A mão invisível dos arquitectos do euro

[hermes]

Artigo interessante sobre o cisma crescente entre a UE e os EUA. Ganha outra relevância pela simultaniedade do cisma crescente entre o Príncipe e os EUA.

EU lawmakers seek to block U.S. financial spying

By Robin Emmott
BRUSSELS | Wed Oct 23, 2013 11:58am EDT

http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/10/23/us-eu-us-security-idUSBRE99M0OR20131023?feedType=RSS&feedName=topNews

(Reuters) - The European Parliament called on Wednesday for U.S. access to a global financial database in Belgium to be suspended due to concerns that the United States is snooping on the European Union, not just combating terrorism.

EU lawmakers voted to freeze Washington's ability to track international payments because of suspicions that it has abused an agreement giving it limited access to the SWIFT database.

They worry the United States is covertly drawing additional information from the database following leaked U.S. documents aired by Globo, Brazil's biggest television network, indicating that the U.S. government has secretly tapped into SWIFT.

"We need full transparency, especially with all the NSA revelations," said Guy Verhofstadt, leader of the Liberals in the European Parliament, referring to the U.S. National Security Agency surveillance made public by fugitive former NSA contractor Edward Snowden.

"Europe cannot accept that the data of private citizens is being accessed without anyone knowing about it," Verhofstadt, a former Belgian prime minister, told Reuters.

Although not binding, the parliament's vote reflects public anger at reports of NSA spying on European citizens. The European Commission - the EU executive - and EU governments will still need to approve any suspension of U.S. access to SWIFT.

The European Commission said a statement that it was "still waiting for additional written assurances" that the United States is respecting its agreement with the EU, but had no immediate plans to propose a suspension of SWIFT to EU members.

"U.S. LAP DOG"

The United States denies any wrongdoing.

David Cohen, the U.S. Treasury's undersecretary for terrorism and financial intelligence, has told EU Home Affairs Commissioner Cecilia Malmstrom his government has respected the 2010 agreement, according to an October 9 statement by Malmstrom.

The EU shares data with the U.S. Treasury from SWIFT, which exchanges millions of financial messages on transactions across the world every day, but only on a limited basis to help intercept possible terrorism plots.

The agreement is part of transatlantic cooperation following the September 11, 2001 attacks on U.S. cities.

The parliament in Strasbourg voted 280 in favor and 254 against with 30 abstentions, calling for a suspension until a full inquiry can clarify the situation.

"The EU cannot continue to remain silent in the face of these ongoing revelations: it gives the impression we are little more than a lap dog of the United States," said Jan Philipp Albrecht, a German Green in the parliament.

Globo's report of U.S. financial spying was among a host of leaks by Snowden that have tested EU-U.S. diplomatic relations.

French newspaper Le Monde reported this week that the NSA had recorded French telephone data on a huge scale between December 2012 and January this year. Other reports have accused the U.S. government of bugging European Union offices.

The parliament's call follows another vote by EU lawmakers for a tougher data privacy regime including fines for companies such as Google, Facebook, Yahoo! that violate rules limiting how data is shared with non-EU countries.

(Reporting by Robin Emmott; Editing by Alistair Lyon)

[valves1]

os estados unidos tem tecnologia bastante avancada para espiar provavelmente toda a comunicacao que cada um de nos faz atraves do telemovel ou do computador;
Aqui cada um fala por si, na minha opiniao se esse sistema for utilisado para perceber e fiscalizar  coisas menos boas que se passam nos paises excelente !

[hermes]

Interessante documento desclassificado a relatar o que os EUA tinham medo que a Comunidade Europeia fizesse nos anos 70. É particularmente valioso por revelar onde as peças de xadrez estavam bem como a estratégia na mente dos arquitectos do euro [o ouro é a medida de todas as coisas: petróleo e balanças comerciais]. Assim podemos observar as suas posições actuais e ver se estão mais perto das posições onde os arquitectos do euro as queriam. Os negritos são meus e servem para destacar os pontos que me chamaram a atenção [essencialmente onde as peças estavam bem como a estratégia na mente dos arquitectos do euro].

61. Note From the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for International Finance and Development ( Weintraub ) to the Under Secretary of the Treasury for Monetary Affairs ( Volcker )(1)

Washington, March 6, 1974.

Paul:

This is a paper which we prepared for Secretary Kissinger giving some of our views on the gold question. We discussed it at a meeting for his background, (2) without attempting to reach any conclusions. We would appreciate any reactions you have to the paper. The Secretary said he would most appreciate meeting with you and anybody else you wish to designate in about two weeks to talk out the issue and what might be done, using a revised options paper for this purpose.
One option that is not included in the paper, but which should be for various reasons, is how to deal with thwarting the Europeans if they were to go ahead without us in a way which we felt was inimical to our interests.

Sid

Attachment (3)

GOLD AND THE MONETARY SYSTEM: POTENTIAL U.S.–EC CONFLICT

Summary

The Foreign Policy Context

Within the next few months the long-standing U.S.-European dispute on the role of gold will probably be propelled from the back room to the main stage of our relationship. The stakes in this dispute are high, involving the long-run stability of the international monetary system and prospects for increased dissension within Europe and between Europe and the U.S.


The Problem

U.S. objectives for the world monetary system—a durable, stable system, with the SDR as a strong reserve asset at its center—are incompatible with a continued important role for gold as a reserve asset. These objectives are in apparent conflict with the EC desire to facilitate the use of gold in international transactions. There is a belief among certain Europeans that a higher price of gold for settlement purposes would facilitate financing of oil imports, although the argument depends on assumptions regarding producers' attitude towards gold as an asset which may not be valid. Adamant U.S. insistence on maintaining the present fixed official price is likely to create international conflict with the EC, and may also lead to unilateral EC arrangements which would defeat our aims for the system.


The Conclusion

The U.S. objectives are important, and should not be given up, but they may be achievable without rigid adherence to the present fixed official gold price. Compromise proposals exist which would make adequate progress towards our objectives for the system while meeting principal EC needs. Since the EC is likely to set forth its proposals before the C–20 winds up its existence this summer, a U.S. position will be needed within the next several months. Tactically, it may also be preferable to discuss possible compromise proposals with one or more EC members before we are confronted with an EC position.

Pressures are building within the EC for settlement of intra-EC balances with gold valued at the market price (or some other price substantially higher than the current official price of $42.20 per troy ounce). Unilateral EC action in this direction would run directly counter to the stated United States position on international gold policy. The EC reportedly will try to avoid a direct conflict through pressing for rapid resolution of the problem within the framework of the multilateral monetary reform negotiations. Therefore, the U.S. position needs to be re-examined in light of present circumstances. This memorandum examines the foundations of this potential U.S.–EC conflict on the gold question, and considers which negotiating positions among various options would best serve U.S. interests.


Gold in the International Monetary System — The Issues

Agreement has been reached in the C–20 monetary reform negotiations that the SDR should take the place once held by gold at the center of the world monetary system. However, there is still substantial disagreement on what the exact future role of gold should be—whether it eventually ought to be phased out of the system (the U.S. view) or retain an important function as a reserve asset and means of international settlement (the position of some European countries).

U.S. interests in this question are in the establishment of stable, durable world monetary system, based on a strong SDR, which would avoid future monetary crises and conflict, such as those that have plagued the Bretton Woods system in recent years. In our view a system which included gold as a major reserve asset alongside SDRs would be inherently unstable, just as bimetallism was in the U.S.

This inherent instability stems from the fact that gold is traded as a commodity on a private market at a variable price subject to the vagaries of world production (largely Soviet and South African) and sales, and of demands by hoarders and speculators. With a fluctuating, and generally rising, free market for gold, a permanently fixed official price is simply not credible, and becomes less so as the gap between private and official prices widens. If, however, the price at which official transactions in gold are made were to be periodically adjusted to the market price, then an unstable situation would rise as between gold and SDRs.

At the present time, the value of the SDR is fixed in terms of gold. However, it has been generally agreed in the C–20 that the new SDR should not be related to gold, but rather to a basket of currencies. In this case, a changing price at which official gold transactions take place would create capital gains (or losses) for gold holders as compared to SDR holders, stimulate speculative central bank demand for gold, and weaken the SDR. (4)

It is the U.S. concern that any substantial increase now in the price at which official gold transactions are made would strengthen the position of gold in the system, and cripple the SDR. If international liquidity were injected via gold, there would be little likelihood of new SDR allocations.(5) There also would be reduced incentive to sell gold on the private market even after an official price increase since central banks would cling to their gold in expectation of further official gold price increases. In addition, too large an increase in world liquidity might add to inflationary dangers. Finally, the distribution of the increase in world reserves would be highly inequitable, with eight wealthy countries getting three-fourths, while the developing countries would get less than 10 percent (see attached table). Producing countries (the USSR and South Africa) would benefit from the implicit floor put under the free-market gold price.

To encourage and facilitate the eventual demonetization of gold, our position is to keep the present gold price, maintain the present Bretton Woods agreement ban against official gold purchases at above the official price (6) and encourage the gradual disposition of monetary gold through sales in the private market. An alternative route to demonetization could involve a substitution of SDRs for gold with the IMF, with the latter selling the gold gradually on the private market, and allocating the profits on such sales either to the original gold holders, or by other agreement.

European views on the role of gold in the world monetary system vary considerably. The British and Germans, on one hand, generally agree in principle to the desirability of phasing gold out of the system. On the other end of the spectrum, the French have been the main proponents of a continued important role for gold in the system.

Support for a continued role for gold in the system is based in large part on the belief that "paper gold"—the SDR—does not command sufficient confidence and acceptability to replace gold completely in the system. There is, in fact, still a considerable emotional attachment to gold as a monetary asset, and a basic distrust of bank or paper money not having intrinsic value. On the other hand, most European officials recognize the basic problems involved in a combined SDR–gold reserve asset system. Belgian Finance Minister De Clerq, (7) for example, speaking at the IMF annual meetings in September stated:
Any redefinition of the role of gold must be based on the principle stated above: that SDR must become the center of the system and that there can be no question of introducing a new form of gold– paper and gold–metal bimetallism, in which the SDR and gold would be in competition.

