Grécia - Tópico principal

[Mr. Medium Term Investor]

A confirmar-se, estão só a adiar o inevitável. Mais um balão de oxigénio para uns tempos.

[Incognitus]

Talvez por ser assim tão evidente é desprezado. Mas esse é o real problema, a Grécia não está a "respirar, comer e beber".

Isso é um exagero. Por essa lógica a Bulgária já morreu (GDP per capita 7.7 vs 29.6 na Grécia)
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_sovereign_states_in_Europe_by_GDP_(nominal)_per_capita
(mesmo que o PIB grego tenha corrigido vê-se claramente que a Grécia está muito acima e anda, ela por ela, com Portugal).
E os búlgaro, não sendo ricos, ainda estão bem acima de muitos países mundiais.

Esse tipo de argumentos não faz sentido nenhum. Uma perda é sempre muito mais dolorosa do que o prazer que advem de um ganho da mesma magnitude. Devia ser facilmente percebido por alhuém que anda na bolsa.
Com esse argumento, imagino que se um casal com 7 filhos perder um filho, no funeral a mensagem de consolo que se dá é que só perdeu 14%, e se o casal ainda não for idoso, acrescentar que podem facilmente colmatar a perda em cerca de 9 meses.
Sem ir para comparações, tomando qq pais da esfera ocidental, estatisticamente nos anos de depressão a seguir á crise petrolifera de 73 o PIB era de certeza mais elevado que no incio dos anos 60, mas apesar disso o sofrimento percepcionado pelas pessoas era muito superior.

O facto de o sofrimento ser maior não cria para essas pessoas uma situação de excepção que lhes atribui maiores direitos do que às outras, particularmente às outras que até mais pobres são.

Pensar isso é desde logo dar valores diferentes a diferentes seres humanos. Um bocado como a coisa de não apoiar a cultura em função do público, diga-se, pelo que pode existir um padrão.

[Zenith]

Isso é um argumento em que os os comunistas se iriam rever.

[Visitante]

De resto, em que é que se materializaria tal coisa? Em não emprestar ainda mais dinheiro?

Em manter o país disfuncional, um país com uma oligarquia corrupta. Há 'luvas' da corrupção que vão para fora da Grécia.

[Incognitus]

Isso é um argumento em que os os comunistas se iriam rever.

Os comunistas talvez. Os socialistas não. Ora, não há comunistas, só socialistas. Nem na Coreia do Norte há comunistas.

Porquê? Porque no socialismo podem existir níveis de vida brutalmente diferentes. Um Castro ou um Mao podem viver como Marajás, e servirem-se do que de melhor a terra tem para dar, incluindo súbditas para manter o líder moralizado. E toda a estrutura vive melhor do que a populaça em geral pela mesma razão.

No comunismo, não. Portanto quem quer que diga que está a lutar pelo comunismo, fica-se SEMPRE pelo socialismo. Lutar a partir daí seria lutar contra o interesse próprio.

----------

Mas de qq forma espanta-me que defendas esse tipo de desigualdade arbitrária, com base no "sentirem-se a sofrer" ainda que o sofrimento nesse caso seja irracional.

De resto, embora exista pesquisa científica que CONFIRMA esse sofrimento, existe igualmente pesquisa científica a dizer que as pessoas se adaptam rapidamente às novas circunstâncias. Aliás, adaptam-se até a circunstâncias absurdamente más, que fará a circunstâncias que são apenas aparentemente más (sem o serem, objectivamente).

[Incognitus]

De resto, em que é que se materializaria tal coisa? Em não emprestar ainda mais dinheiro?

Em manter o país disfuncional, um país com uma oligarquia corrupta. Há 'luvas' da corrupção que vão para fora da Grécia.

O país mantém-se disfuncional por iniciativa Grega. Ou melhor, por falta de iniciativa Grega. Não porque a UE o imponha ou deixe de impor.

[tommy]

http://observador.pt/opiniao/a-semana-em-que-a-europa-deixou-de-usar-gravata/

A semana em que a Europa tirou a gravata

O chefe do governo holandês ameaçou Tsipras de que se houver novo resgate à Grécia, ele também fará um referendo na Holanda. Ao mobilizar a rua grega, Tsipras despertou as outras ruas europeias.


Domingo passado, Tsipras convidou os gregos a recusarem a austeridade proposta pelos credores europeus; agora, em nome dos gregos, ele próprio propôs aos credores uma carga de austeridade muito maior, com cortes e aumentos de impostos no valor de 13 biliões de euros. É assim a democracia na versão de Tsipras: o povo vota num sentido, e o governo decide noutro. Tsipras submeteu a Grécia a uma das maiores fraudes plebiscitárias da história, ao persuadir os eleitores gregos, como em Janeiro, de que tinham uma margem de manobra que, de facto, não existia. Quanto tempo durará a democracia grega neste regime de demagogia golpista?

