Grécia - Tópico principal

[Lark]

"The agreement with Greece is a victory for French President François Hollande"

Press article by Hans-Werner Sinn, Wirtschaftswoche, 17.07.2015, p. 35

The euro zone turns now finally in a transfer union, in the north compensate for the lack of competitiveness of the South permanently.

After the agreement with Greece had been reached in the morning of July 13, François Hollande and Alexis Tsipras fell into his arms, while Angela Merkel stood as the drowned rat. When it comes to the crunch, the French president enforces precisely and determines the line of approach in Europe. The euro zone remains a "French affair with German money", as expressed by a CNN reporter once.

Maximum danger existed for the French Mare Nostrum, as Yanis Varoufakis evening held a plea for the Grexit after winning referendum in the government. For months his men had been working on a plan for a Greek parallel currency, and they wanted to implement now. But that he ran on at Tsipras. The squealed in Paris, within hours Varoufakis resigned.

Fared Varoufakis similar to Prime Minister Papandreou, the Sarkozy had hunted in the fall of 2011 from his post because he had considered the exit in case of failure of a referendum.

That Varoufakis actively working on Plan B, I knew for a long time. To manifest it that Greece would never come on a green branch in Euro was. With wages of nearly 15 euros per hour, the country lies with the three to five times the wages of the neighboring countries Romania, Bulgaria and Turkey. By inflationary credit bubble that had caused the euro, the Greek products had become much too expensive. A persistent import surplus and a no longer controllable mass unemployment were the consequences.

The idea that the Greek Competition weakness could be overcome by a productivity miracle, nominal wage cuts or more money is nigh absurd. Only the exit along with devaluation of all wages, prices, rents and loan contracts would have allowed a socially acceptable downgrading of claims on the compatible with the productivity of the country level and can make Greece competitive. Combined with a settlement of old foreign debt according to the rules of the Paris Club, you would press the reset button and to allow the country an economic start with no new external loans.

That not only left economists like Joseph Stiglitz and Paul Krugman, but also Wolfgang Schäuble and his experts thought the exit along with debt restructuring for the better solution in the Finance Ministry, had caused pure horror at the French establishment in Paris and Brussels. Now we put everything on one card, forcing Germany to heave. If they do not want to risk a rupture with France, Angela Merkel had to give in. In 2010, Sarkozy had the bailout by threatening force, France would otherwise exit the Euro. Eventually you will learn how far Hollande went.

Tsipras was not bad off at all. Instead of 53 billion euros, of which the referendum was still the talk, he can now bring 86 billion euros home, after all, half the gross domestic product. Although about 50 billion euros for the repayment of debt to the IMF and the ECB have thought of the money, it € 36 billion remain for its budget and the replenishment of accounts that entertain the Greeks in their bankrupt banks, at least 3,200 euros per citizen , That added another ten percent to what was previously flowed already on public loans (30100 euro per citizen) - an ordinary surcharge, the one comes the next three years to make ends meet comfortably.

Decisions taken place now a clear once and for all, that the euro zone will develop into a transfer union, in the northern countries to compensate for the lack of competitiveness of the southern countries by ceding part of their income. France Europe model has been strengthened, and the ditch, the pulling of the Euro through central Europe, has deepened. Poland and the Czech Republic are now for the time being certainly not join, and the UK will perhaps turn away entirely. But that does not bother François Hollande. He received and announced that he would now like to build a fiscal union with more firmly institutionalized north-south transfers and its own parliament for the euro zone headwater by his success.

tradução do google de fonte

[Lark]

Interview with Hans-Werner Sinn, Handelsblatt, 07.17.2015, p. 9

The Ifo president wants the cost of Greece reveal.

Mr. sense, your colleague Clemens Fuest has proposed an increase in the solidarity levy for Greece. What do you think?

I think that is correct, because it makes the debate about the costs of bailing out Greece honest. The loans to Athens are transformed by the lifetime extension, interest rate reductions and restructuring actions gradually, but surely in pure transfers. One makes in front of something, when you think the money ever came back. It's just being honest when, against funding the hidden public debt, which is connected to the support by raising taxes and the repayment of open government debt. Everyone can then see and feel what the Greek bailout will actually cost.

They were so far but not a supporter of a transfer union.

No, I'm not even now. But you have members of parliament, the vote today on the launch of negotiations on a third package Greece force, to see the truth in the eye. Citizens need to know that they are charged. Germany will grant every Greeks with the new package according to the latest estimates in 2200 Euro.

Is the situation in Greece comparable to the situation in eastern Germany after reunification?

There are actually in Greece similar problems as before. The Greek economy is in a similar state of disrepair, as the East German, it was. The difference is, of course, that with Greece no common state was formed.

