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Robert Mundell, evil genius of the euro
By: Greg Palast
guardian.co.uk,
Tuesday 26 June 2012 13.30 BST
http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2012/jun/26/robert-mundell-evil-genius-euro (http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2012/jun/26/robert-mundell-evil-genius-euro)
For the architect of the euro, taking macroeconomics away from elected politicians and forcing deregulation were part of the plan
The idea that the euro has "failed" is dangerously naive. The euro is doing exactly what its progenitor – and the wealthy 1%-ers who adopted it – predicted and planned for it to do.
That progenitor is former University of Chicago economist Robert Mundell. The architect of "supply-side economics" is now a professor at Columbia University, but I knew him through his connection to my Chicago professor, Milton Friedman, back before Mundell's research on currencies and exchange rates had produced the blueprint for European monetary union and a common European currency.
Mundell, then, was more concerned with his bathroom arrangements. Professor Mundell, who has both a Nobel Prize and an ancient villa in Tuscany, told me, incensed:
"They won't even let me have a toilet. They've got rules that tell me I can't have a toilet in this room! Can you imagine?"
As it happens, I can't. But I don't have an Italian villa, so I can't imagine the frustrations of bylaws governing commode placement.
But Mundell, a can-do Canadian-American, intended to do something about it: come up with a weapon that would blow away government rules and labor regulations. (He really hated the union plumbers who charged a bundle to move his throne.)
"It's very hard to fire workers in Europe," he complained. His answer: the euro.
The euro would really do its work when crises hit, Mundell explained. Removing a government's control over currency would prevent nasty little elected officials from using Keynesian monetary and fiscal juice to pull a nation out of recession.
"It puts monetary policy out of the reach of politicians," he said. "[And] without fiscal policy, the only way nations can keep jobs is by the competitive reduction of rules on business."
He cited labor laws, environmental regulations and, of course, taxes. All would be flushed away by the euro. Democracy would not be allowed to interfere with the marketplace – or the plumbing.
As another Nobelist, Paul Krugman, notes (http://krugman.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/06/24/revenge-of-the-optimum-currency-area/), the creation of the eurozone violated the basic economic rule known as "optimum currency area (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Optimum_currency_area)". This was a rule devised by Bob Mundell.
That doesn't bother Mundell. For him, the euro wasn't about turning Europe into a powerful, unified economic unit. It was about Reagan and Thatcher.
"Ronald Reagan would not have been elected president without Mundell's influence," once wrote Jude Wanniski (http://www.polyconomics.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=1661:theory-and-policy-mundell-to-reagan&catid=48:1999&Itemid=31) in the Wall Street Journal. The supply-side economics pioneered by Mundell became the theoretical template for Reaganomics – or as George Bush the Elder called it, "voodoo economics" (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Reaganomics): the magical belief in free-market nostrums that also inspired the policies of Mrs Thatcher.
Mundell explained to me that, in fact, the euro is of a piece with Reaganomics:
"Monetary discipline forces fiscal discipline on the politicians as well."
And when crises arise, economically disarmed nations have little to do but wipe away government regulations wholesale, privatize state industries en masse, slash taxes and send the European welfare state down the drain.
Thus, we see that (unelected) Prime Minister Mario Monti is demanding labor law "reform" in Italy to make it easier for employers like Mundell to fire those Tuscan plumbers. Mario Draghi, the (unelected) head of the European Central Bank, is calling for "structural reforms" – a euphemism for worker-crushing schemes. They cite the nebulous theory that this "internal devaluation" of each nation will make them all more competitive.
Monti and Draghi cannot credibly explain how, if every country in the Continent cheapens its workforce, any can gain a competitive advantage.
But they don't have to explain their policies; they just have to let the markets go to work on each nation's bonds. Hence, currency union is class war by other means.
The crisis in Europe and the flames of Greece have produced the warming glow of what the supply-siders' philosopher-king Joseph Schumpeter (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Joseph_Schumpeter) called "creative destruction". Schumpeter acolyte and free-market apologist Thomas Friedman flew to Athens to visit the "impromptu shrine" of the burnt-out bank where three people died after it was fire-bombed by anarchist protesters, and used the occasion to deliver a homily on globalization and Greek "irresponsibility" (http://www.nytimes.com/2010/05/16/opinion/16friedman.html).
The flames, the mass unemployment, the fire-sale of national assets, would bring about what Friedman called a "regeneration" of Greece and, ultimately, the entire eurozone. So that Mundell and those others with villas can put their toilets wherever they damn well want to.
Far from failing, the euro, which was Mundell's baby, has succeeded probably beyond its progenitor's wildest dreams.
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Euro to Beat Dollar? Draghi's Genius
Tuesday August 07, 2012 09:57
By: Axel Merk
http://www.kitco.com/ind/Merk/20120807.html (http://www.kitco.com/ind/Merk/20120807.html)
Investors have not woken up to it, but last week may have been a game changer. European Central Bank (ECB) President Draghi took tail risks out of the Eurozone, while at the same time forcing closer fiscal integration. He did it all while keeping the ECB out of some political minefields. It's pure genius. The initial market reaction suggested he might have lost a battle, not realizing that he is winning the war.
(http://www.thinkfn.com/forumbolsaforex/index.php?action=dlattach;topic=426.0;attach=1692;image)
Dismayed by a dysfunctional process caused by a lack of leadership and the increasing risk of some of the worst case scenarios playing out, we have been staying away from the euro in our hard currency strategy. As of late last week, those dynamics changed: we are giving the euro another chance, not only because of substantial short covering potential, but also because Draghi’s “whatever it takes” approach might bring about seismic changes in how European integration, fiscal and monetary policy move forward.
In essence, Draghi told the world that the ECB will act like a central bank of a United States of Europe if the integration of European fiscal policy accelerates. The “integration” process hasn’t worked particularly well. In the early years of the Eurozone, peripheral Eurozone countries used cheap access to financing to live beyond their means. Now, the markets have serious doubts about the sustainability of the finances of weaker Eurozone countries. To regain the markets’ trust, governments have nibbled with austerity measures. While the respective governments will take offense to us using the term ‘nibble’ at their hard fought progress, governments have not been able to reduce their debt loads. Politicians blame the high cost of borrowing and speculators. Unfortunately, as long as debt is merely shuffled around, no matter how big any aid package may be, it is unlikely to bring long lasting relief. In an effort to regain the trust of the markets, governments must engage in credible structural reform. Ireland has successfully gone down this path, but politicians have so far been unable to do the same in Spain, Italy and Greece. In Spain, Prime Minister Rajoy enjoys an absolute parliamentary majority and has no excuse. Italy is run by a technocrat; as such, the market is rightfully suspicious. Greece, well, is in a category of her own.
To break the debt spiral of these weaker countries, the European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF) and European Stability Mechanism (ESM) have been put in place. Accessing these facilities comes with a hefty price tag: giving up sovereign control over one’s budget. However, that’s exactly what a United States of Europe needs: tight fiscal integration. While access to the bailout facilities reduces the immediate cost of borrowing, it may also shut the door to selling bonds in the markets at palatable cost.
That raises the question of what is a palatable cost of borrowing? In the 1990’s, paying 6% for 10-year debt was just normal for some countries. Yet, because so much more debt has piled up, paying 6% is now considered unsustainable – at least unless such draconian budget cuts are introduced to balance budgets even with such high interest burden. And just in case anyone is wondering, the U.S. would be in just as dire a situation, if not worse, if it had to pay 6% on its long-term debt. We are currently concerned about the “fiscal cliff” in the U.S. – but even if the draconian cuts and increased taxes introduced by the fiscal cliff were implemented, the U.S. budget deficit would still be above 3% of GDP (the level that Eurozone nations are intended to stay below). The difference between the U.S. and peripheral Eurozone countries is foremost that the bond market lets the U.S. get away with its deficit spending.
We have long argued that the market provides the best incentive to stop governments from overspending. Spain, Italy, Ireland, Portugal, Greece – all these countries have engaged in astounding reforms, all with the “encouragement” of the bond market. Politicians, however, are most creative in avoiding making tough choices. So how does one square the circle, how does one live with political realities while at the same time provide a path to fiscal sustainability? Politicians have called for the ECB to step in, to buy bonds of weaker Eurozone countries, thus lowering their cost of borrowing. But when the ECB has done that in the past through the Securities Markets Program (SMP), policy makers have lost their motivation to pursue structural reform. Policy makers choose between the cost of acting and the cost of not acting: the moment there is relief in the market, commitment to reform fades. It also puts the ECB into the uncomfortable position of playing judge of whose reform plans are worthy of support and whose are not.
The argument for market intervention is that the “monetary transmission mechanism” is broken. That may be correct, but becoming a political hot potato is no attractive alternative for a central bank.
So ECB President Draghi announced a new philosophical framework last week: the judge of whether sufficient austerity is implemented to warrant ECB support is the conditionality of EFSF/ESM, i.e. the types of rules the International Monetary Fund (IMF) introduces on countries. It’s the best one can hope for if policy makers don’t accept the market’s judgment. In our view, accepting the market pressure would be preferred, but this is the best course of action given the realities presented. Indeed, we consider Draghi’s action nothing short of pure genius.
Draghi’s action is pure genius because it dramatically accelerates fiscal integration in Europe. Already Spain and Italy are contemplating joining the bailout regime, if in turn Draghi will help lower their cost of borrowing. There will certainly be a lot of horse-trading; we also don’t expect all austerity measures to necessarily be fully implemented. But that’s not the point. The point is that weak countries subject themselves to a political body (not a central bank) that negotiates and sets terms. It is the United States of Europe we have been waiting for. With the framework set, the ECB can engage in market operations targeting securities that are part of the program. Draghi already indicated that the focus will be on the short-end of the yield curve (shorter dated Treasury securities); this is akin to what other central banks, like the Federal Reserve (Fed) do; well, the Fed has since moved out the yield curve (longer dated Treasury securities). Longer dated debt will be affected, although significant risk premia over German bonds may continue for some time.
Based on other comments we have seen, odds are that not many others, if any, will agree that Draghi’s actions were “pure genius.” After all, he did not provide the immediate relief all those stimulus addicted market participants have gotten used to. But Draghi understands that the best short-term policy may be a good long-term policy. The short-term policies advocated by many pundits, an aggressive purchase program of peripheral bonds would only achieve that holders of such debt can dump their bonds; buyers would be guaranteed to buy such securities at inflated prices, setting them up for almost certain disappointment (and thus scaring them away from future bond auctions).
Instead, Draghi achieved a great deal: as fiscal integration in the Eurozone may be dramatically accelerated. Importantly, a political process has been put in place. Ironically, it took a monetary policy maker to put a fiscal process in place; yet, Draghi allowed the ECB to be used merely as a catalyst, not as a political pawn.
Draghi also correctly shifts the focus going forward on the increased “fragmentation” in the Eurozone where market participants increasingly focus on domestic rather than intra-European activities. While more needs to be done, other central bank activities under consideration would have amplified rather than reduced fragmentation, would have made the demise of the euro more likely. To address fragmentation issues, work on many fronts needs to take place. Market participants are doing their part by rewriting contracts to clearly state what law they are subject to in case a member country were to leave the Euro.
As such, we started buying the Euro again in our hard currency strategy. Make no mistake about it: we are only putting our foot in the water; we are not yet wholeheartedly embracing the Euro. But we are giving this new framework a chance, as we judge it to be the greatest progress in the Eurozone debt crisis we have seen to date. The coming months will show whether this is to be written off as a trading opportunity or whether it is the new strategic direction that it has the potential of being. Greece may still drop out of the Euro, but such an exit is much less of a threat to Eurozone and global financial stability than it was as recently as a week ago.
Given that currencies trade against one another, this analysis would not be complete without looking at the U.S. dollar. In the U.S., too, many pundits have been disappointed at the lack of action by the Fed. Indeed, we also think the Fed under Bernanke’s leadership is likely to provide more stimulus. But just as Draghi has presented a new philosophical framework for future action, Bernanke may feel he is obliged to provide a new framework for “QE3”. That’s because many have rightfully pointed out that any new action might have limited impact, yet risk ever more unintended consequences. The obvious opportunity that presents itself will be in Jackson Hole, where he will be speaking later this month. The Fed is focused on different issues, notably a sustained recovery after the housing bust. As such, the Fed – and we are putting words into Bernanke’s mouth here – may need to err on the side of inflation. No responsible central banker – never mind closet central banker and chief Keynesian cheerleader Paul Krugman - would ever openly advocate inflation. Let’s just say that Bernanke’s upcoming Jackson Hole speech should be interesting to watch.
For now, with the prospect of ECB action – even if with delays and no guarantee - a number of tail risks have been taken out of the Eurozone. In our assessment, that alone warrants a significantly stronger Euro versus the U.S. dollar. As we discussed, we believe there’s a new wind blowing in the Eurozone. That wind may well take the tailwind of recent months out of the U.S. dollar.
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So that Mundell and those others with villas can put their toilets wherever they damn well want to.
esta frase diz tudo sobre o seu autor...
enquanto não perceberem que as pessoas têm o DIREITO de meter uma casa de banho onde bem entendem, sem que haja um burocrata que decida sobre isso, não há nada que se possa discutir
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So that Mundell and those others with villas can put their toilets wherever they damn well want to.
esta frase diz tudo sobre o seu autor...
enquanto não perceberem que as pessoas têm o DIREITO de meter uma casa de banho onde bem entendem, sem que haja um burocrata que decida sobre isso, não há nada que se possa discutir
Sim, o autor tem colocadas as suas lentes, mas está a apontar para coisas importantes, nomeadamente para as ideias de um dos arquitectos do euro que conhece em primeira mão. Além disso, parece-me ser a melhor abertura para uma thread que tem como propósito ir expondo o sistema monetário alternativo ao dólar que os europeus criaram.
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Sim, o autor tem colocadas as suas lentes, mas está a apontar para coisas importantes, nomeadamente para as ideias de um dos arquitectos do euro que conhece em primeira mão. Além disso, parece-me ser a melhor abertura para uma thread que tem como propósito ir expondo o sistema monetário alternativo ao dólar que os europeus criaram.
pois eu parece-me um excelente sistema aquele que tira o poder aos políticos e o entrega aos mercados; aquele que impede os políticos de prejudicarem os aforradores e os criadores de poupança através de inflação/criação monetária e torna transparente o desastre dos défices estatais
neste processo todo o que não concordo é com o carácter não democrático das instituições europeias... a Europa está a ser gerida por um conjunto de burocratas não eleitos e não directamente responsabilizáveis perante os eleitores europeus; todos os saltos em frente na construção europeia têm sido à revelia das populações europeias que estão completamente alienadas do processo e é esse o verdadeiro calcanhar de aquiles por onde todo o projecto um dia poderá ruir, porque é algo construído nas costas dos eleitores e não resultante da sua vontade expressa
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... Mão invisivel essa que arrisca no que toca a Países com economias mais debeis como a Portuguesa a destruir pura e simplesmente o estado Social tal como o conhecemos até hoje, pondo em causa tarefas tão basicas como como por exemplo o pagamento de pensões de reforma num futuro não muito distante ... A prestação de cuidados de saúde na abrangencia que hoje é conhecida etc etc
Portugal deveria pura e simplesmente abandonar o Euro, se não avançar para uma União fiscal, Orçamental. e não iria deixar saudade ...
Por outro lado o processo de destruição criativa é virtuoso mas sería anti civilizacional se fosse com " mortos e feridos " pelo caminho,
as pessoas não são descartaveis como na Idade média ... A politica do Fed é bem melhor, sobretudo porque olha para o quotidiano das pessoas coisa que o a politica do BCE não olha ...
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... Mão invisivel essa que arrisca no que toca a Países com economias mais debeis como a Portuguesa a destruir pura e simplesmente o estado Social tal como o conhecemos até hoje, pondo em causa tarefas tão basicas como como por exemplo o pagamento de pensões de reforma num futuro não muito distante ... A prestação de cuidados de saúde na abrangencia que hoje é conhecida etc etc
a mão invisível é que é responsável pelo fim do Estado Social???? O estado social nunca foi sustentável, foi apenas uma bolha que se aguentou enquanto foi possível emitir dívida...
A politica do Fed é bem melhor, sobretudo porque olha para o quotidiano das pessoas coisa que o a politica do BCE não olha ...
a política do fed resulta apenas nos EUA derivado da sua hegemonia mundial a vários níveis (militar etc.) Se fosse noutro país estava igual ou pior que a Europa...
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Vai ser vai ...
nota que o estado Social é sempre mais sustentavel com uma economia que cresce , A grande verdade é que a economia Portuguesa nunca foi capaz de cresceu com a moeda unica ...
em Portugal se rebentar o estado social lá se vai o tecido empresarial Português como o conhecemos até hoje ...
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Vai ser vai ...
nota que o estado Social é sempre mais sustentavel com uma economia que cresce , A grande verdade é que a economia Portuguesa nunca foi capaz de cresceu com a moeda unica ...
em Portugal se rebentar o estado social lá se vai o tecido empresarial Português como o conhecemos até hoje ...
a economia não cresceu na moeda única porque fomos inundados de uma torrente de crédito barato que induziu a distorções graves na nossa economia, nomeadamente num sector não transaccionável sobredimensionado; por outro lado os défices estatais tornaram-se cada vez mais pesados uma vez que não existia manipulação monetária para os reduzir
a destruição de emprego brutal que se assiste no nosso país é precisamente o desinflar do sector não transaccionável que vivia numa bolha insustentável
como foi referido no artigo, a falta de controlo da política monetária exige reformas estruturais que os políticos não querem fazer o que resulta num crescimento anémico ou nulo enquanto essas reformas não forem desbloqueadas
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... Mão invisivel essa que arrisca no que toca a Países com economias mais debeis como a Portuguesa a destruir pura e simplesmente o estado Social tal como o conhecemos até hoje, pondo em causa tarefas tão basicas como como por exemplo o pagamento de pensões de reforma num futuro não muito distante ... A prestação de cuidados de saúde na abrangencia que hoje é conhecida etc etc
Portugal deveria pura e simplesmente abandonar o Euro, se não avançar para uma União fiscal, Orçamental. e não iria deixar saudade ...
