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Mensagens - Dilath Larath

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61
Comunidade de Traders / Re:Investir na Grécia
« em: 2015-04-04 00:48:03 »
quando o euro foi lançado, eu pensei para mim: qual é a grande vantagem disto? pensei pensei e a única coisa que me ocorreu é que faciltava os câmbios de moeda.
como não me ocorreu mais nada, pensei: deve haver montes de argumentos para adotar uma moeda comum... eu é que não percebo nada disto.

passaram estes anos todos e ainda não consegui encontrar uma boa razão. nunca a vi escrita, nunca a vi dita. nada.
por isso pergunto:
qual a vantagem de ter uma moeda comum seja com quem for?

D

62
Comunidade de Traders / Re:Investir na Grécia
« em: 2015-04-04 00:44:25 »
Portugal, Espanha, França, Itália é toda uma contiguidade territorial e linguística. À Grécia poderíamos permitir o spin-off assim que o preferisse. O conjunto P-E-F-I parece-me economicamente coerente e politicamente harmonizável.

seja, mas por que é que temos que ter uma moeda comum? porquê?

D

63
Comunidade de Traders / Re:Krugman et al
« em: 2015-04-04 00:40:11 »
Paul Krugman - New York Times Blog
 

John Galt Hates Ben Bernanke

Ah: I see that there was a Twitter exchange among Brad DeLong, James Pethokoukis, and others over why Republicans don’t acknowledge that Ben Bernanke helped the economy, and claim credit. Pethokoukis — who presumably gets to talk to quite a few Republicans from his perch at AEI — offers a fairly amazing explanation:

'B/c many view BB as enabling Obama’s spending and artificially propping up debt-heavy economy in need of Mellon-esque liquidation'

Yep: that dastardly Bernanke was preventing us from having a financial crisis, curse him.

Actually, there’s a lot of evidence that this was an important part of the story. As I pointed out a couple of months ago, Paul Ryan and John Taylor went all-out conspiracy theory on the Bernanke Fed, claiming that its efforts were not about trying to fulfill its mandate, but rather that 'This looks an awful lot like an attempt to bail out fiscal policy, and such attempts call the Fed’s independence into question'

Basically, leading Republicans didn’t just expect a disaster, they wanted one — and they were furious at Bernanke for, as they saw it, heading off the crisis they hoped to see. It’s a pretty awesome position to take. But it makes a lot of sense when you consider where these people were coming from.

After all, what is Atlas Shrugged really about? Leave aside the endless speeches and bad sex scenes. What you’re left with is the tale of how a group of plutocrats overthrow a democratically elected government with a campaign of economic sabotage.

Look, I know it sounds harsh to say that Republicans opposed QE in large part out of fear that it would work, and deliver a success to a president they hated. I mean, the next thing you know I’ll be accusing them of crazy things they would never do, like deliberately trying to undermine delicate nuclear negotiations. Oh, wait.

krugman

64
Comunidade de Traders / Re:Investir na Grécia
« em: 2015-04-04 00:36:30 »
Compor uma gestão mais prudente da emissão monetária e assegurar uma credibilidade externa maior do a pluralidade de moedas próprias do conjunto - que é mais homogéneo do que o actual.

troca lá isso por miúdos...

D

65
Comunidade de Traders / Re:Investir na Grécia
« em: 2015-04-04 00:32:47 »
[ ]
nao estou a ver isso a acontecer de jeito nenhum - o euro dos aflitos e falidos - ora então os 4 da vidairada: portugal italia grécia e espanha. Ia ser bonito lol. Quem é q pagava as dividas de grécia e de portugal? A italia e a espanha?! E quem pagava os juros altissimos que essa moeda teria? [ ]

A desvalorização do "euro latino" facilitaria o pagamento da dívida externa aos credores que saíssem do euro e converter-se-ia em dívida pública interna dos credores PIGS da nova zona euro. Quanto à indisciplina monetária, não será assim tão catastrófico, é preciso ver que a nova zona continua a precisar de importar o que não produz e necessita, pelo que tem interesse em não encarecer o que compra e não vender ao desbarato o que exporta. E era uma boa lição ao falhanço da estratégia alemã do "quero posso e imponho": pois que imponha, mas na sua terra e no quintal dos vizinhos, porque a Europa não é a Alemanha.

mas porquê uma moeda única?
qual é o racional de ter uma moeda comum a outros países sejam eles quais forem?
qual é a vantagem?