Is the debt burden for Greece become unsustainable, as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) has now been determined?

Yes, it is, because of the sugarcoated growth forecasts of the IMF, without which no loans had already may grant. Within the euro zone, a haircut for legal reasons is not possible. It should also not extend the maturities longer be demanded in the interest and amortization as the IMF are suspended for 30 years, because that would be a sham. The Ifo Institute has calculated that the debt restructuring 2012, the public creditors had already cost 43 billion euros.

google translation de fonte

[Lark]

That not only left economists like Joseph Stiglitz and Paul Krugman, but also Wolfgang Schäuble and his experts thought the exit along with debt restructuring for the better solution

Stiglitz,
Krugman,
Schäuble,
Sinn

são já uns quantos 'toinos' como o neo lhes chama, a dizerem a mesma coisa.
não serás tu o 'toino', neo?

L

[Lark]

Bernanke Isn’t Serious

By which I mean that he isn’t Serious. His latest on Greece and the euro suggests that the deeper problems lie not in Greek fecklessness but in the refusal of the core — basically Germany — to allow either monetary or fiscal policies that would offset the downdraft from austerity in the periphery. He even questions the sacred status of “structural reform”:

The slow recovery from the crisis of the euro zone as a whole is the result, among other factors, of (1) political resistance that delayed by many years the implementation of sufficiently aggressive monetary policies by the European Central Bank; (2) excessively tight fiscal policies, especially in countries like Germany that have some amount of “fiscal space” and thus no immediate need to tighten their belts; and (3) delays in taking the necessary steps, analogous to the banking “stress tests” in the United States in the spring of 2009, to restore confidence in the banking system. I would not, by the way, put “structural rigidities” very high on this list. Structural reforms are important for long-run growth, but cost-saving measures are less relevant when many workers are already idle; moreover, structural problems have existed in Europe for a long time and so can’t explain recent declines in performance.

Does all this sound sort of … familiar? Kind of like what other bearded Anglo-Saxon economists have been saying? As I’ve tried to point out for a long time, in this policy debate the supposedly radical types are the ones doing standard, more or less textbook economics, while the respectable voices have subscribed to fantasies ungrounded in either history or theory.

You might think that having one of history’s most celebrated central bankers weigh in on the anti-austerity side of the issue would change perceptions about what’s serious as opposed to Serious. But don’t bet on it.

Krugman

[Kin2010]

Vê-se ue é uma crappy tradução do google.

[Lark]

Greece and Europe: Is Europe holding up its end of the bargain?


This week the Greek parliament agreed to European demands for tough new austerity measures and structural reforms, defusing (for the moment, at least) the country's sovereign debt crisis. Now is a good time to ask: Is Europe holding up its end of the bargain? Specifically, is the euro zone's leadership delivering the broad-based economic recovery that is needed to give stressed countries like Greece a reasonable chance to meet their growth, employment, and fiscal objectives? Over the longer term, these questions are evidently of far greater consequence for Europe, and for the world, than are questions about whether tiny Greece can meet its fiscal obligations.

Unfortunately, the answers to these questions are also obvious. Since the global financial crisis, economic outcomes in the euro zone have been deeply disappointing. The failure of European economic policy has two, closely related, aspects: (1) the weak performance of the euro zone as a whole; and (2) the highly asymmetric outcomes among countries within the euro zone. The poor overall performance is illustrated by Figure 1 below, which shows the euro area unemployment rate since 2007, with the U.S. unemployment rate shown for comparison.1



In late 2009 and early 2010 unemployment rates in Europe and the United States were roughly equal, at about 10 percent of the labor force. Today the unemployment rate in the United States is 5.3 percent, while the unemployment rate in the euro zone is more than 11 percent. Not incidentally, a very large share of euro area unemployment consists of younger workers; the inability of these workers to gain skills and work experience will adversely affect Europe's longer-term growth potential.

The unevenness in economic outcomes among countries within the euro zone is illustrated by Figure 2, which compares the unemployment rate in Germany (which accounts for about 30 percent of the euro area economy) with that of the remainder of the euro zone.2



Currently, the unemployment rate in the euro zone ex Germany exceeds 13 percent, compared to less than 5 percent in Germany. Other economic data show similar discrepancies within the euro zone between the "north" (including Germany) and the "south."

The patterns illustrated in Figures 1 and 2 pose serious medium-term challenges for the euro area. The promise of the euro was both to increase prosperity and to foster closer European integration. But current economic conditions are hardly building public confidence in European economic policymakers or providing an environment conducive to fiscal stabilization and economic reform; and European solidarity will not flower under a system which produces such disparate outcomes among countries.