Por outro lado o processo de destruição criativa é virtuoso mas sería anti civilizacional se fosse com " mortos e feridos " pelo caminho,
as pessoas não são descartaveis como na Idade média ... A politica do Fed é bem melhor, sobretudo porque olha para o quotidiano das pessoas coisa que o a politica do BCE não olha ...
A alternativa é o abismo: http://piie.com/publications/pb/pb12-20.pdf (http://piie.com/publications/pb/pb12-20.pdf)
Ningém quer o abismo.
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Sim se for acompanhado de um retrocesso na integração economica ... em todo o caso a situação como ela está não é sustentavel para países como Portugal e quem diz que ou " a Europa muda ou mudamos nós fala verdade "
a economia não cresceu na moeda única porque fomos inundados de uma torrente de crédito barato que induziu a distorções graves na nossa economia, nomeadamente num sector não transaccionável sobredimensionado; por outro lado os défices estatais tornaram-se cada vez mais pesados uma vez que não existia manipulação monetária para os reduzir
O credito barato á economia não é uma caracteristica do Euro, na verdade foi indo em crescendo ao longo da decada 90 sem nunca ter posto em causa a economia ...
O sector dos não transacionaveis pode ter aumentado o seu crescimento durante o Euro, no entanto já vinha em crescendo da decada anterior sem que isso tenha posto em causa a economia
muito do credito que veio foi para ser investido ... e nunca se investiu tanto por exemplo em obras publicas como nos ultimos 10 anos, nunca como dantes este tipo de investimentos deu tão poucos frutos,
O que foi caracteristico do Euro e provavelmente determinante desta letargia economica foi Portugal ter perdido sex appeal no que toca a atracção do investimento directo estrangeiro no sector produtivo ( Bens transacionaveis ), e o ter-se acentuado o fenomeno de deslocalização nalguns sectores tradicionais para as economias emergentes com mão de obra barata ...
Cumpts
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Sim se for acompanhado de um retrocesso na integração economica ...
Os imbalanços do Target2 são a aoutoestrada não só para o retrocesso, como tb para a desintegração económica.
Seguem alguns excertos do artigo:
One of the big questions of our time is whether the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) will survive. Too often, analysts discuss a possible departure of one or several countries from the euro area as little more than a devaluation, but I argue that any country’s exit from the euro area would be a far greater event with potentially odious consequences. Exit from the EMU cannot be selective: It is either none or all.
The breakup of a currency zone is far more serious than a devaluation. When a monetary union with huge uncleared balances is broken up, the international payments mechanism within the union breaks up, impeding all economic interaction. A new payments mechanism may take years to establish, as was the case in the former Soviet Union. Meanwhile, the collapse may lead to a host of disasters. Almost half the cases of hyperinflation in the world took place in connection with the disorderly collapse of three European currency zones in the last century: the Austro-Hungarian Empire, Yugoslavia, and the Soviet Union. It is easier to establish a monetary union than to break it up. In this policy brief, I focus on lessons that can be learned from the breakup of the ruble zone, in which I participated actively.
[...]
Second, the critical argument for a domino eff ect is that the EMU already has large uncleared interbank balances in its so-called Target2 system. Target2 stands for Trans-European Automated Real-Time Gross Settlement Express Transfer System. It is simply the second version of this payments system now in use (Bindseil, Cour-Th imann, and König 2012, 85). Exit of any country is likely to break this centralized EMU payments mechanism. These rising uncleared balances are a serious concern because nobody can know how they will be treated if the EMU broke up. Any attempt to cap them would risk disruption of the EMU. These balances need to be resolved but in a fashion that safeguards the integrity of the EMU. However, as I show, this can hardly be done by anything less than fully securing the sustainability of the EMU.
[...]
The three other European examples of breakups in the last century are of the Habsburg Empire, the Soviet Union, and Yugoslavia. They are ominous indeed. All three ended in major disasters, each with hyperinfl ation in several countries. In the Habsburg Empire, Austria and Hungary faced hyperinfl ation. Yugoslavia experienced hyperinfl ation twice. In the former Soviet Union, 10 out of 15 republics had hyperinflation.
The combined output falls were horrendous, though poorly documented because of the chaos. Officially, the average output fall in the former Soviet Union was 52 percent, and in the Baltics it amounted to 42 percent (Åslund 2007, 60). According to the World Bank, in 2010, 5 out of 12 post-Soviet countries—Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan—had still not reached their 1990 GDP per capita levels in purchasing power parities. Similarly, out of seven Yugoslav successor states, at least Serbia and Montenegro, and probably Kosovo and Bosnia-Herzegovina, had not exceeded their 1990 GDP per capita levels in purchasing power parities two decades later (World Bank 2011). Arguably, Austria and Hungary did not recover from their hyperinfl ations in the early 1920s until the mid-1950s. Thus the historical record is that half the countries in a currency zone that breaks up experience hyperinflation and do not reach their prior GDP per capita as measured in purchasing power parities until about a quarter of a century later, which is far more than the lost decade in Latin America in the 1980s.
[...]
In important respects, the EMU is reminiscent of the three difficult cases, the Austro-Hungarian Empire, Yugoslavia, and especially the ruble zone. It lacks rules and procedures for exit, and it has a centralized payments system, which is an essential part of a real currency union, but it is also a true poison pill. There is no reason to believe that an exit would be easily accepted by all the parties concerned. The EMU may have an advantage in comparison with the other monetary unions as long as the European Central Bank (ECB) manages to retain a firm monopoly on the issue of money.
[...]
The best resolution would be the adoption of the complete US Federal Reserve System, which is much discussed. Sinn (2011b) agrees: “Only the American alternative is viable.” A step in that direction would be the formation of a banking union, that is, the establishment of a European correspondent to the US Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation with its deposit insurance, bank regulation, and bank resolution as well as a European bank bailout institution.
Such a solution was outlined at the Euro summit on June 28–29, 2012, but the decisions were not complete. A fullfledged banking union should weaken the rationale for the current steady bank run in Southern Europe. Yet in order for a banking union to become credible, EMU members need to offer a joint and several guarantee that they will do whatever is needed to maintain the EMU. The risk of any exit from the EMU must be firmly denied (Portes 2012). The chronic current account deficits need to be resolved by other means— stricter fiscal control in the southern countries and some fiscal easing in the northern countries. The European Union and EMU have suffi cient means to force any member to pursue rigorous fiscal and structural policies.
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O credito barato á economia não é uma caracteristica do Euro, na verdade foi indo em crescendo ao longo da decada 90 sem nunca ter posto em causa a economia ...
a crédito barato logo a partir dos anos 90 deveu-se também ao euro na medida em que até ao final da década se registou uma convergência das taxas de juro de todos os países da futura UEM
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The European Union and EMU have suffi cient means to force any member to pursue rigorous fiscal and structural policies.
a grécia é um exemplo que contraria isto...
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The European Union and EMU have suffi cient means to force any member to pursue rigorous fiscal and structural policies.
a grécia é um exemplo que contraria isto...
Dentro do artigo supracitado...
If Greece were to leave the EMU, it would have to cut public expenditures viciously. Considering that Greek GDP per capita at current exchange rates is still three times larger than in neighboring Bulgaria and Turkey, a two-thirds cut in Greece’s GDP would not seem implausible. Within the EMU, by contrast, Greece might have to endure a GDP contraction of 10 percent or so on top of the 15 percent already incurred, which is a far more attractive option. In addition to bailout funds and the costs of EMU disruption, Greece would lose a few percent of GDP annually in EU structural funds, agricultural subsidies, and other grants. For all these reasons no Greek government should even think of abandoning the euro.
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If Greece were to leave the EMU, it would have to cut public expenditures viciously.
pois, mas pelos vistos eles não querem saber do médio prazo, apenas do curto prazo, i.e, só irão cortar na despesa em última instância e quando a isso forem MESMO obrigados
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isto é só rir ...
Merkel que anda a esticar a corda até ao limite agora vem dizer que não há tempo a perder para salvar o Euro ...
se há alguem que na pratica mais tenha adiado a resolução do problema é a Sr.ª Merkel ... e se nos pormos no lugar dela uma solução lenta do problema é o que mais lhe interessa, isto porque a Alemanha está melhor do que nunca
e qualquer que seja o solução do problema Euro a Alemanha irá para pior ...
Merkel: "Não há tempo a perder" para resolver a crise do euro
16 Agosto 2012 | 17:42
Rita Faria - afaria@negocios.pt
Imprimir|Enviar|Reportar Erros|Partilhar|Votar|Total: 1 VotoTamanho
Chanceler alemã acredita que os responsáveis políticos estão a caminhar na direcção certa para salvar o euro. No entanto, alerta que "o tempo está a pressionar".
A chanceler alemã, Angela Merkel, afirmou esta quinta-feira que "não há tempo a perder" no processo de resolução da crise do euro. Para a responsável do governo germânico, o avanço em direcção a uma união mais "estreita" na Europa é um passo importante na prossecução desse objectivo.
No entanto, sublinhou que os responsáveis políticos dos Estados-membros da Zona Euro estão “comprometidos em fazer tudo o que puderem para manter o euro”.
"Em muitas destas questões, sentimos que estamos na direcção certa. Mas claro, o tempo está a pressionar", acrescentou a responsável alemã, citada pela Bloomberg.
Na conferência de imprensa que se seguiu ao encontro com o primeiro-ministro do Canadá, Stephen Harper, Merkel afirmou ainda que a insistência do Banco Central Europeu (BCE) em impor condicionalismos aos países que precisem da sua intervenção para baixar os custos de financiamento vai ao encontro das convicções do seu país, no que respeita a combater a crise da dívida.
"O Banco Central Europeu está completamente em linha com o que dissemos até agora", frisou. Por outro lado, considera que a Comissão Europeia devia ter "poderes mais fortes" para intervir nos orçamentos nacionais dos Estados-membros da Zona Euro.
Tags: MerkelAlemanhaBCEEuropaZona Euro 0
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O coveiro do padrão ouro
Não obstante ser pouco plausível os EUA voltarem a submeter o resto do mundo ao padrão ouro, pois estes são uns párias a nível internacional e ainda continuarem a dever ouro a quase toda a gente [possivelmente à excepção dos franceses :D] incluindo aos seus próprios cidadãos, nunca é de excluir momentos de loucura dos dirigentes americanos, pelo que os arquitectos do euro tomaram as devidas providências... (http://www.thinkfn.com/forumbolsaforex/Smileys/yarex2/evil.gif)
Comecemos por rever a História. No fim dos anos 70 início dos anos 80 o resto do mundo teve a oportunidade de voltar ao padrão ouro e ninguém o quis, pelo que não é agora que o vão querer, apesar dos sonhos [delírios] dos Socialistas do Gold Standard.
Ora os arquitectos do euro desenharam-no de tal forma que este se tornou a Nemésis do padrão ouro. Vejamos as evidências / mecanismos.
1º As reservas de ouro do Eurogrupo são marked to market:
(http://www.thinkfn.com/forumbolsaforex/index.php?action=dlattach;topic=426.0;attach=1684;image)
Tal significa que o euro não só se protege da desvalorização das suas reservas em dólares, pois o enforcement da Lei de Gresham por parte dos cidadãos americanos valoriza as reservas de ouro do Eurogrupo, mas tb e ainda deixa nas mãos dos arbitragistas o trabalho de sapa sobre qq padrão ouro que os americanos queiram voltar a impingir ao resto do mundo com a vantagem do Eurogrupo não poder ser acusado de estar a destruir o padrão ouro, pois o Eurogrupo não está a fazer absolutamente nada, a culpa é toda dos especuladores.
2º A total auxência de impostos via directiva comunitária sobre o ouro monetário, retira qq atritos que pudessem limitar a acção dos arbitragistas.
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The instant reaction to Mario Draghi's decision to ditch his Jackson Hole speech (see 10.27am) is that he is planning a big new announcement next Thursday, probably a bond-buying spree to take the market pressure off Spain and Italy, despite the Bundesbank's opposition.
But, as Ian Traynor writes from Brussels, the ECB president has other issues to deal with:
A few days after next week's meeting, the European Commission is also to unveil proposals for a new eurozone banking supervision regime, expected to confer or recommend vast new powers for the ECB as the main supervisory agency.
In his speech in Hamburg on Monday evening, Jörg Asmussen, a member of the ECB's six-strong executive, revealed several things that can be expected over the next fortnight.
Firstly, the bond-buying intervention now looks a given, albeit hedged with conditions. The ECB will intervene in the secondary markets to buy bonds with short maturities, he said, but only if the eurozone's bailout funds first became active in the primary markets, in other words directly buying up distressed government bonds. That introduces a strong element of politics since eurozone governments and finance ministers will need to decide to use the bailout funds before ECB action is triggered.
Lessons have been learned, Asmussen pointed out bluntly.
"The mistake with Italy in summer last year when the ECB bought Italian bonds while the time was unfortunately not used for the necessary adjustment measures must not be repeated."
The issue of seniority in relation to private creditors also had to be sorted to offset the risk of investor flight from troubled countries. And any country benefitting from the bond-buying would need to succumb, as Draghi insisted at the beginning of the month, to troika-style terms set by Brussels and national capitals, predicaments that Mariano Rajoy in Madrid and Mario Monti in Rome are keen to avoid.
On the new banking supervisory regime, Asmussen made plain that the ECB is up for it, despite increasing reservations about a concentration of power in Frankfurt and a possible conflict of interest with its monetary policy remit.
"The Commission will present its proposals on September 11 foreseeing a transfer of supervisory tasks to the ECB," said Asmussen. "The ECB is ready to accept this responsibility, but under certain conditions."
He insisted twice that the new supervisor must be empowered to close down bad banks.
"The ECB has to be given all the instruments needed to carry out the tasks of bank supervision effectively. In particular that means access to all the necessary information, intervention rights and the right to close down non-viable banks. Without these minimum tools, the ECB will not take on the responsibility. The risk to the reputation of the institution would be too great."
Source: http://www.guardian.co.uk/business/2012/aug/28/eurozone-crisis-spanish-recession-germany-greece?newsfeed=true#block-503ca58db579dbcf12d6e306 (http://www.guardian.co.uk/business/2012/aug/28/eurozone-crisis-spanish-recession-germany-greece?newsfeed=true#block-503ca58db579dbcf12d6e306)
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The future of the euro: stability through change
Contribution from Mario Draghi, President of the ECB,
Published in "Die Zeit", 29 August 2012
https://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/key/date/2012/html/sp120829.en.html (https://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/key/date/2012/html/sp120829.en.html)
Across Europe, a fundamental debate is taking place about the future of the euro. Many citizens are concerned about where Europe is heading. Yet the solutions presented appear to them unsatisfactory. This is because these solutions offer binary choices: either we must go back to the past, or we must move to a United States of Europe. My answer to the question is: to have a stable euro we do not need to choose between extremes.
The reason this debate is taking place is not the euro as a currency. The objectives of the single currency remain as relevant today as they were when the single currency was agreed. To spread price stability and sustainable growth to all European citizens. To reap the gains of the world’s largest single market and make the historic process of European unification irreversible. To raise Europe’s standing – not only economically but also politically – in a globalised world.
The debate is taking place because the euro area has not yet fully succeeded as a polity. Currencies ultimately depend on the institutions that stand behind them. When the euro was first proposed, there were those who said it would have to be preceded by a long process of political integration. This was because sharing a currency would imply a high degree of joint decision-making. Member countries would be a “Schicksalsgemeinschaft” and would need strong common democratic underpinnings.
But a deliberate choice was made in the 1990s not to give the euro such features. The euro was launched as a “currency without a state” to preserve the sovereignty and diversity of member countries. This informed the so-called “Maastricht setup”, which laid the euro’s institutional foundations. But as recent events have shown, this institutional framework left the euro area insufficiently equipped to ensure sound economic policies and effectively manage crises.
For this reason, the way ahead cannot be a return to the status quo ante. The challenges of having a single monetary policy but loosely coordinated fiscal, economic and financial policies have been clearly revealed by the crisis. As Jean Monnet said, coordination “ is a method which promotes discussion, but it does not lead to a decision.” And strong decisions have to be made to manage the world’s second most important currency.
A new architecture for the euro area is desirable to create sustained prosperity for all euro area countries, and especially for Germany. The root of Germany’s success is its deep integration into the European and world economies. To continue to prosper, Germany needs to remain an anchor of a strong currency, at the centre of a zone of monetary stability and in a dynamic and competitive euro area economy. Only a stronger economic and monetary union can provide this.
Yet this new architecture does not require a political union first. It is clear that monetary union does entail a higher degree of joint decision-making. But economic integration and political integration can develop in parallel. Where necessary, sovereignty in selected economic policy fields can and should be pooled and democratic legitimation deepened.
How far should this go? We do not need a centralisation of all economic policies. Instead, we can answer this question pragmatically: by calmly asking ourselves which are the minimum requirements to complete economic and monetary union. And in doing so, we will find that all the necessary measures are firmly within our reach.
For fiscal policies, we need true oversight over national budgets. The consequences of misguided fiscal policies in a monetary union are too severe to remain self-policed. For broader economic policies, we need to guarantee competitiveness. Countries must be able to generate sustainable growth and high employment without excessive imbalances. The euro area is not a nation-state where persistent cross-regional subsidies have sufficient popular support. Therefore, we cannot afford a situation where some regions run permanently large deficits vis-à-vis others.
