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Autor Tópico: Krugman et al  (Lida 605854 vezes)

Zel

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Re:Krugman et al
« Responder #1220 em: 2013-05-17 22:39:26 »
esse sokal revolveu mostrar o que sao as ciencias sociais... uma fraude onde a politica e a ideologia se mascaram de objectividade cientifica para melhor atingir os seus fins

Kin2010

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Re:Krugman et al
« Responder #1221 em: 2013-05-18 22:02:20 »
esse sokal revolveu mostrar o que sao as ciencias sociais... uma fraude onde a politica e a ideologia se mascaram de objectividade cientifica para melhor atingir os seus fins

Não. A paródia do Sokal é sobre o *pos-modernismo*. Esse sim, é uma disciplina decadente e estúpida. Não se pode comparar as ciências sociais a ele.

Zel

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Re:Krugman et al
« Responder #1222 em: 2013-05-19 18:04:50 »
a parodia necessariamente tinha de ser sobre algo, mas as implicacoes sao para todas as ciencias sociais fraudulentas

Lark

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Re:Krugman et al
« Responder #1223 em: 2013-05-20 01:30:18 »
a parodia necessariamente tinha de ser sobre algo, mas as implicacoes sao para todas as ciencias sociais fraudulentas

a paródia foi sobre algo que não é uma ciência social.
mas claro, tem implicações nas ciências sociais.

bravo! excelente racicínio.
com a capacidade de racicínio lógico que apresentas, começo a temer pela qualidade dos teus sistemas.

este exemplo, é assim como... sei lá: fazer um estudo desacreditando a astrologia (como se fosse preciso) e isso ter implicações na astronomia.

L
« Última modificação: 2013-05-20 01:33:50 por Lark »
Be Kind; Everyone You Meet is Fighting a Battle.
Ian Mclaren
------------------------------
If you have more than you need, build a longer table rather than a taller fence.
l6l803399
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So, first of all, let me assert my firm belief that the only thing we have to fear is...fear itself — nameless, unreasoning, unjustified terror which paralyzes needed efforts to convert retreat into advance.
Franklin D. Roosevelt

Zel

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Re:Krugman et al
« Responder #1224 em: 2013-05-20 01:39:16 »
a parodia necessariamente tinha de ser sobre algo, mas as implicacoes sao para todas as ciencias sociais fraudulentas

a paródia foi sobre algo que não é uma ciência social.
mas claro, tem implicações nas ciências sociais.

bravo! excelente racicínio.
com a capacidade de racicínio lógico que apresentas, começo a temer pela qualidade dos teus sistemas.

este exemplo, é assim como... sei lá: fazer um estudo desacreditando a astrologia (como se fosse preciso) e isso ter implicações na astronomia.

L

blablabla, olha o adorador de gurus que nem entende a matematica deles a criticar

o pos-modernismo nao esta ligado as ciencias sociais ? hehe, nao te afundes mais.




Lark

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Re:Krugman et al
« Responder #1225 em: 2013-05-20 01:44:20 »
está tão ligado às ciências sociais como a astrologia está à astronomia.

L
Be Kind; Everyone You Meet is Fighting a Battle.
Ian Mclaren
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If you have more than you need, build a longer table rather than a taller fence.
l6l803399
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So, first of all, let me assert my firm belief that the only thing we have to fear is...fear itself — nameless, unreasoning, unjustified terror which paralyzes needed efforts to convert retreat into advance.
Franklin D. Roosevelt

Iced

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Re:Krugman et al
« Responder #1226 em: 2013-05-20 14:13:36 »
http://krugman.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/05/20/german-wages-and-portuguese-competitiveness-a-bit-wonkish/

Citar
German Wages and Portuguese Competitiveness (A Bit Wonkish)

There’s a three-cornered debate among Ryan Avent, Tyler Cowen, and Karl Smith over the extent to which a more expansionary ECB policy would help the European periphery.

I very much agree with Avent and Smith that Cowen, who worries that such a policy would largely lead to inflation in Germany rather than a boom in Portugal, is completely missing the point; that’s a feature, not a bug.

But what really puzzles me about Cowen’s exposition here is his misplaced focus on the extent to which Portugal and Germany are in direct competition with each other, or to which Germany is Portugal’s main export market. This is very nearly irrelevant — because the point is that Germany and Portugal, for better or (mainly) worse, now share a currency, and what happens in Germany very much affects the value of that currency relative to other currencies.

