Krugman et al

[Zel]

este artigo de 2005, encontrei-o com facilidade

That Hissing Sound
 
By PAUL KRUGMAN
Published: August 8, 2005

This is the way the bubble ends: not with a pop, but with a hiss.

Housing prices move much more slowly than stock prices. There are no Black Mondays, when prices fall 23 percent in a day. In fact, prices often keep rising for a while even after a housing boom goes bust.

So the news that the U.S. housing bubble is over won't come in the form of plunging prices; it will come in the form of falling sales and rising inventory, as sellers try to get prices that buyers are no longer willing to pay. And the process may already have started.

Of course, some people still deny that there's a housing bubble. Let me explain how we know that they're wrong.

One piece of evidence is the sense of frenzy about real estate, which irresistibly brings to mind the stock frenzy of 1999. Even some of the players are the same. The authors of the 1999 best seller "Dow 36,000" are now among the most vocal proponents of the view that there is no housing bubble.

Then there are the numbers. Many bubble deniers point to average prices for the country as a whole, which look worrisome but not totally crazy. When it comes to housing, however, the United States is really two countries, Flatland and the Zoned Zone.

In Flatland, which occupies the middle of the country, it's easy to build houses. When the demand for houses rises, Flatland metropolitan areas, which don't really have traditional downtowns, just sprawl some more. As a result, housing prices are basically determined by the cost of construction. In Flatland, a housing bubble can't even get started.

But in the Zoned Zone, which lies along the coasts, a combination of high population density and land-use restrictions - hence "zoned" - makes it hard to build new houses. So when people become willing to spend more on houses, say because of a fall in mortgage rates, some houses get built, but the prices of existing houses also go up. And if people think that prices will continue to rise, they become willing to spend even more, driving prices still higher, and so on. In other words, the Zoned Zone is prone to housing bubbles.

And Zoned Zone housing prices, which have risen much faster than the national average, clearly point to a bubble.

In the nation as a whole, housing prices rose about 50 percent between the first quarter of 2000 and the first quarter of 2005. But that average blends results from Flatland metropolitan areas like Houston and Atlanta, where prices rose 26 and 29 percent respectively, with results from Zoned Zone areas like New York, Miami and San Diego, where prices rose 77, 96 and 118 percent.

Nobody would pay San Diego prices without believing that prices will continue to rise. Rents rose much more slowly than prices: the Bureau of Labor Statistics index of "owners' equivalent rent" rose only 27 percent from late 1999 to late 2004. Business Week reports that by 2004 the cost of renting a house in San Diego was only 40 percent of the cost of owning a similar house - even taking into account low interest rates on mortgages. So it makes sense to buy in San Diego only if you believe that prices will keep rising rapidly, generating big capital gains. That's pretty much the definition of a bubble.

Bubbles end when people stop believing that big capital gains are a sure thing. That's what happened in San Diego at the end of its last housing bubble: after a rapid rise, house prices peaked in 1990. Soon there was a glut of houses on the market, and prices began falling. By 1996, they had declined about 25 percent after adjusting for inflation.

And that's what's happening in San Diego right now, after a rise in house prices that dwarfs the boom of the 1980's. The number of single-family houses and condos on the market has doubled over the past year. "Homes that a year or two ago sold virtually overnight - in many cases triggering bidding wars - are on the market for weeks," reports The Los Angeles Times. The same thing is happening in other formerly hot markets.

Meanwhile, the U.S. economy has become deeply dependent on the housing bubble. The economic recovery since 2001 has been disappointing in many ways, but it wouldn't have happened at all without soaring spending on residential construction, plus a surge in consumer spending largely based on mortgage refinancing. Did I mention that the personal savings rate has fallen to zero?

Now we're starting to hear a hissing sound, as the air begins to leak out of the bubble. And everyone - not just those who own Zoned Zone real estate - should be worried.

fonte

 nao fica claro o que ele acha sobre o tradeoff de inflacionar bolhas para sair duma recessao, parece que na altura ele nao achava muito ma ideia

[Lark]

Para voltarmos a produzir mais é necessário injectar liquidez, não se pode produzir muito com pouca procura.

Daí a importância da teoria de Keynes neste contexto.

Não nos podemos esquecer que foi essa teoria que salvou Alemanha pós guerra Mundial.

E a liquidez existe, é canalizada via banca e Krugman identifica onde está o problema, não é canalizado para a economia real, é desviado para os mercados.

O conceito de banca comercial destruiu as economias.