Despite these differences among member countries, the EC position has begun to coalesce around their desire to free gold for use in settling intra-EC debts—a problem raised by the present "immobilization" of gold which has resulted from the wide disparity between the official and free market gold prices. Monetary authorities have been unwilling to use their gold holdings to settle official debts at a price far below the free market price. This has been a problem particularly for the EC, whose rules under the "snake" arrangement require that final settlement of debts arising out of intervention to support intra-EC exchange rates must be made in reserve assets in proportion to the composition of reserve holdings. (This "immobility" is, of course, an example of the difficulties inherent in a system in which gold retains a reserve currency role alongside another reserve asset.)

To some extent, the immobility of gold reserves as a means of payment is a result of self-imposed restraints. Countries are free to use reserve currencies and SDRs to settle debts. Moreover, countries are now free to obtain additional currencies (and realize substantial capital gains) through sales of gold to the private market. The EC problem is a result of their particular rules for settlement, which reflect the interest of creditor countries in receiving gold and applying discipline to deficit countries. It is also a result of their reluctance, so far, to sell gold on the private market. The reasons for this reluctance are probably related to the unsettled status of gold in the system, the basic attraction of gold, the expectation of future price increases, and the "thinness" of the private gold market.

Nor is it clear that European countries would give up gold even after a price increase, since one increase may lead to an expectation of further increases. Even under the Bretton Woods system, the Europeans did not often give up gold to settle deficits.
The "immobility" problem is of particular concern to the French and Italians, who have substantial outstanding EC debts and especially high proportions of their reserve assets in gold. Recently, with the private price continuing to rise, and final decisions on monetary reform apparently further off than previously thought, otherEC countries are coming around to the French-Italian view that this problem must be resolved. However,the Germans and British, in particular, are concerned that the solution be accomplished in a way which would not antagonize the United States. They wish to settle this issue in the C–20 multilateral context, if possible. Failing agreement there, the EC might feel free to unilaterally make some regional arrangement.

Various European proposals have been made to deal with the gold issue. The basic French proposal in the C–20 was simply to increase the official price of gold although this may have been made with tongue in cheek and received no support other than from South Africa. Other European proposals, and the stated French fallback position, have been variations on the idea that the official price of gold be abolished, leaving the SDR as the sole numeraire of the system, and that monetary authorities be free to deal at a negotiated price, or at a price related (perhaps at a discount) to the private market price. In the version reportedly recently proposed to the EC by the UK, such an arrangement would be combined with coordinated central bank sales to the private market. Another possibility reportedly being considered is to have the Italians, who have the greatest need, sell gold on the private market by themselves to avoid unduly depressing the market. The French version of this proposal would allow central banks either to buy or sell gold on the private market (obviously in order to avoid depressing the private market and to keep or augment the role of gold in the system).

In lieu of a general agreement permitting official transactions in gold at a price higher than the official price, some EC countries have proposed special arrangements to deal only with the intra-EC problem. Such proposals have heretofore been shelved by a combination of technical problems, and an unwillingness to take unilateral action of doubtful legality and offensive to the United States. Most recently, the EC Commission has proposed a system which would in effect set a higher provisional price, to be corrected when agreement is reached on a new price for gold.

Both the European C–20 proposal and the intra-EC proposals would fall short of a generalized increase in the official price of gold. However, each would amount to a generalized de facto, if not de jure, (8) official price increase, and strengthen the role of gold in the system. A system of sales, but no purchases, to the private market would mitigate this tendency.

The recent oil price increases have added a new dimension to the gold issue, and in the view of some European officials, relegated the intra-EC problem to a secondary position. Although mobilization of gold for intra-EC settlement would help in the financing of imbalances among EC countries, it would not, of itself, provide resources for the financing of the anticipated deficit with the oil producers. For this purpose, it would be useful if the oil producers would invest some of their excess revenues in gold purchases from deficit EC countries at close to a market price. This would be an attractive proposal for European countries, and for the U.S., in that it would not involve future interest burdens and would avoid immediate problems arising from increased Arab ownership of European and American industry. (The Arabs could both sell the gold and use the proceeds for direct investment, so that the industry ownership problem would not be completely solved.) From the Arab point of view such an asset would have the advantages of being protected from exchange-rate changes and inflation, and subject to absolute national control. Some European officials are thinking in terms of clearing the way for such transactions (which would now be forbidden by IMF rules). It has been argued that Arabs would only be interested in buying gold at near the market price if they could obtain assurances of some sort of floor price. We have received word that such a proposal is being floated within the German Government.

From the standpoint of international liquidity needs, a reasonable case can now be made for a generalized gold price increase, since the probable payments patterns stemming from the higher oil prices (overall deficits for Europe and Japan) may lead to a reduction in world reserve liquidity. However, from the U.S. viewpoint (as well as many countries without large gold holdings) substantial new SDR allocations would be preferable when new liquidity creation is needed.

Options for U.S. Negotiating Policy on Gold

Since the U.S. is likely to be presented with pressure to acquiesce in some arrangements to meet the European objectives sketched out above, it is important that we reconsider what our own negotiating posture should be.

At either end of the spectrum of possible negotiating positions are the following:

Option 1:Continue adamant opposition to any proposal involving an increase in price at which monetary authorities carry out transactions in gold. Advantages: If successful, we will keep gold from regaining strength as an international reserve asset, maintain the strength of the SDR, and probably eventually obtain the demonetization of gold and a more rational, stable international monetary system. Disadvantages: The EC may then go ahead with its own arrangements which would amount to a virtual de facto increase in the official gold price, with undesirable effects on the world monetary system and lead to increased U.S.–EC conflict and bitterness.

Option 2: Acquiesce in a European-type plan involving abolition of the official price, permitting settlement of official balances at a negotiated price, with a "sales only" rule for transactions in the private market. Advantages: This would be somewhat preferable to a plan involving an outright increase in the official price, and would maintain an avenue for demonetization through one-way sales to the private market. The SDR would become the sole numeraire of the system. In the short run, tensions with Europe over monetary issues would be reduced. The increase in de facto liquidity might be helpful in present circumstances, and gold sales to the Arabs might help finance western balance of payments deficits. Disadvantages: This has most of the disadvantages discussed above of (and may in fact lead to) an outright increase in the official price of gold. We may thereby lose the opportunity to build a stable and rational world monetary system, with adverse long-term consequences involving monetary instability and conflict. The disadvantages to each of these options are such that a search for additional options is justified. Intermediate options do exist which have the potential of meeting EC objectives of mobilizing gold in the short run, while maintaining the desirable trend towards gold demonetization.

Option 3: Complete short-term demonetization of gold through an IMF substitution facility. Countries could give up their gold holdings to the IMF in exchange for SDRs. The gold could then be sold gradually, over time, by the IMF to the private market. Profits from the gold sales could be distributed in part to the original holders of the gold, allowing them to realize at least part of the capital gains, while part of the profits could be utilized for other purposes, such as aid to LDCs. Advantages: This would achieve our goal of demonetization and relieve the problem of gold immobility, since the SDRs received in exchange could be used for settlement with no fear of foregoing capital gains. (9) Disadvantages: This might be a more rapid demonetization than several countries would accept. There would be no benefit from the viewpoint of financing oil imports with gold sales to Arabs (although it is not necessarily incompatible with such an arrangement). The only important disadvantage of option 3 would be its likely unacceptability to countries who would prefer to cling to gold for traditional reasons. But it would show our sensitivity to the immobility problem, and be a good initial bargaining position. We might, in the end, have to fall back on a fourth option:

Option 4: Accept a European-type arrangement in which the official gold price was abolished, and official transactions at a market-related price were permitted, but with agreement that a certain portion of gold be given up to an IMF substitution facility, and that gradual further substitution of SDRs for gold would take place over a longer period of time. One possible rule among many could be that countries should keep the nominal value of their gold holdings fixed at present levels with any increases in value coming from price increases offset by substitutions. Another variant on this proposal would have countries agree to pre-determined, gradual direct sales to the private market. Again, profits could be shared between gold holders and others. Advantages: This would provide adequate momentum towards gold demonetization while providing relief to gold immobility problems. It seems somewhat more compatible with gold sales to the Arabs, if this is desirable. It may be negotiable. Disadvantages: It is somewhat less desirable for the medium-term workings of the system than option 3.


Conclusions

The U.S. objectives in reducing the role of gold in the world monetary system are worthwhile, but they may be achievable without insisting on adherence to the present fixed official price of gold. Moreover, such a stand might unnecessarily create international friction. Compromise proposals exist which have good prospects for achieving our objectives for the system while meeting the principal EC requirements. We should be prepared to use these compromises in the near future.


Tactics

Negotiation in a broader IMF forum is likely to be a very divisive and contentious process unless based on a prior U.S.-European understanding. The Europeans, however, are not united, although working on a common substantive position. We could wait for this position to develop further or proceed now with bilateral contacts with one or more EC members. Our waiting to be confronted with the EC position puts the French in a strong position through their veto over any departure from the agreed EC line. The gold issue would be an appropriate one to pursue in bilateral contacts with the Germans and British, both of whom could probably agree to options involving more modest flex in our traditional position than the French or Italians want. But there is, of course, no guarantee that the British and/or Germans could carry the resulting compromise in Brussels. Nevertheless, working out a compromise with some of the major Europeans could reduce the prospects for a U.S.–EC standoff, while leaving a substantial intra-EC disagreement to be bridged by the Europeans.