Cowen writes that rising wages in Germany

    solves (at best) only one of the core problems of the eurozone, namely incorrect relative prices between Portugal and Germany. It helps less with the “Portuguese nominal wages are too high” problem …

OK, stop right there. When you say “Portuguese nominal wages are too high”, you have to explain, too high relative to what? As Rudi Dornbusch always used to say, it takes two nominals to make a real.

And the answer, clearly, is “too high relative to German wages”. What else could it be?

But, you say, Portugal doesn’t compete that much with Germany. Ahem. Suppose that I could wave a magic wand (or play a few notes on a a Magic Flute) and suddenly increase all German wages by 20 percent. What do you think would happen to the value of the euro against the dollar and other currencies? It would drop a lot, yes? And Portuguese exports would become a lot more competitive everywhere, including non-German and indeed non-Euro destinations.

I guess I thought this was obvious. Apparently not.

Again, as Ryan says, the crucial difference between German/ Portuguese economic relations and, say, US/ El Salvador relations is that Germany and Portugal share a currency. This creates obligations for Germany, whether it likes them or not.

A vida para ter interesse,deve ser construida por nos,de forma inteligente!
-devemos criar marcos na nossa vida,que sejam pontos de referencia!
-devemos amar muitas mulheres para sabermos o verdadeiro sentimento do amor!
-devemos combater de acordo com os nossos ideais,lutando e sendo solidarios,em busca de um mumdo melhor!
-devemos fazer aquilo que nos apetece,respeitando as regras socias!
-devemos por vezes ser egoistas,gostar de nos proprios,pois e impossivel dar felicidade a alguem,quando somos infelizes!

POR FIM,DEVEMOS SER GENUINOS!

JAMES

Luisa Fernandes

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Re:Krugman et al
« Responder #1227 em: 2013-05-21 10:25:13 »
...


This creates obligations for Germany, whether it likes them or not.


Parece que muita gente não percebe isto. Pena.
« Última modificação: 2013-05-21 10:25:40 por Luisa Fernandes »
Quem não Offshora não mama...

itg00022289

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Re:Krugman et al
« Responder #1228 em: 2013-05-21 11:26:19 »
...


This creates obligations for Germany, whether it likes them or not.


Parece que muita gente não percebe isto. Pena.
a maior pena parece ser os alemães não querem perceber... bandidos

Lark

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Re:Krugman et al
« Responder #1229 em: 2013-05-21 11:40:20 »
...


This creates obligations for Germany, whether it likes them or not.


Parece que muita gente não percebe isto. Pena.
a maior pena parece ser os alemães não querem perceber... bandidos

itg, faz-nos lá um favor.
explica porque é que o racicínio do krugman está errado.
esse tipo de argumentação, meio dumb meio insolente já era. não sei se te apercebeste mas estamos cada vez mais a tentar fundamentar os racicínios e as opiniões.
isso que tu escreveste não é nada.
vá lá, tu fazes melhor que isso.

L
Be Kind; Everyone You Meet is Fighting a Battle.
Ian Mclaren
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If you have more than you need, build a longer table rather than a taller fence.
l6l803399
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So, first of all, let me assert my firm belief that the only thing we have to fear is...fear itself — nameless, unreasoning, unjustified terror which paralyzes needed efforts to convert retreat into advance.
Franklin D. Roosevelt

Lark

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Re:Krugman et al
« Responder #1230 em: 2013-05-21 12:14:21 »
Where Are The Deficit Celebrations?

For three years and more Beltway politics has been all about the deficit. Urgent action was needed to avert crisis. A Grand Bargain absolutely had to be reached. Fix the Debt, now now now!

So where are the celebrations now that the debt issue looks, if not solved, at least greatly mitigated? And it’s not just recovering revenues: health costs, the biggest driver of long-run spending, have slowed dramatically.

What we’re getting from the deficit scolds, however, are at best grudging admissions that things may look a bit less dire — if not expressions of regret that the public seems insufficiently alarmed.

Jamelle Bouie gets at a large part of it by noting what was obvious all along: for many deficit scolds, it was never really about the debt, it was about using deficits as a way to attack the social safety net. Deficits may have come down, but not the way they were supposed to — hey, we were supposed to be kicking 65 and 66 year-olds off Medicare, not doing something so goody-goody as managing costs better.