The risks for the European project posed by these economic developments are real, no matter what the reasons for them may be. In fact, the reasons are not so difficult to identify. The slow recovery from the crisis of the euro zone as a whole is the result, among other factors, of (1) political resistance that delayed by many years the implementation of sufficiently aggressive monetary policies by the European Central Bank; (2) excessively tight fiscal policies, especially in countries like Germany that have some amount of "fiscal space" and thus no immediate need to tighten their belts; and (3) delays in taking the necessary steps, analogous to the banking "stress tests" in the United States in the spring of 2009, to restore confidence in the banking system. I would not, by the way, put "structural rigidities" very high on this list. Structural reforms are important for long-run growth, but cost-saving measures are less relevant when many workers are already idle; moreover, structural problems have existed in Europe for a long time and so can't explain recent declines in performance.

What about the strength of the German economy (and a few others) relative to the rest of the euro zone, as illustrated by Figure 2? As I discussed in an earlier post, Germany has benefited from having a currency, the euro, with an international value that is significantly weaker than a hypothetical German-only currency would be. Germany's membership in the euro area has thus proved a major boost to German exports, relative to what they would be with an independent currency.

Nobody is suggesting that the well-known efficiency and quality of German production are anything other than good things, or that German firms should not strive to compete in export markets. What is a problem, however, is that Germany has effectively chosen to rely on foreign rather than domestic demand to ensure full employment at home, as shown in its extraordinarily large and persistent trade surplus, currently almost 7.5 percent of the country's GDP. Within a fixed-exchange-rate system like the euro currency area, such persistent imbalances are unhealthy, reducing demand and growth in trading partners and generating potentially destabilizing financial flows.3 Importantly, Germany's large trade surplus puts all the burden of adjustment on countries with trade deficits, who must undergo painful deflation of wages and other costs to become more competitive. Germany could help restore balance within the euro zone and raise the currency area's overall pace of growth by increasing spending at home, through measures like increasing investment in infrastructure, pushing for wage increases for German workers (to raise domestic consumption), and engaging in structural reforms to encourage more domestic demand. Such measures would entail little or no short-run sacrifice for Germans, and they would serve the country's longer-term interests by reducing the risks of eventual euro breakup.

I'll end with two concrete proposals. First, negotiations over Greece's evidently unsustainable debt burden should be based on explicit assumptions about European growth. If European growth turns out to be weaker than projected, which in turn would make it tougher for Greece to grow, then Greece should be allowed greater leeway after the fact in meeting its fiscal targets.

Second, it's time for the leaders of the euro zone to address the problem of large and sustained trade imbalances (either surpluses or deficits), which, in a fixed-exchange-rate system like the euro zone, impose significant costs and risks. For example, the Stability and Growth Pact, which imposes rules and penalties with the goal of limiting fiscal deficits, could be extended to reference trade imbalances as well. Simply recognizing officially that creditor as well as debtor countries have an obligation to adjust over time (through fiscal and structural measures, for example) would be an important step in the right direction.

Ben Bernanke (outro toino)

[Lark]

Vê-se ue é uma crappy tradução do google.

por isso é que realcei isso no fim.
não há versão em inglês que eu saiba.
e eu infelizmente não sei traduzir do alemão.
é o que se arranja...

L

[Reg]

se gregos nao querem sair, o resto europa nao os  expulsa vao andar nisto durante anos  com  os resgates

cada ano que passa a grecia fica mais barata  comparado com o resto europa/usa/china.

com euro ou sem euro com ou sem reformas  estao ficar baratos cada ano que passa.

[Pedro.J50]

"The agreement with Greece is a victory for French President François Hollande"

Press article by Hans-Werner Sinn, Wirtschaftswoche, 17.07.2015, p. 35

The euro zone turns now finally in a transfer union, in the north compensate for the lack of competitiveness of the South permanently.

After the agreement with Greece had been reached in the morning of July 13, François Hollande and Alexis Tsipras fell into his arms, while Angela Merkel stood as the drowned rat. When it comes to the crunch, the French president enforces precisely and determines the line of approach in Europe. The euro zone remains a "French affair with German money", as expressed by a CNN reporter once.

Maximum danger existed for the French Mare Nostrum, as Yanis Varoufakis evening held a plea for the Grexit after winning referendum in the government. For months his men had been working on a plan for a Greek parallel currency, and they wanted to implement now. But that he ran on at Tsipras. The squealed in Paris, within hours Varoufakis resigned.

Fared Varoufakis similar to Prime Minister Papandreou, the Sarkozy had hunted in the fall of 2011 from his post because he had considered the exit in case of failure of a referendum.