D

66
Comunidade de Traders / Re:Investir na Grécia
« em: 2015-04-04 00:31:25 »
Pode ser que, um dia, quando de facto tivermos capacidade para isso, nos possamos aventurar em ter a nossa própria moeda em que não seja a tristeza de "desvaloriza, default, fmi, desvaloriza, default, fmi, desvaloriza,...")

outra coisa: tivemos que ser resgatados 3 vezes; 1 vez em 75m outra em 83 se não estou em erro e outra agora.

em 1975 estávamos em pleno PREC, descolonização e na primeira crise petrolífera. portanto dou um desconto.

tirando essa tivemos uma crise fora do euro e outra dentro do euro.

aparentemente o facto de estarmos no euro não precaveu a crise.
a crise dentro do euro, custou foi muito mais aos portugueses e demorou muito mais tempo a passar (ainda estamos nela e não sabemos quando saímos).

não estou a ver a vantagem.

D

67
Comunidade de Traders / Re:Investir na Grécia
« em: 2015-04-04 00:22:19 »
nao estou a ver isso a acontecer de jeito nenhum - o euro dos aflitos e falidos - ora então os 4 da vidairada: portugal italia grécia e espanha. Ia ser bonito lol. Quem é q pagava as dividas de grécia e de portugal? A italia e a espanha?! E quem pagava os juros altissimos que essa moeda teria?

Sou 100% a favor do Euro em Portugal e, por esquisito que seja, a favor da Libra no UK. A grande diferença sendo que as discussões que vejo aqui no UK são "como se vai pagar o NHS? A linha Londres - Manchester de alta velocidade é um investimento rentável? Para que é canalizado os impostos cobrados? Quais as prespectivas para diminuição da divida pública?" - ou seja, têm uma cultura capaz de entender que sem dinheiro não há vicios - e isto quer os de direita quer os de esquerda. O público e a comunicação social obriga-os a justificarem onde vão aplicar os fundos e como os vão arranjar.

Agora, basta ver o que se discute em Portugal: o caso do Meco, as contas do Sócas, a saída do Costa da CML, etc. Honestamente, quanto menos controlarmos a nossa politica monetária em Portugal melhor. Pode ser que, um dia, quando de facto tivermos capacidade para isso, nos possamos aventurar em ter a nossa própria moeda em que não seja a tristeza de "desvaloriza, default, fmi, desvaloriza, default, fmi, desvaloriza,...") e que possamos ter uma moeda que se adapte melhor à nossa economia. A não existência dessa capacidade é muito boa para os politicos não fazerem o que lhes dá na pinha e o povo ficar feliz com um aumento do salário de 20% com uma inflação de 200%.

o primeiro argumento é 'somos irresponsáveis e alguém tem que tomar conta de nós'.
quais são os outros?

D

68
Comunidade de Traders / Re:Krugman et al
« em: 2015-04-03 21:56:36 »
Larry Summers and Ben Bernanke are having the most important blog fight ever

Why the heck are interest rates so low?

That's the question former Treasury Secretary Larry Summers and former Federal Reserve Chair Ben Bernanke have been debating in what might be the world's most important, but also most respectful, blog fight. Are rates low because not enough people want to invest or because too many people want to save? The answer tells us why the economy seems stuck and what we can do to un-stuck it.

Now, part of it is that the Federal Reserve has cut short-term rates to zero and bought enough long-term bonds to push their rates down, too. But that's not the real story. After all, it's not like the Fed can keep rates lower than they "should" be without fueling inflation—which there isn't any now. So rates are so low not because that's where the Fed wants them to be, but rather because that's where the economy needs them to be. If it weren't for the fact that rates can't go—well, at least not that far—below zero, they'd probably have fallen even further on their own, and the recovery would have been better. Everything the Fed has done has just been trying to make up for this, to get rates closer to where they would be if they could be negative.

Okay, but why does the economy still need such low rates? Good question. Summers worries it's a new old problem called "secular stagnation." That's the idea that, absent a bubble, the economy will be stuck in a never-ending slump, because inflation-adjusted interest rates can't go low enough to get people to borrow and invest. Economist Alvin Hansen first proposed this in 1938, when it looked like slower population growth would mean slower investment growth—why build new houses or offices if there aren't new people for them?—and make the Depression go on for, well, close enough to forever.

Now the baby boom thankfully proved him wrong, but what if, Summers wonders, their retirement proves him right? Once again, there isn't as much population growth, this time because the Boomers are starting to collect Social Security, and that means there isn't as much demand for new investments. Not only that, but in the internet age, companies don't even need to spend as much as they used to on the investments they do make. Computers, in other words, cost a lot less than factories. Add it all up, and it could be that only way for the economy to get enough investment spending would either be for the government to do it directly or to try to get the private sector to do it by increasing inflation so that real rates come down.