There is, however, a secondary factor: think about the personal career incentives of the professional deficit scolds. You’re Bowles/Simpson, with a lucrative and ego-satisfying business of going around the country delivering ominous talks about The Deficit; you’re an employee of one of the many Pete Peterson front groups; and now, all of a sudden, the deficit is receding, and you had nothing to do with it. It’s a disaster!

And so the deficit progress must be minimized and bad-mouthed.

krugman
Be Kind; Everyone You Meet is Fighting a Battle.
Ian Mclaren
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If you have more than you need, build a longer table rather than a taller fence.
l6l803399
-------------------------------------------
So, first of all, let me assert my firm belief that the only thing we have to fear is...fear itself — nameless, unreasoning, unjustified terror which paralyzes needed efforts to convert retreat into advance.
Franklin D. Roosevelt

Kin2010

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Re:Krugman et al
« Responder #1231 em: 2013-05-24 00:29:45 »
Atenção que há agora alguns sinais de que o massivo QE do Japão pode dar mau resultado. As yields estão a subir, o que mostra que afinal a impressão de moeda em massa pode fazê-las subir também, por quebra da confiança. Há quem preveja um meltdown no Japão.

Visitante

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Re:Krugman et al
« Responder #1232 em: 2013-05-24 10:43:15 »
Atenção que há agora alguns sinais de que o massivo QE do Japão pode dar mau resultado. As yields estão a subir, o que mostra que afinal a impressão de moeda em massa pode fazê-las subir também, por quebra da confiança. Há quem preveja um meltdown no Japão.


Como se diz no artigo seguinte "The JGB market is just so dependent on the BOJ." As yields só sobem se o BOJ quiser.

BOJ Chief Shrugs Off Rising Bond Yields
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887324659404578498340347989934.html


Kin2010

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Re:Krugman et al
« Responder #1233 em: 2013-05-24 20:21:39 »
Atenção que há agora alguns sinais de que o massivo QE do Japão pode dar mau resultado. As yields estão a subir, o que mostra que afinal a impressão de moeda em massa pode fazê-las subir também, por quebra da confiança. Há quem preveja um meltdown no Japão.


Como se diz no artigo seguinte "The JGB market is just so dependent on the BOJ." As yields só sobem se o BOJ quiser.

BOJ Chief Shrugs Off Rising Bond Yields
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887324659404578498340347989934.html


Isso é questionável. Há pelo menos uma autoridade japonesa a dizer que elas poderão subir, seja qual for a quantidade de OTs comprada pelo BoJ.

E eu compreendo a ideia. Se todos os agentes menos um estiverem convencidos de que um certo activo não tem valor, achas que eles vão mudar de opinião por haver um agente, mesmo com recursos ilimitados, que quer comprar? Acho que não faz muito sentido. O que faz sentido é que lhe descarregam o activo em cima e ele fica o único dono do mesmo.

Incognitus

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Re:Krugman et al
« Responder #1234 em: 2013-05-24 20:39:07 »
Atenção que há agora alguns sinais de que o massivo QE do Japão pode dar mau resultado. As yields estão a subir, o que mostra que afinal a impressão de moeda em massa pode fazê-las subir também, por quebra da confiança. Há quem preveja um meltdown no Japão.


Como se diz no artigo seguinte "The JGB market is just so dependent on the BOJ." As yields só sobem se o BOJ quiser.

BOJ Chief Shrugs Off Rising Bond Yields
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887324659404578498340347989934.html


Isso é questionável. Há pelo menos uma autoridade japonesa a dizer que elas poderão subir, seja qual for a quantidade de OTs comprada pelo BoJ.

E eu compreendo a ideia. Se todos os agentes menos um estiverem convencidos de que um certo activo não tem valor, achas que eles vão mudar de opinião por haver um agente, mesmo com recursos ilimitados, que quer comprar? Acho que não faz muito sentido. O que faz sentido é que lhe descarregam o activo em cima e ele fica o único dono do mesmo.


Também não é bem assim ... e se o BoJ as comprar todas? Nesse caso estabelece o preço onde quiser.
"Nem tudo o que pode ser contado conta, e nem tudo o que conta pode ser contado.", Albert Einstein

Incognitus, www.thinkfn.com

Kin2010

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Re:Krugman et al
« Responder #1235 em: 2013-05-24 22:08:58 »
Se comprasse mesmo todas deixava de haver cotação. Talvez seja melhor pensar na situação em que tinha comprado quase todas, e ainda havia um mercado para as restantes. Nesse caso, qual seria o preço? Seria alto, mesmo tendo em conta de que quase ninguém queria as OTs?