That Varoufakis actively working on Plan B, I knew for a long time. To manifest it that Greece would never come on a green branch in Euro was. With wages of nearly 15 euros per hour, the country lies with the three to five times the wages of the neighboring countries Romania, Bulgaria and Turkey. By inflationary credit bubble that had caused the euro, the Greek products had become much too expensive. A persistent import surplus and a no longer controllable mass unemployment were the consequences.

The idea that the Greek Competition weakness could be overcome by a productivity miracle, nominal wage cuts or more money is nigh absurd. Only the exit along with devaluation of all wages, prices, rents and loan contracts would have allowed a socially acceptable downgrading of claims on the compatible with the productivity of the country level and can make Greece competitive. Combined with a settlement of old foreign debt according to the rules of the Paris Club, you would press the reset button and to allow the country an economic start with no new external loans.

That not only left economists like Joseph Stiglitz and Paul Krugman, but also Wolfgang Schäuble and his experts thought the exit along with debt restructuring for the better solution in the Finance Ministry, had caused pure horror at the French establishment in Paris and Brussels. Now we put everything on one card, forcing Germany to heave. If they do not want to risk a rupture with France, Angela Merkel had to give in. In 2010, Sarkozy had the bailout by threatening force, France would otherwise exit the Euro. Eventually you will learn how far Hollande went.

Tsipras was not bad off at all. Instead of 53 billion euros, of which the referendum was still the talk, he can now bring 86 billion euros home, after all, half the gross domestic product. Although about 50 billion euros for the repayment of debt to the IMF and the ECB have thought of the money, it € 36 billion remain for its budget and the replenishment of accounts that entertain the Greeks in their bankrupt banks, at least 3,200 euros per citizen , That added another ten percent to what was previously flowed already on public loans (30100 euro per citizen) - an ordinary surcharge, the one comes the next three years to make ends meet comfortably.

Decisions taken place now a clear once and for all, that the euro zone will develop into a transfer union, in the northern countries to compensate for the lack of competitiveness of the southern countries by ceding part of their income. France Europe model has been strengthened, and the ditch, the pulling of the Euro through central Europe, has deepened. Poland and the Czech Republic are now for the time being certainly not join, and the UK will perhaps turn away entirely. But that does not bother François Hollande. He received and announced that he would now like to build a fiscal union with more firmly institutionalized north-south transfers and its own parliament for the euro zone headwater by his success.

tradução do google de fonte

Artigo muito interessante e que provávelmente retrata o que aconteceu.
Obrigado pelo post.
Bom domingo.

[jeab]

Sinto-me miseravelmente infeliz perante tanta eloquência de gente iluminada, nos mídia, no fórum, nas conversas de rua, sobre o que se passa actualmente na Grécia. Infeliz, porque sinto-me um estúpido à espera que um desses iluminados coloque as questões base e argumente essas mesmas questões. Mas, agora, discute-se só o que é actual e ninguém  mete o dedo na ferida e a esprema até o pus sair todo.

  Mas afinal, como é que a Grécia chegou a este ponto de falência técnica?  Quais foram as causas?  Quem foram os culpados?  Isto é básico . Sem se saber isto, não se pode tomar medidas de evitar a continuação dos problemas, nem de afastar da governança os que as causaram.

Discute-se planos de austeridade que não se faz a mínima ideia se são os adequados, pois não se discute as causas que levaram à presente situação. Discute-se ética, solidariedade, sem se saber o porquê do familiar estar pobre? Olha-se só para a árvore e que se lixe a floresta?

Bolas, devo ser o único estupidamente básico perante tanta pesporrência 

Continuando com a minha estupefacção, não entendo que diferença tem a actuação do syriza do habitual de outro partido anterior no poder na grécia, nomeadamente:

- Antes das eleições, prometeu acabar c/ austeridade, diminuir e renegociar a dívida, incluindo o slogan - não pagamos. Saída do euro caso não aceitassem as suas condições. Ganhou as eleições baseado nestas promessas.

- Depois de eleições, coerentemente fez um referendo para validar as suas promessas.


O que aconteceu?

- Fez exactamente o oposto a todas as promessas, e vai F... o Zé Povinho com a maior austeridade que a Grécia já teve, além de manter a dívida intacta.

 Mais conversas para quê?