But Bernanke thinks this is overly pessimistic. The U.S. economy looks like it's picking up speed now, and it was going plenty fast in the 1990s even before the tech bubble turned the Pets.com sock puppet into the avatar of irrational exuberance. Besides, it isn't easy to tell a story about why people would need negative real rates to get them to invest. "Almost any investment would be profitable," Bernanke says, if rates were that low for that long, to the point that it would even "pay to level the Rocky Mountains to save the small amount of fuel expended by trains and cars that must currently climb steep grades." That sure doesn't seem like the world we live in. And even if it were—this is the most important part—we could still export our way to health as long as other countries were doing alright.

So why does Bernanke think the economy needs low rates? Well, he doesn't really. Or at least he thinks it won't soon. Now, there are still, he says, "economic headwinds" left over from the crisis that justify low rates today. But rates should rise tomorrow—or maybe six months from now—if the recovery keeps chugging along. "Should" is a funny word, though. If history is any guide, long-term rates probably won't go up that much because of what Bernanke calls the "global saving glut."

Bernanke first talked about this back in 2005, when, as a Fed Governor, he tried to explain the puzzle of long-term rates not rising much despite short-term rates doing so. The answer, Bernanke said, was that after the East Asian Financial Crisis in 1998, emerging markets like China and Saudi Arabia had seen how much trouble they could get into if they didn't build up a war chest of dollars, so they started saving much, much more. Specifically, they took the money they made selling things to the U.S. and put it into U.S. bonds. All that incoming money pushed down long-term rates in the U.S., which, even though it sounds good, actually wasn't, because it also pushed up the dollar and made the trade deficit worse. Things aren't as bad today, but they still aren't good. Sure, Asia's emerging markets aren't hoarding dollars like before, but Germany, as Paul Krugman puts it, is the new China when it comes to turning saving into a vice. So once again, interest rates are down, the dollar is up, and a widening trade deficit is weighing down the recovery.

Even though secular stagnation and the global saving glut are distinct economic stories, it's easy to confuse them since they look the same. Output is below potential and interest rates are low in both, which is just another way of saying that people want to save more than they want to invest. Secular stagnation says it's because there isn't enough demand for investment, while the global saving glut says, yes, it's because there's too much supply of savings. Now why does it matter which it is? Well, as Bernanke points out, different problems have different solutions. Secular stagnation means the economy is broken and the government needs to fix it by giving us more inflation and more infrastructure spending. But the global saving glut means the economy wouldn't need any fixing if governments would stop breaking it by manipulating their currencies down to run bigger and bigger surpluses and amass bigger and bigger piles of dollars.

But enough suspense. Is secular stagnation or the global saving glut to blame for our economic woes? Yes. See, despite the fact that it's hard to imagine a world where real rates aren't negative enough to get people to invest, we can't write off secular stagnation just yet. That's because it's not hard to imagine a world where central banks get stuck in a self-induced paralysis. Just open your eyes. Japan, as Paul Krugman points out, let prices fall so much that its inflation-adjusted rates never fell to zero even though its nominal rates did. So its real rates weren't that much less than the rest of the world's even as its economy fell behind—and, as Brad DeLong reminds us, it did fall behind—which, in turn, meant that its currency never fell enough to be a real escape hatch from its slump. The same has happened to Europe the past few years. Now, it's true that both are doing what they should now—buying bonds, like the Fed did, until inflation goes back up—but both are in such deep holes and have such bad demographics that they're going to be stuck in something that looks an awful lot like secular stagnation for awhile. Maybe not a long a run where we're all dead, but at least one where we're all middle-aged.


And that creates all kinds of problems for us. Europe's slump, for example, means that there's, well, a glut of money leaving the continent looking for better returns abroad, in the process, pushing the dollar up and the euro down. That'd be good news if it was enough to get Europe back to normal anytime soon, but markets don't seem to think it will. If they did, the dollar probably wouldn't be rising as much as it has. So what exactly are we saying here? Well, the easiest way to think about it is this. We used to have a global saving glut caused by other country's policy decisions, but now we have a global saving glut caused by other country's secular stagnation.

If that's right, then it's not going to be enough to browbeat countries that aren't spending a lot into spending more. They can't. Instead, we're going to have to fight the global saving glut by pushing the dollar down—maybe by raising the Fed's inflation target from 2 to 4 percent. The funny thing is that's also the way to fight secular stagnation here at home, so no matter what you think the economy's problem is, this might be the solution. Indeed, back in January 2009, none other than Bernanke himself was surprised that there wasn't "slightly more interest" at the Fed "in moving [inflation] up from our so-called comfort zones, given our recent experience with deflation risk and zero lower bound." It's still surprising that there isn't. The global saving glut hasn't gone away and the fact that interest rates can't go much below zero means there's a risk that with worse policy and worse demographics, we could get dragged down into secular-ish stagnation too.