Entretanto, alguma coisa mudou na Europa. Se tivesse de fixar um momento para simbolizar essa viragem, escolheria os já célebres oito minutos de fúria oratória que Guy Verhofstadt, também sem gravata, dirigiu contra Tsipras no parlamento europeu, quarta-feira passada. Mais do que um discurso, foi o sinal de uma nova etapa da odisseia grega no Euro: o momento em que a oligarquia europeia, também ela, tirou a gravata, e começou a falar sem rodeios e a procurar aplausos na plateia. Durante meses, o espectáculo foi proporcionado exclusivamente pelo duo Tsipras e Varoufakis. Agora, Tsipras, subitamente calado, quase esmagado, já não é o único tipo cool e sem gravata.

Quando os investidores internacionais se assustaram em 2010, a UE tentou proteger a Grécia. Deu-lhe dinheiro, perdoou-lhe dívidas, mas esperou, como contrapartida, que os políticos gregos desmantelassem a máquina de fazer défices instalada no país à sombra do Euro. A ideia era proporcionar-lhes uma pressão externa que eles pudessem usar para fazerem passar reformas que, finalmente, desmamassem a Grécia do défice. Foi uma ilusão, porque a pressão externa não compensou a falta de apoio interno para as reformas. Por isso, os apertões da UE só serviram para ir destruindo os líderes gregos: primeiro Papandreou, depois Samaras. Foi assim que, por fim, a UE se viu diante de Tsipras. O caudilho do Syriza foi hábil. Aproveitou a pressão europeia, não para impor reformas, mas para pousar como o grande defensor da soberania nacional. Os gregos reagiram ambiguamente: por um lado, tiraram o dinheiro dos bancos; mas por outro, votaram em Tsipras. O referendo consagrou-o finalmente, esta semana, como uma espécie de Hugo Chávez do Mediterrâneo.

Só que a golpada do referendo teve um efeito inesperado. Até agora, a crise grega era um assunto de bastidores, de gabinetes, de cimeiras. Uma questão diplomática, para técnicos discretos. Tsipras trouxe-a para a rua. Mas ao mobilizar a rua grega, despertou as outras ruas europeias. Na cimeira de segunda-feira, segundo a edição em papel do El País, o chefe do governo holandês Mark Rutte, ameaçou Tsipras de que se houver um terceiro resgate à Grécia, fará ele também um referendo no seu país. O “nee” num referendo holandês acerca de outro empréstimo à Grécia seria provavelmente tão esmagador como o “oxi” no referendo grego. O demagogo grego deve ter percebido finalmente que o seu golpe plebiscitário abrira a caixa de Pandora. Entretanto, mais de 100 deputados da CDU-CSU, o partido da chanceler Merkel, já deram a entender que votariam contra um terceiro resgate. Mas houve pior: ontem, Jens Weideman, presidente do Bundesbank, exigiu que fossem “os políticos” – isto é, os governos e os parlamentos –, e não o BCE, a tomarem a responsabilidade pelas transferências de recursos para a Grécia. Durante meses, o BCE foi usado para viabilizar a fuga de capitais da Grécia. Como se a questão fosse apenas técnica. O banco central alemão quer que a suposta ajuda aos bancos gregos seja finalmente desvendada como uma questão política.

Há muito tempo que todos percebemos que a Grécia é um daqueles problemas que é possível adiar, mas já não é possível resolver. Este fim de semana, poderemos ter mais um adiamento. Mas os riscos são grandes. O que farão os gregos, quando descobrirem que foram convidados a recusar um acordo, apenas para aceitarem um acordo muito mais duro? E que farão os outros contribuintes europeus, quando perceberem que, mais uma vez, a oligarquia europeia vai obrigá-los a pagar a irreversibilidade do Euro? Por enquanto, o Euro sobe, as bolsas animam-se, o investimento em dívida italiana aumenta, os juros gregos baixam. Mas algo mudou. A Europa já não usa gravata.

Grande crónica!!


A partir de hoje é luta rija e de faca nos dentes.   

[Counter Retail Trader]

O PDF foi se .... "bad request"

Qual, o da proposta?

sim , ontem nao li tudo , mas pareceu um pouco amador na elaboração, pouco detalhe.. mas tambem nunca fiz uma proposta do genero..

[as]

Nãããaooooo 

Assim nunca mais saímos disto, e vai passar a mensagem errada aos extremistas de portugal, espanha, etc.

Porquê? O acordo que vai passar era o que estava na mesa por parte da UE ou melhor ainda (do ponto de vista da UE)...

Inclui compromissos para privatizar uma série de coisas, para liberalizar uma série de actividades, etc. Isto além das questões paramétricas.

Calma que o Syriza hostilizou muita gente na Eurozone. A França pode mandar bitaites mas não está disposta a pagar a parte da Eslováquia, Finlândia e afins. Alguém vai obrigar a escrever que não haverá qualquer restruturação de dívida para os credores públicos.

O problema é que ter os bancos fechados é lixado, e o bicho vai baixar as calças até aos tornozelos.