Ou seria alto, mas entretanto a cotação da moeda tinha caído de tal maneira, que em termos reais o valor das OTs tinha descido?

Não sei, mas gostava de compreender isto.

Visitante

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Re:Krugman et al
« Responder #1236 em: 2013-05-24 23:01:43 »
Kin, eu ficaria encantado se as JGBs caíssem. Agora parece-me que o banco central não vai deixar, pois isso inviabilizaria a política de relançamento económico que estão a tentar implementar. Se deixarem cair as obrigações, as taxas de juro de longo prazo sobem, e isso penalizaria a recuperação económica. É um facto que estão a haver muitas vendas mas o BOJ está a comprar em força. Prevejo que tenhamos um cenário idêntico aos USA, a subida das acções não vai implicar a queda das obrigações.

Embora não acredite que as JGBs caiam sustentadamente, julgo que se justifica abrir curtos a estes níveis de taxas (cerca de 0,3 %) para aproveitar a volatilidade. Parece-me pouco arriscado, apesar de se estar a negociar contra o BOJ, mas o limite de yield zero joga a nosso favor.

vbm

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Re:Krugman et al
« Responder #1237 em: 2013-05-25 15:56:39 »
«As obrigações a juro quase zero,
e os depósitos com remuneração negativa,
só podem ser atraentes por causa da excessiva
cotação do ouro.»
___________________________________________

Haverá sentido neste enunciado?
E porque está o ouro a cair, agora?

Zel

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Re:Krugman et al
« Responder #1238 em: 2013-05-27 16:27:43 »
Cambridge, Massachusetts, May 25 2013

Dear Paul:

Back in the late 1980s, you helped shape the concept of an emerging market debt overhang.  The financial crisis has laid bare the fact that the dividing line between emerging markets and advanced countries is not as crisp as once thought.  Indeed, this is a recurring theme of our 2009 book, This Time is Different:  Eight Centuries of Financial Folly.  Today, the growth bind of advanced countries in the periphery of the eurozone has a great deal in common with that of emerging market economies of the 1980s.

We admire your past scholarly work, which influences us to this day.  So it has been with deep disappointment that we have experienced your spectacularly uncivil behavior the past few weeks.  You have attacked us in very personal terms, virtually non-stop, in your New York Times column and blog posts.  Now you have doubled down in the New York Review of Books, adding the accusation we didn't share our data.  Your characterization of our work and of our policy impact is selective and shallow.  It is deeply misleading about where we stand on the issues.  And we would respectfully submit, your logic and evidence on the policy substance is not nearly as compelling as you imply.

You particularly take aim at our 2010 paper on the long-term secular association between high debt and slow growth. That you disagree with our interpretation of the results is your prerogative.  Your thoroughly ignoring the subsequent literature, however, including the International Monetary Fund's work as well as our own deeper and more complete 2012 paper with Vincent Reinhart, is troubling.   Perhaps, acknowledging the updated literature-not to mention decades of theoretical, empirical, and historical contributions on drawbacks to high debt-would inconveniently undermine your attempt to make us a scapegoat for austerity.  You write "Indeed, Reinhart-Rogoff may have had more immediate influence on public debate than any previous paper in the history of economics."

Setting aside this wild hyperbole, you never seem to mention our other line of work that has surely been far more influential when it comes to responding to the financial crisis.  Specifically, our 2009 book (released before our growth and debt work) showed that recoveries from deep systemic financial crises are long, slow and painful.  This was not the common wisdom at all before us, as you yourself have acknowledged  on more than one occasion.  Over the course of the crisis, and certainly by 2010, policymakers around the world were using our research, alongside their assessments, to help justify sustained macroeconomic easing of both monetary and fiscal policy fronts.

Your desire to blame our later 2010 paper for the stances of some politicians fails to recognize a basic reality:  We were out there endorsing very different policies.  Anyone with experience in these matters knows that politicians may float a citation to an academic paper if it suits their purposes.  But there are limits to how much policy traction they can get with this device when the paper's authors are out offering very different policy conclusions.  You can refer to the appendix to this letter for our views on policy through the financial crisis as they were stated publicly in real time.  We were not silent.

Very senior former policy makers, observing the attacks of the past few weeks, have forcefully explained that real-time policies are very seldom driven to any significant extent by a single academic paper or result.