For financial policies, there need to be powers at the centre to limit excessive risk-taking by banks and regulatory capture by supervisors. This is the best way to protect euro area taxpayers. There also needs to be a framework for bank resolution that safeguards public finances, as we see in other federations. In the U.S., for example, on average about 90, mostly smaller, banks per year have been resolved since 2008 and this had no impact on the solvency of the sovereign.
Political union can, and shall, develop hand-in-hand with fiscal, economic and financial union. The sharing of powers and of accountability can move in parallel. We should not forget that 60 years of European integration have already created a significant degree of political union. Decisions are made by an EU Council filled by national ministers and by a directly elected European Parliament. The challenge is to further increase the legitimacy of these bodies commensurate with increasing their responsibilities and to seek ways to better anchor European processes at the national level.
A more solid political foundation should allow for agreement on a basic principle: that it is neither sustainable nor legitimate for countries to pursue national policies that can cause economic harm for others. This constraint has to be built into how countries design their economic and social models. The only sustainable model is one that is consistent with the terms of a common currency. Countries have to live within their means. Competition and labour markets have to be reinvigorated. Banks have to conform to the highest regulatory standards and focus on serving the real economy. This is not the end, but the renewal of the European social model.
From the ECB’s perspective, a strong economic union is an essential complement to the single monetary policy. Building this will require a structured process with correct sequencing. Yet citizens can be certain that three elements will remain constant. The ECB will do what is necessary to ensure price stability. It will remain independent. And it will always act within the limits of its mandate.
Yet it should be understood that fulfilling our mandate sometimes requires us to go beyond standard monetary policy tools. When markets are fragmented or influenced by irrational fears, our monetary policy signals do not reach citizens evenly across the euro area. We have to fix such blockages to ensure a single monetary policy and therefore price stability for all euro area citizens. This may at times require exceptional measures. But this is our responsibility as the central bank of the euro area as a whole.
The ECB is not a political institution. But it is committed to its responsibilities as an institution of the European Union. As such, we never lose sight of our mission to guarantee a strong and stable currency. The banknotes that we issue bear the European flag and are a powerful symbol of European identity.
Those who want to go back to the past misunderstand the significance of the euro. Those who claim only a full federation can be sustainable set the bar too high. What we need is a gradual and structured effort to complete EMU. This would finally give the euro the stable foundations it deserves. It would fully achieve the ultimate goals for which the Union and the euro were founded: stability, prosperity and peace. We know this is what the people in Europe, and in Germany, aspire to.
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Cronologia abreviada do euro
1978 April 8: At EC summit, French President Valery Giscard d’Estaing and German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt propose establishment of European Monetary System.
1979 March 13: Establishment of European Monetary System and European Currency Unit. Eight currencies -- the Belgian and Luxembourg francs, French franc, deutsche mark, Danish krone, Dutch guilder, Italian lira and Irish pound -- take part in the exchange-rate mechanism limiting currency fluctuations.
1989 April: Committee chaired by EC President Jacques Delors makes the case for a single currency and European Central Bank. Intergovernmental conference to negotiate revisions to European Community treaties starts a year later.
1991 Dec. 10: Meeting in Maastricht, the Netherlands, EC leaders approve Treaty on European Union calling for closer political ties and formation of single currency by 1999 among countries that meet economic convergence targets. The U.K. secures the right to opt out.
1994 Jan. 1: Stage two of monetary union process begins with establishment of European Monetary Institute, the forerunner of the European Central Bank, in Frankfurt. Alexandre Lamfalussy of Belgium is the EMI’s first president.
1995 Dec. 15: EU leaders agree to call the new currency the “euro.” Meeting in Madrid, they also agree on three-year phase-in of monetary union from locking of exchange rates in 1999 to circulation of euro banknotes in 2002.
1998 March 25: European Commission declares 11 countries -- Germany, France, Italy, Belgium, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Austria, Portugal, Spain, Ireland and Finland -- eligible for monetary union. The EMI endorses launch of euro, while warning several countries to step up debt-reduction efforts.
1998 May 3: EU heads of state and government vote unanimously to admit 11 countries to monetary union on Jan. 1, 1999. Duisenberg is appointed to eight-year term as ECB president, but agrees to step down early to make way for Trichet. Finance ministers agree to base euro conversion on current bilateral central rates in the exchange-rate mechanism.
1999 Jan. 1: Euro established with 11 founding members.
Source: http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-12-12/euro-timeline-from-bretton-woods-agreement-in-1944-to-eu-fiscal-compact-.html (http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-12-12/euro-timeline-from-bretton-woods-agreement-in-1944-to-eu-fiscal-compact-.html)
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Esta mensagem poderá parecer fora do sítio, mas esperem pela próxima para perceberem o fio condutor.
After Creating Dollar Exclusion Zones In Asia And South America, China Set To Corner Africa Next
by Tyler Durden
on 07/15/2012 13:11 -0400
http://www.zerohedge.com/news/after-creating-dollar-exclusion-zones-asia-and-south-america-china-set-corner-africa-next (http://www.zerohedge.com/news/after-creating-dollar-exclusion-zones-asia-and-south-america-china-set-corner-africa-next)
By now it really, really should be obvious. While the insolvent "developed world" is furiously fighting over who gets to pay the bill for 30 years of unsustainable debt accumulation and how to pretend that the modern 'crony capitalist for some and communist for others' system isn't one flap of a butterfly's wings away from full on collapse mode, China is slowly taking over the world's real assets. As a reminder: here is a smattering of our headlines on the topic from the last year: "World's Second (China) And Third Largest (Japan) Economies To Bypass Dollar, Engage In Direct Currency Trade (http://www.zerohedge.com/news/news/worlds-second-and-third-largest-economies-bypass-dollar-engage-direct-currency-trade)", "China, Russia Drop Dollar In Bilateral Trade (http://www.zerohedge.com/news/article/much-ado-about-nothing-china-russia-drop-dollar-bilateral-trade)", "China And Iran To Bypass Dollar, Plan Oil Barter System (http://www.zerohedge.com/news/news/china-and-iran-bypass-dollar-plan-oil-barter-system-and-deeper-dive-iranian-oil-bourse)", "India and Japan sign new $15bn currency swap agreement (http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-16351065)", "Iran, Russia Replace Dollar With Rial, Ruble in Trade, Fars Says (http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-01-07/iran-russia-replace-dollar-with-rial-ruble-in-trade-fars-says.html)", "India Joins Asian Dollar Exclusion Zone, Will Transact With Iran In Rupees (http://www.zerohedge.com/news/india-joins-asian-dollar-exclusion-zone-will-transact-iran-rupees)", 'The USD Trap Is Closing: Dollar Exclusion Zone Crosses The Pacific As Brazil Signs China Currency Swap (http://www.zerohedge.com/news/usd-trap-closing-dollar-exclusion-zone-crosses-pacific-brazil-signs-china-currency-swap)", and finally, "Chile Is Latest Country To Launch Renminbi Swaps And Settlement (http://www.zerohedge.com/news/chile-latest-country-launch-renminbi-swaps-and-settlement)", we now get the inevitable: "Central bank pledges financial push in Africa (http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/cndy/2012-07/14/content_15579858.htm)." To summarize: first Asia, next Latin America, and now Africa.
Yep: the Yuan may not be the reserve currency by default, but at this rate China will have bilateral, read USD-bypassing relations, with all countries in Asia, South America and shortly Africa (where none other than Goldman Sachs has been pushing harder than anyone). Once the entire world is trading in CNY, it will be merely a matter of flipping the switch and all those fancy three-letter economic theories that explain why the uber-welfare state works just becayse the US can print an infinity+1 in debt, will all suddenly find themselves completely and totally bidless.
From China Daily (http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/cndy/2012-07/14/content_15579858.htm):
China is to promote the yuan's use in settling trade and investment with Africa, and encourage the more active development of Chinese financial institutions across the continent, a senior central bank official said on Friday.
Li Dongrong, assistant governor of the People's Bank of China, said Africa has the capability of becoming a new hub of international capital flow, and the yuan's use there should be further improved in accordance with rising demand for the currency there.
"We will continue to encourage domestic financial institutions to increase their presence and business across the continent," Li told delegates at the Forum on China-Africa Financial Cooperation in Beijing, adding that the cooperation potential between the two sides is huge, as Africa's economy continues to take off.
According to Li, yuan-denominated settlement between China and some African countries has already started, with 4.3 billion yuan ($156.5 million) worth of settlement made with South Africa and 2.3 trillion yuan with Mauritius, for example.
The popularity of using the yuan has been increasing in Africa, and more central banks are considering including the currency in their reserve portfolios, reported various governors of African central banks at the forum.
For China, Ghana is not Spain. It is far, far more valuable.
Millison Narh, second deputy governor of the Bank of Ghana, said the bank's board of directors has decided to use the yuan as part of its settlement and reserve currencies in January, but has yet to finalise details with the People's Bank of China
"We have looked at the currency rate risk management of the reserve portfolio. I think the yuan has performed very well, supported by the huge international reserves of China. It makes sense to use the yuan as both the settlement currency and the reserve currency."
More African central banks will make similar decisions, and in five years about 20 percent of African central banks' foreign reserve portfolio would be yuan assets, he said.
So is Zambia:
Michael Gondwe, governor of the Bank of Zambia, added that his country is yet to decide on including the yuan in its foreign reserve assets, but it is expecting increased usage of it to settle trade between China and Zambia.
Franklin Kennedy, a non-executive director of the African Export-Import Bank, said he believed using the yuan on the continent was "a natural evolvement - it has to happen", and expects more African central banks to include the currency in their foreign reserve portfolios.
Of course the French, who are not used to being snubbed in what is rapidly becoming a second Congress of Berlin, only this time one without any European participation, are not very happy:
One trade finance manager at Societe Generale (China) Ltd, who declined to be named, said he has seen little demand among traders to settle deals in yuan, because there is no sound channel to make investment or purchases in yuan after holding the currency.
As for the truth:
Babacar Ndiaye, the former president of the African Development Bank, said he saw "no reason" why traders would refuse to settle transactions in yuan "when the trade flow increases" between China and Africa.
"It is logical that very soon more and more central banks of Africa will follow Nigeria to include the yuan into their reserves," he said
He added at present it is just the beginning, and central banks would also prefer to buy treasury bonds from China in the future if possible.
But... but... if the whole world suddenly realizes that the CNY is the defacto reserve currency and "would also prefer to buy treasury bonds from China in the future if possible"... who does that leave as natural buyers for US paper? Aside from the Fed of course...
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Depois dos europeus terem sustentado activamente o nível de vida americano de 1980 a 1999 para manter o gigante adormecido durante a criação do euro, entre 2001 e 2011 os chineses chegaram a barriga ao balcão para potenciarem as sua industrialização e criarem a sua própria moeda regional. Agora que a China também deixou de pagar o tributo, segue-se a consequência óbvia, se bem que com 10 anos de atraso.
Why the US Dollar will Hyperinflate
by Stuart Bishop
http://www.dollarvigilante.com/blog/2012/6/4/why-the-us-dollar-will-hyperinflate.html (http://www.dollarvigilante.com/blog/2012/6/4/why-the-us-dollar-will-hyperinflate.html)
Imagine a scenario. One fine morning you turn on the television, and all the channels are preoccupied with an imminent speech from the president of the United States. People are excited, as the supposed biggest pop star in the world walks to the podium to make his speech. Maybe he is finally going to solve the financial crisis. Maybe he is going to follow the sage advice of Paul Krugman and announce another massive increase in spending, and this time it will be enough for these economic green shoots to turn into solid oak trees, built to last for generations.
He finally arrives on the stage, looks calmly at his teleprompter and starts to read out aloud in his own unique style:
’Citizens of America, I address you today to give you an honest appraisal of our financial situation. We are broke. We cannot afford to pay the promises we have made to people. We owe $16 trillion to our creditors, and our government is not in a position to pay this back. We have according to some estimates $75 trillion in unfunded future liabilities.
To this end, I have just finished speaking to the Chinese leadership and explained our problem to them. Unfortunately they have decided not to continue to support our ongoing trade deficit by recycling the excess dollars we print and give to them for physical goods into purchases of US government bonds. All the other creditor nations of the world have informed my team of financial advisors this morning that they intend to do the same. To compound matters, they have decided to stop using dollar currency pegs, which in simple terms means all the inflation we used to be able to export to them via forcing them to absorb and hold printed dollars as reserves is now going to return to us faster via increased prices. If we continue down this path, the trade deficit will widen even further, and we will have to print even more money to purchase fewer physical goods. This increase in the money supply would decimate the savings of many of you that voted for me, the middle class, and only nominally save the asset values of the wealthiest. As a champion of the middle class I cannot allow that to happen.
In practical terms, this means every promise that I made to you in my campaigns cannot be met. Obamacare, forget about it. Social security for retiree’s is not going to happen. Expect to work more hours for less pay, if you are lucky enough to even have a job. The savings for social security were spent decades ago. Medicare and Medicaid is also going to be completely abolished. Our military is completely unsustainable. Just the same as all the fancy military equipment we buy and all our bases in countries all over the world. We need to cut this back dramatically. These soldiers will be made unemployed and will have to find work in the private sector. The world will now need to police itself.
Your government, led by me has a spending addiction, and like any other addict needs it’s ’fix’. Unfortunately to sustain our government spending ’fix’ Federal Reserve President Ben Bernanke would need to continue to print more dollars. He has simply refused, suggesting we check the whole federal government into rehab. I understand and accept his refusal to hyper print the currency and will use an executive order to tell congress not to pass any laws forcing the Federal Reserve into printing more money to pay for our ballooning expenses.
Finally, I would like to say to everyone watching this, change really has come to America’
I hope you could read between the intentional sarcasm there and grasp the bigger point. At some point in the near future, the United States and its government is going to have to voluntarily or be forced by the market to face its spending problem (http://www.dollarvigilante.com/blog/2011/8/1/debt-cut-deal-is-just-smoke-mirrors.html). The United States government is the most indebted government in the history of mankind. It owes almost $16 trillion. It has unfunded liabilities estimated by many at $75 trillion and by some at over $110 trillion (http://www.dollarvigilante.com/blog/2011/7/26/the-debt-ceiling-charade.html). It has a spending problem, where roughly $3.7 trillion dollars are spent, and $2.3 trillion dollars are received in taxes (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2011_United_States_federal_budget). In this context, the above speech is a near total impossibility for Obama or any other future US president to make. Neither is any Congressman, Senator or significant politician going to demand this. Maybe a wild card Ron Paul presidential election victory could make this possible. Even then I doubt it. The cuts required and the immediate pain that would be imposed would be so severe, that this would be a non starter. Enough people are dependent enough on the government to come out ’en masse’ to block any attempt at electing Ron Paul. This alone is the strongest reason I anticipate a major hyperinflation of the US dollar within the next few years.
So to argue that anything other than a full blown hyperinflation is coming to the United States, you would need to argue one of two things. The US Government consumption machine will stop living beyond its means by choice. A full default on an entire generation of people that can all vote for more spending when threatened with lower living standards. Think ‘occupy wall street’ on steroids when you think of this. Alternatively you can argue that someone is going to be willing to buy US government debt as its deficit expands into eternity. I don’t see it, but am open to someone trying to make a logical case in the comments that they believe that this $1.4 trillion gap, with a $500 - $600 billion trade deficit will be bridged by a US cut in spending or by foreigners starting to fully purchase US government debt again.
(http://www.thinkfn.com/forumbolsaforex/index.php?action=dlattach;topic=426.0;attach=2253;image)
(http://www.thinkfn.com/forumbolsaforex/index.php?action=dlattach;topic=426.0;attach=2252;image)
Allow me to add a little historical background to this story. The story of the US dollar being the world reserve currency starts back in 1922, when after an international conference in Genoa (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Genoa_Conference_(1922)), the world decided that using only gold as central bank reserves was too restrictive on central bankers. The solution was the addition of US Dollars and UK Pounds as additional reserves central bank reserves. This has through various forms and other changes in the world financial system have led us to where we are today. A hugely bloated fiat currency reserve system, struggling to maintain its store of value (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Store_of_value) function to the world. In other words, a world forced to save in other peoples exponentially growing debt, hoping the counterparty never defaults. For a decent, if a little US centric overview of the evolution of the monetary system check out Jim Rickards great book Currency Wars (http://www.amazon.co.uk/Currency-Wars-Making-Global-Portfolio/dp/1591844495).
The US was never in position to merely take this exorbitant privilege (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Exorbitant_privilege) it has received. Control of the world reserve currency is something they have been given. Anyone that doubts this merely needs to look at who have been the main purchasers of the government debt of the United States. Do you really believe that these countries ever expect to able to use these dollar reserves it holds for anything? If any large holder of US debt were to dump them, it would quickly bring on the end of the world dollar reserve and all the fiscal problems would just happen almost immediately, as the dollar is repudiated all around the world. It is like the world is stuck playing a game of chicken, the cost of not blinking is giving away free stuff to Uncle Sam. Who blinks first?
This set of circumstances has allowed the US to live above its means during much of the last century. The dollar world reserve system affords the US a standard of living it could never maintain were it not for the political and structural support from other nations. Mainly from the European countries from 1980-1999 and China since roughly 2001. This support takes several forms. Primarily the deficit of the US is recycled by other countries back into United States government debt. Furthermore other countries, as they receive these dollars print more local currency to match the dollar holdings. The inflation that would return to the US from running a deficit never actually returns to the US. A pain free deficit so to speak. If only my credit card worked like that (I wish). Imagine this scenario. My name is Uncle Sam. I spend $500 billion in 2011, I don’t pay my bill. My credit card company turns to me and says that I have a $500 billion credit limit for the next year. So the next year I spend another $500 billion without consequences. This cycle continues, with the debt increasing exponentially. The only difference between me and Uncle Sam in my scenario, is that Uncle Sam gets to set his own rate of interest. Unsurprisingly, he chooses close to zero to let the party go on a little longer. This is largely responsible for the addiction of the US Government and the US people have to free stuff (paid for by paper dollars) from the rest of the world, as well explained by the Triffin Dilemma (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Triffin_dilemma).