Não me acredito que não haja ninguém a por o dedo na ferida. E ria-me a valer se alguém dissesse que tinha que levar a questão a referendo: Está disposto a enterrar mais dinheiro na Grécia?

Cmps,

   AS

Justamento o que tinha escrito!  Grande Holanda!

A Grécia pensou que tinha de defrontar uma equipa... Enganou-se, tem de defrontar 18 e ganhar a todas!

[Incognitus]

O PDF foi se .... "bad request"

Qual, o da proposta?

sim , ontem nao li tudo , mas pareceu um pouco amador na elaboração, pouco detalhe.. mas tambem nunca fiz uma proposta do genero..

Bem, infelizmente não o guardei. A coisa era mais completa do que o normal da Grécia, que geralmente se fica só pelas intenções.

[Counter Retail Trader]

Ok aqui esta

E sem a versao grega

http://www.naftemporiki.gr/finance/story/976680/the-greek-reform-proposals



olicy Commitments and Actions to be taken in consultation with EC/ECB/IMF staff:
 
1. 2015 supplementary budget and 2016-19 MTFS1
Adopt effective as of July 1, 2015 a supplementary 2015 budget and a 2016–19 medium-term fiscal strategy, supported by a sizable and credible package of measures. The new fiscal path is premised on a primary surplus target of (1, 2, 3), and 3.5 percent of GDP in 2015, 2016, 2017 and 2018. The package includes VAT reforms (¶2), other tax policy measures (¶3), pension reforms (¶4), public administration reforms (¶5), reforms addressing shortfalls in tax collection enforcement (¶6), and other parametric measures as specified below.
 
The Proposal
2. VAT reform
Adopt legislation to reform the VAT system that will be effective as of July 1, 2015. The reform will target a net revenue gain of 1 percent of GDP on an annual basis from parametric changes. The new VAT system will: (i) unify the rates at a standard 23 percent rate, which will include restaurants and catering, and a reduced 13 percent rate for basic food, energy, hotels, and water (excluding sewage), and a super-reduced rate of 6 percent for pharmaceuticals, books, and theater; (ii) streamline exemptions to broaden the base and raise the tax on insurance; and (iii) Eliminate discounts on islands, starting with the islands with higher incomes and which are the most popular tourist destinations, except the most remote ones. This will be completed by end-2016, as appropriate and targeted fiscally neutral measures to compensate those inhabitants that are most in need are determined. The new VAT rates on hotels and islands will be implemented from October 2015.
The increase of the VAT rate described above may be reviewed at the end of 2016, provided that equivalent additional revenues are collected through measures taken against tax evasion and to improve collectability of VAT. Any decision to review and revise shall take place in consultation with the institutions.
3. Fiscal structural measures
Adopt legislation to:
· close possibilities for income tax avoidance (e.g., tighten the definition of farmers), take measures to increase the corporate income tax in 2015 and require 100 percent advance payments for corporate income and gradually for individual business income tax by 2017; phase out the preferential tax treatment of farmers in the income tax code by 2017; raise the solidarity surcharge;
· abolish subsidies for excise on diesel oil for farmers and better target eligibility to halve heating oil subsidies expenditure in the budget 2016;
·     in view of any revision of the zonal property values, adjust the property tax rates if necessary to safeguard the 2015 and 2016 property tax revenues at €2.65 billion and adjust the alternative minimum personal income taxation.
·     eliminate the cross-border withholding tax introduced by the installments act (law XXXX/2015) and reverse the recent amendments to the ITC in the public administration act (law XXXX/2015), including the special treatment of agricultural income.
·     adopt outstanding reforms on the codes on income tax, and tax procedures: introduce a new Criminal Law on Tax Evasion and Fraud to amend the Special Penal Law 2523/1997 and any other relevant legislation, and replace Article 55, ¶s 1 and 2, of the TPC, with a view, inter alia, to modernize and broaden the definition of tax fraud and evasion to all taxes; abolish all Code of Book and Records fines, including those levied under law 2523/1997 develop the tax framework for collective investment vehicles and their participants consistently with the ITC and in line with best practices in the EU.
·     adopt legislation to upgrade the organic budget law to: (i) introduce a framework for independent agencies; (ii) phase out ex-ante audits of the Hellenic Court of Auditors and account officers (ypologos); (iii) give GDFSs exclusive financial service capacity and GAO powers to oversee public sector finances; and (iv) phase out fiscal audit offices by January 2017.
·     increase the rate of the tonnage tax and phase out special tax treatments of the shipping industry.
By September 2015, (i) simplify the personal income tax credit schedule; (ii) re-design and integrate into the ITC the solidarity surcharge for income of 2016 to more effectively achieve progressivity in the income tax system; (iii) issue a circular on fines to ensure the comprehensive and consistent application of the TPC; (iv) and other remaining reforms as specified in ¶9 of the IMF Country Report No. 14/151.
On health care, effective as of July 1, 2015, (i) re-establish full INN prescription, without exceptions, (ii) reduce as a first step the price of all off-patent drugs to 50 percent and all generics to 32.5 percent of the patent price, by repealing the grandfathering clause for medicines already in the market in 2012, and (iii)) review and limit the prices of diagnostic tests to bring structural spending in line with claw back targets; and (iv) collect in the full the 2014 clawback for private clinics, diagnostics and pharmaceuticals, and extend their 2015 clawback ceilings to 2016.
Launch the Social Welfare Review under the agreed terms of reference with the technical assistance of the World Bank to target savings of ½ percent of GDP which can help finance a fiscally neutral gradual roll-out of the GMI in January 2016.
Adopt legislation to:
·     reduce the expenditure ceiling for military spending by €100 million in 2015 and by €200 million in 2016 with a targeted set of actions, including a reduction in headcount and procurement; 
·     introduce reform of the income tax code, [inter alia covering capital taxation], investment vehicles, farmers and the self- employed, etc.;
·     raise the corporate tax rate from 26% to 28%;
·     introduce tax on television advertisements;
·     announce international public tender for the acquisition of television licenses and usage related fees of relevant frequencies; and
·     extend implementation of luxury tax on recreational vessels in excess of 5 meters and increase the rate from 10% to 13%, coming into effect from the collection of 2014 income taxes and beyond;
·     extend Gross Gaming Revenues (GGR) taxation of 30% on VLT games expected to be installed at second half of 2015 and 2016;
·     generate revenues through the issuance of 4G and 5G licenses.
We will consider some compensating measures, in case of fiscal shortfalls: (i) Increase the tax rate to income for rents, for annual incomes below €12,000 to 15% (from 11%) with an additional revenue of €160 million and for annual incomes above €12,000 to 35% (from 33%) with an additional revenue of €40 million; (ii)  the corporate income tax will increase by an additional percentage point (i.e. from 28% to 29%) that will result in additional revenues of €130 million.
 
