Grécia - Tópico principal

[Kin2010]

http://observador.pt/2015/08/05/varoufakis-e-a-noite-do-referendo-o-relato-de-um-ministro-aliviado-por-ja-nao-o-ser/

o varoufakis acusa o tsipras e de forma simpatica de querer perder o referendo

Tal e qual como eu aqui previ. Tanto o Varoufakis como o Evans-Pritchard vieram depois a escrever a dar razão à minha tese.

[Lark]

Schäuble's ticking clock

Here's a fact about the Greek financial crisis that doesn't seem to be widely reported: in just under five months, the rules of the game are going to change, and the changes will probably tilt the balance of power in favor of the Greek government and against the Troika.

Here's the story.

As we've learned over the past two months, the Troika's biggest stick is the ability (and willingness) of the European Central Bank to cripple the banking system of a Eurozone member state by denying it liquidity.

Now, for a central bank to deliberately destabilize a financial system under its care is, as far as I can tell, unprecedented in the history of modern central banking.  And it is unimaginable that the countries composing the Eurozone would have signed up in the first place if the ECB "charter" had explicitly given the central bank the role of "enforcer" of the terms of the growth-and-stability pact (or of pretty much anything else).  So the ECB's actions would have been jaw-dropping enough under the original rules of the Eurozone.  But the reality is worse.

In 2013, the European Commission designated the ECB to be the authoritative bank regulator for the Eurozone.  (1)  The ECB is the entity charged with determining whether a particular bank is solvent.  It is also charged with the responsibility to take early action to force the resolution of insolvent (and likely-to-become insolvent) banks in such a way as to preserve the smooth functioning of the financial system of the Eurozone and of each member state.

It's hard to avoid the conclusion that, if Greece's banks are in such trouble that the ECB is remotely justified in refusing to provide liquidity support, that the ECB is also, in its role as bank regulator, obliged to shut those banks down and see that they are rapidly restructured and recapitalized.

In other words, the ECB is explicitly required by its own enabling legislation to prevent the state of affairs which it deliberately created in Greece.

So what happens in 2016?

On January 1, the final piece of the Eurozone banking union puzzle falls into place:  the responsibility for structuring bank resolution programs will shift from national resolution authorities to a Eurozone-wide Single Resolution Mechanism (SRM), backed by a Single Resolution Fund (SRF).  The goal of this institution is to break, one and for all, the link between the solvency of any particular national government and the stability of its banking system.  In other words, its purpose is to take away the very leverage the Troika has been using to force concessions from the Greek government -- the threat that "insolvent government = banking system collapse."

The Single Resolution Fund is also, to be perfectly frank, a de facto transfer union.  Nominally, of course, it is no such thing, because there must never be such a thing, because...reasons.  How does this work?  The SRF is to be funded by compulsory levies charged against banks.  These, we are assured, are not taxes, and banks are not taxpayers, so no tax money is involved. (Seriously.) In any event, over the next several years (there's a transition formula), the SRF will evolve from a nationally compartmentalized fund into a single entity fully mutualizing the cost of bank resolution across all countries of the Eurozone.   And in the interim, the fund is authorized to borrow against future charges-to-banks-that-are-not-a-tax-because-reasons.

What does this mean for Greece?  A couple of things.  First, it gives the Greek government a way to force the "are they solvent or aren't they" issue.  If the Greek national authorities declare one or more banks to be in danger of insolvency, they can ask the SRM to help create a resolution plan.  The ECB could prevent this, but only by explicitly declaring said banks not merely solvent, but safe.

Second, the existence of the SRF, even in its initial "compartmentalized" form, drastically reduces the uncertainty associated with declaring a Greek bank insolvent.  Under current rules, it's not 100% clear that the ECB is required to provide financial support to make an orderly resolution feasible.  (I would argue that it's strongly implied, but given the ECB's demonstrated willingness to ignore its responsibilities when it come to Greece, I certainly wouldn't rely on it.)  The responsibilities of the SRF are indisputable.

So: it is settled EU policy that the insolvency of a particular Eurozone government shall not destabilize the financial system in that or any other Eurozone country.  And, to that end, financing bank resolutions is a responsibility of the Eurozone banking system as a whole, not of individual Eurozone governments.  Good.  But it's hard not to suspect that some in the EU, in writing and blessing these rules, had in mind a silent caveat: "except for Greece."

In fact, it's not hard to imagine what might happen if the first use of the SRF were to recapitalize, say, Alpha Bank.  The German press, among others, would take a sudden interest in the SRM and the SRF, and might not be inclined to accept the notion that compulsory payments to a governmental entity are, in some fundamental sense, not "taxes."  And somebody, somewhere will accuse the Merkel government (with some justice) of having signed on to a stealth transfer union, which is "bailing out" Greek banks.  Hijinks ensue.

How could EU policymakers have convinced themselves that that the SRM would never be applied to Greece?  My personal guess would be that it involved the same form of self-deception entailed in all games of "kick the can down the road," the expectation -- born more of wishful thinking than of reason -- that, somehow, these things will work out before the moment of truth arrives.

But now the moment of truth is awfully near.

All of which might help to explain Wolfgang Schäuble's evident desire to push Greece out of the Eurozone as quickly as possible.  There's a ticking clock: in five months, it becomes a whole lot harder for the Troika to hold the Greek banking system hostage, and the consequence of trying -- the activation of the SRM to recapitalize insolvent Greek banks -- could have interesting political repercussions in Germany and elsewhere.

I'm very curious to see what's going to happen next.

--------------------------------------

(1) This became effective on January 1, 2014.  The ECB exercises direct supervision of a number of large banks, while supervising the rest through the national regulatory authorities.  However, there seems to be no doubt of the ECB's authority to override the judgment of a local regulator should a difference of opinion arise as to the solvency of a particular institution.

fonte

[valves1]

um haircut da divida  grega pode nao ser tecnicamente necessario ( uma  vez que enquanto forem emprestando  dinheiro para o   serviço da dívida a grecia nao cai ) mas com  as taxas de juro a  preparem-se para iniciar a subida que impacto isso tera  por exemplo na periferia da zona euro ?

The Federal Reserve on Wednesday continued to pave the way for an increase in interest rates as early as September.

The US central bank left its key interest rate unchanged at near zero – where it has been since the 2008 financial crisis – but once again signalled that rates will rise later this year.