Having to give the US free stuff presents a real structural problem to the rest of the world too. As the US gets to exchange printed US dollars for real tangible things, the peoples of the recipient countries have to accept a consequently lower standard of living in order to support it. A tax to support Uncle Sam so to speak. A quick note – Americans say foreigners hate them for their freedom (http://www.dollarvigilante.com/blog/2011/6/22/censorship-and-propaganda-in-the-ussa.html)! Maybe more like they hate giving you free stuff and working for free.
At the same time global trade requires a currency which can be exchanged quickly to complete digital transactions in. In currency terms a compatible global medium of exchange (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Medium_of_exchange) and unit of account (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Unit_of_account). This is a catch 22 for many of the largest exporting countries in the world. Exchange real tangible physical goods and services for paper promises and support the status quo, or end the existing currency arrangement by refusing to honour and support the US dollar as a trading unit and store of value any more.
Changes in economic systems are traumatic periods of time, and the largest surplus countries like Russia, China, Saudi Arabia and some of the Gulf States fear the inevitable upheaval that will accompany any switch from a dollar reserve system to something new. The power to pull the trigger on the dollar is a power that has consequences. This upheaval can equal revolutions and threaten the very existence of these governments, so they have good reason to be concerned. Given the political nature of currency management and that all politicans are liars (https://www.facebook.com/pages/Politicians-are-all-Liars/347046107757), I find it better to discuss who is providing the support for the US deficit by purchasing the US debt. Sometimes actions speak louder than words.
Following the US Government debt trail since 2009 shows, the largest purchaser has been the Federal Reserve (http://www.moneynews.com/Headline/fed-debt-Treasury/2012/03/28/id/434106). Some other surprise countries have been purchasing over the last 12 months, including world economic powerhouses like Luxemburg, Belguim and (two lost decades) Japan. It seems like China and the european economic powers are flat or declining (http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/data-chart-center/tic/Documents/mfh.txt). This means that unless another credible long term dollar support enters the arena , the tangible dollar support provided by surplus countries is fading away. In the face of this, I expect Ben Bernanke to have to fully monetise the US Government debt in the coming years. When he is does, the inflation that is exported by dollar convertibility will finally reach home, and this will likely be enough to send the dollar hyper as the US government cannot stop spending.
So as noted above. The US faces some choices. Stop spending and balance the budget soon, or watch the deficit grow to such an extent that the dollar loses any possible semblance of crediblity in the world. The former is politically impossible as discussed above. More than impossible, I am sitting and thinking about how it could be enacted and it is a beyond unthinkable political u-turn from the political elites. The latter is happening already, the direction is very clear. Just wait for Helicopter Ben (http://www.dollarvigilante.com/blog/2010/11/4/helicopter-ben-officially-begins-cluster-bombing-world-with.html) to rev up his chopper and nominally save everything and anything that needs a bail out, and for all this inflation to return to the US via US debt monetisation and broken currency pegs (http://blogs.wsj.com/chinarealtime/2012/03/21/bernanke-chinas-dollar-peg-like-being-on-gold-standard/).
Finally, as the TDV rightly champions on a daily basis, you don’t want to be in the USSA when this goes down. The timing of it all, who knows and who really cares? Timing is a political decision made by different bureaucrats sat around the world trying to judge how they can benefit/survive it all. In any case, I would rather be decades too early than a moment too late in my preparations. Timing is a mugs game anyway. Like investing in Facebook stock (http://blogs.computerworld.com/20210/facebook_stock_price_tanks_in_illegal_ipo_fraud).
The real question any vigilante should want to know is what is coming next... I say the Euro, I’ll write something explaining the reasons why this could work in the next few weeks, if the TDV team want to publish it.
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Toda a gente sabe onde estivemos, vejamos para onde vamos!
A seguinte trilogia de artigos do Martin Sibileau apresenta um mapa plausível.
Todavia o autor não olhou com atenção para o que estava no balanço do BCE. O balanço do BCE não é um conjunto vazio, como ele o representou inicialmente:
(http://www.thinkfn.com/forumbolsaforex/index.php?action=dlattach;topic=426.0;attach=3089;image)
Vejamos o que o BCE realmente tem nas suas reservas, olhem com especial atenção o primeiro item dos assets:
(http://www.thinkfn.com/forumbolsaforex/index.php?action=dlattach;topic=426.0;attach=3092;image)
Como o ouro valoriza com as espectativas inflacionistas, tal expande os assets do BCE, bem como os dos Bancos Centrais do Eurogrupo, logo não é assim tão preocupante que o diferencial das taxas de juro seja negativo para o BCE como os artigos levam a supor. Por outro lado, pelo que os PIIGS estão a berrar, os orçamentos destes de certeza que têm de estar a ficar mais equilibrados.
Seguiremos com atenção a evolução deste gráfico:
(http://www.thinkfn.com/forumbolsaforex/index.php?action=dlattach;topic=426.0;attach=3090;image)
Na minha opinião, a única falha do Martin Sibileau é não reparar que a Europa não é o mundo anglo-saxónico! :D
É que o BCE / Eurogrupo têm a faca e o queijo na mão [controlam a política monetária e controlam o ouro]. Já nos EUA e UK, os Bancos Centrais têm a faca [controlam a política monetária] e o Tesouro dos respectivos governos têm o queijo na mão [controlam o ouro], logo o mais provável é que os respectivos governos comam o queijo.
Um sistema monetário baseado em reservas de ouro cotadas a preço de mercado é superior aos padrões ouro clássicos com câmbio fixo, pois assim os Bancos Centrais têm a liberdade de valorizarem / desvalorizarem a sua moeda quando estes quiserem vendendo / comprando ouro e não quando convém aos gold bugs, pois a janela do ouro está fechada de vez. Melhor ainda, um sistema monetário baseado em reservas de ouro cotadas a preço de mercado tem a vantagem de reduzir o alcance de políticas beggar thy neighbor dos países concorrentes, pois a quantidade de ouro que um Banco Central tem à sua disposição é finita.
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How Draghi opened the door to hyperinflation and denied the Fed an exit strategy
By: Martin Sibileau
Published on September 10th 2012
http://sibileau.com/martin/2012/09/10/why-draghi-opened-the-door-to-hyperinflation-and-denied-the-fed-an-exit-strategy/ (http://sibileau.com/martin/2012/09/10/why-draghi-opened-the-door-to-hyperinflation-and-denied-the-fed-an-exit-strategy/)
We finally heard the intentions of Mr. Draghi, President of the European Central Bank (“ECB”). We only need to know the conditions Germany’s Verfassungsgericht will impose on September 12th. We believe they will be relevant.
On Thursday, Draghi told us he intends (1) to purchase sovereign debt in the secondary market, (2) that before he does so, the issuing country must submit to certain conditions within a fiscal adjustment program, (3) that when he finally buys the debt, he will buy any debt (new or outstanding) with a maturity lower than three years, (4) that after buying it, he will sterilize the transaction, (5) that the collateral pledged so far for liquidity lines will not be subject to minimum credit ratings any longer, (6) that the ECB will accept to rank pari-passu with other creditors going forward, and (7) that the Securities Market Programme will be terminated, with the purchased debt held until maturity. According to Mr. Draghi (but not toGermany), buying debt with a tenor lower than three years does not constitute government financing. The number three, it seems, is a magical number.
We will mince no words: Mr. Draghi has opened the door to hyperinflation. There will probably not be hyperinflation because Germanywould leave the Euro zone first, but the door is open and we will explain why. To avoid this outcome, assuming that in this context the Eurozone will continue to show fiscal deficits, we will also show that it is critical that the Fed does not raise interest rates. This can only be extremely bullish of precious metals and commodities in the long run. In the short-run, we will have to face the usual manipulations in the precious metals markets and everyone will seek to front run the European Central Bank, playing the sovereign yield curve and being long banks’ stocks. If in the short-run, the ECB is the lender of last resort, in the long run, it may become the borrower of first resort!
The policy of the ECB resembles that which the central bank of Argentinaadopted in April of 1977, which included sterilization via issuance of debt. This policy would result in the first episode of high inflation eight years later, in 1985 and generalized hyperinflation in 1989. Indeed, Argentina’s hyperinflation was not caused by the primary fiscal deficit of the government, but by the quasi-fiscal deficit suffered by its central bank. We will not elaborate on a comparison today, but will simply show how the Euro zone can end up in the same situation. To those interested in Argentina as a case study, we recommend this link (http://www-wds.worldbank.org/servlet/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/1991/03/01/000009265_3961001014104/Rendered/PDF/multi_page.pdf) (refer section II.2 “Cuasifiscal Expenditures”, page 13 of the document)
Mechanics of the sterilization
In the chart below, we describe what we think Draghi has in mind, when he refers to sterilization. In stage 1, the governments whose debt will be bought by the ECB (EU governments) issue their bonds (sov bonds, a liability), which is purchased by the Euro zone banks (EU banks). These bonds will be an asset to the banks, which will in exchange create deposits for the governments (sov deposits, a liability to the banks and an asset to the EU governments).
In stage 2, the EU banks sell the sov bonds to the European Central Bank. The ECB buys them issuing Euros, which become an asset of the EU banks. The EU banks have thus seen a change in the composition of their assets: They exchanged interest producing sov bonds for cash. Until now, selling distressed sov bonds to the ECB to avoid losses was a positive thing for the EU banks. However, going forward, as the backstop of the ECB is in place and the expectation of default is removed from the front end (i.e. 1 to 3 years), exchanging carry (i.e. interest income) for cash will be a losing proposition. The EU banks will demand that the euros be sterilized, to receive ECB debt in exchange at an acceptable interest rate.
The sterilization is seen in stage 3: The ECB issues debt, which the EU banks purchase with the Euros they had received in exchange of their sov bonds. Currently, the ECB is issuing debt with a 7-day maturity. Should the situation worsen (as described further below), this will be a disadvantage that could make high inflation easier to set in.
We can see the result of the whole exercise in stage 4: The ECB is left with sovereign bonds, with a maturity of up to three years, as an asset financed by its 7-day debt. The EU banks own the ECB 7-day debt, and need a positive net interest income to profit from the deposits (sov deposits and also private deposits) that support that ECB debt (their asset).
(http://www.thinkfn.com/forumbolsaforex/index.php?action=dlattach;topic=426.0;attach=3093;image)
What could go wrong
As can be observed in the chart above, at the end of the sterilization, the ECB is left with two assets which will generate a net interest income: Interest receivable from sov bonds – Interest payable on ECB debt.
If the interest payable on the ECB debt was higher than that received from the sov bonds, the European Central Bank would have a net interest loss, which could only cover by printing more Euros. This would be a spiraling circularity where the net interest loss forces the ECB to print euros that need to be sterilized, issuing more debt and exponentially increasing the net interest loss. This perverse dynamic of a net interest loss born out of sterilization affected the central bank of Argentina, although for different reasons, beginning in 1977. It generated a substantial quasi-fiscal deficit which would later morph into hyperinflation in 1989. Without entering into further details about the Argentine experience, we must however ask ourselves under what conditions could the Euro zone befall to such dynamic. That is the purpose of this article.
As the ECB backstops short-term sovereign debt, two results will emerge in the sovereign risk space: First, the market will discover the implicit yield cap and through rational expectations, that yield cap –having been validated by the ECB- will become the floor for sovereign risk within the Euro zone. The key assumption here is that primary fiscal deficits persist across the Euro zone. Secondly, within that maturity range selected by the ECB for its secondary market purchases (up to three years), the market will arbitrage between the rates of core Europe and its periphery, converging into a single Euro zone yield target.
Now, for simplicity, let’s say that the discovered yield cap, which going forward will be a floor, is 4%. This 4% will be a risk-free rate, which in a world of ultra-low interest rates, will look very tempting. The problem is that the risk-free condition holds as long as the bond is bought by the European Central Bank. In the zombie banking system of the Euro zone, where the profitability of banks has been destroyed, banks will not be able to survive if they pass this risk-free yield on to the central bank, unless….unless the central bank compensates them for that lost yield with a “reasonable” rate on the debt it issues during the sterilization. And no, we are not thinking of 75bps!
What is then a reasonable rate? Well, a rate that leaves a profit after paying for deposits. Yes, we know that that is not a problem today, in the context of zero interest rates. But if the floor sovereign rate for the whole Euro zone converged to a relatively significant positive number, banks would only be able to attract the billions in deposits they lost –which are needed in the first place to buy the sovereign bonds in the primary market- at rates higher than the sovereign floor rate received by the ECB. Why higher? Firstly, because unlike the holders of sovereign bonds, depositors do not have the explicit backstop of the European Central Bank on their deposits, which are leveraged multiple times. The liquidity lines provided by the European Central Bank may disappear at a moment’s notice, which is why money left the periphery to the core of the EU zone. An alternative to the European Central Bank, if the deposits from the private sector did not stop falling, would be to keep lending to the EU banks. But this is not feasible in the long run, given the shortage of available collateral. Secondly, as the yield cap becomes the convergence floor, the market’s inflation expectations crystallize into a meaningful expected inflation rate.
Therefore, should fiscal deficits persist in the Euro zone, it is conceivable that as these so-called Outright Monetary Transactions (OMT) develop, we may eventually see net interest losses run by the European Central Bank. It is clear that a net interest loss would be expansionary of the monetary base, because in order to pay for that interest loss, the central bank would have to print more euros, which would need to be sterilized, increasing its debt and interest losses exponentially. It should be noted that once the market’s expectations adapt to this rate of growth in the supply of money, a net interest gain by the central bank, for whatever reason, would be seen contracting the supply of money and therefore, deflationary!
Having said this, we think that the time frame for such a result would be considerable. It would take years for this to unfold and it is very unlikely that it ends in hyperinflation because Germany and the rest of core Europe would leave the Euro zone before it gets there. We present another chart below, to visualize our thoughts:
(http://www.thinkfn.com/forumbolsaforex/index.php?action=dlattach;topic=426.0;attach=3101;image)
Additional conclusions
If we were to see a process like the one just described, it would be very hard for the Fed to engage in an exit strategy that would lift interest rates. If it did, the interest rates both the European Central Bank and the EU banks would have to pay on its debt and to attract deposits, respectively, would increase meaningfully. The contagion risk to the USD zone would be very significant and the Fed would have to “couple” its balance sheet to that of the Euro zone via currency swaps. The segmentation seen today in the Eurodollar market, with Libor being a completely useless benchmark, would only accentuate.
This thesis, if proved correct, is bullish of EU banks in the short-to-medium run (before the private sector collapses in a wave of defaults due to higher interest rates, beginning with the sovereign risk-free floor validated by the ECB last Thursday) and very bullish of precious metals and commodities in the long run.
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Did the risk-free rate move to Frankfurt?
By: Martin Sibileau
Published on September 16th 2012
http://sibileau.com/martin/2012/09/16/did-the-risk-free-rate-move-to-frankfurt/ (http://sibileau.com/martin/2012/09/16/did-the-risk-free-rate-move-to-frankfurt/)
Last week, after the German Bundesverfassungsgericht decided not deactivate the debt monetization program announced by Mr. Draghi a week earlier, the Italian government sold EUR4BN in 4.75% 2014 notes at an average yield of 2.75%. This compares with 4.65% obtained at a sale of the securities on July 13th.
With the European Central Bank backstopping short-term EU sovereign debt (as long as the issuer submits to a fiscal adjustment program), we should see two trends taking place:
The first one, mentioned in our last letter (http://www.sibileau.com/martin/2012/09/10), is that the market should arbitrage between the rates of core Europe and its periphery, converging into a single Euro zone target yield. The Italian auction mentioned above, together with continuous weakness in Germany’s sovereign debt, the movement of capital out of the US dollar to the Euro zone (lifting the Euro to $1.31) and the rally in EU banks, would seem to indicate that this convergence is slowly materializing. The critical piece here, the one that will really nail this coffin, is the return of deposits transferred to the core of the Euro zone, back to the periphery that originated them. This is what’s behind the ongoing negotiations towards a banking union. Ironically, if the banking union was successful, making deposits return to banks of the periphery, it would make it easier for the Germans to leave the Euro zone, because the current imbalances of the Target 2 system (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/TARGET2) would disappear, radically lowering the cost of the exit!
The second trend, the one we missed last week, consists in that –perhaps- we will no longer be able to talk about “the” risk-free rate of interest, when we refer to the US sovereign yield. If the first trend proves true, there would be no reason to believe that the short-term US sovereign yield should keep as low as it is vs. the equivalent EU sovereign yield. For all practical purposes, in the segment of up-to-3 years, the European Central Bank would set the value of the world’s risk-free rate! The big assumption here is of course, that the first trend, above, holds true. Only then, the arbitrage between the US sovereign yield and the EU sovereign yield could be triggered.
What would the levels be, for the up-to-3 year yields? As we know, the European Central Bank will not pre-commit to a yield target. Of course, they don’t want to be challenged, because there is only so much they can sterilize before they start suffering a net interest loss, as we explained last week (http://www.sibileau.com/martin/2012/09/10). But from a dynamic perspective, what counts is not the level, but the driver: In the long run, as the sterilization fails (also explained in our last letter and first proposed back on May 13th, 2010 (http://sibileau.com/martin/2010/05/13/)), the short-term “risk-free” rate of interest would be driven by the consolidated fiscal deficit of the Euro zone.