(1) Source: National Archives, RG 56, Office of the Under Secretary of the Treasury, Files of Under Secretary Volcker, 1969–1974, Accession 56–79–15, Box 1, Gold—8/15/71–2/9/72. No classification marking. A stamped notation on the note reads: "Noted by Mr. Volcker." Another notation, dated March 8, indicates that copies were sent to Bennett and Cross.
(2) The paper was discussed with Kissinger at a Department of State staff meeting on March 6. The summary attached to the front page of the meeting's minutes notes that Kissinger decided: "That a small State–Treasury group, to include Volcker be assembled to refine the choices in theEB paper and report back in two weeks. The revised paper should include the options of possible unilateral EC action vis-à-vis gold prices and in relation to oil import costs as well as US responses to abort or penalize such action (EB action)." (Ibid., RG 59, Transcripts of Secretary of StateKissinger's Staff Meetings, 1973–1977, Entry 5177, Box 2, Secretary's Staff Meeting, March 6, 1974)
(3) Confidential.
(4) If a fixed SDR–gold price were to be maintained, and periodic free-market related adjustments in the official prices of gold were to be made, then the currency value of the world's primary reserve assets would be tied to a price set on a volatile, unstable market. [Footnote is in the original.]
(5) As can be seen from the table at the end of this memorandum, official gold reserves are now valued at $43 billion at the $42.20 per ounce price. The free market price is almost four times the official price. [Footnote is in the original. The table is attached but not printed.]
(6) The French have stated that they do not consider the IMF Articles as binding under present circumstances (the U.S. having suspended its convertibility obligation). We consider the Articles still binding. Other countries have not yet taken a position. [Footnote is in the original.]
(7) Willy de Clercq was the Belgian Minister of Finance and Deputy Prime Minister.
(8) Under the present IMF Articles of Agreement, a generalized gold price increase (uniform par value change) would require approval of countries representing 85% of the IMF weighted voting power. Thus we have the power to block any legal change. [Footnote is in the original.]
(9) The additional SDRs might be quite acceptable since, for a time at least, they would be "backed" by IMF gold holdings. Some gold "backing" could be maintained until prejudices against paper money waned—in a manner similar to the evolution of domestic monies. [Footnote is in the original.]

Fonte: http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v31/d61

[hermes]

ECB's Weidmann calls for earlier introduction of bail-in rules

Tue Nov 12, 2013 6:04pm IST

http://in.reuters.com/article/2013/11/12/us-ecb-weidmann-idINBRE9AB0KU20131112

(Reuters) - Rules ensuring that banks' bondholders and big depositors share the costs of any lender failing should be introduced earlier than currently planned, European Central Bank Governing Council member Jens Weidmann said on Tuesday.

Weidmann, also president of Germany's Bundesbank, joins a long list of ECB and German government officials pushing for the early introduction of 'bail-in' rules, in January 2015 instead of 2018.

The bail-in rules should if possible be in place by the time the planned mechanism to wind down banks starts, he said. That is currently expected in 2015, shortly after the ECB takes up its new role as the single supervisor for euro zone banks.

"It is important that bail-in be implemented as simultaneously to other measures as possible. In particular, the bail-in transition periods should be shortened," Weidmann said in a speech in Frankfurt.

He said banks should be allowed to fail, but added: "Different to how things were done in the past, it should be done if possible without putting financial stability at risk and without using public money."

(Reporting by Eva Taylor; Editing by Hugh Lawson)

[hermes]

EU set to tell markets it will stand by weak banks

Thursday November 14, 2013 (16:05)   

http://www.ekathimerini.com/4dcgi/_w_articles_wsite2_1_14/11/2013_527840

European Union finance ministers will pledge on Friday to stand by their banks if health checks next year reveal they need to bolster their capital, according to a draft statement obtained by Reuters.

The Eurogroup of ministers from the 17 countries that share the euro were due to discuss the backstop arrangement for banks on Thursday, but more serious talks will only take place when finance ministers of all 28 EU member states meet on Friday.

The talks on making a clean sweep of bank problems are part of wider negotiations on setting up a eurozone banking union to police lenders and support weaklings or close them down.

The banking union will be preceded by a so-called asset quality review of eurozone banks by the European Central Bank and then a stress test of all banks across the wider EU to see how assets such as loans would fare in an economic downturn.

"The council (of ministers) reiterates that all member states participating in the (ECB supervision) implement appropriate arrangements, including the establishment of national backstops ahead of the completion of (bank health tests)," said the draft statement.

The results of the health checks are expected around the time that the ECB becomes the supervisor for euro zone banks, which is the first step towards banking union.

If the tests show that a bank is short of capital, its shareholders and other investors will be asked to raise it.

But if there is insufficient investor interest and the bank's health cannot be repaired by imposing losses on junior bondholders, governments have to be ready to provide the missing money themselves.

Very few countries have any special funds set aside for such a purpose now, so the ministers have to make sure that at least all the necessary legislation is in place for them to be able to inject capital.

"In the eventuality that the (tests) reveal a capital shortfall, the established pecking order - first private sources, then national and euro area/EU instruments - will apply," the draft statement said.

The draft statement by ministers made clear that government help will only be possible if private funds are not available.

State help, in other words, will come at a heavy cost -- imposing losses on shareholders and junior bondholders, changing a bank's management and capping salaries and bonuses.

In time, possibly as soon as 2015, senior bondholders and even depositors with more than 100,000 euros in a bank, will be asked to contribute to help restructure a bank.

If a euro zone government cannot raise the capital itself, it could ask the euro zone bailout fund, the ESM, for a loan, as Spain did to recapitalize its banks in 2012.

If a government cannot borrow enough from the ESM because that would make its own public debt unsustainable and it would not be able to repay the loan, the ESM could recapitalize a bank directly, without government intermediation, from November 2014.

On Friday the ministers will also discuss how to set up an agency and fund to close or revamp banks in trouble - another pillar of the banking union.

But officials said they expected no major progress here as euro zone countries are divided over which European institution should have the power to shut a bank and who should pay for it. [Reuters]

[hermes]

Depois do documento de Março de 1974, atrás mencionado, seguem-se as decisões informais dos líders da CEE em Abril de 1974. Ênfase adicionada sobre o mecanismo do novo sistema monetário pretendido pelos europeus.

Following is text of statement made to C-20 deputies’ meeting on May 7 by Dutch treasurer-general Oort Re Zeist meeting of EC finance ministers April 22 and 23 on gold:

I have been asked to report on an informal discussion - and I emphasize the word informal rpt informal discussion - which the ministers of finance of the EEC have held on April 22 and 23 at Zeist on the subject of gold.

Before I report to you on the outcome of the discussion I would like to make clear that it has resulted neither in a formal decision on the part of the EEC countries nor even in a firm proposal to be confidential

Made in a wider international context. What came out of Zeist was a consensus on certain substantive propositions that are to be further explored before they are submitted to a next meeting of the council of ministers of the EEC. If at a later stage the council reaches agreement on a certain position, the further procedure could be that the European community formulates a formal proposal on how to deal with the problem of gold in the period before the reform of the international monetary system.

In Zeist, ministers have agreed on two general propositions. First, they have re-asserted that the SDR should become the principal reserve asset in the future system, and that arrangements for gold in the interim period should not be inconsistent with that goal. Second, they have agreed that such interim arrangements should enable monetary authorities to effectively utilize the monetary gold stocks as instruments of international settlement.

There was a consensus among ministers that an increase of the official gold price, although it might serve the second objective, would be inconsistent with the first. In order to mobilize monetary gold as an international reserve asset, they have agreed that:

1. Monetary authorities should be permitted to buy and to sell gold both among themselves, at a marked-related price, and on the free market. The monetary authorities would have complete freedom to buy or to sell gold, and would have no obligation whatever to enter into any particular transaction.

2. Certain delegations are of the opinion that gold transactions with the free market should not, over a certain period of time, lead to a net increase of the combined official gold stocks.

3. In order to apply these principles, various practical solutions can be envisaged. Two were mentioned in particular. One is that monetary authorities periodically fix a minimum and a maximum price below or above which they would not sell or buy on the market. The other consists in creating a buffer stock to be managed by an agent who would be charged by the monetary authorities to intervene on the market such as to ensure orderly conditions on the free market for gold.

4. These arrangements would be adopted provisionally and would be reviewed in the light of experience attained after, say, a year.

In concluding, Mr. Chairman, I would like to emphasize once more that what I have just said is not rpt not a proposal by the EEC, but a report on an interim-stage in the discussions. Ministers have permitted us to make this report in order to inform you as early as possible of the direction in which a consensus among the EEC countries is emerging. They expect deputies to interpret the status of the information in the light of what I have just said.

Fonte: https://www.wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/1974PARIS11237_b.html

Quanto ao ponto 4., não há nada mais definitivo que medidas temporárias, e é equivalente ao proverbial nariz do camelo dentro da tenda do beduino.

[hermes]

Segue-se a análise da proposta anterior pelo Ministério dos Negócios Estrangeiros dos EUA agora desclassificada.

Ainda estive para juntar ênfase sobre quem estava por detrás da proposta da CEE, dos objectivos, das consequências para os detentores de dólares e das consequências sobre a hegemonia dos EUA, mas depois vi que ia ficar quase tudo sublinhado... Limitei-me apenas a sublinhar qual seria o preço do ouro, através da piada que este seria tão caro que as torneiras de ouro que os árabes adoram colocar na casa de banho seriam tão minúsculas que demorariam duas semanas para encher a banheira.

63. Minutes of Secretary of State Kissinger's Principals and Regionals Staff Meeting¹

Washington, April 25, 1974, 3:13–4:16 p.m.

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to international monetary policy.]

Secretary Kissinger: Now we've got Enders, Lord and Hartman. They'll speak separately or together. (Laughter.)

Mr. Hartman: A trio.

Mr. Lord: I can exhaust my knowledge of gold fairly quickly, I think.

Secretary Kissinger: Now, I had one deal with Shultz—never to discuss gold at this staff meeting—because his estimate of what would appear in the newspapers from staff meetings is about the same as mine.

Are you going to discuss something—is this now in the public discussion, what we're discussing here?

Mr. Enders: It's been very close to it. It's been in the newspapers now—the EC proposal.²

Secretary Kissinger: On what—revaluing their gold?

Mr. Enders: Revaluing their gold—in the individual transaction between the central banks. That's been in the newspaper. The subject is, obviously, sensitive; but it's not, I think, more than the usual degree of sensitivity about gold.

Secretary Kissinger: Now, what is our position?

Mr. Enders: You know what the EC proposal is.

Secretary Kissinger: Yes.

Mr. Enders: It does not involve a change in the official price of gold. It would allow purchases and sales to the private market, provided there was no net purchase from the private market by an individual central banker in a year. And then there would be individual sales between the central banks on—

Secretary Kissinger: How can they permit sale to the private market? Oh, and then they would buy from the private market?