It is worth noting that in the past, polemicists have often pinned the austerity charge on the International Monetary Fund for its work with countries having temporary or permanent debt sustainability issues.  Since its origins after World War II, IMF programs have almost always involved some combination of austerity, debt restructurings, and structural reform.  When a country that has been running large deficits is suddenly no longer able to borrow new funds, some measure of adjustment is invariably required, and one of the IMF's usual roles has been to serve as a lightning rod.   Even before the IMF existed, long periods of autarky and hardship accompanied debt crises.

Now let us turn to the substance. The events of the past few weeks do not change basic facts and fundamentals. 

Some Fundamentals on Debt

First, the advanced economies now have levels of debt that surpass most if not all historic episodes. It is public debt and private debt (which often becomes public as a crisis unfolds). Significant shares of these debts are held by foreigners in most cases, with the notable exception of Japan.  In Europe, where the (public and private) external debt exposures loom largest, financial de-globalization is well underway.  Debt financing has become an increasingly domestic business and a difficult one when the pool of domestic saving is limited.

As for the United States: our only short-lived high-debt episode involved WWII debts, which were held by domestic residents, not fickle international investors or central banks in China and elsewhere around the globe.  This observation is not meant to suggest "a scare" in the offing, with bond vigilantes driving a concerted sell-off of Treasuries by the rest of the world and a dramatic spike US in interest rates.  Carmen's work on financial repression suggests a different scenario. But many emerging markets have stepped into bubble-like territory and we have seen this movie before.  We should not take for granted their prosperity that makes possible their continuing large-scale purchases of US debt.  Reversals are possible.  Sensible risk management means planning for these and other contingencies that might disturb today's low global interest rate environment.

Second, on debt and growth.  The Herndon, Ash and Pollin paper, using a different methodology, reinforces our core result that high levels of debt are associated with lower growth.  This fact has been hidden in the tabloid media and blogosphere discourse, but this point is made plain by even a cursory look at the full set of results reported in the very paper they critique.  More importantly, the result was prominently featured in our 2012 Journal of Economic Perspectives paper with Vincent Reinhart on Debt Overhangs, which they do not cite. The main point of our 2012 paper is that while the difference in annual GDP growth between high and lower debt cases is about one percent a year, debt overhang episodes last on average 23 years. Thus, the cumulative effect on income levels over time is significant.

Third, the debate of the last few weeks does not change the fact that debt levels above 90% (even if one entirely rejects this marker for gross central government debt as a common cross-country "threshold") are very rare altogether and even rarer in peacetime.  From 1955 until right before the recent crisis, advanced economies spent less than 10% of those years at a debt/GDP ratio of higher than 90%; only about two percent of the years are above 120% debt/GDP. If governments thought high debt was a riskless proposition, why did they avoid it so consistently?

Debt and Growth Causality

Your recent April 29, 2013 NY Times blog The Italian Miracle is meant to highlight how in high-debt Italy, interest rates have come down since the European Central Bank's well-placed efforts to act more as a lender of last resort to periphery countries.  No disagreement there. However, this positive development is meant to re-enforce your strongly held view that high debt is not a problem (even for Italy) and that causality runs exclusively from slow growth to debt.  You do not mention that in this miracle economy, GDP fell by more than 2 percent in 2012 and is expected to fall by a similar amount this year. Elsewhere you have stated that you are sure that Italy's long-term secular growth/debt problems, which date back to the 1990s, are purely a case of slow growth causing high debt.  This claim is highly debatable.

Indeed, your repeatedly-expressed view that slow growth causes high debt but not visa-versa, is hardly supported by the recent literature on the subject.  Of course, as we have already noted, this work has been singularly ignored in the public discourse of the past few weeks.  The best and worst that can be said is that the results are mixed.  A number of studies looking at more comprehensive growth models have found significant effects of debt on growth. We made this point in the appendix to our New York Times piece.  Of course, it is well known that the economic cycle impacts government finances and therefore debt (causation from growth to debt).  Cyclically adjusted budgets have been around for decades, your shallow characterization of the growth-debt connection.

As for ways debt might affect growth, there is debt with drama and debt without drama.

Debt with drama.  Do you really think that a country that is suddenly unable to borrow from international capital markets because its public and/or private debts that are a contingent public liability are deemed unsustainable will not suffer lower growth and higher unemployment as a consequence? With governments and banks shut out from international capital markets, credit to firms and households in periphery Europe remains paralyzed. This credit crunch has a crippling effect on growth and employment with or without austerity.  Fiscal austerity reinforces the procyclicality of the external and domestic credit crunch.  This pattern is not unique to this episode.