Having said this, the remaining question is what determines the value of the long-term risk-free rate of interest. The Fed, in our view, although not announced last Thursday, will eventually continue to purchase long-term US sovereign debt. Effectively in the beginning, the Fed would set the value of the risk-free yield curve, past the three-year point. When things get out of control and inflation expectations for the US dollar take the lead (in a few years), the fiscal deficit of the US should determine the dynamics of the long-end of the curve….Does that make sense? No! (At least not, if you are not Keynesian) Because if “things get out of control”, we must say good bye to long-term interest rates altogether. That market will evaporate, and the US will only be able to sell short-term debt. At that point, if the Euro zone still exists as we know it, the battle for the ownership of the risk free rate will have been won by the European Central Bank, by definition. Why? Because by definition, if the Euro zone still exists, it is because they succeeded in stabilizing their fiscal problems. Otherwise, the shortening of the term horizon for the US sovereign yield should continue contracting, until hyperinflation completely wipes it out.
Additional thoughts
With these thoughts in mind, one cannot but wonder at the idiocy blindness of those who sustain that both the European and the US central banks removed “tail risks” in the last days, with their new measures. To start, the whole idea that a tail risk exists is simply a fallacy of Keynesian economics. It assumes there is a universe of possible outcomes and, as if humans acted driven by animal spirits, randomly, each one of them has a likelihood of occurring. In all honesty….what else can occur if a central bank prints money to generate a bubble? Why would the bursting of the bubble be called a tail risk, rather than the logical outcome? Why, if that was tried in 2001 in the US, resulting in the crisis of 2008…why would it be any different now, when there is an explicit announcement to print billions per month? Why?
The splitting of the risk-free interest rates, in short and long terms, and the “moving” of the short-term to the Euro zone somehow sadly reminds us of the division of the Roman Empire, between West and East, when the capital moved to Constantinople. Is this ominous?
Finally, as inflation expectations, post the ECB/Fed announcements pick up, the rally in credit (i.e. IG18 credit default swaps index reaching 83bps) is telling us that banks outside the Euro zone or the USD zone -banks which did not benefit so much from a “portfolio” effect-, will have a hard time remaining profitable, unless they take additional risks, or they get themselves the same subsidy that the ECB and the Fed give to their zombie banks. This suggests to us that the Canadian dollar should not rise significantly above the US dollar.
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On risk convergence, overdertermined systems and hyperinflation
By: Martin Sibileau
Published on September 30th 2012
http://sibileau.com/martin/2012/09/30/on-rates-convergence-overdertermined-systems-and-hyperinflation/ (http://sibileau.com/martin/2012/09/30/on-rates-convergence-overdertermined-systems-and-hyperinflation/)
This week, we want to follow up on some thoughts from our last two letters, where we deduce the impact of the policies undertaken by both the Fed and the European Central Bank (ECB). As well, we provide a few comments on an ongoing debate: Will we ever experience hyperinflation?
Last week, we came up with three important conclusions:
-Conclusion No.1: The ECB backstop generates capital gains for the banks of the Euro zone and transforms risky sovereign debt into a carry product (i.e. an asset whose price is mostly driven by the interest it pays, rather than its risk of default, because this risk has been removed by the central bank)
This is what we wrote on Sept. 10th (http://www.sibileau.com/martin/2012/09/10): “… Until now, selling distressed sovereign bonds to the ECB to avoid losses was a positive thing for the EU banks. However, going forward, as the backstop of the ECB is in place and the expectation of default is removed from the front end (i.e. 1 to 3 years), exchanging carry (i.e. interest income) for cash will be a losing proposition. The EU banks will demand that the euros be sterilized, to receive ECB debt in exchange at an acceptable interest rate…”
Where do we stand?
Everyone expects Spainto request a bailout and accept the conditions that would allow the ECB to buy their bonds. In the meantime, someone took the time to measure the impact of the ECB backstops over the past year and came up with a number: EUR9BN in capital gains. On Sep. 20th, the European Banks research team from Barclays published a note titled “Liability management-understanding the rationale”. Barclays estimates that in their liability management transactions on EUR200BN of unsecured debt, European Banks have gained EUR9BN, from lower interest expenses. This of course, came courtesy of the Fed first (remember the EURUSD swaps put in place at the end of 2011?) and the ECB later, with 3-year long-term refinancing operations. The chart below (source: Bloomberg) shows the iShares MSCI Europe Financial Sector Index Fund (ticker: EUFN). The rally that began at the end of July with the speculation on the future actions of the ECB has peaked, awaiting further news.
(http://www.thinkfn.com/forumbolsaforex/index.php?action=dlattach;topic=426.0;attach=3102;image)
If we are correct with this conclusion, removing (i.e. buying) the assets backstopped by the ECB (i.e. sovereign debt) from the banks in the secondary market via the OMT (Outright Monetary Transactions), will be expensive to the banks. Why? Because these banks, which after so much misery, end up finding out that the assets they were holding are no longer in risk of default and provide a nice interest, will now have to hand these assets over to the ECB. It would be ok to do this every once in a while. However, the fiscal deficits of the EU countries do not happen every once in a while, but every minute and they keep on growing! Should the ECB seek to make the OMT sustainable as the fiscal deficits of the Euro zone periphery continue, the banks will have to be appropriately compensated. The risk remains then, that at a future, much later date, the ECB faces a net interest loss (between the interest it receives for their sovereign debt holdings and the one it pays to the banks). Under this scenario, the only alternative left will be to monetize that deficit all the way to hyperinflation. But in the meantime, let’s move to…
-Conclusion No.2: The ECB backstop will set a floor to yields
This is what we wrote: “…As the ECB backstops short-term sovereign debt, two results will emerge in the sovereign risk space: First, the market will discover the implicit yield cap and through rational expectations, that yield cap –having been validated by the ECB- will become the floor for sovereign risk within the Euro zone. The key assumption here is that primary fiscal deficits persist across the Euro zone…”
Where do we stand?
It is too early to say anything, as the ECB has not purchased anything yet and the potential secession ofCataloniaand recent protests have delayed (if we are correct) the establishment of a floor.
-Conclusion No.3: The ECB backstop will first push rates within the Euro zone to a convergence (periphery will have lower rates, core will see higher rates). And secondly, will force US rates to converge to the Euro zone rate, if the Euro zone survives the first convergence.
This is what we wrote: “…within that maturity range selected by the ECB for its secondary market purchases (up to three years), the market will arbitrage between the rates of core Europe and its periphery, converging into a single Euro zone yield target….” and “…If the () trend proves true, there would be no reason to believe that the short-term US sovereign yield should keep as low as it is vs. the equivalent EU sovereign yield. For all practical purposes, in the segment of up-to-3 years, the European Central Bank would set the value of the world’s risk-free rate! The big assumption here is of course, that the first trend, above, holds true. Only then, the arbitrage between the US sovereign yield and the EU sovereign yield could be triggered…”
Where do we stand?
Again, with the political struggle between the periphery and coreEuropeand (within the periphery) between the people and their appointed leaders, this convergence has been temporarily interrupted
The charts below (source: Bloomberg) show the convergence that started at the end of July, in 2-yr rates (but can also be observed in 10-yrs, not shown here). In the second chart, we show theUS30-yr yield, which suggests that a bearish trend is building (i.e. higher yields), consistent with our conclusion. Time will decide….
(http://www.thinkfn.com/forumbolsaforex/index.php?action=dlattach;topic=426.0;attach=3103;image)
(http://www.thinkfn.com/forumbolsaforex/index.php?action=dlattach;topic=426.0;attach=3104;image)
All this would indicate that the key to what’s coming next is simply political, which brings us back to one of the first letters of the year, titled “An analytic framework for 2012 (http://sibileau.com/martin/2012/01/23/)”, where we precisely showed the tragic (and spiraling) circularity of enhanced deficits, adjustments programs and coercion by the EU council, backstopped by the actions of the ECB. We reproduce a chart from that letter, below.
As the problem spirals, the actions of the ECB must strengthen: If at the beginning of the year, 3-yr lines of secured lending bought time, by September, “conditional” but unlimited bond purchases were now required. A few months from now, that conditionality will surely be merely a simple protocol. In every turn of this circularity, as unemployment, prices and fiscal deficits grow, so does social unrest. Social unrest therefore is the determinant in this overdetermined system (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Overdetermined_system).
(http://www.thinkfn.com/forumbolsaforex/index.php?action=dlattach;topic=426.0;attach=3105;image)
To those familiar with Algebra, we suggest that the Ponzi scheme we live in is actually an overdetermined system (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Overdetermined_system), because there is no solution that will simultaneously cover all the financial and non-financial imbalances of practically any currency zone on the planet. Precisely this limitation is the driver of the many growing confrontations we see: In the Middle East, in the South China Sea, in Europe and soon too, in North America. That these tensions further develop into full-fledged war is not a tail risk. The tail risk is indeed the reverse: The tail risk is that these confrontations do not further develop into wars, given the overdetermination of the system!
Some final comments on hyperinflation
We have noticed of late that there’s a debate on whether or not the US dollar zone will end in hyperinflation and whether or not the world can again embrace the gold standard. We will not discuss the latter today. With the regards to the former, we think it is still early to talk about hyperinflation. We don’t know when it will take place. All we can guarantee is that there are certain conditions necessary to see inflation spike up and morph into hyperinflation, and such conditions have not crystallized yet. However, there is a high risk at this stage in the game that they do, and we briefly examined that risk for the Euro zone, on September 10th (http://sibileau.com/martin/2012/09/10/why-draghi-opened-the-door-to-hyperinflation-and-denied-the-fed-an-exit-strategy/).
Money has two purposes: to store value and to transact. There is however another use of money, which is a derivative of the storage-of-value use. The use of money to repay debt.
Those who demand money to repay debts do not do so to store value or to transact. But as long as there are debts outstanding, there will be a demand for currency to repay that credit. This means that, in order to see such demand diminish, we need to see defaults first, which will along eliminate credit extended in fiat, debased currency. As this process unfolds, the banking system goes bankrupt, is nationalized, and credit is directed towards and centrally managed by the government. This may easily takes years, but it is taking place in the Euro zone right now. The repo market and futures markets die along and central banks end up becoming counterparties in cross currency and interest rate swaps. Once this stage is reached, the private sector is out of the system and fiat money is only demanded to transact. Here’s when the velocity of circulation of money starts to rise exponentially.
As these successive steps are passed, slowly, central banks suffer structural changes in their balance sheets. For instance, let’s take the example of Argentina. At one point, after many devaluations of the peso, the central bank by 1982 had become the main USD swap counterparty for corporate credit. However, to avoid a wave of bankruptcies after the June 1982 devaluation (after the Falklands War), it refinanced USD denominated debt at a 23% lower exchange rate, and in the process sold FX insurance at a cost (for the corporations entering the transaction) of 5%/month, when the inflation rate was 7.9%/month. This was going to be a huge burden that accelerated the deficit of the central bank, which of course was monetized (refer here (http://www.usalvador.com.ar/fce/informes/doc2.pdf)), unleashing the first high inflation of 1985.
The parallel with the situation in the Euro zone is self-evident: If the ECB starts buying sovereign bonds as fiscal deficits continue, the recent transitory appreciation of the Euro (to $1.3150 was mainly driven by short covering and the capital gains in financials, mentioned above) is not sustainable. In the long run, the intervention of the ECB would only devalue the Euro, creating a currency mismatch for those companies in the Euro zone that issued USD denominated debt. Thanks to the FX swaps by the Fed and the crowding out of the ECB in favour printing Euros for government debt, these companies are more numerous than they would have been. Therefore, the ingredient for an hyperinflationary process is already present, but we’re not quite there yet…
In the end, by the time the use of fiat money is reduced to its transactional role, central banks run huge deficits, called quasi-fiscal. They have backstopped government debt, money markets, repo markets, future markets and derivatives markets. The interest they pay on their liabilities to sterilize their actions always ends being higher than the one they receive for their assets. And it makes perfect sense: Otherwise, nobody would have asked these central banks to be their backstop! An additional source of fuel for this fire is the so called Olivera effect (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Olivera%E2%80%93Tanzi_effect) (after Julio H. Olivera). This is another ingredient to turn a mild inflationary process into hyperinflation. This effect refers to the fact that when inflation reaches a relevant number, it becomes profitable for taxpayers to delay their tax filings, which reduces the tax burden. Governments are thus forced print more money to cover the loss in real revenue they suffer.
The fact that we are still in the early chapters of the story just narrated does not allow us to state that hyperinflation is only a tail risk. The tail risk is (again) the reverse: That all the steps central banks took since 2008 won’t lead to spiraling quasi-fiscal deficits.
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Em março o Simon Black já tinha mencionado o motim do Panamá contra a inflação importada pelo uso do dólar como legal tender, cf. 1º artigo, agora seguem-se as consequências, cf. 2º artigo.
A dollar mutiny has broken out in the global currency wars
by Simon Black
on March 8, 2012
Panama City, Panama
[url]http://www.sovereignman.com/expat/a-dollar-mutiny-has-broken-out-in-the-global-currency-wars-6161/[/url] ([url]http://www.sovereignman.com/expat/a-dollar-mutiny-has-broken-out-in-the-global-currency-wars-6161/[/url])
I’ve been having breakfast at Cafe Manolo’s ever since I started coming to Panama, going on ten years now. They make the best ‘batido’ ever… it’s sort of like a milk shake crossed with a fruit smoothie. And it used to be ridiculously cheap. Not anymore.
Economists use a term ‘menu costs’ to explain why retail prices are ‘sticky’ and resistant to change. The analogy is that, even in the face of rising input costs, a restaurant owner will resist raising his prices because it costs a lot of money to print new menus.
Apparently someone forgot to explain this concept to Mr. Manolo. Rather than printing new menus, the staff at this once cheap establishment simply scratches out the old prices and scrawls in the new prices.
([url]http://www.thinkfn.com/forumbolsaforex/index.php?action=dlattach;topic=426.0;attach=3706;image[/url])
Without doubt, Panama is becoming very expensive. And if they handed out Academy Awards for inflation, I’m sure the first person that Panama would thank in its tearful acceptance speech would be none other than one Ben Shalom Bernanke, Ph.D.
As you’re probably aware, Panama is a dollarized economy. In fact, since Panama’s independence was engineered by JP Morgan in 1903, the country has never circulated its own currency. Officially, Panama’s currency is the ‘Balboa’, though it has been pegged to the US dollar at parity since inception, and US dollar notes are the only currency in circulation.
In the old days, this was practically viewed as being on the gold standard. Panama has never had authority to print US dollars and expand the money supply, just like currencies backed by gold in the 19th century couldn’t simply conjure more gold out of thin air.
Decades ago when the dollar was actually a respected store of value, Panama’s dollarization really meant something. Today is a different story. Yet while Panama is still unable to print its own currency, Ben Bernanke obviously has no such restrictions.
The trillions of dollars that Bernanke has created over the last few years have made their way into the financial system and reduced the purchasing power of US dollars. Right now this is being felt acutely with respect to fuel prices denominated in USD.
The consequent rising prices hit dollarized countries like Panama very hard because there is no central bank here to monetize the debt and finance populist deficit spending.
Case in point– Ricardo Quijano, Panama’s Minister of Industry and Trade, confirmed this morning that the government’s fuel compensation fund has completely run out of money. In the face of rising fuel prices, the government is now no longer able to subsidize gasoline.
As Quijano said, “We are almost in a national emergency. Oil prices are not going down.”
It seems clear now that the Panamanian government recognizes the challenges of being dollarized and is exploring a number of options to circumvent its limitations.
For example, while the government isn’t able to print US dollars, they do have the authority to mint their own Balboa coins. Only US paper notes are used in Panama, but there are local Balboa coins in circulation of similar look, feel, and value as their US counterparts.
Until recently, the Panamanian government had historically only minted penny, nickel, dime, quarter, and 50-cent pieces… more out of necessity to make change than anything else. Importing paper currency is easy, but importing coins is costly and inefficient.
Late last summer, though, the government began circulating a new 1 Balboa coin, equal in value to $1. Forty million coins were minted and issued at a cost of roughly 25 cents each, netting the government a cool $30 million in the process… not a trivial sum here.
As you could imagine, 2 Balboa coins ($2) are now on the table, making all of this a rather bizarre twist in the global currency wars of competitive devaluation.
The United States can print all it wants, and, at least until now, export the worst of the inflationary effects overseas to those poor suckers in Asia who keep buying Treasuries. Panama cannot export its inflation to the same extent, so rising prices have made a permanent home down here in the tropics over the last few years.
Panama is essentially absorbing all of the downside of being dollarized, but receiving little upside. Minting its own coins constitutes the country’s opening salvo in the currency wars– a mutiny of sorts on the dollar side. Panama is unwilling to take a backseat to Mr. Bernanke any longer and is taking steps to reduce reliance on US dollar hegemony.
If a country as small and US-aligned as Panama is taking these steps, it’s an interesting indication of what will happen in larger, quasi-dollarized places like Hong Kong and Saudi Arabia. Perhaps a “Dollar Spring”?
Panama leader tells Germany he wants to adopt euro
Reuters, 15/10 16:19 CET
[url]http://www.euronews.com/newswires/1692066-panama-leader-tells-germany-he-wants-to-adopt-euro/[/url] ([url]http://www.euronews.com/newswires/1692066-panama-leader-tells-germany-he-wants-to-adopt-euro/[/url])
BERLIN (Reuters) – Panama would like to introduce the euro as legal tender alongside the U.S. dollar, President Ricardo Martinelli told German Chancellor Angela Merkel on Monday during a visit to Europe.
“In Panama the currency in free circulation is the American dollar and I told the chancellor we are looking for ways for the euro to become another currency of legal circulation and to be accepted in the Panamanian market,” President Ricardo Martinelli told a joint news conference with Merkel in Berlin.