Mr. Enders: Then they would buy.

Secretary Kissinger: But they wouldn't buy more than they sold.

Mr. Enders: They wouldn't buy more than they sold. There would be no net increase in gold held by the central banks that was held by the EEC. It could be held by others.

I've got two things to say about this, Mr. Secretary. One is: If it happens, as they proposed, it would be against our interests in these ways.

Secretary Kissinger: Have you accepted it or is this just a French proposal?

Mr. Enders: It's an informal consensus that they've reached among themselves.

Secretary Kissinger: Were they discussed with us at all?

Mr. Enders: Not in a systematic way. They're proposing to send over to Washington the Dutch Finance Minister and the Dutch Central Governor would talk to the Treasury.

Secretary Kissinger: What's Arthur Burns' view?

Mr. Enders: Arthur Burns—I talked to him last night on it, and he didn't define a general view yet. He was unwilling to do so. He said he wanted to look more closely on the proposal. Henry Wallich, the international affairs man, this morning indicated he would probably adopt the traditional position that we should be for phasing gold out of the international monetary system; but he wanted to have another look at it. So Henry Wallich indicated that they would probably come down opposing this. But he was not prepared to do so until he got a further look at it.

Secretary Kissinger: But the practical consequence of this is to revalue their gold supply.

Mr. Enders: Precisely.

Secretary Kissinger: Their gold reserves.

Mr. Enders: That's right. And it would be followed quite closely by a proposal within a year to have an official price of gold—

Secretary Kissinger: It doesn't make any difference anyway. If they pass gold at the market price, that in effect establishes a new official price.

Mr. Enders: Very close to it—although their—

Secretary Kissinger: But if they ask what they're doing—let me just say economics is not my forte. But my understanding of this proposal would be that they—by opening it up to other countries, they're in effect putting gold back into the system at a higher price.

Mr. Enders: Correct.

Secretary Kissinger: Now, that's what we have consistently opposed.

Mr. Enders: Yes, we have. You have convertibility if they—

Secretary Kissinger: Yes.

Mr. Enders: Both parties have to agree to this. But it slides towards and would result, within two or three years, in putting gold back into the centerpiece of the system—one. Two—at a much higher price. Three—at a price that could be determined by a few central bankers in deals among themselves.

So, in effect, I think what you've got here is you've got a small group of bankers getting together to obtain a money printing machine for themselves. They would determine the value of their reserves in a very small group.

There are two things wrong with this.

Secretary Kissinger: And we would be on the outside.

Mr. Enders: We could join this too, but there are only very few countries in the world that hold large amounts of gold—United States and Continentals being most of them. The LDC's and most of the other countries—to include Japan—have relatively small amounts of gold. So it would be highly inflationary, on the one hand—and, on the other hand, a very inequitable means of increasing reserves.

Secretary Kissinger: Why did the Germans agree to it?

Mr. Enders: The Germans agreed to it, we've been told, on the basis that it would be discussed with the United States—conditional on United States approval.

Secretary Kissinger: They would be penalized for having held dollars.

Mr. Enders: They would be penalized for having held dollars. That probably doesn't make very much difference to the Germans at the present time, given their very high reserves. However, I think that they may have come around to it on the basis that either we would oppose it—one—or, two, that they would have to pay up and finance the deficits of France and Italy by some means anyway; so why not let them try this proposal first?

The EC is potentially divided on this, however, and if enough pressure is put on them, these differences should reappear.

Secretary Kissinger: Then what's our policy?

Mr. Enders: The policy we would suggest to you is that, (1), we refuse to go along with this—

Secretary Kissinger: I am just totally allergic to unilateral European decisions that fundamentally affect American interests—taken without consultation of the United States. And my tendency is to smash any attempt in which they do it until they learn that they can't do it without talking to us.

That would be my basic instinct, apart from the merits of the issue.

Mr. Enders: Well, it seems to me there are two things here. One is that we can't let them get away with this proposal because it's for the reasons you stated. Also, it's bad economic policy and it's against our fundamental interests.

Secretary Kissinger: There's also a fundamental change of our policy that we pursued over recent years—or am I wrong there?

Mr. Enders: Yes.

Secondly, Mr. Secretary, it does present an opportunity though—and we should try to negotiate for this—to move towards a demonetization of gold, to begin to get gold moving out of the system.

Secretary Kissinger: But how do you do that?

Mr. Enders: Well, there are several ways. One way is we could say to them that they would accept this kind of arrangement, provided that the gold were channelled out through an international agency—either in the IMF or a special pool—and sold into the market, so there would be gradual increases.

Secretary Kissinger: But the French would never go for this.

Mr. Enders: We can have a counter-proposal. There's a further proposal—and that is that the IMF begin selling its gold—which is now 7 billion—to the world market, and we should try to negotiate that. That would begin the demonetization of gold.

Secretary Kissinger: Why are we so eager to get gold out of the system?

Mr. Enders: We were eager to get it out of the system—get started—because it's a typical balancing of either forward or back. If this proposal goes back, it will go back into the centerpiece system.

Secretary Kissinger: But why is it against our interests? I understand the argument that it's against our interest that the Europeans take a unilateral decision contrary to our policy. Why is it against our interest to have gold in the system?

Mr. Enders: It's against our interest to have gold in the system because for it to remain there it would result in it being evaluated periodically. Although we have still some substantial gold holdings—about 11 billion—a larger part of the official gold in the world is concentrated in Western Europe. This gives them the dominant position in world reserves and the dominant means of creating reserves. We've been trying to get away from that into a system in which we can control—

Secretary Kissinger: But that's a balance of payments problem.

Mr. Enders: Yes, but it's a question of who has the most leverage internationally. If they have the reserve-creating instrument, by having the largest amount of gold and the ability to change its price periodically, they have a position relative to ours of considerable power. For a long time we had a position relative to theirs of considerable power because we could change gold almost at will. This is no longer possible—no longer acceptable. Therefore, we have gone to special drawing rights, which is also equitable and could take account of some of the LDC interests and which spreads the power away from Europe. And it's more rational in—

Secretary Kissinger: "More rational" being defined as being more in our interests or what?

Mr. Enders: More rational in the sense of more responsive to worldwide needs—but also more in our interest by letting—

Secretary Kissinger: Would it shock you? I've forgotten how SDR's are generated. By agreement?

Mr. Enders: By agreement.

Secretary Kissinger: There's no automatic way?

Mr. Enders: There's no automatic way.

Mr. Lord: Maybe some of the Europeans—but the LDC's are on our side and would not support them.

Mr. Enders: I don't think anybody would support them. Secretary Kissinger: But could they do it anyway?

Mr. Enders: Yes. But in order for them to do it anyway, they would have to be in violation of important articles of the IMF. So this would not be a total departure. (Laughter.) But there would be reluctance on the part of some Europeans to do this.

We could also make it less interesting for them by beginning to sell our own gold in the market, and this would put pressure on them.

Mr. Maw: Why wouldn't that fit if we start to sell our own gold at a price?

Secretary Kissinger: But how the hell could this happen without our knowing about it ahead of time?

Mr. Hartman: We've had consultations on it ahead of time. Several of them have come to ask us to express our views. And I think the reason they're coming now to ask about it is because they know we have a generally negative view.

Mr. Enders: So I think we should try to break it, I think, as a first position—unless they're willing to assign some form of demonetizing arrangement.

Secretary Kissinger: But, first of all, that's impossible for the French.

Mr. Enders: Well, it's impossible for the French under the Pompidou Government. Would it be necessarily under a future French Government? We should test that.

Secretary Kissinger: If they have gold to settle current accounts, we'll be faced, sooner or later, with the same proposition again. Then others will be asked to join this settlement thing.

Isn't this what they're doing?

Mr. Enders: It seems to me, Mr. Secretary, that we should try—not rule out, a priori, a demonetizing scenario, because we can both gain by this. That liberates gold at a higher price. We have gold, and some of the Europeans have gold. Our interests join theirs. This would be helpful; and it would also, on the other hand, gradually remove this dominant position that the Europeans have had in economic terms.

Secretary Kissinger: Who's with us on demonetizing gold?

Mr. Enders: I think we could get the Germans with us on demonetizing gold, the Dutch and the British, over a very long period of time.

Secretary Kissinger: How about the Japs?

Mr. Enders: Yes. The Arabs have shown no great interest in gold.

Secretary Kissinger: We could stick them with a lot of gold.

Mr. Sisco: Yes. (Laughter.)

Mr. Sonnenfeldt: At those high-dollar prices. I don't know why they'd want to take it.

Secretary Kissinger: For the bathroom fixtures in the Guest House in Rio. (Laughter.)

Mr. McCloskey: That'd never work.

Secretary Kissinger: That'd never work. Why it could never get the bathtub filled—it probably takes two weeks to fill it.

Mr. Sisco: Three years ago, when Jean³ was in one of those large bathtubs, two of those guys with speakers at that time walked right on through. She wasn't quite used to it. (Laughter.)

Secretary Kissinger: They don't have guards with speakers in that house.

Mr. Sisco: Well, they did in '71.

Mr. Brown: Usually they've been fixed in other directions.

Mr. Sisco: Sure. (Laughter.)

Secretary Kissinger: O.K. My instinct is to oppose it. What's your view, Art?

Mr. Hartman: Yes. I think for the present time, in terms of the kind of system that we're going for, it would be very hard to defend in terms of how.

Secretary Kissinger: Ken?

Mr. Rush: Well, I think probably I do. The question is: Suppose they go ahead on their own anyway. What then?

Secretary Kissinger: We'll bust them.

Mr. Enders: I think we should look very hard then, Ken, at very substantial sales of gold—U.S. gold on the market—to raid the gold market once and for all.

Mr. Rush: I'm not sure we could do it.

Secretary Kissinger: If they go ahead on their own against our position on something that we consider central to our interests, we've got to show them that that they can't get away with it. Hopefully, we should have the right position. But we just cannot let them get away with these unilateral steps all the time.