While the Fed chair, Janet Yellen, has left little doubt that rates will rise this year, the Fed left itself wiggle room as it has set no timetable and said rates would only be raised if the economy continues to improve and unemployment continues to fall.
Analysis Will a rise in US interest rates cause investments to tumble?
Even the mere prospect of the Federal Reserve raising interest rates has delivered a shock to US markets due to a lack of liquidity – so what can investors expect when the inevitable rate hikes actually come to pass?
Read more

Many market watchers expect rates to be raised at the Fed’s next policy meeting on 16-17 September, when Yellen will hold a press conference. The central bank has another meeting scheduled for December.

Earlier this month, Yellen told Congress: “Our economy is in a much better state. Low interest rates have facilitated it, and a decision on our part to raise rates will say, ‘No, the economy doesn’t stink.’

“We’re close to where we want to be, and we now think the economy can not only tolerate but needs higher rates. So there have been headwinds, and we’ve tried to use monetary policy to overcome them.”

Tom di Galoma, head of rates trading at ED&F Man Capital, said: “The economy is improving, but they are not really saying that the economy is taking off here. If the Fed doesn’t raise rates in September, I think we’re looking at some time mid-next year.”
Advertisement

Wednesday’s statement pointed to improvements in the unemployment rate, consumer spending and housing. The language of the statement was little changed, but for the first time it pointed to “solid” job gains. The unemployment rate has fallen to a seven-year low of 5.3%. It continued to describe economic activity as expanding “moderately”.

The Fed said it still expects inflation to rise gradually toward its 2% target. It left unchanged its phrasing on raising rates “when it has seen some further improvement in the labor market and is reasonably confident that inflation will move back to its 2% objective over the medium term”.

The committee has kept the benchmark overnight federal funds rate at a record low of 0-0.25% since December 2008 as the global economy struggled with the worst recession since the Great Depression.

Yellen has repeatedly stressed that when the Fed does raise rates it will do so only gradually. She has suggested that raising rates in small increments, followed by pauses, will let the Fed assess the effects of slightly higher borrowing costs.

US stocks spiked slightly after the Fed’s statement.

[Incognitus]

Schäuble's ticking clock

Here's a fact about the Greek financial crisis that doesn't seem to be widely reported: in just under five months, the rules of the game are going to change, and the changes will probably tilt the balance of power in favor of the Greek government and against the Troika.

Here's the story.

As we've learned over the past two months, the Troika's biggest stick is the ability (and willingness) of the European Central Bank to cripple the banking system of a Eurozone member state by denying it liquidity.

Now, for a central bank to deliberately destabilize a financial system under its care is, as far as I can tell, unprecedented in the history of modern central banking.  And it is unimaginable that the countries composing the Eurozone would have signed up in the first place if the ECB "charter" had explicitly given the central bank the role of "enforcer" of the terms of the growth-and-stability pact (or of pretty much anything else).  So the ECB's actions would have been jaw-dropping enough under the original rules of the Eurozone.  But the reality is worse.

In 2013, the European Commission designated the ECB to be the authoritative bank regulator for the Eurozone.  (1)  The ECB is the entity charged with determining whether a particular bank is solvent.  It is also charged with the responsibility to take early action to force the resolution of insolvent (and likely-to-become insolvent) banks in such a way as to preserve the smooth functioning of the financial system of the Eurozone and of each member state.

It's hard to avoid the conclusion that, if Greece's banks are in such trouble that the ECB is remotely justified in refusing to provide liquidity support, that the ECB is also, in its role as bank regulator, obliged to shut those banks down and see that they are rapidly restructured and recapitalized.

In other words, the ECB is explicitly required by its own enabling legislation to prevent the state of affairs which it deliberately created in Greece.

So what happens in 2016?

On January 1, the final piece of the Eurozone banking union puzzle falls into place:  the responsibility for structuring bank resolution programs will shift from national resolution authorities to a Eurozone-wide Single Resolution Mechanism (SRM), backed by a Single Resolution Fund (SRF).  The goal of this institution is to break, one and for all, the link between the solvency of any particular national government and the stability of its banking system.  In other words, its purpose is to take away the very leverage the Troika has been using to force concessions from the Greek government -- the threat that "insolvent government = banking system collapse."

The Single Resolution Fund is also, to be perfectly frank, a de facto transfer union.  Nominally, of course, it is no such thing, because there must never be such a thing, because...reasons.  How does this work?  The SRF is to be funded by compulsory levies charged against banks.  These, we are assured, are not taxes, and banks are not taxpayers, so no tax money is involved. (Seriously.) In any event, over the next several years (there's a transition formula), the SRF will evolve from a nationally compartmentalized fund into a single entity fully mutualizing the cost of bank resolution across all countries of the Eurozone.   And in the interim, the fund is authorized to borrow against future charges-to-banks-that-are-not-a-tax-because-reasons.

What does this mean for Greece?  A couple of things.  First, it gives the Greek government a way to force the "are they solvent or aren't they" issue.  If the Greek national authorities declare one or more banks to be in danger of insolvency, they can ask the SRM to help create a resolution plan.  The ECB could prevent this, but only by explicitly declaring said banks not merely solvent, but safe.

Second, the existence of the SRF, even in its initial "compartmentalized" form, drastically reduces the uncertainty associated with declaring a Greek bank insolvent.  Under current rules, it's not 100% clear that the ECB is required to provide financial support to make an orderly resolution feasible.  (I would argue that it's strongly implied, but given the ECB's demonstrated willingness to ignore its responsibilities when it come to Greece, I certainly wouldn't rely on it.)  The responsibilities of the SRF are indisputable.

So: it is settled EU policy that the insolvency of a particular Eurozone government shall not destabilize the financial system in that or any other Eurozone country.  And, to that end, financing bank resolutions is a responsibility of the Eurozone banking system as a whole, not of individual Eurozone governments.  Good.  But it's hard not to suspect that some in the EU, in writing and blessing these rules, had in mind a silent caveat: "except for Greece."

In fact, it's not hard to imagine what might happen if the first use of the SRF were to recapitalize, say, Alpha Bank.  The German press, among others, would take a sudden interest in the SRM and the SRF, and might not be inclined to accept the notion that compulsory payments to a governmental entity are, in some fundamental sense, not "taxes."  And somebody, somewhere will accuse the Merkel government (with some justice) of having signed on to a stealth transfer union, which is "bailing out" Greek banks.  Hijinks ensue.

How could EU policymakers have convinced themselves that that the SRM would never be applied to Greece?  My personal guess would be that it involved the same form of self-deception entailed in all games of "kick the can down the road," the expectation -- born more of wishful thinking than of reason -- that, somehow, these things will work out before the moment of truth arrives.