4. Pension reform
The Authorities recognise that the pension system is unsustainable and needs fundamental reforms. This is why they will implement in full the 2010 pension reform law (3863/2010), and implement in full or replace/adjust the sustainability factors for supplementary and lump-sum pensions from the 2012 reform as a part of the new pension reform in October 2015 to achieve equivalent savings and take further steps to improve the pension system.
Effective from July 1, 2015 the authorities will phase-in reforms that would deliver estimated permanent savings of ¼-½ percent of GDP in 2015 and 1 percent of GDP on a full year basis in 2016 and thereafter by adopting legislation to:
·     create strong disincentives to early retirement, including the adjustment of early retirement penalties, and through a gradual elimination of grandfathering to statutory retirement age and early retirement pathways progressively adapting to the limit of statutory retirement age of 67 years, or 62 and 40 years of contributions by 2022, applicable for all those retiring (except arduous professions, and mothers with children with disability) with immediate application;
·     adopt legislation so that withdrawals from the Social Insurance Fund will incur an annual penalty, for those affected by the extension of the retirement age period, equivalent to 10 percent on top of the current penalty of 6 percent;
·     integrate into ETEA all supplementary pension funds and ensure that, starting January 1, 2015, all supplementary pension funds are only financed by own contributions;
·     better target social pensions by increasing OGA uninsured pension;
·     Gradually phase out the solidarity grant (EKAS) for all pensioners by end-December 2019. This shall be legislated immediately and shall start as regards the top 20% of beneficiaries in March 2016 with the modalities of the phase out to be agreed with the institutions;
·     freeze monthly guaranteed contributory pension limits in nominal terms until 2021;
·     provide to people retiring after 30 June 2015 the basic, guaranteed contributory, and means tested pensions only at the attainment of the statutory normal retirement age of currently 67 years;
·     increase the health contributions for pensioners from 4% to 6% on average and extend it to supplementary pensions;
·     phase out all state-financed exemptions and harmonize contribution rules for all pension funds with the structure of contributions to IKA from 1 July 2015;
Moreover, in order to restore the sustainability of the pension system, the authorities will by 31 October 2015, legislate further reforms to take effect from 1 January  2016; (i) specific design and parametric improvements to establish a closer link between contributions and benefits; (ii) broaden and modernize the contribution and pension base for all self-employed, including by switching from notional to actual income, subject to minimum required contribution rules; (iii) revise and rationalize all different systems of basic, guaranteed contributory and means tested pension components, taking into account incentives to work and contribute; (iv) the main elements of a comprehensive SSFs consolidation, including any remaining harmonization of contribution and benefit payment rules and procedures across all funds; (v) abolish all nuisance charges financing pensions and offset by reducing benefits or increasing contributions in specific funds to take effect from 31 October 2015; and (vi) harmonize pension benefit rules of the agricultural fund (OGA) with the rest of the pension system in a pro rata manner, unless OGA is merged into other funds. The consolidation of social insurance funds will take place by end 2017. In 2015, the process will be activated through legislation to consolidate the social insurance funds under a single entity and the operational consolidation will have been completed by 31 December 2016. Further reductions in the operating costs and a more effective management of fund resources including improved balancing of needs between better-off and poorer-off funds will be actively encouraged.
The authorities will adopt legislation to fully offset the fiscal effects of the implementation of court rulings on the 2012 pension reform.
In parallel to the reform of the pension system, a Social Welfare Review will be carried out to ensure fairness of the various reforms.
The institutions are prepared to take into account other parametric measures within the pension system of equivalent effect to replace some of the measures mentioned above, taking into account their impact on growth, and provided that such measures are presented to the institutions during the design phase and are sufficiently concrete and quantifiable, and in the absence of this the default option is what is specified above.
 