[Lark]

Grexit remains the likely outcome of this sorry process
Wolfgang Munchau

Unless the economy behaves very differently than in the past, it will be trapped in a vicious circle

Alexis Tsipras should never have hired Yanis Varoufakis as his finance minister. Or he should have listened to him, and kept him on. But instead the Greek prime minister chose the worst of all options. He followed Mr Varoufakis’ advice of rejecting the offer of the creditors — until last week. But having done this, Mr Tsipras committed a critical error by rejecting Mr Varoufakis’ plan B for the moment when the country’s banks closed down: the immediate introduction of a parallel currency — IOUs issues by the Greek state but denominated in euros. A parallel currency would have allowed the Greeks to pay for their daily transactions when cash withdrawals were limited to €60 a day. A total economic collapse would have been avoided.

But Mr Tsipras did not go for this, or indeed any other plan B. Instead he capitulated. At that point, he was no longer even in a position to choose a Grexit — a Greek exit from the eurozone. The economic precondition for a smooth departure would have been a primary surplus — before debt service — and an equivalent surplus in the private sector. Greece has no foreign exchange reserves. If the Greeks were to reintroduce the drachma, they would have had to pay for all of their imports with the foreign exchange earnings of their exports. These minimum preconditions were in place in March but not in July.

So, like his predecessors, Mr Tsipras ended up with another very lousy bailout deal. And this one suffers from the same fundamental flaws as its predecessors. This leads me to conclude that Grexit remains the most likely ultimate outcome after all.

There are three principal ways in which this can happen. The first is that a deal is simply not concluded. All that was agreed last week is for negotiations to start, plus some interim financing. A deal might fail because principal participants themselves are sceptical. Wolfgang Schäuble, the German finance minister, says he will keep up his offer of a Grexit in his drawer, just in case the negotiations fail.

Mr Tsipras denounced the agreement on several occasions last week.

And the International Monetary Fund is telling us that the numbers do not add up, and that it will not sign unless the European creditors agree to debt relief.

The Germans refuse any discussion on this subject, citing some trumped-up rules according to which eurozone countries are not allowed to default. This is legal hogwash, but I suppose the purpose is to describe new red lines in the negotiations.

My hunch is that they will ultimately fudge a deal, but that will come — as it always does — with overwhelming collateral damage: less debt relief than needed, and more austerity than Greece can bear.

A more likely Grexit scenario is that a programme is agreed and then fails. The Athens government may implement all the measures the creditors demand, but the economy fails to recover and debt targets remain elusive. Mr Tsipras already agreed last week that if this situation arose, he would pile on more austerity. So, unless the economy behaves in future in a very different way from the way it behaved in the past, it will remain trapped in a vicious circle for many years to come. At that point, Mr Tsipras, or his successor, could concede defeat and opt for a negotiated Grexit as the least painful option.

Grexit could also be forced on them by the creditors.

Athens has caved in to an ultimatum from its creditors and agreed to rush through long-resisted economic reforms in a bid to stay in the eurozone

My own most likely Grexit scenario is a different one yet again. Donald Tusk, the president of the European Council, hinted at this in his interview with the Financial Times last week when he said that he felt “something revolutionary” in the air. He is on to something. The most probable scenario for me is Grexit through insurrection. Give it another three years, and I would not be surprised to see Mr Tusk and his colleagues in the European Council having to entertain even more drastic action to quell a crisis.

Greece is not quite at the point of insurrection yet — despite eight years of recession. Opinion polls still reflect a majority of the people in favour of keeping the euro. In real life people choose between a small number of political alternatives and settle for the one they think works best for the economy. They voted for Mr Tsipras and his Syriza party in January because the other parties failed to deliver. If Syriza fails to deliver, too, as it surely will, the Greeks will have no democratic choices left.

Can Mr Tsipras still avert disaster? If there is a snap election in the autumn, he might well win it and then revive Mr Varoufakis’ parallel currency idea at some point. But I think the parallel currency moment has gone with the man. My hunch is that Mr Tsipras will run a rabble-rousing political campaign, with a lot of rhetoric against the creditors but then agree to whatever the creditors are demanding, and follow the programme to its dramatic climax.

ft

[valves1]

A inflação é uma praga que serve para empobrecer as pessoas...   

e verdade que a inflação beneficia devedores em detrimento de credores, e tambem e verdade que as pessoas podem empobrecer simplesmente mantendo os  rendimentos durantes uma serie de anos seguidos, no entanto    quando o mercado laboral e  funcional a inflaccao ate permite uma alocacao/transferencia  mais rapida de recursos humanos  uma vez que as pessoas nao se acomodariam facilmente a um salario que rapidamente as poderia empobrecer e por outro lado associado a inflaccao tens uma taxa de desemprego muito mais baixa;

Mas afinal, como é que a Grécia chegou a este ponto de falência técnica?  Quais foram as causas?  Quem foram os culpados?  Isto é básico . Sem se saber isto, não se pode tomar medidas de evitar a continuação dos problemas, nem de afastar da governança os que as causaram.