The real mystery, in other words, is why we're accepting a world where interest rates are staying so low.

wapo

69
Comunidade de Traders / Re:Investir na Grécia
« em: 2015-04-03 19:22:33 »
Greece says ready to make IMF payment on April 9

(Reuters) - Greece will repay a loan tranche to the IMF on time on April 9, its deputy finance minister said on Friday, seeking to quell fears of default after a flurry of contradictory statements on the issue in recent days.

Greece is fast running out of cash and its euro zone and International Monetary Fund lenders have frozen bailout aid until the new leftist-led government reaches agreement on a package of reforms.

That prompted the interior minister to suggest this week that Athens would prioritize wages and pensions over the roughly 450 million euro ($490 million) payment to the IMF, though the government denied that was its stance.

Euro zone officials then quoted Greece as saying it will run out of money on April 9, which the finance ministry denied.

"We strive to be able to pay our obligations on time," Dimitris Mardas told Greece's Skai TV. "We are ready to pay on April 9."

Adding to the confusion, German magazine Der Spiegel quoted a finance ministry general secretary, Nikos Theocharakis, as saying Greece would probably not pay next week's IMF tranche, prompting a further denial from the Greek finance ministry.

Theocharakis said Greece would be "close to the end" on April 9 and called the technical teams from its creditors "completely useless," according to an extract of the article due to be published on Saturday.

"Mr. Theocharakis never characterized the technical teams of the institutions with the phrase attributed to him," the ministry said in a statement. "On the contrary ... he referred to them as saying they include 'top-notch people with impressive skills.'"

Germany's Spiegel Online quoted Belgian Finance Minister Johan Van Overtveldt as saying that Greece postponing the repayment due on April 9 was "out of the question", otherwise a Greek exit from the euro zone could no longer be ruled out.

He said the Eurogroup would not release further funds to Greece until Athens implemented some of the reforms it had promised.

Athens has not received bailout funds since August last year and has resorted to measures such as borrowing from state entities via repo transactions to tide it through the cash crunch.

The government is hoping approval of its latest reforms package will unlock remaining aid of 7.2 billion euros under its EU/IMF bailout and lead to the return of about 1.9 billion euros in profits made by the European Central Bank on Greek bonds.

Mardas said, without providing figures, that state revenue in March had topped targets and that the government had made progress in talks with lenders on its latest reforms list.

German Chancellor Angela Merkel has said Greece would receive fresh funds only once its creditors approve the reforms Athens has presented.

reuters

70
Comunidade de Traders / Re:Investir na Grécia
« em: 2015-04-03 19:15:22 »
O Governo Inglês não existe. Existe o Governo Britânico.

certo. erro meu.

O Banco de Inglaterra é o Banco Central do Reino Unido, independentemente do nome que tenha.

correcto. O Banco de Inglaterra é o Banco Central do Reino Unido.
Mas não deixa de ser o Banco de Inglaterra.

O bundesbank podia ser o banco central da europa (e praticamente é).
a diferença para o ECB é que não teria representantes de outras nações.
tal como o banco de inglaterra.

gales não risca nada na política monetária do RU.
a irlanda do norte não risca nada na política monetária do RU.
a escócia não risca nada na política monetária do RU.

D

71
Comunidade de Traders / Re:Iran nuclear deal
« em: 2015-04-03 19:10:03 »
Os sauditas estão a mostrar terem juizinho.

Iran vows to honor nuclear deal; Saudi king gives it a cautious nod

RIYADH, Saudi Arabia — Iranian President Hassan Rouhani pledged Friday that his country would honor what he called a historic agreement to curb its nuclear program, provided that world powers uphold their end of the deal.

In a televised address to the nation, Reuters news agency reported, Rouhani declared in Tehran: “We don’t cheat. We are not two-faced.” He added: “If we’ve given a promise . . . we will take action based on that promise. Of course, that depends on the other side taking action on their promises, too.”

The comments came after Saudi Arabia’s King Salman expressed cautious backing for efforts to reach a final deal to curb Iran’s nuclear program, telling President Obama that he hoped it would strengthen “stability and security” in the region.

The remarks by Salman suggested no major policy shifts by Saudi Arabia or its Persian Gulf Arab partners after the announcement Thursday of a framework that would place limits on Iran’s nuclear program — but allow some level of uranium enrichment — in exchange for easing international sanctions.