5. Public Administration, Justice and Anti Corruption
Adopt legislation to:
·     reform the unified wage grid, effective 1 January, 2016, setting the key parameters in a fiscally neutral manner and consistent with the agreed wage bill targets and with comprehensive application across the public sector, including decompressing the wage distribution across the wage spectrumin connection with the skill, performance and responsibility of staff. (The authorities will also adopt legislation to rationalise the specialised wage grids, by end-November 2015);
·     align non-wage benefits such as leave arrangements, per diems, travel allowances and perks, with best practices in the EU, effective 1 January 2016;
·     establish within the new MTFS ceilings for the wage bill and the level of public employment consistent with achieving the fiscal targets and ensuring a declining path of the wage bill relative to GDP until 2019;
·     hire managers and assess performance of all employees (with the aim to complete the hiring of new managers by 31 December 2015 subsequent to a review process)
·     introduce a new permanent mobility scheme applied by Q4 2015. The scheme will promote the use of job description and will be linked with an online database that will include all current vacancies. Final decision on employee mobility will be taken by each service concerned. This will rationalize the allocation of resources as well as the staffing across the General Government.
·     reform the Civil Procedure Code, in line with previous agreements;  introduce measures to reduce the backlog of cases in administrative courts; work closely with European institutions and technical assistance on e-justice, mediation and judicial statistics
·     strengthen the governance of ELSTAT. It shall cover (i) the role and structure of the Advisory bodies of the Hellenic Statistical System, including the recasting of the Council of ELSS to an advisory Committee of the ELSS, and the role of the Good Practice Advisory Committee (GPAC); (ii) the recruitment procedure for the President of ELSTAT, to ensure that a President of the highest professional calibre is recruited, following transparent procedures and selection criteria; (iii) the involvement of ELSTAT as appropriate in any legislative or other legal proposal pertaining to any statistical matter; (iv) other issues that impact the independence of ELSTAT, including financial autonomy, the empowerment of ELSTAT to reallocate existing permanent posts and to hire staff where it is needed and to hire specialised scientific personnel, and the classification of the institution as a fiscal policy body in the recent law 4270/2014; role and powers of Bank of Greece in statistics in line with European legislation.
·     Publish a revised Strategic Plan against Corruption by 31 July 2015. Amend and implement the legal framework for the declaration of assets and financing of the political parties and adopt legislation insulating financial crime and anti-corruption investigations from political intervention in individual cases.
Moreover, in collaboration with the OECD, the Authorities will:
·     Strengthen controls in public entities and especially SOEs. Empower the Line Ministries to perform robust audit and control inspections to supervised entities including SOEs.
·     Strengthen controls and internal audit processes in high spending Local Government Institutions and their supervised legal entities.
·     Strengthen controls in public and private investment cases funded either by national or co-funded by other sources, public works and public procurement (e.g. in health sector, SDIT).
·     Strengthen transparency and control processes and skills in tax and customs authorities.
·     Assess major risks in the public procurement cycle, taking in consideration the recent developments (Central Purchasing and e-Procurement: KHMDHS and ESHDHS) and the need to have a clear governance framework. Develop strategy according to the assessment(Q4 2015)
·     Implement strategy to mitigate public procurement risks.(Q1 2016)
·     Assess 2 specific sectors, Health and Public Works in order to understand the existing constrains related to corruption and waste risks and propose measures to address them. Develop and implement strategy. (Q4 2015)
 