A procura existe, não existe é rendimento. Existe muita vontade de comprar carros actuais, casas actuais. A dificuldade está em produzir algo que tenha o valor da casa ou carro para trocar por ela.

não existe rendimento->não existe procura. é essa a definição de uma crise de procura, tal como esta é.
se o desemprego passasse, por artes mágicas, para 4 ou 5%, a procura aparecia, porque aparecia rendimento.

[Lark]

este artigo de 2005, encontrei-o com facilidade

That Hissing Sound
 
By PAUL KRUGMAN
Published: August 8, 2005

This is the way the bubble ends: not with a pop, but with a hiss.

Housing prices move much more slowly than stock prices. There are no Black Mondays, when prices fall 23 percent in a day. In fact, prices often keep rising for a while even after a housing boom goes bust.

So the news that the U.S. housing bubble is over won't come in the form of plunging prices; it will come in the form of falling sales and rising inventory, as sellers try to get prices that buyers are no longer willing to pay. And the process may already have started.

Of course, some people still deny that there's a housing bubble. Let me explain how we know that they're wrong.

One piece of evidence is the sense of frenzy about real estate, which irresistibly brings to mind the stock frenzy of 1999. Even some of the players are the same. The authors of the 1999 best seller "Dow 36,000" are now among the most vocal proponents of the view that there is no housing bubble.

Then there are the numbers. Many bubble deniers point to average prices for the country as a whole, which look worrisome but not totally crazy. When it comes to housing, however, the United States is really two countries, Flatland and the Zoned Zone.

In Flatland, which occupies the middle of the country, it's easy to build houses. When the demand for houses rises, Flatland metropolitan areas, which don't really have traditional downtowns, just sprawl some more. As a result, housing prices are basically determined by the cost of construction. In Flatland, a housing bubble can't even get started.

But in the Zoned Zone, which lies along the coasts, a combination of high population density and land-use restrictions - hence "zoned" - makes it hard to build new houses. So when people become willing to spend more on houses, say because of a fall in mortgage rates, some houses get built, but the prices of existing houses also go up. And if people think that prices will continue to rise, they become willing to spend even more, driving prices still higher, and so on. In other words, the Zoned Zone is prone to housing bubbles.

And Zoned Zone housing prices, which have risen much faster than the national average, clearly point to a bubble.

In the nation as a whole, housing prices rose about 50 percent between the first quarter of 2000 and the first quarter of 2005. But that average blends results from Flatland metropolitan areas like Houston and Atlanta, where prices rose 26 and 29 percent respectively, with results from Zoned Zone areas like New York, Miami and San Diego, where prices rose 77, 96 and 118 percent.

Nobody would pay San Diego prices without believing that prices will continue to rise. Rents rose much more slowly than prices: the Bureau of Labor Statistics index of "owners' equivalent rent" rose only 27 percent from late 1999 to late 2004. Business Week reports that by 2004 the cost of renting a house in San Diego was only 40 percent of the cost of owning a similar house - even taking into account low interest rates on mortgages. So it makes sense to buy in San Diego only if you believe that prices will keep rising rapidly, generating big capital gains. That's pretty much the definition of a bubble.

Bubbles end when people stop believing that big capital gains are a sure thing. That's what happened in San Diego at the end of its last housing bubble: after a rapid rise, house prices peaked in 1990. Soon there was a glut of houses on the market, and prices began falling. By 1996, they had declined about 25 percent after adjusting for inflation.

And that's what's happening in San Diego right now, after a rise in house prices that dwarfs the boom of the 1980's. The number of single-family houses and condos on the market has doubled over the past year. "Homes that a year or two ago sold virtually overnight - in many cases triggering bidding wars - are on the market for weeks," reports The Los Angeles Times. The same thing is happening in other formerly hot markets.

Meanwhile, the U.S. economy has become deeply dependent on the housing bubble. The economic recovery since 2001 has been disappointing in many ways, but it wouldn't have happened at all without soaring spending on residential construction, plus a surge in consumer spending largely based on mortgage refinancing. Did I mention that the personal savings rate has fallen to zero?

Now we're starting to hear a hissing sound, as the air begins to leak out of the bubble. And everyone - not just those who own Zoned Zone real estate - should be worried.

fonte

 nao fica claro o que ele acha sobre o tradeoff de inflacionar bolhas para sair duma recessao, parece que na altura ele nao achava muito ma ideia

ó zel, concede lá que o krugman diagnosticou a crise imobiliária, ao contrário do mito que te andaram a vender nos sites libertários.
bolas, se andamos nos mercados a primeira coisa que queremos é ser objectivos e não ir em cantigas.