Martinelli provided no details about the switch but he expressed “full confidence” in the German and European economies and said he expected the euro zone debt crisis would soon pass.
Seventeen of the European Union’s 27 member states are in the euro zone but euros are also in circulation in a number of non-EU countries, including Kosovo and Montenegro in the Balkans as well as tiny Monaco and Andorra, and in overseas territories.
Panama’s dollarised economy – almost 10,000 kilometres from mainland Europe – is one of the fastest growing in Latin America, expanding 10.6 percent last year with help from heavy infrastructure spending including the expansion of the Panama Canal.
Financial markets’ fears of a possible meltdown of the common currency have eased since the European Central Bank said it was ready to buy unlimited quantities of sovereign debt to reduce borrowing costs of vulnerable countries such as Spain.
But Merkel, head of the currency bloc’s largest economy, has said Europe needs to persevere with tough austerity measures and move towards closer banking, fiscal and political union in order to secure the euro’s future.
(Reporting by Stephen Brown; Editing by Gareth Jones and Patrick Graham)
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(http://www.thinkfn.com/forumbolsaforex/index.php?action=dlattach;topic=426.0;attach=3923;image)
Article 31
Foreign reserve assets held by national central banks
31.1. The national central banks shall be allowed to perform transactions in fulfilment of their obligations towards international organizations in accordance with Article 23.
31.2. All other operations in foreign reserve assets remaining with the national central banks after the transfers referred to in Article 30, and Member States' transactions with their foreign exchange working balances shall, above a certain limit to be established within the framework of Article 31.3, be subject to approval by the ECB in order to ensure consistency with the exchange rate and monetary policies of the Community.
31.3. The Governing Council shall issue guidelines with a view to facilitating such operations.
Source: [url]http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:11992M/PRO/SEBC/31:EN:NOT[/url] ([url]http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:11992M/PRO/SEBC/31:EN:NOT[/url])
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Artigo interessante do Jim Sinclair.
No entanto o Jim está enganado relativamente às empresas mineiras, se pensa que os donos vão ficar bilionários. Por um lado, as democracias ocidentais não vão tolerar que uma mão cheia de privados tenham a sua impressora privada de dinheiro e os governos vão agarrar com as duas mãos esta nova fonte de receita via royalties [pois já no presente, as riquesas do subsolo "são" de todos]. Por outro lado, os Bancos Centrais do Canadá e da Austrália venderam as suas reservas de ouro quando o LTCM esticou o pernil e actualmente têm apenas 3.4 e 79.9 toneladas respectivamente, pelo que é previsível que os tesouros / Bancos Centrais destes países venham a ter a opção de compra desse ouro [financiada pelos impostos cobrados às mineiras :D] ao preço de mercado câmbio vigente. Ou seja as empresas mineiras tornar-se-ão utilities com margens de utilities.
The Bright Future of Gold: The Final Solution of the 2008 Monetary Crisis
December 28, 2012, at 7:48 pm
by Jim Sinclair
[url]http://www.jsmineset.com/2012/12/28/the-bright-future-of-gold-the-final-solution-of-the-2008-monetary-crisis/[/url] ([url]http://www.jsmineset.com/2012/12/28/the-bright-future-of-gold-the-final-solution-of-the-2008-monetary-crisis/[/url])
Dear CIGAs,
Let’s keep things very simple:
1. The future of gold will not be determined by the USA.
2. The present manipulation in gold is purely Western, and any other thought is rank nonsense. This event is both short term and very short sighted in terms of people’s published analysis.
3. The triumvirate of Euroland, Russia and China will determine the future of gold as financial power has shifted from the West towards the East.
4. The strategy of the flushing of Lehman Brothers was to initiate a transfer of failed and to fail debt and debit, producing obligations in all forms from the balance sheets of international banks and investment banks onto the only entity that could mechanically accept them in infinite amounts, the balance sheet of Western central banks. To avoid a total and terminal collapse of Western finance, the US Fed had to take the entirety of the problem onto its balance sheet in exchange for newly created electronic bank wired funds.
5. This cash then simply filled an empty hole that was not visible to a general public because of the willingness of FASB to allow these institutions to call what was worthless as full value.
6. The means of the transfer is presently and was QE.
7. QE was a total success in stopping an absolute economic collapse of the West in an unprecedented economic proportion.
8. QE was for the banks and not for anything else. It filled a black hole made invisible by FASB capitulation to political pressure allowing fraudulent computer valuations. This gave birth to the large equity rally off the bottom in early 2009 within two weeks of the FASB’s capitulation.
9. Because of the nature of QE, the only real economic stimulant was the wealth effect of a roaring equity market. That left Main Street totally out of the equation and did nothing to reverse the long term bull trend in unemployment.
10. Any consideration of an exit formula for the Fed to reduce the size of its balance sheet must take into consideration the quality of the assets that QE has purchased, which is known to have a strong emphasis on paper that truly has and will never have a market. For those assets that do have a market, sales of the dimension of the purchase would certainly impact interest rates in a most alarming way because of the lack of international buying of US Federal debt. All debt markets affect all other debt markets from the loan shark to the US treasury.
11. So there must be a way of doing the necessary in order to compensate for the weak asset expansion of the balance sheet of the Fed and other central banks because there is no exit strategy despite the over-educated academics that would try and convince you otherwise.
12. I am the most practical market related writer in this field. I assure you all talk of an exit program is based on a full recovery to opulent economic times that QE is not designed to produce, nor can.
13. Because the problem at the time of Lehman Brothers was so great, there wasn’t even a good estimate of its size so that QE had to be to infinity. I stated that many years before Bloomberg.
14. Therefore the solution to the present problem that must take place before there is any chance of real economic recovery is that central banks must balance their balance sheet in an economic condition as present and predicted here to remain about the same or worse that permits absolutely no exit strategy.
15. That means that the price of gold as the other central bank asset must rise in the free market significantly so that the balance sheets of the Western world central banks begins to heal and maybe even balance.
16. The mathematics of the price of gold are well in excess of the two magnets now functioning at $2111 and revolving around $4000.
17. Marry this concept to the recent memo of CIGA Belgian and you have the total solution to the present problem that no other mechanism can produce. This will be initiated not by the USA, but by Euroland, Russia and China.
Now add the text of the discussion of earlier this week on the ascendancy of the euro as we enter the final chapter of the Monetary Crisis of 2008 caused by the fraud of OTC derivatives, a crime with many millions of victims and potentially a lost generation. Not one of the major perpetrators suffered corporal repercussions.
Jim Sinclair’s Commentary
This is a brief of discussions within a private self financed research group in Holland.
It demands respect and my gratitude for their contribution of this ever more complicated subject, Gold.
They can be reached at goudstudieforum.com ([url]http://goudstudieforum.com/[/url])
Jim,
The Asian wealth producers (physical economy) and the major oil and gas owners, sympathize with the euro goldkoncept, that concept being, the market revaluation of gold without any link to any currency. (Remember the Duisenberg Speech.)
Gold, the wealth reserve (so not as a currency), shall be freely valued at the world’s gold auctions. The demise of the old dollar standard and rise of the Gold value standard and reserve.
Real value should be priced in and exchanged for a currency that also values, recognizes and promotes gold as a value standard. That currency is not the dollar, but the € (€ system and regime).
This (brilliant) idea/concept is not new. The early pioneers were Jacques Rueff and Triffin. Read: The Monetary Sin of the West ([url]http://www.amazon.com/The-Monetary-West-Jacques-Rueff/dp/B0006DYVOC/ref=sr_1_1?ie=UTF8&qid=1356623282&sr=8-1&keywords=The+monetary+sin+of+the+West[/url]).
Both wanted, but disagreed, to a free-floating gold price (value) during the London Gold Pool period (sixties). Their (Reuff and Triffin’s) point was:
Financial, monetary, and economic global stability by introducing the Gold Value Standard. The Dollar-regime (system) refused and forced the acceptance of the absurd SDR (paper gold).
But the two-tier gold market was born:
Monetary ($)gold and non-monetary gold. Oil and Asians keep accumulating physical gold and the € currency (€-system) that favors Free Floating Gold Value. Stability means that value should be exchanged for value. Currencies that recognize the value of gold as a wealth reserve are worth to buy valuable oil and products. The owners and producers of wealth get the assurance that their wealth can be safely stored as a reserve in free floating gold value, the only appropriate store of wealth.
That’s the running transition out of the non-wealth $-system.
CIGA Belgian
Conclusion to both briefs:
You have all the mechanical parts of the solution to the problem. The progress toward resolving this mess will again make huge profits for the “Good ole boys club,” particularly the Yalies.
Gold will move up in the free market and that is what this reaction is all about. The Canadian Dollar, Swiss and Euro will all benefit. Gold will not be confiscated because it becomes a major asset of the insiders. Gold producing companies with low cost operation will enjoy the leverage common to that industry in what is about occur. The amount of bearishness now developing in gold and certainly in good gold shares is the ultimate contrarian’s dream about to come true.
This is the golden stage. It is so simple it is almost silly, but few if any, really get it.
Respectfully,
Jim
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Kohl confesses to euro's undemocratic beginnings
08.04.13 @ 21:56
By Valentina Pop
http://euobserver.com/political/119735 (http://euobserver.com/political/119735)
Berlin - Former German Chancellor Helmut Kohl - the architect of German reunification - admitted he would never have won a referendum on the adoption of the euro in his country and said he acted "like a dictator" to see the common currency introduced.
In an interview from 2002 but published only recently as part of a PhD thesis (http://www.statement-television.de/app/download/5792929033/Bilanz+einer+gescheiterten+Kommunikation.pdf) written by journalist Jens Peter Paul, Kohl said that the idea behind the euro was to avoid another war in Europe.
"Nations with a common currency never went to war against each other. A common currency is more than the money you pay with," he said.
He recalled French President Francois Mitterand - and other European leaders of the time - repeatedly urged him to push through the common currency idea, which was not very popular in Germany.
"They thought - and were right about it - that if Germany doesn't adopt the euro, nobody will. And about the German situation they said: if Helmut Kohl doesn't push it through, nobody else will. Decisions emerged out of this core attitude," Kohl said.
One of these decisions was not to step down and let his popular interior minister, Wolfgang Schaeuble, become chancellor in the 1994 elections. Schaeuble, who currently serves as finance minister in the government of Angela Merkel, would not have been able to push through the euro, Kohl said.
"Schaeuble is a very talented man, no doubt about it, but this was not a matter for a newcomer, you needed someone with full authority," Kohl said.
Germany's chancellor between 1982 and 1998, Kohl said it took him "years" to build the trust and negotiation skills to convince other European leaders of his ideas and push them through.
"And it paid off, for instance in the Frankfurt Bank," Kohl said, in reference to the concession made by France and Great Britain to allow the European Central Bank to be based in Frankfurt.
With political parties springing up in favour of keeping Deutsche Mark and his own Christian-Democrats lukewarm to the idea of the euro, Kohl said a referendum on the matter would have been a lost cause.
"I knew that I could never have won a referendum here in Germany. We would have lost any plebiscite about the introduction of the euro. That is very clear. I would have lost it," he said.
The odds would have been about seven to three against the euro, Kohl recalled. The Social-Democratic opposition would not have come out against it, but also "not gone to the battlefield in favour of the euro, surely not."
In addition, the freshly reunified East Germans, happy to finally have their Deutsche Mark back, would never have voted in favour of abandoning it again for a new European currency.
"In the end, representative democracy can only be successful if someone stands up and says: this is how it is. I link my existence to this political project. Then you get a whole bunch of people in your own party who say: If he falls, I fall too. And then it is not about the euro - it is a life philosophy."
"I wanted to bring the euro because to me it meant the irreversibility of European development... for me the euro was a synonym for Europe going further," Kohl said.
But he admitted that in bringing this idea to life he "was like a dictator."
Asked if he had to accept the euro in return for French support for German reunification, Kohl replied:
"No more war - that was the first message. That was the point for men like Mitterand and Kohl, who in 1984 held hands on the Verdun battlefield. It wasn't about German reunification first and foremost."
Kohl paid tribute to Mitterand's wife, Danielle, who told her husband not to ignore east Germans' desire to reunite with their western brothers.
"On German reunification, Mitterand was torn. The President of the Republic had all the files from Quai d'Orsay [the French foreign ministry] and they were not in favour of German reunification. Better keep them [the Germans] as few as possible," Kohl recalled.
In the end, Mitterand's wife prevailed. The Berlin wall fell and Germany reunited in 1990. Kohl was celebrated as the chancellor of German reunification.
His other big legacy however - bringing the euro to life without enough public support - remains controversial. That the single currency began as a political project without being backed up by an economic union is seen as at the root of the ongoing crisis in the eurozone.
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a construcao europeia tem sido feita sempre contra o povo e a democracia e em nome de um elitismo bondoso
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É no mínimo estranha este constante apelo aos referendos, e o chamar anti-democrático a quem não faz um referendo.
Geralmente, quem defende um referendo com unhas e dentes é quem espera que a sua ideia ganhe no mesmo. Se a ideia tiver mais hipóteses de perder, já não se fala de referendo.
Os Anglo-Americanos estão sempre a chamar anti-democrática à UE por tudo e por nada, e a pedir-lhe referendos por tudo e por nada. Então por que é que os seus governos não fizeram um referendo para decidir se iam invadir o Iraque ou não?
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o que deve ser ou nao referendado depende dos paises e provavelmente deveria haver muito mais referendos mas pondo isso de parte pois nao tenho paciencia para essa discussao, o que interessa aqui eh que a construcao europeia foi feita contra a vontade da maioria dos cidadaos de varios paises nordicos, paises esses onde referendar questoes de soberania eh normal e faz parte da sua cultura democratica, incluindo a alemanha. e nos casos em que ate fizeram referendos perderam sempre e repetiram com ameacas ate conseguirem o que queriam (e ai ja nao repetiram mais) ou entao simplesmente avancaram com as medidas sem os referendos como no caso do tratado de lisboa que foi uma forma de nao referendar a constituicao europeia que havia sido chumbada em refendo.
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a construcao europeia tem sido feita sempre contra o povo e a democracia e em nome de um elitismo bondoso
É verdade, foi "contra" o povo nomeadamente contra o curto-prazismo e umbiguismo deste, mas teve e tem um propósito subavaliado pelas gerações mais recentes:
"Nations with a common currency never went to war against each other. A common currency is more than the money you pay with."
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Ambrose Evans-Pritchard dá destaque a João Ferreira do Amaral no Telegraph:
http://blogs.telegraph.co.uk/finance/ambroseevans-pritchard/100024723/portuguese-bestseller-calls-for-euro-exit/ (http://blogs.telegraph.co.uk/finance/ambroseevans-pritchard/100024723/portuguese-bestseller-calls-for-euro-exit/)
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Existe aqui uma questao pouco debatida e que se pretende com o facto de a zona euro nao ter uma linguagem unica no mercado laboral. Por exemplo quem quiser procurar emprego num pais tera que saber as varias linguas maternas sob pena de perder logo 80 p.p das oportunidades. Numa europa muito desigual em termos de distribuicao de oportunidades de emprego nao se devia proibir os anuncios em que seja condicao eliminatoria saber a lingua materna ?
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a construcao europeia tem sido feita sempre contra o povo e a democracia e em nome de um elitismo bondoso
É verdade, foi "contra" o povo nomeadamente contra o curto-prazismo e umbiguismo deste, mas teve e tem um propósito subavaliado pelas gerações mais recentes:
"Nations with a common currency never went to war against each other. A common currency is more than the money you pay with."
Bem observado, sem dúvida! Em compensação, e infelizmente, há numerosos casos de nações com uma moeda comum em que surgiram as lamentavelmente tão frequentes "guerras civis"... :-[
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E ingenuidade pensar que o euro evita guerras. Na verdade politicas monetarias extremamente restritivas na pratica atira muita gente nos paises pobres para fora da zona euro e para uma situacao pior do que se tivessem uma moeda propria
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a construcao europeia tem sido feita sempre contra o povo e a democracia e em nome de um elitismo bondoso
É verdade, foi "contra" o povo nomeadamente contra o curto-prazismo e umbiguismo deste, mas teve e tem um propósito subavaliado pelas gerações mais recentes:
"Nations with a common currency never went to war against each other. A common currency is more than the money you pay with."
Bem observado, sem dúvida! Em compensação, e infelizmente, há numerosos casos de nações com uma moeda comum em que surgiram as lamentavelmente tão frequentes "guerras civis"... :-[
Ele está a falar de uma sociedade de nações [exemplo União Monetária Latina (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Latin_Monetary_Union)] e não de ditaduras [exemplo o Império Austro-Húngaro ou a Jugoslávia].
A existência de uma moeda comum numa sociedade de nações funciona como mais um forte incentivo para se atingir um consenso.
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Artigo interessante sobre o cisma crescente entre a UE e os EUA. Ganha outra relevância pela simultaniedade do cisma crescente entre o Príncipe (http://www.thinkfn.com/forumbolsaforex/index.php/topic,1879.0.html) e os EUA.
EU lawmakers seek to block U.S. financial spying
By Robin Emmott
BRUSSELS | Wed Oct 23, 2013 11:58am EDT
[url]http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/10/23/us-eu-us-security-idUSBRE99M0OR20131023?feedType=RSS&feedName=topNews[/url] ([url]http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/10/23/us-eu-us-security-idUSBRE99M0OR20131023?feedType=RSS&feedName=topNews[/url])
(Reuters) - The European Parliament called on Wednesday for U.S. access to a global financial database in Belgium to be suspended due to concerns that the United States is snooping on the European Union, not just combating terrorism.
EU lawmakers voted to freeze Washington's ability to track international payments because of suspicions that it has abused an agreement giving it limited access to the SWIFT database.