Mr. Lord: Does the Treasury agree with us on this? I mean, if this guy comes when the Secretary is out of the country—

Secretary Kissinger: Who's coming?

Mr. Enders: The Dutch Finance Minister—Duisenberg—and Zijlstra. I think it will take about two weeks to work through a hard position on this. The Treasury will want our leadership on the hardness of it. They will accept our leadership on this. It will take, I would think, some time to talk it through or talk it around Arthur Burns, and we'll have to see what his reaction is.

Mr. Rush: We have about 45 billion dollars at the present value—

Mr. Enders: That's correct.

Mr. Rush: And there's about 100 billion dollars of gold.

Mr. Enders: That's correct. And the annual turnover in the gold market is about 120 billion.

Secretary Kissinger: The gold market is generally in cahoots with Arthur Burns.

Mr. Enders: Yes. That's been my experience. So I think we've got to bring Arthur around.

Secretary Kissinger: Arthur is a reasonable man. Let me talk to him. It takes him a maddening long time to make a point, but he's a reasonable man.

Mr. Enders: He hasn't had a chance to look at the proposal yet.

Secretary Kissinger: I'll talk to him before I leave.⁴

Mr. Enders: Good.

Mr. Boeker: It seems to me that gold sales is perhaps Stage 2 in a strategy that might break up the European move—that Stage 1 should be formulating a counterproposal U.S. design to isolate those who are opposing it the hardest—the French and the Italians. That would attract considerable support. It would appeal to the Japanese and others. I think this could fairly easily be done. And that, in itself, should put considerable pressure on the EEC for a tentative consensus.

Mr. Hartman: It isn't a confrontation. That is, it seems to me we can discuss the various aspects of this thing.

Secretary Kissinger: Oh, no. We should discuss it—obviously. But I don't like the proposition of their doing something and then inviting other countries to join them.

Mr. Hartman: I agree. That's not what they've done.

Mr. Sonnenfeldt: Can we get them to come after the French election⁵ so we don't get kicked in the head?

Mr. Rush: I would think so.

Secretary Kissinger: I would think it would be a lot better to discuss it after the French election. Also, it would give us a better chance. Why don't you tell Simon this?

Mr. Enders: Good.

Secretary Kissinger: Let them come after the French election.

Mr. Enders: Good. I will be back—I can talk to Simon. I guess Shultz will be out then.⁶

Mr. Sonnenfeldt: He'll be out the 4th of May.

Mr. Enders: Yes. Meanwhile, we'll go ahead and develop a position on the basis of this discussion.

Secretary Kissinger: Yes.

Mr. Enders: Good.

Secretary Kissinger: I agree we shouldn't get a consultation—as long as we're talking Treasury, I keep getting pressed for Treasury chair-manship of a policy committee. You're opposed to that?⁷

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to international monetary policy.]
1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Transcripts of Secretary of State Kissinger's Staff Meetings, 1973–1977, Entry 5177, Box 3, Secretary's Staff Meeting, April 25, 1974. Secret. According to an attached list, the following people attended the meeting: Kissinger, Rush, Sisco, Ingersoll, Hartman, Maw, Ambassador at Large Robert Mc-Closkey, Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Donald Easum, Hyland, Atherton, Lord, Policy Planning Staff member Paul Boeker, Eagleburger, Springsteen, Special Assistant to the Secretary of State for Press Relations Robert Anderson, Enders, Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs Jack Kubisch, and Sonnenfeldt.

2 Meeting in Zeist, the Netherlands, on April 22 and 23, EC Finance Ministers and central bankers agreed on a common position on gold, which they authorized the Dutch Minister of Finance, Willem Frederik Duisenberg, and the President of the Dutch central bank, Jelle Zijlstra, to discuss with Treasury and Federal Reserve Board officials in Washington. (Telegram 2042 from The Hague, April 24, and telegram 2457 from USEC Brussels, April 25; ibid., Central Foreign Policy Files)

3 Jean Sisco was Joseph Sisco's wife.

4 From April 28 to 29, Kissinger was in Geneva for talks with Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko.

5 France held a Presidential election on May 19.

6 George Shultz's tenure as Secretary of the Treasury ended on May 8, when he was replaced by William Simon.

7 The summary attached to the front page of the minutes notes that "The Secretary is inclined to oppose the proposal on grounds of non consultation by the Europeans as well as on the proposal's merits. The Secretary agreed to talk to Arthur Burns in this sense."

Fonte: http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v31/d63

[hermes]

Já aqui tinha mencionado a importância do ouro no euro e na construção do euro. Bem como trazer os alemães para o campo francês [para relembrar os campo francês, ver posts acima] em 1978:

Cronologia abreviada do euro

1978 April 8: At EC summit, French President Valery Giscard d’Estaing and German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt propose establishment of European Monetary System.

1979 March 13: Establishment of European Monetary System and European Currency Unit. Eight currencies -- the Belgian and Luxembourg francs, French franc, deutsche mark, Danish krone, Dutch guilder, Italian lira and Irish pound -- take part in the exchange-rate mechanism limiting currency fluctuations.

[...]

Posto este preâmbulo, segue-se a transcrição da apresentação do Clemens Werner do Deutsche Bundesbank ocorrida a 30 de Setembro de 2013 na LBMA/LPPM Precious Metals Conference 2013. Ênfase foi adicionada para mostrar desde quando o ouro é a pedra angular do euro.

Present Role of Gold as Part of the Foreign Reserves of the Deutsche Bundesbank

Clemens Werner

Deputy Head of the Market Operations Division, Deutsche Bundesbank

I. Preamble

Thank you very much, Terry. I have to say that Terry is a good swimmer as well: we had a competition once.

Terence Keeley

I lost.

Clemens Werner

II. Introduction

Thank you very much for giving me the opportunity to present some topics about gold. My presentation will be very short and it has three parts: firstly, I will look at the purpose of holding gold from the point of view of the Deutsche Bundesbank, with a brief look into history and then some words on the storage concept that was announced recently.

III. Classical Reasons to Hold Gold

I have selected six classical reasons to hold foreign reserves; two of them apply best for gold. I will not go into detail on all of them, however. Let us start with precautionary holdings; this means the traditional use of reserves as savings for a potential crisis. There is also confidence; gold can provide a level of confidence to a central bank’s balance sheet.

The other classical reasons are well known and apply perhaps more for foreign exchange reserves, like the intervention reason. Holding reserves to cover money in circulation has probably lost relevance slightly. Financing and transactions is another classical motive to hold reserves. Last but not least, the investment purpose, which is important for many central banks, but probably not a self-sufficient motive to hold foreign reserves.

IV. Functions and Attributes of Gold

In particular for gold, we can identify four functions and attributes:

• Universal acceptance – gold is accepted as the ultimate independent means of payment almost everywhere. Gold has no country and no currency risk. Gold has no rating.
• Diversification – gold provides an element of diversification to the foreign reserves of a central bank and for the balance sheet.
• Robustness – compared to other assets, gold is very robust against shocks, so it can be seen as an insurance in case of surprising events.
• Gold allows for the absorption of some volatility in the balance sheet. This is true in the case of the Bundesbank reserve, where we have large unrealised profits which are on the liability side and form a kind of buffer for the profit and loss account.

After Bretton Woods, gold could be seen more as a psychological anchor. The purpose of confidence and psychology are well connected to each other.

I have also added two official statements of the Bundesbank with respect to gold. I take the opportunity just to repeat them here because I think they are still valid:

• ‘Gold constitutes an essential component of the Bundesbank’s reserve assets and meets its needs for security and portfolio diversification.’ This assessment was given at a balance sheet press conference in 2006 and is still true.
• ‘Gold continues to perform an important element of ensuring confidence in the stability of the single currency and remains an important element of global monetary reserves.’

V. Eurosystem and Bundesbank Gold Holdings

Here you see the gold holdings of the Eurosystem and of the Bundesbank. You can see that some central banks within the Eurosystem have sold some gold since 1999 and that the Bundesbank has kept its gold holdings quite stable. In this period of time, there were several attempts and also some pressure for the Bundesbank to sell gold. However, in the end the Bundesbank decided not to sell a significant part of its gold reserves.

In terms of size, the Eurosystem is still a large gold holder with 346 million ounces, which is about 10,800 tonnes of gold. The Bundesbank still has 109 million ounces, which is about 3,391 tonnes of gold.

VI. Bundesbank Gold Reserves

1. History

I do not want to go into detail about the history. I can summarise it by saying the Bundesbank’s gold reserves were acquired with current account surpluses, within the European Payments Union and it also received large portions of gold from the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, from the Bank of England and from the BIS.

Here is another chart showing the size of the Bundesbank’s gold reserves. As you can see, between 1945 and 1950, right after the War, Germany had no gold reserves. After that, within the European Payments Union, German gold reserves increased up until 1971, when the dollar gold standard system broke down. Subsequently, these were treated more like passive holdings. You can see significant changes in 1979, when gold was transferred within a swap to the European Monetary Cooperation Fund in preparation of monetary union in Europe. This was transferred back and immediately after that the other important transaction was the transfer of gold to the ECB in 1999. The ECB received 7.46 million ounces from the Bundesbank and all participating national central banks in 1999.

2. Book Value

Here you see the same position expressed in terms of book value. You can see that in 1999 we switched over to a mark to market valuation in the balance sheet. At the end of 2012, the market value has come down recently, but still you can see the amount of unrealised profit.

3. Gold in the Balance Sheet

Another interesting chart is the share of gold within the Bundesbank’s balance sheet. It is interesting that the share has been quite stable. From when we started monetary union and at the end of 2012, the share of gold as part of the total assets of the Bundesbank was the same. At the same time, there was an impressive increase in the total assets of the Bundesbank and of many other central banks in the Eurosystem as well. If we used the consolidated Eurosystem balance sheet, the picture would look almost the same. You can also see the time when the balance sheet started to shrink slowly and the gold position decreased as well.

Looking at this, you can say that gold has done quite a good job as a safe haven asset. It performed quite well during these times of market turbulence and it has also, let us say, a counter-cyclical component, which you can see here.

VII. Management of Gold Reserves

There is no active management of gold reserves, no buying and selling every day. The gold position, as of July 2013, is €109 billion.