A grecia chegou a este ponto de falencia tecnica porque na  1 fase da moeda unica todos os paises
foram percepcionados como tendo o mesmo risco depreendia-se qua a zona euro evoluiria para uma uniao fiscal, politica dai-que uma data de dinheiro afluiu para projectos publicos e privados  de rentabilidade baixa em   paises perifericos; Os paises foram-se endividando alegremente ao exterior;
  a crise de subprime  2007  veio modificar tudo, a Zona euro foi testada, os paises foram questionados se individualmente poderiam pagar o que deviam ( individualmente nao podiam ) consequentemente    os ratings dos paises, perifericos  foram sucessivamente revistos em baixa, as taxas de juro a que se emprestava a esses paises disparou,  os bancos foram obrigados a desalavancar   e a economia afundou para um nivel de rendimento  que tornou os paises insolventes;

[Lark]

The IMF Says The Greek Deal Is Not Viable

On Wednesday night, while protestors lit up Syntagma Square with firebombs, the Greek government whipped the new bailout deal through its parliament. The eventual result was overwhelmingly in favour, but only because opposition parties supported the Syriza government. Syriza itself was split, with a number of MPs and some ministers either voting against or abstaining. The deputy Finance Minister, Nadia Valavani, resigned; the former Finance Minister Yanis Varoufakis voted No. Prime Minister Alexis Tsipras has taken a beating from his own troops. But he’s not out yet: there may be elections in the autumn, but at present he remains popular and it is unclear who would replace him.

So now the Greek parliament has capitulated, the ECB has decided to release an additional 900m EUR of ELA funding to Greece’s banks. This is only for a week and is subject to the ECB actually being paid on Monday, when a large bond redemption falls due.

But of course this payment is no longer in the hands of the Greek government. The creditors’ plan is that the ECB’s bond redemption would be met with short-term funding from the EU-wide European Financial Stability Mechanism (EFSM). And since the IMF as senior creditor must be paid before the ECB, Greece’s arrears to the IMF will also be paid from the same source. The total amount needed on Monday is 7bn EUR. The release of EFSM funding has been agreed despite objections from non-Euro governments, notably the UK: their fears of losses were apparently assuaged with the promise of “collateral”. It is strange that the release of ELA for Greek banks should in effect be subject to approval by the UK’s finance minister. But we live in strange times.

The ECB’s relaxation of the ELA cap is hardly generous: 900m EUR is about 80 euros per Greek. But on the strength of it, the Greek government has announced that banks will open on Monday July 20th. This is not as good as it sounds: the banks will be open for transactions, but capital controls will remain in place. The cash withdrawal limit remains at 60 EUR, though a new weekly limit will allow people to withdraw larger amounts on fewer days if they choose. This will provide some relief to cash-strapped Greek households. But it is hard to see that this is anything other than a political gesture. The Syriza government promised that banks would open after a No vote in the referendum, but they didn’t. Opening them enables the government to save some face, but it’s hardly a return to “business as usual”.

Now the bailout deal must be forced through other Eurozone parliaments too. The French have already voted in favor of it, pre-empting the Greek vote. The German Bundestag is also expected to vote in favour, despite Finance Minister Schaueble’s attempts to undermine the deal by promoting his “temporary Grexit” scheme. The Finns may vote against the deal. But the deal is still expected to be passed by enough of the national parliaments involved to make it viable. It’s all looking good so far, yes?

No. The IMF has thrown a spanner in the works. It is refusing to participate in the deal unless there is up-front debt relief. The reason the IMF gives is that deterioration in the Greek economy in the last year has made the debt dynamics unsustainable (my emphasis):

Greece’s public debt has become highly unsustainable. This is due to the easing of policies during the last year, with the recent deterioration in the domestic macroeconomic and financial environment because of the closure of the banking system adding significantly to the adverse dynamics. The financing need through end-2018 is now estimated at Euro 85 billion and debt is expected to peak at close to 200 percent of GDP in the next two years, provided that there is an early agreement on a program. Greece’s debt can now only be made sustainable through debt relief measures that go far beyond what Europe has been willing to consider so far.

And it goes on to specify what form those measures might take:

If Europe prefers to again provide debt relief through maturity extension, there would have to be a very dramatic extension with grace periods of, say, 30 years on the entire stock of European debt, including new assistance. This reflects the basic premise that debt cannot be assumed to migrate back onto the balance sheet of the private sector at interest rates close to the current AAA rates before debt levels have been brought to much lower levels; borrowing at anything but AAA rates in the near term will bring about an unsustainable debt dynamic for the next several decades. Other options include explicit annual transfers to the Greek budget or deep upfront haircuts.