But now the moment of truth is awfully near.

All of which might help to explain Wolfgang Schäuble's evident desire to push Greece out of the Eurozone as quickly as possible.  There's a ticking clock: in five months, it becomes a whole lot harder for the Troika to hold the Greek banking system hostage, and the consequence of trying -- the activation of the SRM to recapitalize insolvent Greek banks -- could have interesting political repercussions in Germany and elsewhere.

I'm very curious to see what's going to happen next.

--------------------------------------

(1) This became effective on January 1, 2014.  The ECB exercises direct supervision of a number of large banks, while supervising the rest through the national regulatory authorities.  However, there seems to be no doubt of the ECB's authority to override the judgment of a local regulator should a difference of opinion arise as to the solvency of a particular institution.

fonte

Isso só obriga a dar os bancos como falidos mais cedo. E pior ainda, quando isso acontecer os accionistas serão derretidos, os credores serão derretidos, e só depois é que se salvarão os depositantes (e dentro destes, se a coisa for muito agressiva, só os mais pequenos).

Pelo que o que vimos o BCE a fazer na prática será ainda pior agora -- pois o BCE não terá motivação para passar dezenas de biliões de euros para mãos Gregas. Simplesmente exigirá a resolução muito mais cedo.

[Lark]

Schäuble's ticking clock

Here's a fact about the Greek financial crisis that doesn't seem to be widely reported: in just under five months, the rules of the game are going to change, and the changes will probably tilt the balance of power in favor of the Greek government and against the Troika.

Here's the story.

As we've learned over the past two months, the Troika's biggest stick is the ability (and willingness) of the European Central Bank to cripple the banking system of a Eurozone member state by denying it liquidity.

Now, for a central bank to deliberately destabilize a financial system under its care is, as far as I can tell, unprecedented in the history of modern central banking.  And it is unimaginable that the countries composing the Eurozone would have signed up in the first place if the ECB "charter" had explicitly given the central bank the role of "enforcer" of the terms of the growth-and-stability pact (or of pretty much anything else).  So the ECB's actions would have been jaw-dropping enough under the original rules of the Eurozone.  But the reality is worse.

In 2013, the European Commission designated the ECB to be the authoritative bank regulator for the Eurozone.  (1)  The ECB is the entity charged with determining whether a particular bank is solvent.  It is also charged with the responsibility to take early action to force the resolution of insolvent (and likely-to-become insolvent) banks in such a way as to preserve the smooth functioning of the financial system of the Eurozone and of each member state.

It's hard to avoid the conclusion that, if Greece's banks are in such trouble that the ECB is remotely justified in refusing to provide liquidity support, that the ECB is also, in its role as bank regulator, obliged to shut those banks down and see that they are rapidly restructured and recapitalized.

In other words, the ECB is explicitly required by its own enabling legislation to prevent the state of affairs which it deliberately created in Greece.

So what happens in 2016?

On January 1, the final piece of the Eurozone banking union puzzle falls into place:  the responsibility for structuring bank resolution programs will shift from national resolution authorities to a Eurozone-wide Single Resolution Mechanism (SRM), backed by a Single Resolution Fund (SRF).  The goal of this institution is to break, one and for all, the link between the solvency of any particular national government and the stability of its banking system.  In other words, its purpose is to take away the very leverage the Troika has been using to force concessions from the Greek government -- the threat that "insolvent government = banking system collapse."

The Single Resolution Fund is also, to be perfectly frank, a de facto transfer union.  Nominally, of course, it is no such thing, because there must never be such a thing, because...reasons.  How does this work?  The SRF is to be funded by compulsory levies charged against banks.  These, we are assured, are not taxes, and banks are not taxpayers, so no tax money is involved. (Seriously.) In any event, over the next several years (there's a transition formula), the SRF will evolve from a nationally compartmentalized fund into a single entity fully mutualizing the cost of bank resolution across all countries of the Eurozone.   And in the interim, the fund is authorized to borrow against future charges-to-banks-that-are-not-a-tax-because-reasons.

What does this mean for Greece?  A couple of things.  First, it gives the Greek government a way to force the "are they solvent or aren't they" issue.  If the Greek national authorities declare one or more banks to be in danger of insolvency, they can ask the SRM to help create a resolution plan.  The ECB could prevent this, but only by explicitly declaring said banks not merely solvent, but safe.

Second, the existence of the SRF, even in its initial "compartmentalized" form, drastically reduces the uncertainty associated with declaring a Greek bank insolvent.  Under current rules, it's not 100% clear that the ECB is required to provide financial support to make an orderly resolution feasible.  (I would argue that it's strongly implied, but given the ECB's demonstrated willingness to ignore its responsibilities when it come to Greece, I certainly wouldn't rely on it.)  The responsibilities of the SRF are indisputable.

So: it is settled EU policy that the insolvency of a particular Eurozone government shall not destabilize the financial system in that or any other Eurozone country.  And, to that end, financing bank resolutions is a responsibility of the Eurozone banking system as a whole, not of individual Eurozone governments.  Good.  But it's hard not to suspect that some in the EU, in writing and blessing these rules, had in mind a silent caveat: "except for Greece."

In fact, it's not hard to imagine what might happen if the first use of the SRF were to recapitalize, say, Alpha Bank.  The German press, among others, would take a sudden interest in the SRM and the SRF, and might not be inclined to accept the notion that compulsory payments to a governmental entity are, in some fundamental sense, not "taxes."  And somebody, somewhere will accuse the Merkel government (with some justice) of having signed on to a stealth transfer union, which is "bailing out" Greek banks.  Hijinks ensue.

How could EU policymakers have convinced themselves that that the SRM would never be applied to Greece?  My personal guess would be that it involved the same form of self-deception entailed in all games of "kick the can down the road," the expectation -- born more of wishful thinking than of reason -- that, somehow, these things will work out before the moment of truth arrives.

But now the moment of truth is awfully near.

All of which might help to explain Wolfgang Schäuble's evident desire to push Greece out of the Eurozone as quickly as possible.  There's a ticking clock: in five months, it becomes a whole lot harder for the Troika to hold the Greek banking system hostage, and the consequence of trying -- the activation of the SRM to recapitalize insolvent Greek banks -- could have interesting political repercussions in Germany and elsewhere.

I'm very curious to see what's going to happen next.