The Bundesbank has nine kilograms of unallocated gold, so less than one gold bar unallocated, the rest is stored at several locations; I will come back later to that.

The acquisition costs of the gold position are €73. After 1999, we had another level of acquisition costs that has something to do with the switch to mark to market accounting, but the effective acquisition costs are €73.

We do not do gold deposits currently. We did some gold deposits until 2007 for a very small part of the gold reserves in order to finance some of the storage costs, but there has not been a business case since 2007, as before.

There are some annual sales of gold: five to seven tonnes are sold to the Finance Ministry every year within a coin programme.

Last but not least, the Bundesbank also takes care of storage of the gold.

VIII. Storage and Relocation

Gold is stored only within central banks, but let me first give you some words about the objectives, of which there are three: security, liquidity and cost efficiency. Gold is stored at central banks with high international reputations in countries with democratic structures and with banks having the same or comparable security standards, like our own standards.

Of course, the environment changes and so the concept of storage is reviewed regularly. Some of the most significant changes occurred right after the reunification of Germany, when the reasons to store gold as far to the west and away from the ‘iron curtain’ no longer applied. Another event was the European currency; because of this it was no longer necessary to store gold in euro area countries. In the meantime, euro banknotes and coins had, for many years, tied up a large volume of world storage, which has now been opened up.

The Bundesbank has made several relocations of gold in 2000, when large quantities of gold were relocated from London to Frankfurt (around 900 tonnes) and further relocations have been announced recently, which you can see on our website. There will be a relocation of 300 tonnes of gold from New York to Frankfurt and 374 tonnes from Paris to Frankfurt. Within this relocation the London Good Delivery standard should be achieved.

I have a table showing you the gold holdings of the Bundesbank and the location where it is stored. As you can see, currently 1,000 tonnes are stored within Germany. The biggest part of the reserves is stored at the Federal Reserve Bank in New York, the Bank of England and Banque de France. This Bundesbank has made this public in a step towards more transparency within the management of the gold reserves and has also published its new target, where about 50% of gold will be stored in Germany with the remainder staying in New York and London.

IX. Conclusion

I hope I have given you some interesting information about the Bundesbank’s gold reserves. Thank you very much for your attention and I hope for an interesting discussion.

Terence Keeley

Thank you very much, Clemens. I suggest you sit down and drink a very large glass of water, because when you see the questions that are being asked of you – in fact, could we have a beer at the front table for Clemens?

Alex Gautier will speak next, from the Banque de France. Like Clemens, Alex comes from the markets operations side and directs these activities for the Banque de France. He has helped manage the Banque de France’s gold and foreign exchange reserves as well as the risk department, so he speaks with a great deal of authority. Despite having dual nationality – he also has a US passport which he showed me before this session – he does not speak English. Therefore, you should take your translation phone to your ear or are you going to try to do this in English, Alex? Bon chance.

Fonte: http://www.lbma.org.uk/assets/Werner%2020130930.pdf

[hermes]

Pelo aspecto, parece que vai merda em direcção à ventoinha.

HSBC, Citigroup Said to Suspend Traders as Currency Probe Widens

By Liam Vaughan and Gavin Finch
2014-01-17T17:23:45Z

http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-01-17/hsbc-says-it-suspended-two-london-foreign-exchange-traders-1-.html

HSBC Holdings Plc (HSBA), Europe’s biggest bank by market value, and Citigroup Inc. (C) suspended four traders as the probe into the alleged manipulation of currencies widens.

HSBC suspended two London-based foreign-exchange traders, according to a statement today. Citigroup put two spot traders who specialized in G-10 currencies on leave, according to a person with knowledge of the matter who asked not to be identified because the matter is private.

The moves bring the total number of traders known to be fired, suspended or put on leave to at least 17 since Bloomberg News reported in June that employees at some firms said they shared information about their positions with counterparts at other banks to try and manipulate the WM/Reuters rates, a key benchmark in the $5.3 trillion-a-day currency market.

The world’s seven biggest foreign-exchange dealers have now all taken action against their employees as regulators in Washington, London and Switzerland investigate. Together, the firms account for about 70 percent of all currency trading globally, according to Euromoney Institutional Investor Plc. (ERM)

Deutsche Bank AG has the biggest market share at 15.2 percent, followed by Citigroup with 14.9 percent, Barclays Plc (BARC) at 10.2 percent, UBS AG (UBSN) with 10.1 percent, HSBC at 6.9 percent, JPMorgan Chase & Co. at 6.1 percent, and Royal Bank of Scotland Group Plc with 5.6 percent, according to the survey.

HSBC suspended London-based traders Edward Pinto and Serge Sarramegna, said a person with knowledge of the decision who asked not to be identified because the matter is private.

Deutsche Bank

Citigroup has put Anthony John in London and Andrew Amantia in New York on leave, according to another person with knowledge of the matter who asked not to be identified. None of the traders responded to e-mails and telephone calls seeking comment, while officials at their employers declined to comment.

The traders are the first to be suspended by HSBC, while Citigroup last week fired its head of European spot trading Rohan Ramchandani.

Deutsche Bank suspended several traders after combing through employees’ electronic communications using search terms negotiated with regulators late last year, a person familiar with the matter said this week. UBS suspended its co-chief dealer, Niall O’Riordan, while JPMorgan has put its chief dealer in London, Richard Usher, on leave. Edinburgh-based RBS has suspended foreign-exchange traders Paul Nash and Julian Munson. No individual or firm has been accused of any wrongdoing.

‘The Cartel’

At the center of investigations are instant-message groups with names such as “The Cartel,” “The Bandits’ Club,” “One Team, One Dream” and “The Mafia.” Their members exchanged information on client orders and agreed how to trade at the fix through the messaging platforms, five people with knowledge of the investigations said last month.

Traders on the chats say they were merely matching buyers and sellers ahead of the fix to minimize losses by avoiding trades at a time when prices typically fluctuate the most.

Still, many banks including Deutsche Bank, Citigroup, JPMorgan and Goldman Sachs Group Inc. have clamped down on the use of multi-bank instant-message groups.

Senior currency dealers raised the issue of how they communicate to officials at the Bank of England in April 2012, telling them about how they shared information about orders to reduce the risk of losses in the minutes before benchmarks are calculated, people with knowledge of the meeting said this week. The traders were concerned because regulators were scrutinizing instant messages in their investigations into rigging of the London interbank offered rate, the people said.

The Bank of England said it’s supporting the U.K. Financial Conduct Authority in its investigation into currency manipulation. In the U.S., the Federal Reserve is probing the matter, alongside the U.S. Justice Department. The European Union’s Competition Commission and Swiss Competition Commission are also investigating.

To contact the reporters on this story: Liam Vaughan in London at lvaughan6@bloomberg.net; Gavin Finch in London at gfinch@bloomberg.net

To contact the editor responsible for this story: Heather Smith at hsmith26@bloomberg.net

[hermes]

Um bom resumo de onde estivemos, embora os documentos desclassificados acima mencionados apontem que o papel dos SDRs e a sua aceitação pelos europeus na década de 70 e seguintes não seja bem o que o autor pinta... além de que o apoio do Príncipe já não ser o que era...

The Rise of the Petroyuan and the Slow Erosion of Dollar Hegemony

By Flynt Leverett and Hillary Mann Leverett
On July 28, 2014

http://www.worldfinancialreview.com/?p=2621

For seventy years, one of the critical foundations of American power has been the dollar’s standing as the world’s most important currency. For the last forty years, a pillar of dollar primacy has been the greenback’s dominant role in international energy markets. Today, China is leveraging its rise as an economic power, and as the most important incremental market for hydrocarbon exporters in the Persian Gulf and the former Soviet Union to circumscribe dollar dominance in global energy—with potentially profound ramifications for America’s strategic position.             

Since World War II, America’s geopolitical supremacy has rested not only on military might, but also on the dollar’s standing as the world’s leading transactional and reserve currency. Economically, dollar primacy extracts “seignorage”—the difference between the cost of printing money and its value—from other countries, and minimises U.S. firms’ exchange rate risk. Its real importance, though, is strategic: dollar primacy lets America cover its chronic current account and fiscal deficits by issuing more of its own currency – precisely how Washington has funded its hard power projection for over half a century.       

Since the 1970s, a pillar of dollar primacy has been the greenback’s role as the dominant currency in which oil and gas are priced, and in which international hydrocarbon sales are invoiced and settled. This helps keep worldwide dollar demand high. It also feeds energy producers’ accumulation of dollar surpluses that reinforce the dollar’s standing as the world’s premier reserve asset, and that can be “recycled” into the U.S. economy to cover American deficits. 

Many assume that the dollar’s prominence in energy markets derives from its wider status as the world’s foremost transactional and reserve currency. But the dollar’s role in these markets is neither natural nor a function of its broader dominance. Rather, it was engineered by U.S. policymakers after the Bretton Woods monetary order collapsed in the early 1970s, ending the initial version of dollar primacy (“dollar hegemony 1.0”). Linking the dollar to international oil trading was key to creating a new version of dollar primacy (“dollar hegemony 2.0”)—and, by extension, in financing another forty years of American hegemony. 

Gold and Dollar Hegemony 1.0

Dollar primacy was first enshrined at the 1944 Bretton Woods conference, where America’s non-communist allies acceded to Washington’s blueprint for a postwar international monetary order. Britain’s delegation—headed by Lord Keynes—and virtually every other participating country, save the United States, favoured creating a new multilateral currency through the fledgling International Monetary Fund (IMF) as the chief source of global liquidity. But this would have thwarted American ambitions for a dollar-centered monetary order. Even though almost all participants preferred the multilateral option, America’s overwhelming relative power ensured that, in the end, its preferences prevailed. So, under the Bretton Woods gold exchange standard, the dollar was pegged to gold and other currencies were pegged to the dollar, making it the main form of international liquidity. 