[Zel]

este artigo de 2005, encontrei-o com facilidade

That Hissing Sound
 
By PAUL KRUGMAN
Published: August 8, 2005

This is the way the bubble ends: not with a pop, but with a hiss.

Housing prices move much more slowly than stock prices. There are no Black Mondays, when prices fall 23 percent in a day. In fact, prices often keep rising for a while even after a housing boom goes bust.

So the news that the U.S. housing bubble is over won't come in the form of plunging prices; it will come in the form of falling sales and rising inventory, as sellers try to get prices that buyers are no longer willing to pay. And the process may already have started.

Of course, some people still deny that there's a housing bubble. Let me explain how we know that they're wrong.

One piece of evidence is the sense of frenzy about real estate, which irresistibly brings to mind the stock frenzy of 1999. Even some of the players are the same. The authors of the 1999 best seller "Dow 36,000" are now among the most vocal proponents of the view that there is no housing bubble.

Then there are the numbers. Many bubble deniers point to average prices for the country as a whole, which look worrisome but not totally crazy. When it comes to housing, however, the United States is really two countries, Flatland and the Zoned Zone.

In Flatland, which occupies the middle of the country, it's easy to build houses. When the demand for houses rises, Flatland metropolitan areas, which don't really have traditional downtowns, just sprawl some more. As a result, housing prices are basically determined by the cost of construction. In Flatland, a housing bubble can't even get started.

But in the Zoned Zone, which lies along the coasts, a combination of high population density and land-use restrictions - hence "zoned" - makes it hard to build new houses. So when people become willing to spend more on houses, say because of a fall in mortgage rates, some houses get built, but the prices of existing houses also go up. And if people think that prices will continue to rise, they become willing to spend even more, driving prices still higher, and so on. In other words, the Zoned Zone is prone to housing bubbles.

And Zoned Zone housing prices, which have risen much faster than the national average, clearly point to a bubble.

In the nation as a whole, housing prices rose about 50 percent between the first quarter of 2000 and the first quarter of 2005. But that average blends results from Flatland metropolitan areas like Houston and Atlanta, where prices rose 26 and 29 percent respectively, with results from Zoned Zone areas like New York, Miami and San Diego, where prices rose 77, 96 and 118 percent.

Nobody would pay San Diego prices without believing that prices will continue to rise. Rents rose much more slowly than prices: the Bureau of Labor Statistics index of "owners' equivalent rent" rose only 27 percent from late 1999 to late 2004. Business Week reports that by 2004 the cost of renting a house in San Diego was only 40 percent of the cost of owning a similar house - even taking into account low interest rates on mortgages. So it makes sense to buy in San Diego only if you believe that prices will keep rising rapidly, generating big capital gains. That's pretty much the definition of a bubble.

Bubbles end when people stop believing that big capital gains are a sure thing. That's what happened in San Diego at the end of its last housing bubble: after a rapid rise, house prices peaked in 1990. Soon there was a glut of houses on the market, and prices began falling. By 1996, they had declined about 25 percent after adjusting for inflation.

And that's what's happening in San Diego right now, after a rise in house prices that dwarfs the boom of the 1980's. The number of single-family houses and condos on the market has doubled over the past year. "Homes that a year or two ago sold virtually overnight - in many cases triggering bidding wars - are on the market for weeks," reports The Los Angeles Times. The same thing is happening in other formerly hot markets.

Meanwhile, the U.S. economy has become deeply dependent on the housing bubble. The economic recovery since 2001 has been disappointing in many ways, but it wouldn't have happened at all without soaring spending on residential construction, plus a surge in consumer spending largely based on mortgage refinancing. Did I mention that the personal savings rate has fallen to zero?

Now we're starting to hear a hissing sound, as the air begins to leak out of the bubble. And everyone - not just those who own Zoned Zone real estate - should be worried.

fonte

 nao fica claro o que ele acha sobre o tradeoff de inflacionar bolhas para sair duma recessao, parece que na altura ele nao achava muito ma ideia

ó zel, concede lá que o krugman diagnosticou a crise imobiliária, ao contrário do mito que te andaram a vender nos sites libertários.
bolas, se andamos nos mercados a primeira coisa que queremos é ser objectivos e não ir em cantigas.

concedo, achei que isso era obvio na minha resposta

[Zel]

repôr o glass-steagall act, separando banca de investimento da banca de restalho, para começar, não era mal pensado.

tb deviam partir os bancos em mais pequenos

[mig]

A procura existe, não existe é rendimento. Existe muita vontade de comprar carros actuais, casas actuais. A dificuldade está em produzir algo que tenha o valor da casa ou carro para trocar por ela.

não existe rendimento->não existe procura. é essa a definição de uma crise de procura, tal como esta é.
se o desemprego passasse, por artes mágicas, para 4 ou 5%, a procura aparecia, porque aparecia rendimento.