In other words, the EU has three alternatives: forget about interest and repayment for the foreseeable future, transfer enough money to Greece to enable it to service its debts for the foreseeable future, or write the debts off. “The choice between the various options is for Greece and its European partners to decide,” concludes the IMF’s paper.

The IMF’s stance is a major obstacle. Under the terms of the deal, the Greek government is required to apply for a new IMF program. But as things stand, even if the Greek government clears its arrears on Monday, the IMF will reject its application.

Preliminary figures from the EC suggest that Eurozone governments expect to contribute 40-50bn EUR to the 86bn EUR bailout, with the remainder coming from the IMF and from privatization of Greek state assets. Without the IMF, therefore, the bailout seems likely to be substantially underfunded.

The IMF’s Christine Lagarde says the deal is “categorically impossible” without debt reduction. She is right. If there is no upfront debt relief, the deal is dead. And in a surprise move, the head of the ECB Mario Draghi has now backed the IMF’s stance, saying that the need for debt restructuring is “uncontroversial”.

But Germany remains adamant that there can be no reduction in the present value of the debt, whether through haircut or interest reduction & maturity extension, because to do so would violate the no-bailout clause in Article 125 of the Lisbon Treaty.

Frankly this is specious. The no-bailout clause was flouted in 2010 when Germany and others made bilateral loans to Greece to prevent their own banks collapsing. If they could fudge the treaties then, they can fudge them now. The question is whether there is political will to do so. Greece has made itself very unpopular in the last few months, so no-one wants to make its situation any easier. And the European Commission’s claim that Greek default and exit would now have little systemic impact makes the argument for debt relief much weaker. EU treaties are expendable when the whole system is under pressure, but when it is not they become divine commandments set in tablets of stone.

Eurozone member states need to understand that debt restructuring is not just relief for Greece, it is actually in their own best interests. Without it, they face near-certainty of 100% losses on their bilateral and EFSF loans in a disorderly Greek default at some point in the not too distant future. Even outright haircut would be better than this.

Upfront debt relief is essential if this deal is to have any chance of succeeding. I never thought I would find myself writing this, but it is time for some more Eurofudge.

forbes

[I. I. Kaspov]

A inflação é uma praga que serve para empobrecer as pessoas...   

e verdade que a inflação beneficia devedores em detrimento de credores, e tambem e verdade que as pessoas podem empobrecer simplesmente mantendo os  rendimentos durantes uma serie de anos seguidos, no entanto    quando o mercado laboral e  funcional a inflaccao ate permite uma alocacao/transferencia  mais rapida de recursos humanos  uma vez que as pessoas nao se acomodariam facilmente a um salario que rapidamente as poderia empobrecer e por outro lado associado a inflaccao tens uma taxa de desemprego muito mais baixa;

Se for assim, a inflação poderá trazer algum benefício para uma população jovem e dinânica, e não certamente para a maioria de uma população envelhecida e poupada, e que não aprecia dívidas...

[Incognitus]

A necessidade de cortar a dívida no curto prazo NÃO é óbvia, porque o seu serviço, por mais 5-10 anos, continuará a ser inferior ao de Portugal ou Itália.

Assim, mesmo que mais tarde se ache que é necessário reestruturar essa dívida, essa conclusão ainda pode esperar anos.

Estranho é o insistir-se tanto que tal tenha que ocorrer JÁ.

[valves1]

Se for assim, a inflação poderá trazer algum benefício para uma população jovem e dinânica, e não certamente para a maioria de uma população envelhecida e poupada, e que não aprecia dívidas...

Bem os juros teoricamente poderiam proteger as contas bancarias  A pop envelhecida poderia simplesmente canalizar as suas a poupanças para o imobiliario;
mesmo o mercado de capitais iria ter um dinamismo que nos surpreenderia a todos;
bem eu nao estou aqui a defender que a opcao de inflaccao  seja a panaceia para  os problemas das pessoas   
 estou muito de acordo que inflaccao sem reformas por exemplo  no mercado laboral nao seria correcto;
parece-me no entanto que no atual contexto inflaccionar e a opcao correcta;

[jeab]

Sinto-me miseravelmente infeliz perante tanta eloquência de gente iluminada, nos mídia, no fórum, nas conversas de rua, sobre o que se passa actualmente na Grécia. Infeliz, porque sinto-me um estúpido à espera que um desses iluminados coloque as questões base e argumente essas mesmas questões. Mas, agora, discute-se só o que é actual e ninguém  mete o dedo na ferida e a esprema até o pus sair todo.