But Salman’s statement, reported Friday by the official Saudi Press Agency, also stopped short of full endorsement, underscoring the unease in the gulf and wider Middle East about any steps perceived as benefiting Iran.

Rouhani told Iranians that the six major world powers negotiating with Iran have now accepted that the nation can enrich uranium on its own soil — a step they had strongly opposed as a nuclear proliferation risk but that Iran steadfastly contended was a right granted to it as a signatory of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Objections to Iran’s uranium-enrichment program, an effort that Tehran insisted on maintaining to guarantee an independent fuel supply for its nuclear power plants, have been enshrined in a series of U.N. Security Council resolutions that now are to be scrapped under the deal.

“Today is a day that will remain in the historic memory of the Iranian nation,” Rouhani said, according to Reuters.

“Some think that we must either fight the world or surrender to world powers,” he said. “We say it is neither of those; there is a third way. We can have cooperation with the world.”

Saudi Arabia and the other Sunni Muslim states in the gulf view Shiite-led Iran as their main regional rival. Tensions have further escalated as a Saudi-led coalition carries out airstrikes in Yemen aimed at weakening a Shiite rebel force, which gulf leaders say receives support from Tehran.

King Salman “expressed his hope that reaching a final binding deal would strengthen the stability and security of the region and the world,” the Saudi Press Agency reported.

wapo

72
Comunidade de Traders / Re:Krugman et al
« em: 2015-04-03 18:59:59 »
The Obamacare Doomsday Cult Struggles to Adapt to World That Did Not End
By Jonathan Chait  Follow @jonathanchait

As Obamacare continues to operate successfully, conservative elites have renewed their pleas for the party to develop an alternative beyond demanding the law’s repeal. The trouble is that anti-Obamacare dogma sits so deeply at the GOP’s core that any discussion of health care must pay fealty to their belief that the law has failed utterly. The Republican Party in the Obamacare era is a doomsday cult after the world failed to end. Its entire analysis of the issue is built upon a foundation of falsehoods.

Michael Tanner, a health-care analyst at the Cato Institute, has a column for National Review usefully summarizing the most current iteration of anti-Obamacare talking points. Most of Tanner’s piece is devoted to arguing for alternative proposals, but he begins with the ritual incantation of Obamacare doomsaying. Tanner does not argue that Obamacare is wrong because conservatives philosophically object to using taxation and regulation to transfer resources from the rich and healthy to the poor and sick. Instead he makes eight substantive claims about the law’s impact on health-care access. Every single one of them is overblown or demonstrably wrong.

Here’s Tanner’s litany of failure:

Millions of Americans were forced to change insurance plans, and others found themselves pushed into smaller networks with few choices of providers. Premiums rose. Businesses, laboring under the higher costs imposed by the law, have slowed growth; many have delayed hiring, or shifted workers from full- to part-time. The potential impact on the quality of care remains troubling.
Let’s take these claims in order.

1.“Millions of Americans were forced to change insurance plans.” The specter of mass dislocation was a major anti-Obamacare talking point at the end of 2013 and 2014. The new health-care regulations banned a lot of unpopular practices, like lifetime limits on how much an insurer would pay, or discriminating against preexisting conditions. So it is true that many people who held insurers in the old, barely regulated insurance market needed to find new plans. On the other hand, that market had enormous year-to-year churn anyway. The main way for insurers to make money was to exclude customers who were likely to get sick, so they threw people off their insurance all the time.

We now know that the new churn created by Obamacare was much smaller than conservatives insisted at the time. A recent study by the Urban Institute found that policy cancellations were not “millions,” but under a million. As the authors explain:

These estimates suggest that policy cancellations caused by noncompliance with the ACA were uncommon in 2014 in both the nongroup and ESI markets, and the number and rate of cancellations in the nongroup market in 2014 was far smaller than in 2013. The nongroup market has historically been characterized by high volatility: an analysis of pre-ACA nongroup coverage patterns from 2008–11 shows that only 42 percent of nongroup enrollees retained their coverage after 12 months.
2. “ ... and others found themselves pushed into smaller networks with few choices of providers.” It is true that many people who enrolled in the new exchanges have insurance plans that limit their choice of doctors and hospitals, which is called “narrow networks.” There is no evidence that Obamacare caused this. The law overwhelmingly covers people who had no insurance to begin with. You can’t be “pushed” into a “smaller” network when your previous network was nonexistent.