They worry the United States is covertly drawing additional information from the database following leaked U.S. documents aired by Globo, Brazil's biggest television network, indicating that the U.S. government has secretly tapped into SWIFT.
"We need full transparency, especially with all the NSA revelations," said Guy Verhofstadt, leader of the Liberals in the European Parliament, referring to the U.S. National Security Agency surveillance made public by fugitive former NSA contractor Edward Snowden.
"Europe cannot accept that the data of private citizens is being accessed without anyone knowing about it," Verhofstadt, a former Belgian prime minister, told Reuters.
Although not binding, the parliament's vote reflects public anger at reports of NSA spying on European citizens. The European Commission - the EU executive - and EU governments will still need to approve any suspension of U.S. access to SWIFT.
The European Commission said a statement that it was "still waiting for additional written assurances" that the United States is respecting its agreement with the EU, but had no immediate plans to propose a suspension of SWIFT to EU members.
"U.S. LAP DOG"
The United States denies any wrongdoing.
David Cohen, the U.S. Treasury's undersecretary for terrorism and financial intelligence, has told EU Home Affairs Commissioner Cecilia Malmstrom his government has respected the 2010 agreement, according to an October 9 statement by Malmstrom.
The EU shares data with the U.S. Treasury from SWIFT, which exchanges millions of financial messages on transactions across the world every day, but only on a limited basis to help intercept possible terrorism plots.
The agreement is part of transatlantic cooperation following the September 11, 2001 attacks on U.S. cities.
The parliament in Strasbourg voted 280 in favor and 254 against with 30 abstentions, calling for a suspension until a full inquiry can clarify the situation.
"The EU cannot continue to remain silent in the face of these ongoing revelations: it gives the impression we are little more than a lap dog of the United States," said Jan Philipp Albrecht, a German Green in the parliament.
Globo's report of U.S. financial spying was among a host of leaks by Snowden that have tested EU-U.S. diplomatic relations.
French newspaper Le Monde reported this week that the NSA had recorded French telephone data on a huge scale between December 2012 and January this year. Other reports have accused the U.S. government of bugging European Union offices.
The parliament's call follows another vote by EU lawmakers for a tougher data privacy regime including fines for companies such as Google, Facebook, Yahoo! that violate rules limiting how data is shared with non-EU countries.
(Reporting by Robin Emmott; Editing by Alistair Lyon)
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os estados unidos tem tecnologia bastante avancada para espiar provavelmente toda a comunicacao que cada um de nos faz atraves do telemovel ou do computador;
Aqui cada um fala por si, na minha opiniao se esse sistema for utilisado para perceber e fiscalizar coisas menos boas que se passam nos paises excelente !
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Interessante documento desclassificado a relatar o que os EUA tinham medo que a Comunidade Europeia fizesse nos anos 70. É particularmente valioso por revelar onde as peças de xadrez estavam bem como a estratégia na mente dos arquitectos do euro [o ouro é a medida de todas as coisas: petróleo e balanças comerciais]. Assim podemos observar as suas posições actuais e ver se estão mais perto das posições onde os arquitectos do euro as queriam. Os negritos são meus e servem para destacar os pontos que me chamaram a atenção [essencialmente onde as peças estavam bem como a estratégia na mente dos arquitectos do euro].
(http://www.thinkfn.com/forumbolsaforex/index.php?action=dlattach;topic=426.0;attach=14466;image)
61. Note From the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for International Finance and Development ( Weintraub ) to the Under Secretary of the Treasury for Monetary Affairs ( Volcker )(1)
Washington, March 6, 1974.
Paul:
This is a paper which we prepared for Secretary Kissinger giving some of our views on the gold question. We discussed it at a meeting for his background, (2) without attempting to reach any conclusions. We would appreciate any reactions you have to the paper. The Secretary said he would most appreciate meeting with you and anybody else you wish to designate in about two weeks to talk out the issue and what might be done, using a revised options paper for this purpose.
One option that is not included in the paper, but which should be for various reasons, is how to deal with thwarting the Europeans if they were to go ahead without us in a way which we felt was inimical to our interests.
Sid
Attachment (3)
GOLD AND THE MONETARY SYSTEM: POTENTIAL U.S.–EC CONFLICT
Summary
The Foreign Policy Context
Within the next few months the long-standing U.S.-European dispute on the role of gold will probably be propelled from the back room to the main stage of our relationship. The stakes in this dispute are high, involving the long-run stability of the international monetary system and prospects for increased dissension within Europe and between Europe and the U.S.
The Problem
U.S. objectives for the world monetary system—a durable, stable system, with the SDR as a strong reserve asset at its center—are incompatible with a continued important role for gold as a reserve asset. These objectives are in apparent conflict with the EC desire to facilitate the use of gold in international transactions. There is a belief among certain Europeans that a higher price of gold for settlement purposes would facilitate financing of oil imports, although the argument depends on assumptions regarding producers' attitude towards gold as an asset which may not be valid. Adamant U.S. insistence on maintaining the present fixed official price is likely to create international conflict with the EC, and may also lead to unilateral EC arrangements which would defeat our aims for the system.
The Conclusion
The U.S. objectives are important, and should not be given up, but they may be achievable without rigid adherence to the present fixed official gold price. Compromise proposals exist which would make adequate progress towards our objectives for the system while meeting principal EC needs. Since the EC is likely to set forth its proposals before the C–20 winds up its existence this summer, a U.S. position will be needed within the next several months. Tactically, it may also be preferable to discuss possible compromise proposals with one or more EC members before we are confronted with an EC position.
Pressures are building within the EC for settlement of intra-EC balances with gold valued at the market price (or some other price substantially higher than the current official price of $42.20 per troy ounce). Unilateral EC action in this direction would run directly counter to the stated United States position on international gold policy. The EC reportedly will try to avoid a direct conflict through pressing for rapid resolution of the problem within the framework of the multilateral monetary reform negotiations. Therefore, the U.S. position needs to be re-examined in light of present circumstances. This memorandum examines the foundations of this potential U.S.–EC conflict on the gold question, and considers which negotiating positions among various options would best serve U.S. interests.
Gold in the International Monetary System — The Issues
Agreement has been reached in the C–20 monetary reform negotiations that the SDR should take the place once held by gold at the center of the world monetary system. However, there is still substantial disagreement on what the exact future role of gold should be—whether it eventually ought to be phased out of the system (the U.S. view) or retain an important function as a reserve asset and means of international settlement (the position of some European countries).
U.S. interests in this question are in the establishment of stable, durable world monetary system, based on a strong SDR, which would avoid future monetary crises and conflict, such as those that have plagued the Bretton Woods system in recent years. In our view a system which included gold as a major reserve asset alongside SDRs would be inherently unstable, just as bimetallism was in the U.S.
This inherent instability stems from the fact that gold is traded as a commodity on a private market at a variable price subject to the vagaries of world production (largely Soviet and South African) and sales, and of demands by hoarders and speculators. With a fluctuating, and generally rising, free market for gold, a permanently fixed official price is simply not credible, and becomes less so as the gap between private and official prices widens. If, however, the price at which official transactions in gold are made were to be periodically adjusted to the market price, then an unstable situation would rise as between gold and SDRs.
At the present time, the value of the SDR is fixed in terms of gold. However, it has been generally agreed in the C–20 that the new SDR should not be related to gold, but rather to a basket of currencies. In this case, a changing price at which official gold transactions take place would create capital gains (or losses) for gold holders as compared to SDR holders, stimulate speculative central bank demand for gold, and weaken the SDR. (4)
It is the U.S. concern that any substantial increase now in the price at which official gold transactions are made would strengthen the position of gold in the system, and cripple the SDR. If international liquidity were injected via gold, there would be little likelihood of new SDR allocations.(5) There also would be reduced incentive to sell gold on the private market even after an official price increase since central banks would cling to their gold in expectation of further official gold price increases. In addition, too large an increase in world liquidity might add to inflationary dangers. Finally, the distribution of the increase in world reserves would be highly inequitable, with eight wealthy countries getting three-fourths, while the developing countries would get less than 10 percent (see attached table). Producing countries (the USSR and South Africa) would benefit from the implicit floor put under the free-market gold price.
To encourage and facilitate the eventual demonetization of gold, our position is to keep the present gold price, maintain the present Bretton Woods agreement ban against official gold purchases at above the official price (6) and encourage the gradual disposition of monetary gold through sales in the private market. An alternative route to demonetization could involve a substitution of SDRs for gold with the IMF, with the latter selling the gold gradually on the private market, and allocating the profits on such sales either to the original gold holders, or by other agreement.
European views on the role of gold in the world monetary system vary considerably. The British and Germans, on one hand, generally agree in principle to the desirability of phasing gold out of the system. On the other end of the spectrum, the French have been the main proponents of a continued important role for gold in the system.
Support for a continued role for gold in the system is based in large part on the belief that "paper gold"—the SDR—does not command sufficient confidence and acceptability to replace gold completely in the system. There is, in fact, still a considerable emotional attachment to gold as a monetary asset, and a basic distrust of bank or paper money not having intrinsic value. On the other hand, most European officials recognize the basic problems involved in a combined SDR–gold reserve asset system. Belgian Finance Minister De Clerq, (7) for example, speaking at the IMF annual meetings in September stated:
Any redefinition of the role of gold must be based on the principle stated above: that SDR must become the center of the system and that there can be no question of introducing a new form of gold– paper and gold–metal bimetallism, in which the SDR and gold would be in competition.
Despite these differences among member countries, the EC position has begun to coalesce around their desire to free gold for use in settling intra-EC debts—a problem raised by the present "immobilization" of gold which has resulted from the wide disparity between the official and free market gold prices. Monetary authorities have been unwilling to use their gold holdings to settle official debts at a price far below the free market price. This has been a problem particularly for the EC, whose rules under the "snake" arrangement require that final settlement of debts arising out of intervention to support intra-EC exchange rates must be made in reserve assets in proportion to the composition of reserve holdings. (This "immobility" is, of course, an example of the difficulties inherent in a system in which gold retains a reserve currency role alongside another reserve asset.)
To some extent, the immobility of gold reserves as a means of payment is a result of self-imposed restraints. Countries are free to use reserve currencies and SDRs to settle debts. Moreover, countries are now free to obtain additional currencies (and realize substantial capital gains) through sales of gold to the private market. The EC problem is a result of their particular rules for settlement, which reflect the interest of creditor countries in receiving gold and applying discipline to deficit countries. It is also a result of their reluctance, so far, to sell gold on the private market. The reasons for this reluctance are probably related to the unsettled status of gold in the system, the basic attraction of gold, the expectation of future price increases, and the "thinness" of the private gold market.
Nor is it clear that European countries would give up gold even after a price increase, since one increase may lead to an expectation of further increases. Even under the Bretton Woods system, the Europeans did not often give up gold to settle deficits.
The "immobility" problem is of particular concern to the French and Italians, who have substantial outstanding EC debts and especially high proportions of their reserve assets in gold. Recently, with the private price continuing to rise, and final decisions on monetary reform apparently further off than previously thought, otherEC countries are coming around to the French-Italian view that this problem must be resolved. However,the Germans and British, in particular, are concerned that the solution be accomplished in a way which would not antagonize the United States. They wish to settle this issue in the C–20 multilateral context, if possible. Failing agreement there, the EC might feel free to unilaterally make some regional arrangement.
Various European proposals have been made to deal with the gold issue. The basic French proposal in the C–20 was simply to increase the official price of gold although this may have been made with tongue in cheek and received no support other than from South Africa. Other European proposals, and the stated French fallback position, have been variations on the idea that the official price of gold be abolished, leaving the SDR as the sole numeraire of the system, and that monetary authorities be free to deal at a negotiated price, or at a price related (perhaps at a discount) to the private market price. In the version reportedly recently proposed to the EC by the UK, such an arrangement would be combined with coordinated central bank sales to the private market. Another possibility reportedly being considered is to have the Italians, who have the greatest need, sell gold on the private market by themselves to avoid unduly depressing the market. The French version of this proposal would allow central banks either to buy or sell gold on the private market (obviously in order to avoid depressing the private market and to keep or augment the role of gold in the system).
In lieu of a general agreement permitting official transactions in gold at a price higher than the official price, some EC countries have proposed special arrangements to deal only with the intra-EC problem. Such proposals have heretofore been shelved by a combination of technical problems, and an unwillingness to take unilateral action of doubtful legality and offensive to the United States. Most recently, the EC Commission has proposed a system which would in effect set a higher provisional price, to be corrected when agreement is reached on a new price for gold.
Both the European C–20 proposal and the intra-EC proposals would fall short of a generalized increase in the official price of gold. However, each would amount to a generalized de facto, if not de jure, (8) official price increase, and strengthen the role of gold in the system. A system of sales, but no purchases, to the private market would mitigate this tendency.
The recent oil price increases have added a new dimension to the gold issue, and in the view of some European officials, relegated the intra-EC problem to a secondary position. Although mobilization of gold for intra-EC settlement would help in the financing of imbalances among EC countries, it would not, of itself, provide resources for the financing of the anticipated deficit with the oil producers. For this purpose, it would be useful if the oil producers would invest some of their excess revenues in gold purchases from deficit EC countries at close to a market price. This would be an attractive proposal for European countries, and for the U.S., in that it would not involve future interest burdens and would avoid immediate problems arising from increased Arab ownership of European and American industry. (The Arabs could both sell the gold and use the proceeds for direct investment, so that the industry ownership problem would not be completely solved.) From the Arab point of view such an asset would have the advantages of being protected from exchange-rate changes and inflation, and subject to absolute national control. Some European officials are thinking in terms of clearing the way for such transactions (which would now be forbidden by IMF rules). It has been argued that Arabs would only be interested in buying gold at near the market price if they could obtain assurances of some sort of floor price. We have received word that such a proposal is being floated within the German Government.
From the standpoint of international liquidity needs, a reasonable case can now be made for a generalized gold price increase, since the probable payments patterns stemming from the higher oil prices (overall deficits for Europe and Japan) may lead to a reduction in world reserve liquidity. However, from the U.S. viewpoint (as well as many countries without large gold holdings) substantial new SDR allocations would be preferable when new liquidity creation is needed.
Options for U.S. Negotiating Policy on Gold
Since the U.S. is likely to be presented with pressure to acquiesce in some arrangements to meet the European objectives sketched out above, it is important that we reconsider what our own negotiating posture should be.
At either end of the spectrum of possible negotiating positions are the following:
Option 1:Continue adamant opposition to any proposal involving an increase in price at which monetary authorities carry out transactions in gold. Advantages: If successful, we will keep gold from regaining strength as an international reserve asset, maintain the strength of the SDR, and probably eventually obtain the demonetization of gold and a more rational, stable international monetary system. Disadvantages: The EC may then go ahead with its own arrangements which would amount to a virtual de facto increase in the official gold price, with undesirable effects on the world monetary system and lead to increased U.S.–EC conflict and bitterness.
Option 2: Acquiesce in a European-type plan involving abolition of the official price, permitting settlement of official balances at a negotiated price, with a "sales only" rule for transactions in the private market. Advantages: This would be somewhat preferable to a plan involving an outright increase in the official price, and would maintain an avenue for demonetization through one-way sales to the private market. The SDR would become the sole numeraire of the system. In the short run, tensions with Europe over monetary issues would be reduced. The increase in de facto liquidity might be helpful in present circumstances, and gold sales to the Arabs might help finance western balance of payments deficits. Disadvantages: This has most of the disadvantages discussed above of (and may in fact lead to) an outright increase in the official price of gold. We may thereby lose the opportunity to build a stable and rational world monetary system, with adverse long-term consequences involving monetary instability and conflict. The disadvantages to each of these options are such that a search for additional options is justified. Intermediate options do exist which have the potential of meeting EC objectives of mobilizing gold in the short run, while maintaining the desirable trend towards gold demonetization.
Option 3: Complete short-term demonetization of gold through an IMF substitution facility. Countries could give up their gold holdings to the IMF in exchange for SDRs. The gold could then be sold gradually, over time, by the IMF to the private market. Profits from the gold sales could be distributed in part to the original holders of the gold, allowing them to realize at least part of the capital gains, while part of the profits could be utilized for other purposes, such as aid to LDCs. Advantages: This would achieve our goal of demonetization and relieve the problem of gold immobility, since the SDRs received in exchange could be used for settlement with no fear of foregoing capital gains. (9) Disadvantages: This might be a more rapid demonetization than several countries would accept. There would be no benefit from the viewpoint of financing oil imports with gold sales to Arabs (although it is not necessarily incompatible with such an arrangement). The only important disadvantage of option 3 would be its likely unacceptability to countries who would prefer to cling to gold for traditional reasons. But it would show our sensitivity to the immobility problem, and be a good initial bargaining position. We might, in the end, have to fall back on a fourth option:
Option 4: Accept a European-type arrangement in which the official gold price was abolished, and official transactions at a market-related price were permitted, but with agreement that a certain portion of gold be given up to an IMF substitution facility, and that gradual further substitution of SDRs for gold would take place over a longer period of time. One possible rule among many could be that countries should keep the nominal value of their gold holdings fixed at present levels with any increases in value coming from price increases offset by substitutions. Another variant on this proposal would have countries agree to pre-determined, gradual direct sales to the private market. Again, profits could be shared between gold holders and others. Advantages: This would provide adequate momentum towards gold demonetization while providing relief to gold immobility problems. It seems somewhat more compatible with gold sales to the Arabs, if this is desirable. It may be negotiable. Disadvantages: It is somewhat less desirable for the medium-term workings of the system than option 3.
Conclusions
The U.S. objectives in reducing the role of gold in the world monetary system are worthwhile, but they may be achievable without insisting on adherence to the present fixed official price of gold. Moreover, such a stand might unnecessarily create international friction. Compromise proposals exist which have good prospects for achieving our objectives for the system while meeting the principal EC requirements. We should be prepared to use these compromises in the near future.