6. Tax administration
Take the following actions to:
·     Adopt legislation to establish an autonomous revenue agency, that specifies: (i) the agency’s legal form, organization, status, and scope; (ii) the powers and functions of the CEO and the independent Board of Governors; (iii) the relationship to the Minister of Finance and other government entities; (iv) the agency’s human resource flexibility and relationship to the civil service; (v) budget autonomy, with own GDFS and a new funding formula to align incentives with revenue collection and guarantee budget predictability and flexibility; (vi) reporting to the government and parliament; and (vii) the immediate transfer of all tax- and customs-related capacities and duties and all tax- and customs-related staff in SDOE and other entities to the agency.
·     on garnishments, adopt legislation to eliminate the 25 percent ceiling on wages and pensions and lower all thresholds of €1,500 while ensuring in all cases reasonable living conditions; accelerate procurement of IT infrastructure to automatize e-garnishment; improve tax debt write-off rules; remove tax officers’ personal liabilities for not pursuing old debt; remove restrictions on conducting audits of tax returns from 2012 subject to the external tax certificate scheme; and enforce if legally possible upfront payment collection in tax disputes.
·     amend (i) the 2014–15 tax and SSC debt instalment schemes to exclude those who fail to pay current obligations and introduce a requirement for the tax and social security administrations to shorten the duration for those with the capacity to pay earlier and introduce market-based interest rates; the LDU and KEAO will assess by September 2015 the large debtors with tax and SSC debt exceeding €1 million (e.g. verify their capacity to pay and take corrective action) and (ii) the basic instalment scheme/TPC to adjust the market-based interest rates and suspend until end-2017 third-party verification and bank guarantee requirements.
·     adopt legislation to accelerate de-registration procedures and limit VAT re-registration to protect VAT revenues and accelerate procurement of network analysis software; and provide the Presidential Decree needed for the significantly strengthening the reorganisation of the VAT enforcement section in order to strengthen VAT enforcement and combat VAT carousel fraud. The authorities will submit an application to the EU VAT Committee and prepare an assessment of the implication of an increase in the VAT threshold to €25.000.
·     combat fuel smuggling, via legislative measures for locating storage tanks (fixed or mobile);
·     Produce a comprehensive plan with technical assistance for combating tax evasion which includes (i) identification of undeclared deposits by checking bank transactions in banking institutions in Greece or abroad, (ii) introduction of  a voluntary disclosure program with appropriate sanctions, incentives and verification procedures, consistent with international best practice, and without any amnesty provisions (iii) request from EU member states to provide data on asset ownership and acquisition by Greek citizens, (iv) renew the request for technical assistance in tax administration and make full use of the resource in capacity building, (v) establish a wealth registry to improve monitoring.
·     develop a costed plan for the promotion of the use of electronic payments, making use of the EU Structural and Investment Fund;
·     Create a time series database to monitor the balance sheets of parent-subsisdiary companies to improve risk analysis criteria for transfer pricing
 
7. Financial sector
Adopt: (i) amendments to the corporate and household insolvency laws including to cover all debtors and bring the corporate insolvency law in line with the OCW law; (ii) amendments to the household insolvency law to introduce a mechanism to separate strategic defaulters from good faith debtors as well as simplify and strengthen the procedures and introduce measures to address the large backlog of cases; (iii) amendments to improve immediately the judicial framework for corporate and household insolvency matters; (iv) legislation to establish a regulated profession of insolvency administrators, not restricted to any specific profession and in line with good cross-country experience; (v) a comprehensive strategy for the financial system: this strategy will build on the strategy document from 2013, taking into account the new environment and conditions of the financial system and with a view of returning the banks in private ownership by attracting international strategic investors and to achieve a sustainable funding model over the medium term; and (vi) a holistic NPL resolution strategy, prepared with the help of a strategic consultant.
8. Labour market
Launch a consultation process to review the whole range of existing labour market arrangements, taking into account best practices elsewhere in Europe. Further input to the consultation process described above will be provided by international organisations, including the ILO. The organization and timelines shall be drawn up in consultation with the institutions. In this context, legislation on a new system of collective bargaining should be ready by Q4 2015. The authorities will take actions to fight undeclared work in order to strengthen the competitiveness of legal companies and protect workers as well as tax and social security revenues.
 
9. Product market
Adopt legislation to:
·     implement all pending recommendations of the OECD competition toolkit I, except OTC pharmaceutical products, starting with: tourist buses, truck licenses, code of conduct for traditional foodstuff, eurocodes on building materials, and all the OECD toolkit II recommendations on beverages and petroleum products;
·     In order to foster competition and increase consumer welfare immediately launch a new competition assessment, in collaboration and with the technical support of the OECD, on wholesale trade, construction, e-commerce and media. The assessment will be concluded by Q1 2016.The recommendations will be adopted by Q2 2016.
·     open the restricted professions of engineers, notaries, actuaries, and bailiffs and liberalize the market for tourist rentals ;
·     eliminate non-reciprocal nuisance charges and align the reciprocal nuisance charges to the services provided;
·     reduce red tape, including on horizontal licensing requirements of investments and on low-risk activities as recommended by the World Bank, and administrative burden of companies based on the OECD recommendations, and (ii) establish a committee for the inter-ministerial preparation of legislation. Technical assistance of the World Bank will be sought to implement the easing of licensing requirements.
·     design electronic one-stop shops for businesses through analysing information obligations businesses have to comply with, structuring them accordingly and helping to design a project on developing the necessary ICT tools and infrastructure (Q3 2015). Setting up the institutional & co-ordination structure, identification of the business life events to be included, identification and mapping of information obligations & administrative procedures and training of officials (Q4 2015). Launch (Q1 2016)
·     adopt the reform of the gas market and its specific roadmap, and implementation should follow suit.
·     take irreversible steps (including announcement of date for submission of binding offers) to privatize the electricity transmission company, ADMIE, or provide by October 2015 an alternative scheme, with equivalent results in terms of competition, in line with the best European practices to provide full ownership unbundling from PPC, while ensuring independence.
On electricity markets, the authorities will reform the capacity payments system and other electricity market rules to avoid that some plants are forced to operate below their variable cost, and to prevent the netting of the arrears between PPC and market operator; set PPC tariffs based on costs, including replacement of the 20% discount for HV users with cost based tariffs; and notify NOME products to the European Commission. The authorities will also continue the implementation of the roadmap to the EU target model prepare a new framework for the support of renewable energies and for the implementation of energy efficiency and review energy taxation; the authorities will strengthen the electricity regulator’s financial and operational independence;
 