As Jonathan Cohn laid out in an excellent and balanced explainer on this issue, insurers have been using narrow networks to control costs for decades. “That’s been the case for decades,” Larry Levitt told him, “The only real connection to the Affordable Care Act is that the health reform law is making insurers compete for customers more aggressively.”

If narrow networks are spreading, it is because the Obamacare exchanges are bringing consumer choice into the system. Overwhelmingly, the customers enrolling in plans with narrow networks are not being “pushed” so much as they are choosing them. As a McKinsey study from last year found, 90 percent of eligible customers have access to broader networks of doctors and hospitals. But most customers choose plans with narrow networks because they would rather not pay the higher premiums required to access broader networks. If we think narrow networks are inadequate, one response would be to require insurers to include more doctors and hospitals in their plans, but this would add to costs — an odd argument for a conservative to make.

3. “Premiums rose.” It is true that some people will pay higher premiums. If you previously held a catastrophic plan that covered little to none of your medical expenses, you may now be paying higher premiums in return for having insurance that covers the cost of medical care. Likewise, if you were uninsured and now have coverage, your new premiums are now higher than your old premiums, which were zero. This is exactly what the law intended to do.

The argument between the law’s supporters and critics centered on whether it would succeed or fail at its goal of restraining health care inflation. Historically, the cost of health care has grown at a much faster rate than the cost of other goods. Since Obamacare has taken effect, that trend has sharply reversed itself. Analysts debate the degree to which this enormous success is the result of the new law’s reforms versus outside factors. But the cost of Obamacare insurance premiums has come in well under official projections.

Tanner himself asserted that Obamacare would absolutely increase the cost of health care. “While we were once told that health-care reform would “bend the cost curve down,” we now know that Obamacare will actually increase U.S. health-care spending,” he wrote in 2012. This has been proven false. The federal government is spending less, even with the coverage expansions provided by Obamacare, than it was projected to spending before Obamacare became law:

 
4. “Businesses, laboring under the higher costs imposed by the law ... ” This is the opposite of the truth. The cost of providing health care to employees for business, after years of rapid growth, has stayed unusually flat:

 
5. “ ... have slowed growth.” Actually, 2014, the first year of Obamacare’s implementation coincided with the fastest growth in GDP since the start of the recession.

6. “many have delayed hiring … ” In fact, 2014 was also the best year for job creation, not only since the recession but since 1999.


7. “or shifted workers from full- to part-time.” Nope, the share of part-time workers has also fallen since Obamacare took effect.

8. “The potential impact on the quality of care remains troubling.” This is a really vague statement. Measuring the quality of health care is nearly impossible in general. What’s more, tanner’s formulation has not one but two weasel words (“potential,” “troubling”) that distance him from any verifiable claim.

That said, there’s plenty of evidence that the Affordable Care Act is improving the quality of care. The percentage of Americans delaying medical care for financial reasons has dropped sharply. The rate of hospital-acquired infections (a key target of the law, which changed hospitals’ financial incentive in order to drive down infections) has fallen. Customers who bought insurance through the exchanges report high levels of satisfaction with the quality of their care. One study found that Obamacare is saving around 50,000 lives a year; after President Obama cited the figure, Washington Post fact-checker Glenn Kessler set out to debunk the claim, only to determine that it checked out.

**

This is the reality that the entire Republican Party has failed to come to grips with. The American health-care system before Obamacare was an utter disaster — the most expensive in the world and also the only one that denied access to millions of its own citizens. Obamacare set out to change those things, and it has worked.

There is one remaining indictment of the law that Tanner makes, and it’s true. “The law remains extraordinarily unpopular, with opponents topping supporters by nearly 11 percentage points, according to the latest Real Clear Politics average,” he argues. It is notable that opponents of Obamacare have fixated on the law’s poor polling. In a recent column, Reason’s Peter Suderman quibbles halfheartedly with the law’s demonstrable success in carrying out its goals — suggesting that the astonishing drop in medical inflation may be owed to outside forces — before reveling for six paragraphs in his major point, which is continued lack of public approval. “Obamacare is simply not well liked,” he concludes, “This is the political reality — and President Obama still refuses to embrace it.”

It is telling that, having lost every substantive argument about the law’s operation, their sole remaining refuge is an argument about its perception. It’s true: Their lies got halfway around the world before the truth could get its pants on. Indeed, if you google most of the factual disputes I discuss above, you’ll get a lot more hits from conservatives making hysterical and false predictions than you will find from reports showing those predictions failed to come true. Those myths still hold enormous sway over public opinion. Far more Americans believe Obamacare has death panels, which is false, than believe its costs have come in under projections, which is true. Conservatives have won the propaganda war over Obamacare. The trouble is that they think this is an indictment of Obamacare, when in fact it’s an indictment of them.

jonathan chait

73
Comunidade de Traders / Re:Krugman et al
« em: 2015-04-03 18:52:07 »
The resemblance between America’s right and a doomsday cult is something quite a few people have noticed: when various prophecies of disaster, from hyperinflation to an Obamacare death spiral, failed to materialize, the people predicting those disasters simply found new ways to maintain their faith. So Jonathan Chait’s detailed takedown of denialism about Obamacare’s success is well done, but not all that distinctive.