There was, however, a fatal contradiction in Washington’s dollar-based vision. The only way America could diffuse enough dollars to meet worldwide liquidity needs was by running open-ended current account deficits. As Western Europe and Japan recovered and regained competitiveness, these deficits grew. Throw in America’s own burgeoning demand for dollars—to fund rising consumption, welfare state expansion, and global power projection—and the U.S. money supply soon exceeded U.S. gold reserves. From the 1950s, Washington worked to persuade or coerce foreign dollar holders not to exchange greenbacks for gold. But insolvency could be staved off for only so long: in August 1971, President Nixon suspended dollar-gold convertibility, ending the gold exchange standard; by 1973, fixed exchange rates were gone, too.

These events raised fundamental questions about the long-term soundness of a dollar-based monetary order. To preserve its role as chief provider of international liquidity, the U.S. would have to continue running current account deficits. But those deficits were ballooning, for Washington’s abandonment of Bretton Woods intersected with two other watershed developments: America became a net oil importer in the early 1970s; and the assertion of market power by key members of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) in 1973-1974 caused a 500% increase in oil prices, exacerbating the strain on the U.S. balance of payments. With the link between the dollar and gold severed and exchange rates no longer fixed, the prospect of ever-larger U.S. deficits aggravated concerns about the dollar’s long-term value.

These concerns had special resonance for major oil producers. Oil going to international markets has been priced in dollars, at least since the 1920s—but, for decades, sterling was used at least as frequently as dollars in order to settle transnational oil purchases, even after the dollar had replaced sterling as the world’s preeminent trade and reserve currency. As long as sterling was pegged to the dollar and the dollar was “as good as gold,” this was economically viable. But, after Washington abandoned dollar-gold convertibility and the world transitioned from fixed to floating exchange rates, the currency regime for oil trading was up for grabs. With the end of dollar-gold convertibility, America’s major allies in the Persian Gulf—the Shah’s Iran, Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia—came to favour shifting OPEC’s pricing system, from denominating prices in dollars to denominating them in a basket of currencies.

In this environment, several of America’s European allies revived the idea (first broached by Keynes at Bretton Woods) of providing international liquidity in the form of an IMF-issued, multilaterally-governed currency—so-called “Special Drawing Rights” (SDRs). After rising oil prices engorged their current accounts, Saudi Arabia and other Gulf Arab allies of the United States pushed for OPEC to begin invoicing in SDRs. They also endorsed European proposals to recycle petrodollar surpluses through the IMF, in order to encourage its emergence as the main post-Bretton Woods provider of international liquidity. That would have meant Washington could not continue to print as many dollars, as it wanted to support rising consumption, mushrooming welfare expenditures, and sustained global power projection. To avert this, American policymakers had to find new ways to incentivise foreigners to continue holding ever-larger surpluses of what were now fiat dollars.

Oil and Dollar Hegemony 2.0

To this end, U.S. administrations from the mid-1970s devised two strategies. One was to maximise demand for dollars as a transactional currency. The other was to reverse Bretton Woods’ restrictions on transnational capital flows; with financial liberalisation, America could leverage the breadth and depth of its capital markets, and it could cover its chronic current account and fiscal deficits by attracting foreign capital at relatively low cost. Forging strong links between hydrocarbon sales and the dollar proved critical on both fronts.

To forge such links, Washington effectively extorted its Gulf Arab allies, quietly conditioning U.S. guarantees of their security to their willingness to financially help the United States. Reneging on pledges to its European and Japanese partners, the Ford administration clandestinely pushed Saudi Arabia and other Gulf Arab producers to recycle substantial parts of their petrodollar surpluses into the U.S. economy through private (largely U.S.) intermediaries, rather than through the IMF. The Ford administration also elicited Gulf Arab support for Washington’s strained finances, reaching secret deals with Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates for their central banks to buy large volumes of U.S. Treasury securities outside normal auction processes. These commitments helped Washington prevent the IMF from supplanting the United States as the main provider of international liquidity; they also gave a crucial early boost to Washington’s ambitions to finance U.S. deficits by recycling foreign dollar surpluses via private capital markets and purchases of U.S. government securities. 

A few years later, the Carter administration struck another secret deal with the Saudis, whereby Riyadh committed to exert its influence to ensure that OPEC continued pricing oil in dollars. OPEC’s commitment to the dollar as the invoice currency for international oil sales was key to broader embrace of the dollar as the oil market’s reigning transactional currency. As OPEC’s administered price system collapsed in the mid-1980s, the Reagan administration encouraged universalised dollar invoicing for cross-border oil sales on new oil exchanges in London and New York. Nearly universal pricing of oil—and, later on, gas—in dollars has bolstered the likelihood that hydrocarbon sales will not just be denominated in dollars, but settled in them as well, generating ongoing support for worldwide dollar demand.   

In short, these bargains were instrumental in creating “dollar hegemony 2.0.” And they have largely held up, despite periodic Gulf Arab dissatisfaction with America’s Middle East policy, more fundamental U.S. estrangement from other major Gulf producers (Saddam Husseinn’s Iraq and the Islamic Republic of Iran), and a flurry of interest in the “petro–Euro” in the early 2000s. The Saudis, especially, have vigorously defended exclusive pricing of oil in dollars. While Saudi Arabia and other major energy producers now accept payment for their oil exports in other major currencies, the larger share of the world’s hydrocarbon sales continue to be settled in dollars, perpetuating the greenback’s status as the world’s top transactional currency. Saudi Arabia and other Gulf Arab producers have supplemented their support for the oil-dollar nexus with ample purchases of advanced U.S. weapons; most have also pegged their currencies to the dollar—a commitment which senior Saudi officials describe as “strategic.” While the dollar’s share of global reserves has dropped, Gulf Arab petrodollar recycling helps keep it the world’s leading reserve currency.

The China Challenge

Still, history and logic caution that current practices are not set in stone. With the rise of the “petroyuan,” movement towards a less dollar-centric currency regime in international energy markets—with potentially serious implications for the dollar’s broader standing—is already underway.

As China has emerged as a major player on the global energy scene, it has also embarked on an extended campaign to internationalise its currency. A rising share of China’s external trade is being denominated and settled in renminbi; issuance of renminbi-denominated financial instruments is growing. China is pursuing a protracted process of capital account liberalisation essential to full renminbi internationalisation, and is allowing more exchange rate flexibility for the yuan. The People’s Bank of China (PBOC) now has swap arrangements with over thirty other central banks—meaning that renminbi already effectively functions as a reserve currency. 

Chinese policymakers appreciate the “advantages of incumbency” the dollar enjoys; their aim is not for renminbi to replace dollars, but to position the yuan alongside the greenback as a transactional and reserve currency. Besides economic benefits (e.g., lowering Chinese businesses’ foreign exchange costs), Beijing wants—for strategic reasons—to slow further growth of its enormous dollar reserves. China has watched America’s increasing propensity to cut off countries from the U.S. financial system as a foreign policy tool, and worries about Washington trying to leverage it this way; renminbi internationalisation can mitigate such vulnerability. More broadly, Beijing understands the importance of dollar dominance to American power; by chipping away at it, China can contain excessive U.S. unilateralism.     

China has long incorporated financial instruments into its efforts to access foreign hydrocarbons. Now Beijing wants major energy producers to accept renminbi as a transactional currency—including to settle Chinese hydrocarbon purchases—and incorporate renminbi in their central bank reserves. Producers have reason to be receptive. China is, for the vastly foreseeable future, the main incremental market for hydrocarbon producers in the Persian Gulf and former Soviet Union. Widespread expectations of long-term yuan appreciation make accumulating renminbi reserves a “no brainer” in terms of portfolio diversification. And, as America is increasingly viewed as a hegemon in relative decline, China is seen as the preeminent rising power. Even for Gulf Arab states long reliant on Washington as their ultimate security guarantor, this makes closer ties to Beijing an imperative strategic hedge. For Russia, deteriorating relations with the United States impel deeper cooperation with China, against what both Moscow and Beijing consider a declining, yet still dangerously flailing and over-reactive, America.

For several years, China has paid for some of its oil imports from Iran with renminbi; in 2012, the PBOC and the UAE Central Bank set up a $5.5 billion currency swap, setting the stage for settling Chinese oil imports from Abu Dhabi in renminbi—an important expansion of petroyuan use in the Persian Gulf. The $400 billion Sino-Russian gas deal that was concluded this year apparently provides for settling Chinese purchases of Russian gas in renminbi; if fully realised, this would mean an appreciable role for renminbi in transnational gas transactions.

Looking ahead, use of renminbi to settle international hydrocarbon sales will surely increase, accelerating the decline of American influence in key energy-producing regions. It will also make it marginally harder for Washington to finance what China and other rising powers consider overly interventionist foreign policies—a prospect America’s political class has hardly begun to ponder.

[Kin2010]

Parece-me que isto está mal explicdo. Qual é o problema de um país comprar petróleo e pagar em yuan? Isso deverá funcionar sempre que a entidade que lhe vende o petróleo queira aceitar o yuan. Só há razão para não querer aceitá-los se o yuan se tender a desvalorizar. Ora, se têm preferido receber em USD é porque o USD tem sido das moedas mais estáveis. É só isso que faz estas transacções tenderem a ser feitas em USD.

[hermes]

É uma questão de tamanho [poder militar]. Uma coisa é o Iraque, o Irão ou a Líbia [petróleo por dinares de ouro] outra coisa é a Rússia ou a China. Uma timeline resumida para perceberes a questão.

America’s Petrodollar System: A Timeline of the Rise and Fall of the U.S. Dollar

By Jerry Robinson
On May 17, 2011

http://ftmdaily.com/ftm-financial-news-update/americas-petrodollar-system-a-timeline-of-the-rise-and-fall-of-the-us-dollar/

HOUSTON, TX

Last week, I spent a lot of time explaining America's petrodollar system over the course of several articles. (If you missed them, you can get started here.)

Some of our readers have asked me to provide an overview of the timeline of the rise and fall of the U.S. Dollar. So, here is a brief working timeline of the rise and fall of the petrodollar system, which has been serving to prop up the U.S. Dollar since President Richard M. Nixon closed the international gold window in 1971.

1933… The United States leaves the gold standard in the wake of the Great Depression. America outlaws private ownership of gold.

