pode ser que o editorial do Guardian seja mais do agrado do Tommy. tudo para manter o homem feliz.
EU: the least worst option
Editorial
Neither Athens nor Brussels has an interest in Greece leaving the eurozone. Compromise will not solve everything but it would win valuable time
In the next few hours and days Germany and Greece will either fail to save the European Union from a damaging crisis from which it might not fully recover, or they will agree, as now seems more likely, on one of those messy last-minute deals that are the norm in EU affairs. The hints on the evening of 17 February, in defiance of morning pessimism, were that Greece would in fact apply for an extension of its loan deal. Sensible though this is, the terms will be decisive and in any event would be only a temporary, if welcome, respite to the underlying problem. It would be foolish to assume that it represents a conclusive step back from the brink. The stakes remain too high for easy optimism. The fact remains that the shock of a Greek exit from the eurozone, and perhaps the union, would be huge. There is no provision for leaving the euro and none for leaving the union, either by secession or expulsion. The EU has brakes, which may now be applied, but it has no reverse gear.
It can be argued that Greece is a small country and also a rather unusual EU member, a sort of special case. But all the members are in their different ways special cases, and while Greece is indeed a small country, it is a small country that would leave a very big hole. People forget the way in which the retreat from authoritarianism in southern Europe, in Greece, Spain and Portugal, was cemented into place by union membership. They overlook Greece’s special relationship to the European idea, a relationship which, as long as the understanding of the classical world as our predecessor and ancestor persists, will continue to deeply influence Europeans. They overlook what arrangements an excluded Greece, even if it remained an EU member, might cultivate, or have to cultivate, with Russia and China.
Above all, they overlook the impact of a Greek exit on the fault lines within the Union. If Greece left the eurozone, the question of who’s next would inevitably arise. But even if Greece turned out to be the only country to go, the effect on the European family would be potentially disastrous. The north-south split would be deepened, while the tensions between Germany and all or most of the other members would increase. Chancellor Angela Merkel and Germany would be blamed for damaging the union by their rigidity, their orthodoxy and their inability to see that their interests and Europe’s are not the same. If austerity made in Germany were to be seen as having brought Europe low, the mix of small minded nationalism, Euroscepticism and anti-German feeling that is already a problem would be encouraged and exacerbated.
A Greek exit, in addition, would come at a time of serious international challenges to Europe’s position. To the east is a divided and warring Ukraine and an unpredictable, half-hostile Russia; to the south is a disturbed and disordered Middle East. And, in the world as a whole, Europe is underperforming economically. This is a moment when Europe needs to show it can keep its house in order.
Chancellor Merkel, clearly aware of some of these dangers, decided in 2012 that Germany would make every effort to keep Greece in the eurozone. The problem is that the Greek bailout has not been a success. Ordinary Greeks have suffered, yet the reforms that were supposed to put the economy back on track have either been slow in coming or made things worse. The very language used to describe the process has become toxic, to the point that the new Greek government can barely bring itself to pronounce such words as “troika” or “programme”. In Brussels there has already been much renaming of parts. But cosmetics go only so far. The Greeks want restructuring of their debt and changes in the programmes, and were always unlikely to get both. But prime minister Alexis Tsipras and his finance minister, Yanis Varoufakis, seem convinced they can get more than was originally on offer. Mr Tsipras and Mrs Merkel need a compromise clothed in language acceptable to the two electorates they represent, electorates close to being diametrically opposed, in part because politicians have played to their prejudices. Now, perhaps thanks to the EU commissioner Pierre Moscovici, they may have the makings of a compromise. This would avert a catastrophe but do nothing to solve the fundamental problems. But at least it would give time for the serious reflection and considered action those problems demand.
Guardian