What he does put his finger on, however, is another aspect of the “debate” (it doesn’t really deserve to be dignified with that term): reliance not on substantive arguments about policy, but on public perceptions. In the case of health reform, this amounts to the assertion that it has failed because many Americans continue to believe the opponents’ lies.

This is a cheap, dishonest way to argue — but it’s also very widely used, and not just on the U.S. right. I’m doing some work on the UK austerity debate, and what’s striking to me is how crucial a role this kind of argument from perception plays in Simon Wren-Lewis’s “mediamacro”.

Consider, as a prominent example, the FT’s editorial from 2013 declaring austerity vindicated. At no point does the editorial actually take on the economics. Instead, it declares that “Mr. Osborne has won the political argument”, and dismisses actual economic analysis — a resumption of growth when fiscal consolidation pauses is exactly what you should expect — as too complicated for the voters, bless their pretty little heads.

Let’s be clear about the bad faith this involves. It’s perfectly OK to point out that elections seem to turn on the recent rate of growth rather than a true assessment of economic performance. What’s not OK is blurring the distinction between that kind of political analysis and a real analysis of how policy worked. And when people do that kind of blurring to make the case for policies they prefer, it’s deeply sleazy, no matter who they are.

krugman

74
Comunidade de Traders / Re:Iran nuclear deal
« em: 2015-04-03 18:48:15 »
Só Israel consegue determinar isso.

Israel pode perfeitamente determinar que o Irão continua a ser um perigo existencial e que a capacidade nuclear deste tem que ser obliterada.

Isso não quer dizer que bombardeie o Irão.
Neste caso, querer não é poder.

Israel, neste caso, só fará o que os estados unidos lhe permitirem.
Perder o apoio dos estados unidos é um perigo existencial ainda maior para Israel.

D

75
Comunidade de Traders / Re:Investir na Grécia
« em: 2015-04-03 18:44:31 »
nah - o krugman disse que era interessante. Eu pelo menos não vejo um concordo ou discordo no comentário.

A minha opinião enquanto "quase escocês" é que a interdependência entre a escócia e o rUK é muito forte e as economias funcionam sob os mesmos principios.

Quem é dono dos bancos é indiferente - ao manter a libra teria de se chegar a um acordo entre a Escócia e o rUK para criar algo semelhante ao ECB.

De se notar que o GDP per capita da Escócia é superior ao do rUK...

Citar
What Mervyn suggested, however (after I pressed him a bit) was that these issues are relatively unimportant in the Scottish case. Scottish banks, he argued, aren’t really Scottish at this point — so much of their ownership and business is outside Scotland that they’re effectively English, so they would surely retain lender-of-last resort privileges from the Bank of England and be bailed out if necessary by Westminster. And he also argued that Scotland’s business cycle is closely correlated with the rest of the UK, so that asymmetric shocks of the kind experienced by euro area countries — or US regions — would be minor.

Interesting.

na minha leitura e conhecendo o krugman (dentro do possível) esta é uma opinião que ele achou genuinamente interessante. Não há ironia ali.

a ideia é que o business cycle é o mesmo no resto do UK e na Escócia. não há contra-ciclo como na europa entre a alemanha e os países do sul, por exemplo.
o que ele quer dizer (penso eu) é que  concede que em determinados casos dois países independentes um do outro, poderão ter a mesma moeda.

a opinião anterior dele quanto a isto, é que a escócia não deveria manter a libra, para poder ter soberania sobre a moeda e não estar dependente do Banco de Inglaterra para a política monetária.

aqui parece ter achado válida a exposição do Mervyn King.

Mas tens razão e ainda bem que chamaste a tenção para isso. A opinião prévia  do Krugman não era a que o Mervyn King expressou. Mudou, vai pensar nisso? Não sei.

Quanto a instituir um banco central escocês/inglês, não me parece que isso fosse acontecer. O governo Inglês foi muito claro ao dizer que nunca cederia qualquer parcela de soberania sobre a moeda.
Repara que o banco central do UK é o banco de Inglaterra. Não é o banco central do Reino Unido.
Não tem representantes oficiais escoceses ou galeses ou irlandeses do norte.