1944… A war-torn and financially decimated global economy agrees to make the U.S. Dollar the world reserve currency. This arrangement, known as the Bretton Woods agreement, pegs the value of the U.S. Dollar to a fixed amount of gold. The dollar/gold peg is set at $35 per ounce. This arrangement officially earns the U.S. Dollar the title of "world reserve currency", as it replaces the British Pound as the international medium of exchange. The gold-backing to the U.S. dollar helps to restore global financial confidence thereby bringing much needed calm to the tumultuous economic era. (By making the U.S. Dollar easily convertible into gold, it is soon considered "as good as gold.") Interestingly, despite this arrangement, it is still illegal for American citizens to own gold.

1960's… The Vietnam War and the Great Society government spending combine to create a general international tension regarding America's fiscal health.

1971… After several nations begin redeeming their paper U.S. dollars for the safety of gold, President Richard M. Nixon closes the gold window. In this year, the world enters the first completely fiat monetary system.

1972-1973… Without gold backing, Washington is concerned that global demand for the U.S. "paper" dollar could subside.

1973-1974… To maintain global dollar demand, Washington creates the petrodollar system. The first to enter this arrangement is Saudi Arabia. The Saudis agree to price all of their oil in U.S. dollars and even to invest some of their profits into U.S. Treasury securities. In exchange, the U.S. provides weapons to the Saudis, along with U.S. military bases to "protect" the Saudi oil fields.

Late 1970's… Washington makes similar deals with almost all OPEC nations. Those oil-producing nations who agree to denominate their oil in dollars and then invest their profits into U.S. Treasurys get weapons and "protection." The petrodollar system, created in the Nixon-Kissinger era, was likely one of the most brilliant economic moves in recent political memory. However, the system began breaking down around a decade ago.

2000… On September 24, Iraq's Saddam Hussein declares that his country will no longer price oil in U.S. dollars, but in euros instead.

2003… Iraq is invaded by the U.S. Iraq's oil supplies are removed from a "petro-euro" system back to a petrodollar system.

2005 to present… Iran, Venezuela, Syria, and North Korea (also known as the "Axis of Evil") threaten to move away from dollar-based oil transactions.

2011… Russia begins selling its oil to China in rubles. In tomorrow's article, I will give my final observations and commentary on the rise and fall of the U.S. Dollar.

[hermes]

Kin2010, quanto ao funcionamento do petrodólar tens a seguir e no ficheiro pdf em anexo uma boa explicação.

Meet the System That Will Collapse the U.S. Dollar

By Jerry Robinson
On May 10, 2011

http://ftmdaily.com/energy-crisis/the-petrodollar-system-101-the-beginning/

Over the last few articles, I have explained the reality of peak oil. However, this is just one factor of America’s looming energy crisis. Another major component that is vital to understand is something known as the breakdown of the Petrodollar system. Today, I will begin explaining exactly what this system and why you should understand it.

In the early 1970’s, the international gold standard had collapsed, and America was beginning to live far beyond its means. And despite facing unemployment and inflation, America displayed few signs of the kind of fiscal discipline that could prevent future complications. But just like today, fixing the root of the problem was not the concern of Washington. Instead, the primary concern of those governing America was how to maintain its position of economic dominance on the global stage. In order to ensure continued hegemonic power and thereby preserve an increasing demand for the dollar, Washington needed a plan. That plan came in the form of thepetrodollar system

But what exactly is the petrodollar system? First, let’s begin by defining the “petrodollar.”

A petrodollar is a U.S. dollar that is received by an oil producer in exchange for selling oil. It’s really that simple: Money – in our case, U.S. dollars – received in exchange for oil.

Despite the seeming simplicity of this arrangement of “dollars for oil,” the petrodollar system is actually highly complex and one with many moving parts. It is this complexity that prevents the petrodollar system from being properly understood by the American public. Allow me to provide a very basic overview regarding the history and the mechanics of the petrodollar system. Once you understand this “dollars for oil” arrangement, I believe that it will provide you with a more accurate understanding of what motivates America’s foreign policy. Let’s take a closer look.

The petrodollar system originated in the early 1970’s in the wake of the Bretton Woods collapse. In a series of highly secret meetings, the U.S. – represented by then U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger according to many commentators – and the Saudi Royal Family made a powerful agreement. According to the agreement, the U.S. offered military protection for Saudi Arabia’s oil fields. What did the U.S. want in exchange? For Saudi Arabia to agree to price all of their oil sales in U.S. dollars and to then invest their surplus oil proceeds into U.S. Treasury Bills. This system was later referred to as “petrodollar recycling” by Henry Kissinger. The Saudis agreed and the petrodollar system was born.

By 1975, all of the oil-producing nations of OPEC had agreed to price their oil in dollars and to hold their surplus oil proceeds in U.S. government debt securities as well. Today, the U.S. maintains a major military presence in much of the Persian Gulf region, including the following countries: Bahrain, Iraq, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, and Yemen.

Today, virtually all oil transactions are made in U.S. dollars. This means that if you want to buy a barrel of oil anywhere in this world, you must pay for it with U.S. dollars. If you do not have U.S. dollars, you must obtain them somehow. One way is to simply convert your currency for U.S. dollars on the exchange markets. Or, products can be exported to U.S. in exchange for U.S. dollars.

For example, if you are in Japan, you must first convert your yen into dollars to purchase oil. Mexico must convert its pesos to dollars to buy oil, and so on. This should help partially explain much of East Asia’s export-led strategy. Japan, for example, has very few natural resources, including oil. It must import large amounts of oil and to do this requires that they have U.S. dollars. So Japan manufactures a Honda and ships it to the U.S. and immediately receives payment in U.S. dollars.

The petrodollar system has proven very beneficial to the U.S. economy. In essence, America receives a double loan out of every oil transaction. First, oil consumers are required to purchase oil in U.S. dollars. Second, the excess profits from the oil-producing nations are often transferred to U.S. government debt securities. This arrangement provides two large benefits to the U.S. It increases global demand both for U.S. dollars and for U.S. debt securities.

Additionally, having oil priced in dollars means that the U.S. can, in essence, print money to buy oil and then have the oil producers hold the debt that was created by printing the money in the first place. What other nation, besides America, can print money to buy oil and then have the oil producers hold the debt for the printed money?

Obviously, the petrodollar system was a brilliant political and economic move on the part of U.S. strategists. Washington, knowing that the demand curve for oil would increase dramatically with time, positioned the dollar as the primary medium of exchange for all oil transactions. This single move created a growing international demand for both the U.S. dollar and U.S. debt – all at the expense of oil producing nations.

[JoaoAP]

Já que referem os Petrodólares deixo algumas imagens que podem ajudar a ver se as mudanças anunciadas serão importantes.

[Kin2010]

"For example, if you are in Japan, you must first convert your yen into dollars to purchase oil. Mexico must convert its pesos to dollars to buy oil, and so on. This should help partially explain much of East Asia’s export-led strategy. Japan, for example, has very few natural resources, including oil. It must import large amounts of oil and to do this requires that they have U.S. dollars. So Japan manufactures a Honda and ships it to the U.S. and immediately receives payment in U.S. dollars."

Mas essa necessidade de primeiro trocar um outra currency por USD não deriva de nenhuma lei, certo? Deriva do facto de os produtores de crude preferirem receber em USD. Se alguns deixarem de preferir podem haver transacções com outras moedas e é isso que se está a ver agora.

Até em bitcoins eles se disporiam a receber, se tivessem garantias de que trocavam as bitcoins rapidamente por um activo mais estável com custos mínimos.

[hermes]

Não resulta de nenhuma lei, resulta sim do petróleo ser facto [não de jure] americano.

Tal é o resultado da estratégia brilhante do Kissinger de convencer a casa de Saud a aceitar vender petróleo apenas em dólares e a usá-los para comprar dívida do tio Sam, a troco de proteção e de uns "brinquedos" militares.

Tal como o Breton Woods 1 tinha as suas contradições que levaram à queda do dólar, também o Breton Woods 2 tem as suas contradições --o dilema de Triffin. Aliás, quando Triffin descobriu o dilema, voltou para a Europa para arquitectar o euro e esta foi a solução:

The euro, probably more than any other currency, represents the mutual confidence at the heart of our community. It is the first currency that has not only severed its link to gold, but also its link to the nation-state. It is not backed by the durability of the metal or by the authority of the state. Indeed, what Sir Thomas More said of gold five hundred years ago – that it was made for men and that it had its value by them – applies very well to the euro.

Source: http://www.ecb.eu/press/key/date/2002/html/sp020509.en.html

[As reservas do BCE é a moeda emitida pelo conservador e confiável Banco Central da Natureza com a inovação do câmbio ser variável, i.e. o valor de mercado.]

[vbm]

Mas uma moeda, para funcionar como tal, tem de ter valor em si, não pode tê-lo só por haver nela confiança, mas sim tê-la por também valer por si mesma. Essa razão que indicaste de o dólar ter persistido a ser moeda internacional, mesmo sem ouro, por ser divisa exigida no pagamento de fornecimentos de petróleo - exigência acordada entre a América, a Arábia Saudita e as multinacionais norte-americanas - é uma justificação da prorrogação da vida da divisa como moeda valiosa e até de reserva, mas apenas por mais... uns tempos. O que há, que valha, e não seja facilmente desvalorizável por facilidade de oferta, e a que a emissão de moeda possa ligar-se!?

[hermes]

O que há, que valha, e não seja facilmente desvalorizável por facilidade de oferta, e a que a emissão de moeda possa ligar-se!?

O câmbio livre entre o euro e o ouro.

[vbm]

O que há, que valha, e não seja facilmente desvalorizável por facilidade de oferta, e a que a emissão de moeda possa ligar-se!?

O câmbio livre entre o euro e o ouro.

Câmbio livre... quer dizer que flutua? Segundo a quantidade relativa de euros e ouro... detido onde? Por quem? O BCE? E o Banco tem assim tanto ouro que se permita quantitative easing de euros? A Zona Euro é excedentária em exportações, e acumula divisas?

Como é isso do câmbio livre euro-ouro?

[JoaoAP]

Hermes,

Continuas a achar que o Euro não vai desaparecer?
Achas que vai no futuro ser ainda mais forte?