--------------------------------------

(1) This became effective on January 1, 2014.  The ECB exercises direct supervision of a number of large banks, while supervising the rest through the national regulatory authorities.  However, there seems to be no doubt of the ECB's authority to override the judgment of a local regulator should a difference of opinion arise as to the solvency of a particular institution.

fonte

Isso só obriga a dar os bancos como falidos mais cedo. E pior ainda, quando isso acontecer os accionistas serão derretidos, os credores serão derretidos, e só depois é que se salvarão os depositantes (e dentro destes, se a coisa for muito agressiva, só os mais pequenos).

Pelo que o que vimos o BCE a fazer na prática será ainda pior agora -- pois o BCE não terá motivação para passar dezenas de biliões de euros para mãos Gregas. Simplesmente exigirá a resolução muito mais cedo.

não percebi. estás a objectar - se é que o estás - a quê?
o texto é muito claro.
não percebi o que é que a tua intervenção significa. que concordas com a análise? discordas?

L

[Incognitus]

Estou a dizer que o que o artigo implica (que a Grécia fica de alguma forma com a vida facilitada para obter liquidez) não é o que as alterações produzirão. O que as alterações produzirão será a resolução mais fácil dos bancos (e não o seu suporte com liquidez), o que implicará perdas para accionistas, credores e possivelmente até grandes depositantes.

[Lark]

Estou a dizer que o que o artigo implica (que a Grécia fica de alguma forma com a vida facilitada para obter liquidez) não é o que as alterações produzirão. O que as alterações produzirão será a resolução mais fácil dos bancos (e não o seu suporte com liquidez), o que implicará perdas para accionistas, credores e possivelmente até grandes depositantes.

a resolução poderá implicar venda, liquidação ou recapitalização.
de uma coisa tenho quase a certeza: a grécia não ficará sem sistema bancário; portanto pelo menos um banco será recapitalizado. provavelmente todos. vendidos e recapitalizados.

o governo grego deixa é de ter que entrar com seja o que for para qualquer dos outcomes.
e também não haverá bail in.

logo, para a grécia no seu todo, será muito melhor.
para os accionistas e detentores de dívida dos bancos não será bom concerteza.

L

[Incognitus]

Estou a dizer que o que o artigo implica (que a Grécia fica de alguma forma com a vida facilitada para obter liquidez) não é o que as alterações produzirão. O que as alterações produzirão será a resolução mais fácil dos bancos (e não o seu suporte com liquidez), o que implicará perdas para accionistas, credores e possivelmente até grandes depositantes.

a resolução poderá implicar venda, liquidação ou recapitalização.
de uma coisa tenho quase a certeza: a grécia não ficará sem sistema bancário; portanto pelo menos um banco será recapitalizado. provavelmente todos. vendidos e recapitalizados.

o governo grego deixa é de ter que entrar com seja o que for para qualquer dos outcomes.
e também não haverá bail in.

logo, para a grécia no seu todo, será muito melhor.
para os accionistas e detentores de dívida dos bancos não será bom concerteza.

L

Porque é que não haverá bail-in? O esquema é similar ao do Chipre, logo pode haver bail-in. E no mínimo torram os credores.

[Reg]

Estou a dizer que o que o artigo implica (que a Grécia fica de alguma forma com a vida facilitada para obter liquidez) não é o que as alterações produzirão. O que as alterações produzirão será a resolução mais fácil dos bancos (e não o seu suporte com liquidez), o que implicará perdas para accionistas, credores e possivelmente até grandes depositantes.

a resolução poderá implicar venda, liquidação ou recapitalização.
de uma coisa tenho quase a certeza: a grécia não ficará sem sistema bancário; portanto pelo menos um banco será recapitalizado. provavelmente todos. vendidos e recapitalizados.

o governo grego deixa é de ter que entrar com seja o que for para qualquer dos outcomes.
e também não haverá bail in.

logo, para a grécia no seu todo, será muito melhor.
para os accionistas e detentores de dívida dos bancos não será bom concerteza.

L

Porque é que não haverá bail-in? O esquema é similar ao do Chipre, logo pode haver bail-in. E no mínimo torram os credores.

a duvida e onde pais maior que chipre que ja teve fuga capitais vai  buscar os 100 000 euros de garantia por titular

[Lark]

Estou a dizer que o que o artigo implica (que a Grécia fica de alguma forma com a vida facilitada para obter liquidez) não é o que as alterações produzirão. O que as alterações produzirão será a resolução mais fácil dos bancos (e não o seu suporte com liquidez), o que implicará perdas para accionistas, credores e possivelmente até grandes depositantes.

a resolução poderá implicar venda, liquidação ou recapitalização.
de uma coisa tenho quase a certeza: a grécia não ficará sem sistema bancário; portanto pelo menos um banco será recapitalizado. provavelmente todos. vendidos e recapitalizados.

o governo grego deixa é de ter que entrar com seja o que for para qualquer dos outcomes.
e também não haverá bail in.

logo, para a grécia no seu todo, será muito melhor.
para os accionistas e detentores de dívida dos bancos não será bom concerteza.

L

Porque é que não haverá bail-in? O esquema é similar ao do Chipre, logo pode haver bail-in. E no mínimo torram os credores.

penso que não. este mecanismo não é a mesma coisa. é o equivalente da FDIC.
os depositantes deixam de estar em risco. só os credores e accionistas é que são torrados. tal como deve ser.

L

[Incognitus]

A FDIC também tem a possibilidade de torrar os depositantes acima de um determinado limite, Lark. Não o têm feito, porém.

O limite são $250,000 por depositante.

https://www.fdic.gov/deposit/covered/notinsured.html

[Lark]

A FDIC também tem a possibilidade de torrar os depositantes acima de um determinado limite, Lark. Não o têm feito, porém.

O limite são $250,000 por depositante.

https://www.fdic.gov/deposit/covered/notinsured.html

se não o fizeram na pior crise desde 29, dificilmente o farão.
e a grécia relativamente para a europa é menor que a Lehman. portanto duvido que o façam lá.
é um programa de resolução, finalmente.
mas suponho que tu achas que vão torrar os depositantes. a mim não me parece.
mas vamos ver muito rapidamente. o que vale é que isto é quase em tempo real.

a não ser que haja uma armadilha por aí no caminho para jogar a grécia para fora do euro antes disso.

L

EDIT: ter mais de 100.000 € em bancos gregos deve ser uma raridade. só algum distraído.