  Mas afinal, como é que a Grécia chegou a este ponto de falência técnica?  Quais foram as causas?  Quem foram os culpados?  Isto é básico . Sem se saber isto, não se pode tomar medidas de evitar a continuação dos problemas, nem de afastar da governança os que as causaram.

Discute-se planos de austeridade que não se faz a mínima ideia se são os adequados, pois não se discute as causas que levaram à presente situação. Discute-se ética, solidariedade, sem se saber o porquê do familiar estar pobre? Olha-se só para a árvore e que se lixe a floresta?

Bolas, devo ser o único estupidamente básico perante tanta pesporrência 

Continuando com a minha estupefacção, não entendo que diferença tem a actuação do syriza do habitual de outro partido anterior no poder na grécia, nomeadamente:

- Antes das eleições, prometeu acabar c/ austeridade, diminuir e renegociar a dívida, incluindo o slogan - não pagamos. Saída do euro caso não aceitassem as suas condições. Ganhou as eleições baseado nestas promessas.

- Depois de eleições, coerentemente fez um referendo para validar as suas promessas.


O que aconteceu?

- Fez exactamente o oposto a todas as promessas, e vai F... o Zé Povinho com a maior austeridade que a Grécia já teve, além de manter a dívida intacta.

 Mais conversas para quê?

Independentemente de concordar ou discordar da sua ideologia, para mim Varoufakis foi honesto, coerente e integro ao sair do Governo quando viu que teria que tomar ações contra a sua ideologia politica e depois ao votar contra essas mesmas medidas que discordava. 
Surpreendeu-me pela positiva.

[vbm]

A necessidade de cortar a dívida no curto prazo NÃO é óbvia, porque o seu serviço, por mais 5-10 anos, continuará a ser inferior ao de Portugal ou Itália.

Assim, mesmo que mais tarde se ache que é necessário reestruturar essa dívida, essa conclusão ainda pode esperar anos.

Estranho é o insistir-se tanto que tal tenha que ocorrer JÁ.

Obviamente, onde tem de ocorrer JÁ é em Itália e Portugal!

[Incognitus]

Em Itália não sei, mas em Portugal o serviço da dívida também não estará num ponto historicamente elevado, pleo que mesmo que se ache necessário reestruturar, não tem que ser já.

Reestruturar já apenas significa que os devedores não são sérios e não querem sequer tentar pagar, mesmo quando historicamente o sacrifício que lhes é pedido não é particularmente elevado.

Claro, pagar qualquer dívida impõe sempre ALGUM sacrifício.

[Zenith]

Um texto do Strauss-Kahn, onde fustiga as condições impostas à Grécia onde os crefores não hesitaram em fragmentar a europa para alcançar uma vitória sobre a extrema essquerda

That the amateurism of the Greek government and the relative inaction of their predecessors went

beyond the pale, this I accept. That the coalition of creditors led by the Germans was exasperated

by the situation thus created, this I understand. But these political leaders seemed far too savvy to

want to seize the opportunity of an ideological victory over a far left government at the expense of

fragmenting the Union.

Apresenta a crição do euro como um compromisso ambíguo entre França e Alemanha que temd e ser resolvido

The euro was conceived as an imperfect monetary union forged on an ambiguous agreement

between France and Germany. For Germany, it was about organising a fixed exchange rate system

around the Deutschmark and, through this, imposing a certain ordo-liberal vision of economic

policy. For France, it was a matter of rather naively and romantically establishing an international

reserve currency equal to the grand ambitions of its elites.

...

Germany is trapped in

a misleading and inconsistent story about how the monetary union works, and which is widely

shared by its political classes and people. Conversely, in France, laziness and the latent

sovereignism of the economic and intellectual elites is such that there is no story not any

intelligent, renovated vision of the architecture of monetary union that could find popular support.

We need to invent this common vision, and fast.

e aponta para os riscos de uma Europa fraccionada correr o risco de vassalização 

Like all

Europeans, you need the whole of Europe to survive, divided we are too small. With globalisation

we are witnessing the emergence of vast geographical and economic areas which are going to

complementing one another and competing with one another for decades, maybe centuries.

...
Europe could be one of these players, but this is not yet certain. To do so, its ambition must be to

come together within the current Union and even beyond.

...

An alliance between a few European countries, even led by the most

powerful among them, will be subjugated by our friend and ally the United States in the maybe

not so distant future.

Apesar de não concordar com muito do que le diz, aponta os desafios que europa tem pela frente se não se quiser tornar numa Veneza á escala continental.

http://www.slideshare.net/DominiqueStraussKahn/150718-tweeteurope