Concordo com o Lark, e a teoria de Keynes na economia podia dinamizar empresas na criação de emprego.

Não entendo os economistas continuam a defender austeridade.

[Incognitus]

 
A procura existe, não existe é rendimento. Existe muita vontade de comprar carros actuais, casas actuais. A dificuldade está em produzir algo que tenha o valor da casa ou carro para trocar por ela.

não existe rendimento->não existe procura. é essa a definição de uma crise de procura, tal como esta é.
se o desemprego passasse, por artes mágicas, para 4 ou 5%, a procura aparecia, porque aparecia rendimento.

Concordo com o Lark, e a teoria de Keynes na economia podia dinamizar empresas na criação de emprego.

Não entendo os economistas continuam a defender austeridade.

Se expandires a procura e o emprego através da tomada de dívida para criar actividades para as quais só existe procura enquanto expandires a divida, não estás a curar nada, apenas estás a adiar o problema.

[Tranquilo]

a europa devia investir em infraestruturas (supostamente produtivas), o que tinha várias vantagens, mais actividade, logo mais emprego, logo mais consumo e as economias podiam por esta via (investimento em infraestruturas) tornar-se mais competitivas.

um novo plano Marshall, financiado com divida europeia.

toda a europa poderia beneficiar.

[Zel]

a principal critica eh a de que o krugman nao percebe as consequencias das politicas monetarias que recomenda, no caso especifico da bolha imobiliaria a critica sera que ele nao entendeu a enorme crise que dai poderia vir, creio que ele esperaria apenas uma recessao pequena tal como deu a entender em 2008

[Zel]

 
A procura existe, não existe é rendimento. Existe muita vontade de comprar carros actuais, casas actuais. A dificuldade está em produzir algo que tenha o valor da casa ou carro para trocar por ela.

não existe rendimento->não existe procura. é essa a definição de uma crise de procura, tal como esta é.
se o desemprego passasse, por artes mágicas, para 4 ou 5%, a procura aparecia, porque aparecia rendimento.

Concordo com o Lark, e a teoria de Keynes na economia podia dinamizar empresas na criação de emprego.

Não entendo os economistas continuam a defender austeridade.

Se expandires a procura e o emprego através da tomada de dívida para criar actividades para as quais só existe procura enquanto expandires a divida, não estás a curar nada, apenas estás a adiar o problema.

 para ele toda a actividade economica eh boa, ele nao faz destincao entre bom e mau investimento e como tal nao percebe bem o impacto das bolhas criadas pelas suas recomendacoes de politica monetaria

[Lark]

Public Investment in the Slump
For future reference. In a depressed economy, with the government able to borrow at very low interest rates, we should be increasing public investment — the true cost of the resources is negligible, so the rate of return is very high, not to mention the desirability of creating jobs.

Here’s what has actually happened, as measured by the sum of state, local, and federal nondefense investment:


Doing it wrong.

[Lark]

o que o krugman defende é o investimento público numa situação de armadilha de liquidez. porque o custo de capital é baixo e não há perigo de inflação. a inflação é até desejável.

tudo o resto é mito.

[Incognitus]

Investimento que vise criar actividades que existam autonomamente depois, sem apoio público, deve fazer sentido.
 
No fundo a grande diferença está em quando se defende a ideia keynesiana de abrir buracos para os tapar. Isso não faz sentido, é uma actividade que cessa assim que cesse o apoio público.

[Zel]

o que o krugman defende é o investimento público numa situação de armadilha de liquidez. porque o custo de capital é baixo e não há perigo de inflação. a inflação é até desejável.

tudo o resto é mito.

nao eh bem assim, ja o vi em entrevistas gozar com o conceito de malinvestment

ha varios estudo que indicam que a divida acima de x do pib tem um custo para o PIB futuro, ele nunca fala sobre isso

inclusive fala do japao como se fosse um caso de sucesso qd o japao ainda vai ter uma enorme crise monetaria por ter uma situacao impossivel em termos de divida, principalmente agora com a populacao em decrescimento

a tecnica do krugman eh tapar buracos ate o sistema colapsar, como o colapso demora decadas a tecnica parece ter algum sucesso

mas eh muito melhor ter pequenas crises que nao metem em risco o sistema 

[Lark]

inclusive fala do japao como se fosse um caso de sucesso qd o japao ainda vai ter uma enorme crise monetaria por ter uma situacao impossivel em termos de divida, principalmente agora com a populacao em decrescimento

o krugman diz precisamente o contrário sobre o Japão. too little too late. um exemplo do que não deve ser feito numa armadilha de liquidez.