[Lark]

basicamente o que isto quer dizer é que a arma que foi anteriormente usada para pressionar os gregos, deixou de existir.
o ECB não pode 'brincar' mais com a liquidez dos bancos gregos.

ou liquida ou recapitaliza ou vende. o governo grego não tem que se preocupar mais com isso.
o que significa que um default do governo grego, dentro do euro, não tem impacto na relação ECB/bancos gregos.

L

[tommy]

Achar que o BCE  e os Alemães não podem fazer o que quiserem com os bancos gregos... há gente que não aprende. Força Alemanha, Merkel e Schauble...mostrem pela enésima vez quem é que manda e quem é que tem que de ser mandado.

 

http://observador.pt/especiais/o-que-e-que-a-alemanha-tem-que-os-outros-nao-tem/

As exportações cresceram ainda mais rapidamente do que o PIB e o seu volume sextuplicou só entre 1948 e 1951. A quota da Alemanha nas exportações mundiais passou de 2% no final da década de 40 para 10% no início da década de 70 – e isto apesar de o marco alemão ter conhecido sucessivas valorizações. O fenómeno ficou conhecido como Wirtschaftswunder – o “milagre económico”.



azSk3
Evolução do PIB per capita das principais potências entre 1900 e 1970 (preços ajustados a 1990)

[tommy]

A Finlândia admite ficar de fora do terceiro resgate à Grécia, negociações para o qual estão a decorrer em Atenas. O vice-primeiro-ministro do governo escandinavo diz-se “sem paciência” para a Grécia e garante que a Finlândia não irá aceitar mais responsabilidades financeiras para com Atenas, muito menos um perdão de dívida.

“Claro que podemos ficar de fora [do terceiro resgate], isso é possível”, garantiu Timo Soini, citado pela Reuters (via o grego Kathimerini). O ministro, que acumula a pasta dos Negócios Estrangeiros da Finlândia disse, à margem do congresso do seu partido – os nacionalistas dos Verdadeiros Finlandeses – que “estamos mesmo a ficar sem paciência”.

“O nosso governo tem uma política muito rígida nesta matéria”, asseverou. “Não iremos aceitar aumentar as responsabilidades da Finlândia nem cortes nas dívidas gregas”, acrescentou.

O governo finlandês tem sido um dos mais duros na relação com Atenas, sobretudo desde que os Verdadeiros Finlandeses se juntaram ao governo de coligação que tem as rédeas do país escandinavo.

http://observador.pt/2015/08/09/finlandia-pode-ficar-de-fora-de-terceiro-resgate-a-grecia/

Alguém com juízo que meta os gregos, larks e krugmans desta vida na linha.

[Storgoff]

O problema do espartilho da divida publica grega e de outros países da zona euro, poderá vir a ser resolvido quando o sistema deglutir os seus próprios excessos e isso poderá,  um dia destes, passar  por o BCE comprar montantes significativos de divida publica dos diversos estados membros que seriam posteriormente convertidos numa espécie de divida perpétua e ficaria lá guardada numa gaveta bem escondida nas catacumbas do BCE numa espécie de processo de fossilização para o regalo dos arqueólogos daqui por alguns séculos.

Muitos olham para esta questão das dividas publicas como se tratasse das dívidas lá de casa o que é um erro de palmatória. E ainda não satisfeitos acrescentam também as questões de honra .
Seria bom pensar em primeiro lugar que aquilo que se aplica às realidades micro não se pode extrapolar para a realidade macro.

A partilha duma moeda unica forte entre  paises com niveis de competitividade completamente dispares e sem qualquer política de transferências só podia gerar a actual situação. No fundo não passou dum jogo de predação em que os mais fracos se deixaram cair no engodo e neste momento cairam numa situação que mais parece aquela velha técnica do chulo para manter ad eternum o domínio sobre as suas meninas. Basicamente estas parecem nunca mais conseguirem pagar as dividas ao chulo .

[Lark]

In conversation with El Pais (Claudi Pérez), the complete (long) transcript
Posted on August 2, 2015 by yanisv

Claudi Pérez, of El Pais, inteviewed me in our Athens apartment last week. Here is the article that emerged recently in El Pais. The complete, unedited, transcript (in English) follows:

Why do all the interviews of you I have read begin with a question about how are you if it is clear, as I see, that you are really ok?

I suspect journalists assume that I am somehow downhearted now that I am not in the ministry. But I didn’t enter politics as a career. I entered politics to try to change things. There is a price to pay if one tries to change things.

What is the price?

The disdain of the establishment. The deep feelings of loathing by the vested interests one must dislodge to make a difference. They felt threatened. If you enter politics with an uncompromising position, you cop it.

 You say that you have to change things. In these 6 months, do you have the feeling that you did?

Absolutely. Why are you here? You are here because something changed. There was a government that was elected to negotiate hard on the basis of a line of argument that wasn’t considered acceptable in the eurozone. At the same time, history necessitated it. So you have an unstoppable force striking an immovable object. The immovable logic is the irrationality of the Eurogroup and the unstoppable force is history. The result is a great deal of heat and noise… Hopefully there will be some light too.

I was reading your book, about your daughter… And then I was doing some numbers. The bailout will finish in 2018. Then the supervision will be there until Greece pays back the majority of its loans: the average maturity is 32 years. So the ex troika, now quadriga, and the men in black, will be here in Athens till your grandchildren will be adults. How do you deal with this?

Let’s not call them the ex troika anymore. It’s the troika again. We gave them the chance to become “the institutions”, to legitimize them. But they insisted in behaving like the illegitimate troika of the past five years.

Didn’t you kill the troika?

Well, we got rid of them here in Athens. Now they are back: the troika is back. They could have acted as legitimate institutions. But they seem to have a clear preference to act as the troika of lenders. It’s their choice.

But they’ll be here until 2050, when your grandchildren will be adults.

No, they won’t. Because this agreement doesn’t have a future. It is continuing the extending and pretending charade: extending the crisis with new unsustainable loans, and pretending that this solves the problem… It can’t go on forever. You can fool the people and the markets for a short period of time, but in the end you can’t fool them for fifty years. Either Europe changes, and this process is replaced by something more democratic, and durable, manageable, humanistic. Or Europe will no longer exist as a Monetary Union.

What do you expect for the next 6 months? We expect a 3rd bailout agreement in mid-August.

