that can be expected over the next fortnight.

Firstly, the bond-buying intervention now looks a given, albeit hedged with conditions. The ECB will intervene in the secondary markets to buy bonds with short maturities, he said, but only if the eurozone's bailout funds first became active in the primary markets, in other words directly buying up distressed government bonds. That introduces a strong element of politics since eurozone governments and finance ministers will need to decide to use the bailout funds before ECB action is triggered.

Lessons have been learned, Asmussen pointed out bluntly.

"The mistake with Italy in summer last year when the ECB bought Italian bonds while the time was unfortunately not used for the necessary adjustment measures must not be repeated."

The issue of seniority in relation to private creditors also had to be sorted to offset the risk of investor flight from troubled countries. And any country benefitting from the bond-buying would need to succumb, as Draghi insisted at the beginning of the month, to troika-style terms set by Brussels and national capitals, predicaments that Mariano Rajoy in Madrid and Mario Monti in Rome are keen to avoid.

On the new banking supervisory regime, Asmussen made plain that the ECB is up for it, despite increasing reservations about a concentration of power in Frankfurt and a possible conflict of interest with its monetary policy remit.

"The Commission will present its proposals on September 11 foreseeing a transfer of supervisory tasks to the ECB," said Asmussen. "The ECB is ready to accept this responsibility, but under certain conditions."

He insisted twice that the new supervisor must be empowered to close down bad banks.

"The ECB has to be given all the instruments needed to carry out the tasks of bank supervision effectively. In particular that means access to all the necessary information, intervention rights and the right to close down non-viable banks. Without these minimum tools, the ECB will not take on the responsibility. The risk to the reputation of the institution would be too great."


Source: http://www.guardian.co.uk/business/2012/aug/28/eurozone-crisis-spanish-recession-germany-greece?newsfeed=true#block-503ca58db579dbcf12d6e306
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Re:A mão invisível dos arqitectos do euro
« Responder #19 em: 2012-08-30 11:16:10 »
The future of the euro: stability through change

Contribution from Mario Draghi, President of the ECB,
Published in "Die Zeit", 29 August 2012


https://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/key/date/2012/html/sp120829.en.html

Across Europe, a fundamental debate is taking place about the future of the euro. Many citizens are concerned about where Europe is heading. Yet the solutions presented appear to them unsatisfactory. This is because these solutions offer binary choices: either we must go back to the past, or we must move to a United States of Europe. My answer to the question is: to have a stable euro we do not need to choose between extremes.

The reason this debate is taking place is not the euro as a currency. The objectives of the single currency remain as relevant today as they were when the single currency was agreed. To spread price stability and sustainable growth to all European citizens. To reap the gains of the world’s largest single market and make the historic process of European unification irreversible. To raise Europe’s standing – not only economically but also politically – in a globalised world.

The debate is taking place because the euro area has not yet fully succeeded as a polity. Currencies ultimately depend on the institutions that stand behind them. When the euro was first proposed, there were those who said it would have to be preceded by a long process of political integration. This was because sharing a currency would imply a high degree of joint decision-making. Member countries would be a “Schicksalsgemeinschaft” and would need strong common democratic underpinnings.

But a deliberate choice was made in the 1990s not to give the euro such features. The euro was launched as a “currency without a state” to preserve the sovereignty and diversity of member countries. This informed the so-called “Maastricht setup”, which laid the euro’s institutional foundations. But as recent events have shown, this institutional framework left the euro area insufficiently equipped to ensure sound economic policies and effectively manage crises.

For this reason, the way ahead cannot be a return to the status quo ante. The challenges of having a single monetary policy but loosely coordinated fiscal, economic and financial policies have been clearly revealed by the crisis. As Jean Monnet said, coordination “ is a method which promotes discussion, but it does not lead to a decision.” And strong decisions have to be made to manage the world’s second most important currency.

A new architecture for the euro area is desirable to create sustained prosperity for all euro area countries, and especially for Germany. The root of Germany’s success is its deep integration into the European and world economies. To continue to prosper, Germany needs to remain an anchor of a strong currency, at the centre of a zone of monetary stability and in a dynamic and competitive euro area economy. Only a stronger economic and monetary union can provide this.

Yet this new architecture does not require a political union first. It is clear that monetary union does entail a higher degree of joint decision-making. But economic integration and political integration can develop in parallel. Where necessary, sovereignty in selected economic policy fields can and should be pooled and democratic legitimation deepened.

How far should this go? We do not need a centralisation of all economic policies. Instead, we can answer this question pragmatically: by calmly asking ourselves which are the minimum requirements to complete economic and monetary union. And in doing so, we will find that all the necessary measures are firmly within our reach.

For fiscal policies, we need true oversight over national budgets. The consequences of misguided fiscal policies in a monetary union are too severe to remain self-policed. For broader economic policies, we need to guarantee competitiveness. Countries must be able to generate sustainable growth and high employment without excessive imbalances. The euro area is not a nation-state where persistent cross-regional subsidies have sufficient popular support. Therefore, we cannot afford a situation where some regions run permanently large deficits vis-à-vis others.

For financial policies, there need to be powers at the centre to limit excessive risk-taking by banks and regulatory capture by supervisors. This is the best way to protect euro area taxpayers. There also needs to be a framework for bank resolution that safeguards public finances, as we see in other federations. In the U.S., for example, on average about 90, mostly smaller, banks per year have been resolved since 2008 and this had no impact on the solvency of the sovereign.

Political union can, and shall, develop hand-in-hand with fiscal, economic and financial union. The sharing of powers and of accountability can move in parallel. We should not forget that 60 years of European integration have already created a significant degree of political union. Decisions are made by an EU Council filled by national ministers and by a directly elected European Parliament. The challenge is to further increase the legitimacy of these bodies commensurate with increasing their responsibilities and to seek ways to better anchor European processes at the national level.

A more solid political foundation should allow for agreement on a basic principle: that it is neither sustainable nor legitimate for countries to pursue national policies that can cause economic harm for others. This constraint has to be built into how countries design their economic and social models. The only sustainable model is one that is consistent with the terms of a common currency. Countries have to live within their means. Competition and labour markets have to be reinvigorated. Banks have to conform to the highest regulatory standards and focus on serving the real economy. This is not the end, but the renewal of the European social model.

From the ECB’s perspective, a strong economic union is an essential complement to the single monetary policy. Building this will require a structured process with correct sequencing. Yet citizens can be certain that three elements will remain constant. The ECB will do what is necessary to ensure price stability. It will remain independent. And it will always act within the limits of its mandate.

Yet it should be understood that fulfilling our mandate sometimes requires us to go beyond standard monetary policy tools. When markets are fragmented or influenced by irrational fears, our monetary policy signals do not reach citizens evenly across the euro area. We have to fix such blockages to ensure a single monetary policy and therefore price stability for all euro area citizens. This may at times require exceptional measures. But this is our responsibility as the central bank of the euro area as a whole.

The ECB is not a political institution. But it is committed to its responsibilities as an institution of the European Union. As such, we never lose sight of our mission to guarantee a strong and stable currency. The banknotes that we issue bear the European flag and are a powerful symbol of European identity.

Those who want to go back to the past misunderstand the significance of the euro. Those who claim only a full federation can be sustainable set the bar too high. What we need is a gradual and structured effort to complete EMU. This would finally give the euro the stable foundations it deserves. It would fully achieve the ultimate goals for which the Union and the euro were founded: stability, prosperity and peace. We know this is what the people in Europe, and in Germany, aspire to.
"Everyone knows where we have been. Let's see where we are going." – Another