[hermes]

inclusive fala do japao como se fosse um caso de sucesso qd o japao ainda vai ter uma enorme crise monetaria por ter uma situacao impossivel em termos de divida, principalmente agora com a populacao em decrescimento

o krugman diz precisamente o contrário sobre o Japão. too little too late. um exemplo do que não deve ser feito numa armadilha de liquidez.

É impossível argumentar que está errado, basta depois ele vir dizer que não foi feito o suficiente. 

Por outro lado há alguma evidências do lado do debt / DDP a apontarem o seguinte:

Over the twenty-six public debt overhang [We define a public debt overhang as an episode where the gross public debt/ GDP ratio exceeds 90 percent for five years or more] episodes we consider, encompassing the preponderance of such episodes in advance economies since 1800, growth averages 1.2% less than in other periods. That is, debt levels above 90% are associated with an average growth rate of 2.3% (median 2.1%) versus 3.5% is lower debt periods. Notably, the average duration of debt overhang episodes was 23 years, implying a massive cumulative output loss. Indeed, by the end of the median episode, the level of output is nearly a quarter below that predicted by the trend in lower-debt periods. This long duration also suggests the association of debt and growth is not just a cyclical phenomenon.

Fonte: http://www.economics.harvard.edu/files/faculty/51_Debt_Overhangs.pdf

[Zel]

inclusive fala do japao como se fosse um caso de sucesso qd o japao ainda vai ter uma enorme crise monetaria por ter uma situacao impossivel em termos de divida, principalmente agora com a populacao em decrescimento

o krugman diz precisamente o contrário sobre o Japão. too little too late. um exemplo do que não deve ser feito numa armadilha de liquidez.

nao percebeste, falo de qd ele usa o japao como um exemplo de que eh possivel endividarmo-nos muito mais com "seguranca"

[Lark]

inclusive fala do japao como se fosse um caso de sucesso qd o japao ainda vai ter uma enorme crise monetaria por ter uma situacao impossivel em termos de divida, principalmente agora com a populacao em decrescimento

o krugman diz precisamente o contrário sobre o Japão. too little too late. um exemplo do que não deve ser feito numa armadilha de liquidez.

nao percebeste, falo de qd ele usa o japao como um exemplo de que eh possivel endividarmo-nos muito mais com "seguranca"

ah ok

[Lark]

inclusive fala do japao como se fosse um caso de sucesso qd o japao ainda vai ter uma enorme crise monetaria por ter uma situacao impossivel em termos de divida, principalmente agora com a populacao em decrescimento

o krugman diz precisamente o contrário sobre o Japão. too little too late. um exemplo do que não deve ser feito numa armadilha de liquidez.

É impossível argumentar que está errado, basta depois ele vir dizer que não foi feito o suficiente. 

Por outro lado há alguma evidências do lado do debt / DDP a apontarem o seguinte:

Over the twenty-six public debt overhang [We define a public debt overhang as an episode where the gross public debt/ GDP ratio exceeds 90 percent for five years or more] episodes we consider, encompassing the preponderance of such episodes in advance economies since 1800, growth averages 1.2% less than in other periods. That is, debt levels above 90% are associated with an average growth rate of 2.3% (median 2.1%) versus 3.5% is lower debt periods. Notably, the average duration of debt overhang episodes was 23 years, implying a massive cumulative output loss. Indeed, by the end of the median episode, the level of output is nearly a quarter below that predicted by the trend in lower-debt periods. This long duration also suggests the association of debt and growth is not just a cyclical phenomenon.

Fonte: http://www.economics.harvard.edu/files/faculty/51_Debt_Overhangs.pdf

ele nunca disse que a dívida e o deficit não era um problema. pelo contrário.

o que ele diz é que, numa armadilha de liquidez, há problemas muito mais graves que têm prioridade, nomeadamente o desemprego.

uuffaa, a desinformação e contra-informação sobre o homem é mais que muita. e não custa nada ir ler o original em vez das versões libertárias/conservadoras, para patos

[Lark]

o problema base é este e já está tornar-se estrutural

a velocidade do dinheiro

a inflação passou à história, a deflação ameaça instalar-se, o dinheiro é rei e ninguém quer separar-se dele. o dinheiro não circula.
para circular têm que ser criadas expectativas credíveis de inflação, senão nada feito.