This is a program designed to fail. And so it will fail. It’s not easy for an architect to build a solid building, but it’s easy for him or her to construct a building that will collapse. Anyone can do it. It was planned to fail, because, let’s face it: Wolfgang Schauble is not interested in an agreement that works. He categorically stated that he wanted to redesign the eurozone and part of that redesign is that Greece should be thrown out of the eurozone. I think that he is completely mistaken but nevertheless this is his plan and he is a very powerful player. One of the great fallacies at the moment is to present the deal imposed on our government on 12th July as an alternative to Schauble’s plan. I see things differently: This deal is a part of the Schauble plan. Of course, this is not the conventional wisdom.

So do you expect a Grexit?

I hope not. But what I expect is a lot of noise, as I said: delays, failure to meet unreachable targets, more recession, political dead ends. And then things will come to head and Europe will have to decide whether to go ahead with Schauble’s plan or not.

But which is your central scenario? Is Schauble condemning Greece to go out?

You can see that there is a plan being implemented and which is in progress. Today we have read that Schauble wants to sideline the Commission and to create something like a Budget commissioner who oversees the ‘rules’ that strike down national budgets, even if a country is not under a program. In other words: to turn every country into a program country! One of the great successes of Spain in the middle of the crisis was that you avoided a full MoU (and only had a limited one stemming from the bank recapitalization program). Schauble’s plan is to put the troika everywhere, in Madrid too, but especially in… Paris!

So Paris is the final game.

Paris is the larger prize. It’s the final destination of the troika. Grexit is used to create the fear necessary to force Paris, Rome and Madrid to acquiesce.

Is it to sacrifice Greece for saving Europe?

Think of it as a ‘demonstration effect’: this is what will happen to you if you don’t fully submit to the Troika. What happened in Greece was definitely a coup. The asphyxiation of the Government through the liquidity squeeze, a series of denials of any serious debt restructuring… What was astonishing is that we kept coming to them with proposals which they refused seriously to discuss, they were insisting that we do not make them public and, at the same time, they leaked that we had no proposals. Any independent observer watching this would agree that they were never interested in a mutually beneficial agreement. By imposing the liquidity squeeze, they forced the economy to shrink so as to blame it on us… We had constantly to make payments to the IMF which where scheduled along with disbursements which never came through. So they kept doing this, delaying any agreement, until we run out of liquidity. Then they gave us an ultimatum under the further threat of bank closure. This was nothing but a coup. In 1967 there were the tanks and in 2015 there were the banks. But the result is the same in the sense of having overthrown the Government or having forced it to overthrow itself.

And for Europe as a whole?

Nobody can be free even if one person is a slave. That is Hegel’s well known master-slave paradox. Europe has to pay serious attention to it. Spain cannot prosper, or be free, or sovereign or democratic if its prosperity hinges on another member state being denied growth, prosperity or democracy.  Screen Shot 2015-08-02 at 15.10.07

Rajoy has said that if Spaniards vote for parties like Podemos, we will be like Greece in the coming months.

I remind you that Mitt Romney’s Presidential campaign in 2012 was run also on the basis of that ‘if Obama wins, the US will become like Greece’. So Greece has become a football on the feet of politicians of the right who try to scare their population. This is the great utility of Greece for the Grexit policy of Dr Schauble.

Do you think that Podemos could have damaged Greece because the fear of the political contagion?

I would never say that Podemos is a problem for us. Even if Podemos didn’t exist, the forces of regression in Europe would have used fear because, let’s face it: whenever a province of an empire rebels, the emperor and his minions feel obliged to make an example of those who make a dash for liberty. Maybe Podemos intensified this process but, in reality, we had no alternative: we had an economy caught in a large deflation spiral, no credit even for profitable businesses, no investment except for some speculation.

The previous government was adopting increasing degrees of authoritarianism, shutting down the state’s own radio and television stations. This self-defeating austerity drive, which leads to further losses in income, further debt in order to keep fueling this beast of austerity, can only be kept going by curtailing democracy. So what alternative did we have?

The Greeks voted for us not because they didn’t know we would be treated in a hostile way, but because they had had enough. Whatever happens in Spain, in France, in the Baltics, in Portugal, we had a duty to our people to say: We believe in Europe and we’re going to say to Europeans that we owe them money, we want to repay, but we cannot repay from incomes that keep shrinking. “If you keep squeezing us in this inhuman, irrational manner, you will lose your money and we will lose our country.”

Now, there comes a time when you simply need to say and do what is right, and if Europe as a whole chooses to punish us for it, because it is not ready to accept the truth, then we have no alternative but to say to them: “We are doing our best and we hope you find it in yourselves to do your best too!”

I think that is a uncontroversial: your ideas about austerity and debt relief, everybody says you are right.

If you were talking to me in January it would not have been so. The only reason why now this is not controversial anymore is because we struggled for six months. For those who say to me we failed, these six months were in vain, I say “No we did not fail”. Now we have a debate in Europe which it’s not just about Greece, it’s about the continent. A debate we would have not had otherwise. A debate which is worth Greece’s, our continent’s, weight in gold.

But politics is about results. You called the first and second bailout like the Versailles Treaty. How would you define the third?

The Eurozone began life in 2000. It was badly designed and we realized that, or we should have realized that, in 2008 when Lehman Brothers collapsed. From 2009-2010 we have been in complete denial as official Europe has been doing precisely the wrong thing. This is a European phenomenon, it is an Europe-wide problem. Little Greece, 2% of Eurozone’s GDP, elected a government that raised issues crucial for all of Europe.  After 6 months of struggles we had a major setback, we lost the battle. But we won the war of changing the debate. And this is a result!

The debate is the result?

Certainly! I cannot quantify this result for you. I cannot tell you how many billons it is worth. But some things are not measured in terms of prices but in terms of their value.

You had a plan B, with a parallel currency, but Tsipras didn’t want to press the button, to summarize the story.

He is the prime minister, it was his call. My job, as his financial minister, was to provide the best tools I could and it was his decision whether he chose to use them or not. That is what matters. There were good arguments to utilize these tools and there were arguments for not pressing the button.

When you closed the banks, did you think at that moment that you must press the button?

I clearly thought that we should have reacted in kind when the Eurogroup closed the Greek banks and I have stated this for the record. But this is what collective decision making is all about. It means you have an inner cabinet that decides. I tabled my recommendation but I was in a minority. I respected the decision of the majority and acted according to it, as a team player ought to. This is how democracy and governments work and I fully accept it.

But can this plan B still being implemented?