10. Privatization
·     The Board of Directors of the Hellenic Republic Asset Development Fund will approve its Asset Development Plan which will include for privatisation all the assets under HRDAF as of 31/12/2014; and the Cabinet will endorse the plan.
·     To facilitate the completion of the tenders, the authorities will complete all government pending actions including those needed for the regional airports, TRAINOSE, Egnatia, the ports of Pireaus and Thessaloniki and Hellinikon (precise list in Technical Memorandum). This list of actions is updated regularly and the Government will ensure that all pending actions are timely implemented.
·     The government and HRADF will announce binding bid dates for Piraeus and Thessaloniki ports of no later than end-October 2015, and for TRAINOSE ROSCO, with no material changes in the terms of the tenders.
·     The government will transfer the state's shares in OTE to the HRADF.
·     Take irreversible steps for the sale of the regional airports at the current terms with the winning bidder already selected.
1 The fiscal path to reach the medium term primary surplus target of 3.5% will be discussed with the institutions, in light of recent economic developments.

[Automek]

Esse tipo de argumentos não faz sentido nenhum. Uma perda é sempre muito mais dolorosa do que o prazer que advem de um ganho da mesma magnitude. Devia ser facilmente percebido por alhuém que anda na bolsa.
Com esse argumento, imagino que se um casal com 7 filhos perder um filho, no funeral a mensagem de consolo que se dá é que só perdeu 14%, e se o casal ainda não for idoso, acrescentar que podem facilmente colmatar a perda em cerca de 9 meses.
Sem ir para comparações, tomando qq pais da esfera ocidental, estatisticamente nos anos de depressão a seguir á crise petrolifera de 73 o PIB era de certeza mais elevado que no incio dos anos 60, mas apesar disso o sofrimento percepcionado pelas pessoas era muito superior.

Perder um filho é um mau exemplo. Se queres colocar as coisas no plano do nível de vida é assim:

Uma família ganha 5K mensais e vive numa moradia. Outra ganha 1K e mora num T2 em Corroios.
A primeira vê o rendimento cair para 2.5K e dizes que temos de a ajudar porque é uma tragédia se essa família tiver de ir viver para Corroios.

[Automek]

Para arquivo fica aqui o pdf

[Zenith]

Esse tipo de argumentos não faz sentido nenhum. Uma perda é sempre muito mais dolorosa do que o prazer que advem de um ganho da mesma magnitude. Devia ser facilmente percebido por alhuém que anda na bolsa.
Com esse argumento, imagino que se um casal com 7 filhos perder um filho, no funeral a mensagem de consolo que se dá é que só perdeu 14%, e se o casal ainda não for idoso, acrescentar que podem facilmente colmatar a perda em cerca de 9 meses.
Sem ir para comparações, tomando qq pais da esfera ocidental, estatisticamente nos anos de depressão a seguir á crise petrolifera de 73 o PIB era de certeza mais elevado que no incio dos anos 60, mas apesar disso o sofrimento percepcionado pelas pessoas era muito superior.

Perder um filho é um mau exemplo. Se queres colocar as coisas no plano do nível de vida é assim:

Uma família ganha 5K mensais e vive numa moradia. Outra ganha 1K e mora num T2 em Corroios.
A primeira vê o rendimento cair para 2.5K e dizes que temos de a ajudar porque é uma tragédia se essa família tiver de ir viver para Corroios.

A segunda familia não tem que ajudar, mas não vejo o paralelo com a Grecia-Bulgária. A Bulgária não está a ajudar nem a alternativa apresentada aos gregos é de vir viver para a Bulgária (paralelo de Corroios).
De resto o exemplo dos filhos, não era estabelecer nenhum paralelismo, mas apenas ilustrar com um exemplo facilmente perceptivel  que se fsse possivel fazer uma  curva felicidade - sofrimento  em função de perdas -ganhos, a curva não seria linear, e por isso usar médias estatisticas de um parametro sem saber qual o tipo de efeito sobre outro pode não fazer muito sentido.

[itg00022289]

Consequências da perda Grécia para a UE

What Would the Eurozone Look Like Without Greece?

By Jon Sindreu, Michael Ovaska, Carlos Tovar
Published July 2, 2015 at 3:00 ET

Greece missed a loan payment of €1.55 billion ($1.7 billion) to the IMF on June 30. Pending on July 20 are further payments totaling almost €3.5 billion to the European Central Bank and other institutions. If it misses it, Greece could end up leaving the eurozone, which would have myriad effects, some quite unexpected.