Policy response to debt with drama.  On the policy response to this sad state of affairs, we stress that restoring the credit channel is essential for sustained growth, and this is why there is a need to write off senior bank debt in many countries. Furthermore, there is no reason why the ECB should buy only sovereign debt-purchases of senior bank debt along the lines of the US Federal Reserve's purchases of mortgage-backed securities would be instrumental in rekindling credit and working capital for firms.  We don't see your attraction to fiscal largesse as a substitute. Periphery Europe cannot afford it and for Germany, which can afford it, fiscal expansion would be procyclical.  Any overheating in Germany would exert pressure on the ECB to maintain a tighter monetary policy, backtracking some of the progress made by Mario Draghi. A better use of Germany's balance sheet strength would be to agree on faster and bigger haircuts for the periphery, and to support significantly more expansionary monetary policy by the ECB.

Debt without drama.  There are other cases, like the US today or Japan since the mid-1990s, where there is debt without drama.  The plain fact that we know less about these episodes is a point we already made in our New York Times piece.  We pointedly do not include the historical episodes of 19th century UK and Netherlands among these puzzling cases. Those imperial debts were importantly financed by massive resource transfers from the colonies. They had "good" high-debt centuries because their colonies did not.  We offer a number of ideas in our 2012 paper for why debt overhang might matter even when there is no imminent collapse of borrowing capacity.

Bad shocks do happen. What is the foundation for your certainty that as peacetime debt hits new records in coming years, the United States will be able to engage in  forceful countercyclical fiscal policy if hit by a large unexpected shock?  Furthermore, do you really want to find out the answer to that question the hard way?

The United Kingdom, which does not issue a reserve currency, is more dependent on its financial sector and suffered a bigger banking bust, has not had the same shale gas revolution, and is more vulnerable to Europe, is clearly more exposed to the drama scenario than the US.  And yet you regularly assert that the situations in the US and UK are the same and that both countries have the costless option of engaging in an open-ended fiscal expansion.  Of course, this does not preclude high-return infrastructure investments, making use of the public balance sheet directly or indirectly through public-private partnerships.

Policy response to debt without drama.  Let us be clear, we have addressed the role of somewhat higher inflation and financial repression in debt reduction in our research and in numerous pieces of commentary.  As our appendix shows, we did not advocate austerity in the immediate wake of the crisis when recovery was frail.  But the subprime crisis began in the summer of 2007, now six years ago.  Waiting 10 to 15 more years to deal with a festering problem is an invitation for decay, if not necessarily an outright debt crisis.  The end may not come with a bang but with a whimper.

Scholarship: Stick to the facts

The accusation in the New York Review of Books is a sloppy neglect on your part to check the facts before charging us with a serious academic ethical infraction.  You had already implicitly endorsed this from your perch at the New York Times by posting a link to a program that treated the misstatement as fact.

Fortunately, the "Wayback Machine" crawls the Internet and periodically makes wholesale copies of web pages. The debt/GDP database was first archived in October 2010 from Carmen's University of Maryland webpage.  The data migrated to ReinhartandRogoff.com in March 2011.  There it sits with our other data, on inflation, crises dates, and exchange rates.  These data are regularly sought and found for those doing research who care to look. The greater disclosure of debt data from official institutions is testament to this.  The IMF began to construct historical public debt data only after we had provided a roadmap in the list of our detailed references in a 2009 book (and before that in a 2008 working paper) that explained how we had unearthed the data.

Our interaction with scholars and practitioners working on real world questions in our field is ongoing, and our doors remain open. So to accuse us of not sharing our data is an unfounded attack on our academic and personal integrity.

Recap

Finally, we attach, as do many other mainstream economists, a somewhat higher weight on risks than you do, as debts of all measure -- including old age liabilities, public debt, private debt and external debt -- ascend into record territory.   This is not a conclusion based on one or two papers as you sometimes seem to imply, but rather on a long-standing body of economic research and extensive historical experience about the risks of record high debt levels.

You often cite John Maynard Keynes.  We read Keynes, all the way through.  He wrote How to Pay for the War in 1940 precisely because he was not blasé about large deficits - even in support of a cause as noble as a war of survival. Debt is a slow-moving variable that cannot - and in general should not - be brought down too quickly.  But interest rates can change much more quickly than fiscal policy and debt.