Let’s separate two things. There was a Plan B, which, in fact, we called Plan X, in contrast to the ECB’s 2012 Plan Z, as reported in the Financial Times some time ago. Plan X was a contingency plan for responding to aggressive acts by the ECB, the Eurogroup and so on. Then there was a quite separate design for a new payments system using the tax office’s interface. This system, as I explained in a recent article in the Financial Times, is something that should have been implemented anyway. I think Spain might benefit from implementing it to, or Italy for example. Countries lacking a central bank can potentially benefit from this efficient way of creating more liquidity, and more effectively dealing with multilateral extinguishment of arrears between the state and its citizens, but also among citizens.

So, let’s keep these two ‘plans’ separate. The payment system could, and should, be implemented tomorrow. Plan X is now, I think, part of history because it was intended as a response to aggressive acts that would have as their objective to make us surrender during the negotiations. Now that we have surrendered, it has become part of economic history.

Tsipras said in the parliament before the vote, after the referendum, that there was no alternative to the packages, but I think with this plan you are saying to the people that there is an alternative to the package.

My political thinking, from a very young age, was shaped by a principled, intellectual opposition to TINA – to the neoliberal logic that There Is No Alternative. This opposition shaped me from the time I lived in Britain under Margaret Thatcher who launched TINA. My political thinking was always directed at countering… TINA. I even concocted an alternative, saying that I believe not in TINA but in TATIANA: That Astonishingly There Is AN Alternative! So I would never accept the view that there was no alternative. I would accept that a prime minister, considering all the alternatives, opts for the least bad alternative. We can have a debate on whether his was the least bad, or optimal, alternative. But the proposition that there exists no alternative is constitutionally alien to every fibre of my body and mind.

Let me ask you about your rhetoric: mafia, criminals…

I never used the word Mafia

Terrorism, fiscal waterboarding…

Fiscal waterboarding: I am very proud of this term. It is a precise, an accurate description of what has been happening for years now. What is waterboarding? You take a subject, you push his head in the water until he suffocates but, at some point, before death comes you stop. You pull the head out just in time, before asphyxiation is complete, you allow the subject to take a few deep breaths, and then you push the head again in the water. You repeat until he… confesses. Fiscal waterboarding, on the other hand, is obviously not physical, it’s fiscal. But the idea is the same and it is exactly what happened to successive Greek governments since 2010. Instead of air, Greek governments nursing unsustainable debts were starved of liquidity. Facing payments to their creditors, or meeting its obligations, they were denied liquidity till the very last moment just before formal bankruptcy, until they ‘confessed’’; until they signed on agreements they knew to add new impetus on the real economy’s crisis. At that moment, the troika would provide enough liquidity, like they did now with the 7 billion the Greek government received in order to repay the… ECB and the IMF. Just like waterboarding, this liquidity, or ‘oxygen’, is calculated to be barely enough to keep the ‘subject’ going, without defaulting formally, but never more than that. And so the torture continues with the effect that the government remains completely under the troika’s control. This is how fiscal waterboarding functions and I cannot imagine a better and more accurate term to describe what has been going on.

On my use of the word ‘terror’, take the case of the referendum. On the 25th of June we were presented with a comprehensive proposal by the troika. We studied it with an open mind and concluded that it was a non-viable proposal. If we signed it, we would have definitely failed within 4-5 months and then Dr. Schäuble would say “See, you accepted conditions you could not fulfill”. The Greek government cannot afford to do this anymore. We need to reclaim our credibility by only signing agreements we can fulfill. So I said to my colleagues in the Eurogroup, on the 27th, that our team convened and decided that we could not accept this proposal, because it wouldn’t work. But at the same time, we are Europeanists and we don’t have a mandate, nor the will or interest, to clash with Europe. So we decided to put their proposal to the Greek people to decide.

And what did the Eurogroup do? It refused us an extension of a few weeks in order to hold this referendum in peace and instead they closed down our banks. Closing down the banks of a monetized economy is the worst form of monetary terrorism. It instills fear in people. Imagine if in Spain tomorrow morning the banks didn’t open because of a Eurogroup decision with which to force your government to agree to something untenable. Spaniards would be caught up in a vortex of monetary terror. What is terrorism? Terrorism is to pursue a political agenda through the spread of generalized fear. That is what they did. Meanwhile the Greek systemic media were terrorizing people to think that, if they voted No in the referendum, Armageddon would come. This was also a fear-based campaign. And this is what I said. Maybe people in Brussels don’t like it to hear the truth. If they refrained from trying to scare the Greek, then I would have refrained from using this term.

My point is the rhetoric calling criminals to IMF, as Tsipras did, is not good for the results of the negotiation. And with this rhetoric it is difficult.

He didn’t call the IMF criminal. Let’s be precise. He talked about a criminally negligent program that imposed upon Greeks a monumental crisis, including a humanitarian emergency. Which is exactly what the Greek ‘programs’ fo 2010 and 2012 were. But let me add an important point here: We did not turn up the ‘sharpness’ of our rhetoric (e.g. Tsipras’ remark) until late June. From 25th of January until late June we had been negotiating in good faith while the troika was not. We had been exceptionally mild and polite, in the face of incredible hostility and denigration. We went into each Eurogroup meeting with good proposals, suggesting to them that we should all agree on two or three major reforms immediately (e.g. tax evasion and corruption, a new tax authority independent of politics but also of the oligarchy). They rejected our overtures and they threatened us with cessation of the negotiations if we dared make our proposals public, while they were leaking at the same time to the Financial Times that we had no proposals. They insisted on a denigrating, endless round of ‘technical’ discussions while asphyxiating our economy. They behaved abominably while we continued to respond with solid arguments and in a highly civilized fashion.

And we sat there and took it, month after month. We never stopped compromising. By late June, our Prime Minister had met them 9/10ths of the way. And what did they do? They backtracked even from their own positions, insisting on 25th June, for example, that VAT on hotels should rise to 23%! This was an act of aggression. At that point we decided, very reasonably, to tell the truth, to talk about their program’s criminal negligence, to allude to their fiscal waterboarding. At some point the truth needs to be told. Europeans are losing trust in the EU because of their wall of lies and propaganda which presents itself in the form of nuanced terminology, when in reality what is happening is a complete violation of the basic rules of logic, of the EU Treaties, of polite behaviour and of democracy.

But then why did Tsipras accept it?

You should interview him if you wish to put questions to him. It is not right that I should answer on anyone else’s behalf, especially my Prime Minister.

In the Eurogroup, some ministers portrayed you like difficult to predict, luxurious way of life, many photos… What do you think when you hear this type of portrait?