D

76
Comunidade de Traders / Re:Investir na Grécia
« em: 2015-04-03 18:28:46 »
No Arkansas ou no Alaska não se queixam tanto deste fenómeno. Talvez porque os Estados estão impedidos de ter déficits/endividamento crónicos e por isso quando os têm são mínimos.

Citação de: krugman
— Florida can count on Washington to pay for pensions and medical care, Spain has no comparable cushion —

do artigo que transcrevi um pouco acima.

D

77
Comunidade de Traders / Re:Iran nuclear deal
« em: 2015-04-03 18:25:46 »
Se Israel bombardeasse, duvido que os EUA lhes destruíssem os bombardeiros.

Depois das trabalheira que os US tiveram para chegar a este acordo? Depois do que o bibi fez ao obama, discursando no congresso à revelia dele?
Eu tenho a certeza que os deitariam abaixo!
Depois nenhum deles o reconheceria. Os israelitas não o reconheceriam porque era uma vergonhaça para eles. os americanos também não porque não lhe interessava.
mas os bombardeiros iam parar ao chão, tenho a certeza.

Isto dificilmente acontecá, porque os estados unidos já avisaram concerteza israel para não se atrever a tentar um golpe desses.
e não me parece que os israelitas tenham lata para desafiar os americanos. mas se o fizerem prejudicam-se com F maiúsculo, disso estou certo.

D

78
Comunidade de Traders / Re:Investir na Grécia
« em: 2015-04-03 18:18:24 »
explica lá melhor isso.
o euro persiste?
quem entra?
quem sai?
quem permanece de fora?
EDIT: que moedas são (re)criadas?

D



Apenas o marco, com abertura a que outros adiram.
O euro continuaria, e o BCE mudar-se-ia
para Paris ou Roma. Quem saísse, saía.

depois desta experiência com o euro quem é que quer aderir ao marco? seria sempre o bundesbank a mandar.
só se, como diz o krugman no artigo que postei, a economia do país aderente estivesse intimamente ligada à economia alemã, tal como a da escócia está à da Inglaterra.
não estou a ver; holanda? luxemburgo? bélgica? austria? quem é que quereria estar num novo marco?
diz-me tu, posso estar a ver mal.
os que estão de fora - suécia, dinamarca, polónia, republica checa, etc  se não quiseram o euro, não estou a ver porque quereriam o marco.

e principalmente, porque é que as economias do sul quereriam um euro franco-italiano? não estou a dizer que estou contra, estou a perguntar. qual a vantagem?

qual a vantagem de ter uma moeda única, de todo?
sinceramente, ainda não vi vantagem nenhuma, mas alguém que tenha uma opinião diferente que se pronuncie.

D

Lê bem o que colocaste - não foi o krugman que o disse...

sim, foi o mervin king. e o krugman concordou.
peço desculpa pela imprecisão.

D

79
Comunidade de Traders / Re:Investir na Grécia
« em: 2015-04-03 18:09:16 »
a ideia que me parece que mais tem ecoado por aqui na defesa do euro para portugal é a seguinte:

'somos irresponsáveis, portanto a alemanha tem que tomar conta de nós'

é uma afirmação tão espantosa que ainda não consegui abarcar a totalidade do seu significado.

D

80
Comunidade de Traders / Re:Investir na Grécia
« em: 2015-04-03 17:50:29 »
explica lá melhor isso.
o euro persiste?
quem entra?
quem sai?
quem permanece de fora?
EDIT: que moedas são (re)criadas?

D



Apenas o marco, com abertura a que outros adiram.
O euro continuaria, e o BCE mudar-se-ia
para Paris ou Roma. Quem saísse, saía.

depois desta experiência com o euro quem é que quer aderir ao marco? seria sempre o bundesbank a mandar.
só se, como diz o krugman no artigo que postei, a economia do país aderente estivesse intimamente ligada à economia alemã, tal como a da escócia está à da Inglaterra.
não estou a ver; holanda? luxemburgo? bélgica? austria? quem é que quereria estar num novo marco?
diz-me tu, posso estar a ver mal.
os que estão de fora - suécia, dinamarca, polónia, republica checa, etc  se não quiseram o euro, não estou a ver porque quereriam o marco.

e principalmente, porque é que as economias do sul quereriam um euro franco-italiano? não estou a dizer que estou contra, estou a perguntar. qual a vantagem?

qual a vantagem de ter uma moeda única, de todo?
sinceramente, ainda não vi vantagem nenhuma, mas alguém que tenha uma opinião diferente que se pronuncie.

D

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