You might be right, and this time might be, after all, different.  If so, we will admit that we were wrong.  Whatever the outcome, we intend to be there to put the results in proper context for the community of scholars, policymakers, and civil society.

Respectfully yours,

Carmen M. Reinhart and Kenneth S. Rogoff

Harvard University.

Lark

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Re:Krugman et al
« Responder #1239 em: 2013-05-27 16:55:52 »
ACCURATE AND INACCURATE WAYS OF PORTRAYING THE DEBT-AND-GROWTH ASSOCIATION

Accurate Ways of Portraying the Debt-and-Growth Association:

The Post-WWII G-7:

[graf1]

[graf2]

In the post-WWII G-7, the high-debt low-growth correlation is overwhelmingly driven by (a) the recent experience of Italy and Japan, in which slow growth preceded high debt; (b) the high-debt UK after WWII, but UK growth did not accelerate as its debt load fell; and (c ) the low-debt defeated axis after WWII, which rapidly rebuilt and caught up to their pre-WWII levels of prosperity.

The Owen Zidar Graph:

[graf3]


Countries with debt-to-GDP ratios above 90% do have slower growth than countries with lower debt-to-GDP ratios, but there is no "cliff" at 90%--and policymakers should not have been told that there is an "important marker" at 90%.

[graf4]

Let me highlight a passage from the "Understanding Our Adversaries" evolution-of-economists'-views talk that I started giving three five months ago, a passage based on work by Owen Zidar summarized by the graph above:

The argument for fiscal contraction and against fiscal expansion in the short run is now: never mind why, the costs of debt accumulation are very high. This is the argument made by Reinhart, Reinhart, and Rogoff: when your debt to annual GDP ratio rises above 90%, your growth tends to be slow.

This is the most live argument today. So let me nibble away at it. And let me start by presenting the RRR case in the form of Owen Zidar's graph.

First: note well: no cliff at 90%.

Second, RRR present a correlation--not a causal mechanism, and not a properly-instrumented regression. Their argument is a claim that high debt-to-GDP and slow subsequent growth go together, without answering the question of which way causation runs. Let us answer that question.

The third thing to note is how small the correlation is. Suppose that we consider a multiplier of 1.5 and a marginal tax share of 1/3. Suppose the growth-depressing effect lasts for 10 years. Suppose that all of the correlation is causation running from high debt to slower future growth. And suppose that we boost government spending by 2% of GDP this year in the first case. Output this year then goes up by 3% of GDP. Debt goes up by 1% of GDP taking account of higher tax collections. This higher debt then reduces growth by… wait for it… 0.006% points per year. After 10 years GDP is lower than it would otherwise have been by 0.06%. 3% higher GDP this year and slower growth that leads to GDP lower by 0.06% in a decade. And this is supposed to be an argument against expansionary fiscal policy right now?….

And this isn’t the graph that you were looking for. You want the causal graph. That, worldwide, growth is slow for other reasons when debt is high for other reasons or where debt is high for other reasons is in this graph, and should not be. Control for country and era effects, and Owen reports that the -0.06% becomes -0.03%. As Larry Summers never tires of pointing out, (a) debt-to-annual-GDP ratio has a numerator and a denominator, and (b) sometimes high-debt comes with high interest rates and we expect that to slow growth but that is not relevant to the North Atlantic right now. If the ratio is high because of the denominator, causation is already running the other way. We want to focus on cases of high debt and low interest rates. Do those two things and we are down to a -0.01% coefficient.

We are supposed to be scared of a government-spending program of between 2% and 6% of a year's GDP because we see a causal mechanism at work that would also lower GDP in a decade by 0.01% of GDP? That does not seem to me to compute.


Not so Accurate Ways of Portraying the Debt-and-Growth Association:

[graf5]

[graf6]

Carmen Reinhart and Ken Rogoff (July 2011):

Too Much Debt Means the Economy Can’t Grow: As public debt in advanced countries reaches levels not seen since the end of World War II, there is considerable debate about the urgency of taming deficits with the aim of stabilizing and ultimately reducing debt as a percentage of gross domestic product.

Our empirical research on the history of financial crises and the relationship between growth and public liabilities supports the view that current debt trajectories are a risk to long-term growth and stability, with many advanced economies already reaching or exceeding the important marker of 90 percent of GDP. Nevertheless, many prominent public intellectuals continue to argue that debt phobia is wildly overblown. Countries such as the U.S., Japan and the U.K. aren’t like Greece, nor does the market treat them as such.