There would be 3.2% fewer people, but they would be younger on average. The mean age in the eurozone is 39.6 years, while in Greece it’s 42.3.e: Euro’s Salvation Lies in Its Political Appeal


Population
There would be 3.2% fewer people, but they would be younger on average. The mean age in the eurozone is 39.6 years, while in Greece it’s 42.3.



Economy
The eurozone would lose only 1.8% of its economic output. GDP per capita would actually rise 1.5%.


Debt
If Greece were to exit the eurozone, government debt in the single currency area overall would be reduced by 3.4%, but private debt by only 0.9%.


Defense
Greece ranks seventh among the 19 eurozone countries in military spending per capita. Without it, annual military spending per person would have been 0.4% higher in 2014.


Olive Oil
The eurozone would lose 24.5% of its olive oil production.


Religion
The eurozone would lose 84% of its Orthodox Christians.


Marriage

The eurozone would have 4.1% fewer weddings, but only 2% fewer divorces.


Coastline
The eurozone would be 4.6% smaller but have 31.3% less coastline, in part because Greece has about 2,000 islands.


Elevation
The average elevation would fall by 157 meters (515 feet). Greece’s tallest mountain is the mythic Mount Olympus (2,917 meters high).


Smokers
The eurozone would have 4.8% fewer smokers. Only Austria has a higher percentage of smokers 15 or older.


Sources: Eurostat; CIA Factbook, World Health Organization; International Olive Council; Stockholm International Peace Research Institute; Portland State University

http://graphics.wsj.com/eurozone-without-greece/

[Incognitus]

The SYRIZA meeting is reported to have been tumultuous...Tsipras is reported to have shed tears in his speech.

[Zakk]

The SYRIZA meeting is reported to have been tumultuous...Tsipras is reported to have shed tears in his speech.

Isso foi hoje?

O grande problema vai ser quando a holanda fizer o referendo. ui ui

[Counter Retail Trader]

Claro ja estao a pedir a cabeça dele , depois do acordo bye bye

[Automek]

A segunda familia não tem que ajudar, mas não vejo o paralelo com a Grecia-Bulgária. A Bulgária não está a ajudar nem a alternativa apresentada aos gregos é de vir viver para a Bulgária (paralelo de Corroios).

A Bulgária (família mais pobre) mostra que a situação grega não é nenhuma tragédia como querem fazer crer. Basta baixar o nível de vida e ir viver para Corroios. Claro que é melhor viver numa morada mas se não há dinheiro é fazer como os vizinhos do lado.

[pedferre]

Se não sairem agora, saiem mais tarde com mais calma.


Investment banks increasingly doubt Greece can be saved from an exit from the eurozone
 By
SaraSjolin Markets reporter
The risk of Greece leaving the eurozone has jumped over the past week, after Greeks voted to reject austerity measures put forward by creditors. Now Citigroup joins the herd of investment banks that believe a so-called “Grexit” is the most likely outcome of the ongoing debt debacle.

The bank says a Greek exit from the currency union is likely to happen in one of two ways: a quick departure in the next few months, or a more drawn-out process in the next one-to-three years.

“The proximate drivers of our change of view are the announcement of the referendum, the imposition of capital controls and the emphatic ‘no’ outcome in the referendum,” Citi economists C, +1.40% led by chief economist Willem Buiter, said in a note dated Wednesday.

“Background factors are the weakness of the economy, and the seeming inability of Greece and the creditors to reach a deal that contains both the substantial structural reforms and debt relief that Greece needs to stay in the euro,” they added.

Eurozone leaders have said Greece has a deadline of Sunday to reach a deal with creditors, if it wants to avoid sliding into bankruptcy and falling out of the currency union. Athens has until midnight Thursday to present new reform measures acceptable to it lenders, to move ahead with that deal.

“We view the likelihood of an agreement this weekend, or soon after, as relatively high and therefore don’t expect ‘Grexit’ in the next few weeks,” the Citi economists said.

“However, we view the likelihood of compliance by Greece with a new program — let alone a successful implementation of that program — as low, and the risk of a refusal by the creditors to condone non-compliance by Greece as high,” they added.

Citi has been pondering the possibility of Greek farewell to the eurozone since 2012, when it coined the “Grexit” term. Earlier in 2015, it came up with another acronym when it suggested Greece would be stuck in “Grimbo”, a financial limbo, if Athens fails to secure a bailout deal.

After the resounding “no” vote in Sunday’s Greek referendum, a crowd of investment banks made a Greek departure their base-case scenario. J.P. Morgan JPM, +1.33% Barclays BARC, +2.47% BCS, +4.26% UniCredit UCG, +3.48%  and Daiwa Capital Markets all upped the risk spectrum and said an exit was the most likely outcome.

At that time, Citi stopped short of making an exit its base case, but instead warned Greece would slide into “Grimbo”, before changing its position on Thursday.