It is not true. Nobody said anything like that in the Eurogroup. They may very well have said such things outside the Eurogroup, I would neither know nor care. Everybody, in the end, gets judged by the quality of their public narratives. I will leave you and your readers to pass judgment on their demeanour. We all need to be judged by our voters, by the people of Europe. In my case, I have a clear conscience. After the third Eurogroup I posted on my website my interventions in all three meetings. Read them and tell me if I was unpredictable, impolite, whatever. In my estimation, my interventions were clear, economically beyond reproach, and constructive. Readers can read them and judge.

Do people understand your pictures on Paris Match for example? Do you think that people that have voted Syriza, which is a left party, understand this type of pictures?

Well, you want to walk around with me on the streets of Athens and see what people say to me about all this? Our people are not bothered by any of this, even though I said it clearly that the Paris Match aesthetic was terrible and I regret accepting to do the photoshoot. You may not believe me but, when I accepted, I didn’t know what Paris Match was – it is not the kind of press I ever knew much about. I asked to see the article’s text before agreeing to do the photoshoot. The text was fine and so I made the mistake to agree to the photoshoot. I rushed home for it and only had 15 minutes to spare. Danae, my wife, told me it felt like a bad idea but I was already committed and so I decided to do it quickly, rushing from one ‘set’ to the next before leaving for a meeting with the Prime Minister. It was my mistake to have accepted it and I have apologized for it. But all this talk about Paris Match and its photoshoot had one purpose: to ensure that my message, especially the rational criticisms of Europe’s ways, gets drowned in ugly pictures and toxic noise.

What are you going to do about your political career?

Politics should not be a career. I am a member of the Parliament and extremely honored by the trust vested in me by voters. My commitment to them when I entered politics last January was that I will stand my ground and fight along their side for democracy and prosperity in Greece but also throughout Eyrope. I’m here for the course, I´m not going anywhere.

You are an academic, a professor and author of really good books like the Minotaur. Did you like the politics, what you saw in Brussels?

I certainly didn’t like what I saw in Brussels and I don’t think any European would like it if they had the chance to see it for themselves. But this is what we have, that is the EU we have, and we have to fix it. The worst enemy of democracy is citizens who say this is a terrible system but I’m not prepared to do anything to change it.

Why don’t you have allies in the Eurogroup? I mean, nor France, nor Italy, Spain, Ireland… Countries that at the beginning, with Syriza, had positive thinkings and at the end there were 18 against 1.

What you have to understand is that this 18-1 balance in the Eurogroup is an illusion. The 18 are divided very significantly in three groups. The very tiny, tiny minority who believe in austerity. The largest group of countries don’t believe in austerity but imposed austerity on their own people. And then there is another group of countries that neither believe in austerity nor practise it – e.g. France. But they fear that if they support us openly then austerity and the troika will come their way.

What is your relationship with Schäuble, de Guindos and maybe Dijsselbloem?

No relationship could have existed with Dijsselbloem. This is not just because he is so intellectually lightweight but, primarily, because he is untrustworthy. For example, he chose to lie to me in my first Eurogroup about procedure. It is one thing to disagree with the Eurogroup President. It is quite another thing to have him lie to you about gravely important procedures. On the other hand, Schäuble and de Guindos are two colleagues that I very much enjoy talking to, at a personal level. Our conversations were often tough but they were also interesting exchanges. As an academic, there is nothing more interesting than interesting exchanges. Our disagreements were serious but, at personal level, there was mutual respect and a useful exchange of ideas was had. The problem is that when you put all these people together in the Eurogroup, because of the catastrophically bad institutional design of the Eurogroup, you end up with governance failure that damages Europe. So, in a different context, institutional framework, I am sure that with colleagues like de Guindos and Schäuble our working relationship would have ended up producing tastier fruits.

Coming back to the question about Spain. What are the lessons of Greece for Spain? The Spanish government has said that if people vote for Podemos, problems will come and Spain will become Greece after a few months.

I think that the people of Spain need to look at the economic and social situation in Spain and base the judgment on what their society needs, independently of what is happening in Greece, France… The danger of becoming Greece is always there and will materialize if you keep repeating the same mistakes that were imposed on Greece. Punishing one proud nation in order to put fear in another is not what Europe should be about. It is not the Europe we signed up for, not the Europe that González had signed for or Papandreou, or Giscard d’Estaing, or Helmut Schmidt etc. We need to recover the sense of being Europeans and finding ways of recreating the dream of shared prosperity with democracy. The idea that fear and loathing are going to be the creators of the new Europe is an idea that is going to lead us headlong to a postmodern 1930s. I believe that the people of Spain and of Greece know exactly what the 1930s did to them.

You said once that the legacy of Thatcher was financialization, malls and Tony Blair. And I ask you, what is the legacy of Merkel, of her leadership?

Europe is in the process of turning from a realm of shared prosperity, which is how we imagined it, into an iron cage for our peoples. I hope that Mrs Merkel decides that this is not a legacy she wants to leave behind.

yv

[tommy]

Acho que a Europa tem uma escolha a fazer:

- ou dá ouvidos a totalitários que levam o povo à miséria como o syriza, podemos, larks e krugmans e em pouco tempo a europa é destruída;

- ou corta com estes parasitas, e segue um caminho de rigor nas contas e de deixar de pedir dinheiro aos outros para todos os países europeus.

É simples. 

[tommy]

http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-08-10/russian-workers-vie-with-greeks-in-race-to-productivity-abyss

Assim se vê o que são os gregos:
- preguiçosos;
- caloteiros;
- querem viver à custa dos outros.

[Storgoff]

Instituto alemão conclui que Alemanha ganhou mais de 100 mil milhões de euros com a crise grega 
10 Agosto 2015, 16:10 por Lusa

http://www.jornaldenegocios.pt/economia/europa/uniao_europeia/zona_euro/detalhe/instituto_alemao_conclui_que_alemanha_ganhou_mais_de_100_mil_milhoes_de_euros_com_a_crise_grega_.html

Não sou eu que digo.
É um instituto alemão.
Eis as verdades incómodas  que bem definem o tal espírito de solidariedade europeia, ou seja, a " Predação".
Acrescente-se ao dito estudo, os ganhos da Alemanha com a captação de quadros altamente qualificados a custo zero vindo dos paises em crise e mais alguns ganhos com os spreads adicionados aos juros dos resgates mais toda a dinamização do seu  PIB com que estes factores contribuíram e fica tudo bem mais claro.

Em tempos apelidaram a Manuela Ferreira Leite de  " Salazar de saias", o que se poderá dizer de Angela Merkel ?