Indeed, there is a growing perception that today’s low interest rates for the debt of advanced economies offer a compelling reason to begin another round of massive fiscal stimulus. If Asian nations are spinning off huge excess savings partly as a byproduct of measures that effectively force low- income savers to put their money in bank accounts with low government-imposed interest-rate ceilings -- why not take advantage of the cheap money?

Although we agree that governments must exercise caution in gradually reducing crisis-response spending, we think it would be folly to take comfort in today’s low borrowing costs, much less to interpret them as an “all clear” signal for a further explosion of debt.

Several studies of financial crises show that interest rates seldom indicate problems long in advance. In fact, we should probably be particularly concerned today because a growing share of advanced country debt is held by official creditors whose current willingness to forego short-term returns doesn’t guarantee there will be a captive audience for debt in perpetuity.

Those who would point to low servicing costs should remember that market interest rates can change like the weather. Debt levels, by contrast, can’t be brought down quickly. Even though politicians everywhere like to argue that their country will expand its way out of debt, our historical research suggests that growth alone is rarely enough to achieve that with the debt levels we are experiencing today.

While we expect to see more than one member of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development default or restructure their debt before the European crisis is resolved, that isn’t the greatest threat to most advanced economies. The biggest risk is that debt will accumulate until the overhang weighs on growth.

At what point does indebtedness become a problem? In our study “Growth in a Time of Debt,” we found relatively little association between public liabilities and growth for debt levels of less than 90 percent of GDP. But burdens above 90 percent are associated with 1 percent lower median growth. Our results are based on a data set of public debt covering 44 countries for up to 200 years. The annual data set incorporates more than 3,700 observations spanning a wide range of political and historical circumstances, legal structures and monetary regimes.

We aren’t suggesting there is a bright red line at 90 percent; our results don’t imply that 89 percent is a safe debt level, or that 91 percent is necessarily catastrophic. Anyone familiar with doing empirical research understands that vulnerability to crises and anemic growth seldom depends on a single factor such as public debt.

Matt O'Brien sends us to Tim Fernholz who sends us to Senator Tom Coburn:

Johnny Isakson, a Republican from Georgia and always a gentleman, stood up to ask his question: "Do we need to act this year? Is it better to act quickly?"

"Absolutely," Rogoff said. "Not acting moves the risk closer," he explained, because every year of not acting adds another year of debt accumulation. "You have very few levers at this point," he warned us.

Reinhart echoed Conrad's point and explained that countries rarely pass the 90 percent debt-to-GDP tipping point precisely because it is dangerous to let that much debt accumulate. She said, "If it is not risky to hit the 90 percent threshold, we would expect a higher incidence."

Tim Fernholz's Reinhart-Rogoff quotes:

How influential was the Rogoff-Reinhart study warning that high debt kills growth?:

t is widely acknowledged, based on serious research, that when public debt levels rise about 90% they tend to have a negative economic dynamism, which translates into low growth for many years.” — European Commissioner Olli Rehn.

“Economists who have studied sovereign debt tell us that letting total debt rise above 90 percent of GDP creates a drag on economic growth and intensifies the risk of a debt-fueled economic crisis.” — House Budget Committee Chairman and former Republican vice-presidential candidate Paul Ryan.

“It’s an excellent study, although in some ways what you’ve summarized understates the risks.”— Former US Treasury Secretary Tim Geithner.

“[W]e would soon get to a situation in which a debt-to-GDP ratio would be 100%. As economists such as Reinhart and Rogoff have argued, that is the level at which the overall stock of debt becomes dangerous for the long-term growth of an economy. They would argue that that is why Japan has had such a bad time for such a long period. If deficits really solved long-term economic growth, Japan would not have been stranded in the situation in which it has been for such a long time.” Lord Lamont of Lerwick, former UK chancellor and sometime adviser to current chancellor George Osborne.

“The debt hurts the economy already. The canonical work of Carmen Reinhart and Kenneth Rogoff and its successors carry a clear message: countries that have gross government debt in excess of 90% of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) are in the debt danger zone. Entering the zone means slower economic growth.”— Doug Holtz-Eakin, Chairman of the American Action Forum.

DeLong
« Última modificação: 2013-05-27 16:57:45 por Lark »
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