Tactics
Negotiation in a broader IMF forum is likely to be a very divisive and contentious process unless based on a prior U.S.-European understanding. The Europeans, however, are not united, although working on a common substantive position. We could wait for this position to develop further or proceed now with bilateral contacts with one or more EC members. Our waiting to be confronted with the EC position puts the French in a strong position through their veto over any departure from the agreed EC line. The gold issue would be an appropriate one to pursue in bilateral contacts with the Germans and British, both of whom could probably agree to options involving more modest flex in our traditional position than the French or Italians want. But there is, of course, no guarantee that the British and/or Germans could carry the resulting compromise in Brussels. Nevertheless, working out a compromise with some of the major Europeans could reduce the prospects for a U.S.–EC standoff, while leaving a substantial intra-EC disagreement to be bridged by the Europeans.
(1) Source: National Archives, RG 56, Office of the Under Secretary of the Treasury, Files of Under Secretary Volcker, 1969–1974, Accession 56–79–15, Box 1, Gold—8/15/71–2/9/72. No classification marking. A stamped notation on the note reads: "Noted by Mr. Volcker." Another notation, dated March 8, indicates that copies were sent to Bennett and Cross.
(2) The paper was discussed with Kissinger at a Department of State staff meeting on March 6. The summary attached to the front page of the meeting's minutes notes that Kissinger decided: "That a small State–Treasury group, to include Volcker be assembled to refine the choices in theEB paper and report back in two weeks. The revised paper should include the options of possible unilateral EC action vis-à-vis gold prices and in relation to oil import costs as well as US responses to abort or penalize such action (EB action)." (Ibid., RG 59, Transcripts of Secretary of StateKissinger's Staff Meetings, 1973–1977, Entry 5177, Box 2, Secretary's Staff Meeting, March 6, 1974)
(3) Confidential.
(4) If a fixed SDR–gold price were to be maintained, and periodic free-market related adjustments in the official prices of gold were to be made, then the currency value of the world's primary reserve assets would be tied to a price set on a volatile, unstable market. [Footnote is in the original.]
(5) As can be seen from the table at the end of this memorandum, official gold reserves are now valued at $43 billion at the $42.20 per ounce price. The free market price is almost four times the official price. [Footnote is in the original. The table is attached but not printed.]
(6) The French have stated that they do not consider the IMF Articles as binding under present circumstances (the U.S. having suspended its convertibility obligation). We consider the Articles still binding. Other countries have not yet taken a position. [Footnote is in the original.]
(7) Willy de Clercq was the Belgian Minister of Finance and Deputy Prime Minister.
(8) Under the present IMF Articles of Agreement, a generalized gold price increase (uniform par value change) would require approval of countries representing 85% of the IMF weighted voting power. Thus we have the power to block any legal change. [Footnote is in the original.]
(9) The additional SDRs might be quite acceptable since, for a time at least, they would be "backed" by IMF gold holdings. Some gold "backing" could be maintained until prejudices against paper money waned—in a manner similar to the evolution of domestic monies. [Footnote is in the original.]
Fonte: http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v31/d61 (http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v31/d61)
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ECB's Weidmann calls for earlier introduction of bail-in rules
Tue Nov 12, 2013 6:04pm IST
http://in.reuters.com/article/2013/11/12/us-ecb-weidmann-idINBRE9AB0KU20131112 (http://in.reuters.com/article/2013/11/12/us-ecb-weidmann-idINBRE9AB0KU20131112)
(Reuters) - Rules ensuring that banks' bondholders and big depositors share the costs of any lender failing should be introduced earlier than currently planned, European Central Bank Governing Council member Jens Weidmann said on Tuesday.
Weidmann, also president of Germany's Bundesbank, joins a long list of ECB and German government officials pushing for the early introduction of 'bail-in' rules, in January 2015 instead of 2018.
The bail-in rules should if possible be in place by the time the planned mechanism to wind down banks starts, he said. That is currently expected in 2015, shortly after the ECB takes up its new role as the single supervisor for euro zone banks.
"It is important that bail-in be implemented as simultaneously to other measures as possible. In particular, the bail-in transition periods should be shortened," Weidmann said in a speech in Frankfurt.
He said banks should be allowed to fail, but added: "Different to how things were done in the past, it should be done if possible without putting financial stability at risk and without using public money."
(Reporting by Eva Taylor; Editing by Hugh Lawson)
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EU set to tell markets it will stand by weak banks
Thursday November 14, 2013 (16:05)
http://www.ekathimerini.com/4dcgi/_w_articles_wsite2_1_14/11/2013_527840 (http://www.ekathimerini.com/4dcgi/_w_articles_wsite2_1_14/11/2013_527840)
European Union finance ministers will pledge on Friday to stand by their banks if health checks next year reveal they need to bolster their capital, according to a draft statement obtained by Reuters.
The Eurogroup of ministers from the 17 countries that share the euro were due to discuss the backstop arrangement for banks on Thursday, but more serious talks will only take place when finance ministers of all 28 EU member states meet on Friday.
The talks on making a clean sweep of bank problems are part of wider negotiations on setting up a eurozone banking union to police lenders and support weaklings or close them down.
The banking union will be preceded by a so-called asset quality review of eurozone banks by the European Central Bank and then a stress test of all banks across the wider EU to see how assets such as loans would fare in an economic downturn.
"The council (of ministers) reiterates that all member states participating in the (ECB supervision) implement appropriate arrangements, including the establishment of national backstops ahead of the completion of (bank health tests)," said the draft statement.
The results of the health checks are expected around the time that the ECB becomes the supervisor for euro zone banks, which is the first step towards banking union.
If the tests show that a bank is short of capital, its shareholders and other investors will be asked to raise it.
But if there is insufficient investor interest and the bank's health cannot be repaired by imposing losses on junior bondholders, governments have to be ready to provide the missing money themselves.
Very few countries have any special funds set aside for such a purpose now, so the ministers have to make sure that at least all the necessary legislation is in place for them to be able to inject capital.
"In the eventuality that the (tests) reveal a capital shortfall, the established pecking order - first private sources, then national and euro area/EU instruments - will apply," the draft statement said.
The draft statement by ministers made clear that government help will only be possible if private funds are not available.
State help, in other words, will come at a heavy cost -- imposing losses on shareholders and junior bondholders, changing a bank's management and capping salaries and bonuses.
In time, possibly as soon as 2015, senior bondholders and even depositors with more than 100,000 euros in a bank, will be asked to contribute to help restructure a bank.
If a euro zone government cannot raise the capital itself, it could ask the euro zone bailout fund, the ESM, for a loan, as Spain did to recapitalize its banks in 2012.
If a government cannot borrow enough from the ESM because that would make its own public debt unsustainable and it would not be able to repay the loan, the ESM could recapitalize a bank directly, without government intermediation, from November 2014.
On Friday the ministers will also discuss how to set up an agency and fund to close or revamp banks in trouble - another pillar of the banking union.
But officials said they expected no major progress here as euro zone countries are divided over which European institution should have the power to shut a bank and who should pay for it. [Reuters]
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Depois do documento de Março de 1974, atrás mencionado (http://www.thinkfn.com/forumbolsaforex/index.php/topic,530.msg91949.html#msg91949), seguem-se as decisões informais dos líders da CEE em Abril de 1974. Ênfase adicionada sobre o mecanismo do novo sistema monetário pretendido pelos europeus.
Following is text of statement made to C-20 deputies’ meeting on May 7 by Dutch treasurer-general Oort Re Zeist meeting of EC finance ministers April 22 and 23 on gold:
I have been asked to report on an informal discussion - and I emphasize the word informal rpt informal discussion - which the ministers of finance of the EEC have held on April 22 and 23 at Zeist on the subject of gold.
Before I report to you on the outcome of the discussion I would like to make clear that it has resulted neither in a formal decision on the part of the EEC countries nor even in a firm proposal to be confidential
Made in a wider international context. What came out of Zeist was a consensus on certain substantive propositions that are to be further explored before they are submitted to a next meeting of the council of ministers of the EEC. If at a later stage the council reaches agreement on a certain position, the further procedure could be that the European community formulates a formal proposal on how to deal with the problem of gold in the period before the reform of the international monetary system.
In Zeist, ministers have agreed on two general propositions. First, they have re-asserted that the SDR should become the principal reserve asset in the future system, and that arrangements for gold in the interim period should not be inconsistent with that goal. Second, they have agreed that such interim arrangements should enable monetary authorities to effectively utilize the monetary gold stocks as instruments of international settlement.
There was a consensus among ministers that an increase of the official gold price, although it might serve the second objective, would be inconsistent with the first. In order to mobilize monetary gold as an international reserve asset, they have agreed that:
1. Monetary authorities should be permitted to buy and to sell gold both among themselves, at a marked-related price, and on the free market. The monetary authorities would have complete freedom to buy or to sell gold, and would have no obligation whatever to enter into any particular transaction.
2. Certain delegations are of the opinion that gold transactions with the free market should not, over a certain period of time, lead to a net increase of the combined official gold stocks.
3. In order to apply these principles, various practical solutions can be envisaged. Two were mentioned in particular. One is that monetary authorities periodically fix a minimum and a maximum price below or above which they would not sell or buy on the market. The other consists in creating a buffer stock to be managed by an agent who would be charged by the monetary authorities to intervene on the market such as to ensure orderly conditions on the free market for gold.
4. These arrangements would be adopted provisionally and would be reviewed in the light of experience attained after, say, a year.
In concluding, Mr. Chairman, I would like to emphasize once more that what I have just said is not rpt not a proposal by the EEC, but a report on an interim-stage in the discussions. Ministers have permitted us to make this report in order to inform you as early as possible of the direction in which a consensus among the EEC countries is emerging. They expect deputies to interpret the status of the information in the light of what I have just said.
Fonte: https://www.wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/1974PARIS11237_b.html (https://www.wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/1974PARIS11237_b.html)
Quanto ao ponto 4., não há nada mais definitivo que medidas temporárias, e é equivalente ao proverbial nariz do camelo dentro da tenda do beduino.
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Segue-se a análise da proposta anterior pelo Ministério dos Negócios Estrangeiros dos EUA agora desclassificada.
Ainda estive para juntar ênfase sobre quem estava por detrás da proposta da CEE, dos objectivos, das consequências para os detentores de dólares e das consequências sobre a hegemonia dos EUA, mas depois vi que ia ficar quase tudo sublinhado... Limitei-me apenas a sublinhar qual seria o preço do ouro, através da piada que este seria tão caro que as torneiras de ouro que os árabes adoram colocar na casa de banho seriam tão minúsculas que demorariam duas semanas para encher a banheira. :D
63. Minutes of Secretary of State Kissinger's Principals and Regionals Staff Meeting1
Washington, April 25, 1974, 3:13–4:16 p.m.
[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to international monetary policy.]
Secretary Kissinger: Now we've got Enders, Lord and Hartman. They'll speak separately or together. (Laughter.)
Mr. Hartman: A trio.
Mr. Lord: I can exhaust my knowledge of gold fairly quickly, I think.
Secretary Kissinger: Now, I had one deal with Shultz—never to discuss gold at this staff meeting—because his estimate of what would appear in the newspapers from staff meetings is about the same as mine.
Are you going to discuss something—is this now in the public discussion, what we're discussing here?
Mr. Enders: It's been very close to it. It's been in the newspapers now—the EC proposal.2
Secretary Kissinger: On what—revaluing their gold?
Mr. Enders: Revaluing their gold—in the individual transaction between the central banks. That's been in the newspaper. The subject is, obviously, sensitive; but it's not, I think, more than the usual degree of sensitivity about gold.
Secretary Kissinger: Now, what is our position?
Mr. Enders: You know what the EC proposal is.
Secretary Kissinger: Yes.
Mr. Enders: It does not involve a change in the official price of gold. It would allow purchases and sales to the private market, provided there was no net purchase from the private market by an individual central banker in a year. And then there would be individual sales between the central banks on—
Secretary Kissinger: How can they permit sale to the private market? Oh, and then they would buy from the private market?
Mr. Enders: Then they would buy.
Secretary Kissinger: But they wouldn't buy more than they sold.
Mr. Enders: They wouldn't buy more than they sold. There would be no net increase in gold held by the central banks that was held by the EEC. It could be held by others.
I've got two things to say about this, Mr. Secretary. One is: If it happens, as they proposed, it would be against our interests in these ways.
Secretary Kissinger: Have you accepted it or is this just a French proposal?
Mr. Enders: It's an informal consensus that they've reached among themselves.
Secretary Kissinger: Were they discussed with us at all?
Mr. Enders: Not in a systematic way. They're proposing to send over to Washington the Dutch Finance Minister and the Dutch Central Governor would talk to the Treasury.
Secretary Kissinger: What's Arthur Burns' view?
Mr. Enders: Arthur Burns—I talked to him last night on it, and he didn't define a general view yet. He was unwilling to do so. He said he wanted to look more closely on the proposal. Henry Wallich, the international affairs man, this morning indicated he would probably adopt the traditional position that we should be for phasing gold out of the international monetary system; but he wanted to have another look at it. So Henry Wallich indicated that they would probably come down opposing this. But he was not prepared to do so until he got a further look at it.
Secretary Kissinger: But the practical consequence of this is to revalue their gold supply.
Mr. Enders: Precisely.
Secretary Kissinger: Their gold reserves.
Mr. Enders: That's right. And it would be followed quite closely by a proposal within a year to have an official price of gold—
Secretary Kissinger: It doesn't make any difference anyway. If they pass gold at the market price, that in effect establishes a new official price.
Mr. Enders: Very close to it—although their—
Secretary Kissinger: But if they ask what they're doing—let me just say economics is not my forte. But my understanding of this proposal would be that they—by opening it up to other countries, they're in effect putting gold back into the system at a higher price.
Mr. Enders: Correct.
Secretary Kissinger: Now, that's what we have consistently opposed.
Mr. Enders: Yes, we have. You have convertibility if they—
Secretary Kissinger: Yes.
Mr. Enders: Both parties have to agree to this. But it slides towards and would result, within two or three years, in putting gold back into the centerpiece of the system—one. Two—at a much higher price. Three—at a price that could be determined by a few central bankers in deals among themselves.
So, in effect, I think what you've got here is you've got a small group of bankers getting together to obtain a money printing machine for themselves. They would determine the value of their reserves in a very small group.
There are two things wrong with this.
Secretary Kissinger: And we would be on the outside.
Mr. Enders: We could join this too, but there are only very few countries in the world that hold large amounts of gold—United States and Continentals being most of them. The LDC's and most of the other countries—to include Japan—have relatively small amounts of gold. So it would be highly inflationary, on the one hand—and, on the other hand, a very inequitable means of increasing reserves.
Secretary Kissinger: Why did the Germans agree to it?
Mr. Enders: The Germans agreed to it, we've been told, on the basis that it would be discussed with the United States—conditional on United States approval.
Secretary Kissinger: They would be penalized for having held dollars.
Mr. Enders: They would be penalized for having held dollars. That probably doesn't make very much difference to the Germans at the present time, given their very high reserves. However, I think that they may have come around to it on the basis that either we would oppose it—one—or, two, that they would have to pay up and finance the deficits of France and Italy by some means anyway; so why not let them try this proposal first?
The EC is potentially divided on this, however, and if enough pressure is put on them, these differences should reappear.
Secretary Kissinger: Then what's our policy?
Mr. Enders: The policy we would suggest to you is that, (1), we refuse to go along with this—
Secretary Kissinger: I am just totally allergic to unilateral European decisions that fundamentally affect American interests—taken without consultation of the United States. And my tendency is to smash any attempt in which they do it until they learn that they can't do it without talking to us.
That would be my basic instinct, apart from the merits of the issue.
Mr. Enders: Well, it seems to me there are two things here. One is that we can't let them get away with this proposal because it's for the reasons you stated. Also, it's bad economic policy and it's against our fundamental interests.
Secretary Kissinger: There's also a fundamental change of our policy that we pursued over recent years—or am I wrong there?
Mr. Enders: Yes.
Secondly, Mr. Secretary, it does present an opportunity though—and we should try to negotiate for this—to move towards a demonetization of gold, to begin to get gold moving out of the system.
Secretary Kissinger: But how do you do that?
Mr. Enders: Well, there are several ways. One way is we could say to them that they would accept this kind of arrangement, provided that the gold were channelled out through an international agency—either in the IMF or a special pool—and sold into the market, so there would be gradual increases.
Secretary Kissinger: But the French would never go for this.
Mr. Enders: We can have a counter-proposal. There's a further proposal—and that is that the IMF begin selling its gold—which is now 7 billion—to the world market, and we should try to negotiate that. That would begin the demonetization of gold.
Secretary Kissinger: Why are we so eager to get gold out of the system?
Mr. Enders: We were eager to get it out of the system—get started—because it's a typical balancing of either forward or back. If this proposal goes back, it will go back into the centerpiece system.
Secretary Kissinger: But why is it against our interests? I understand the argument that it's against our interest that the Europeans take a unilateral decision contrary to our policy. Why is it against our interest to have gold in the system?
Mr. Enders: It's against our interest to have gold in the system because for it to remain there it would result in it being evaluated periodically. Although we have still some substantial gold holdings—about 11 billion—a larger part of the official gold in the world is concentrated in Western Europe. This gives them the dominant position in world reserves and the dominant means of creating reserves. We've been trying to get away from that into a system in which we can control—
Secretary Kissinger: But that's a balance of payments problem.
Mr. Enders: Yes, but it's a question of who has the most leverage internationally. If they have the reserve-creating instrument, by having the largest amount of gold and the ability to change its price periodically, they have a position relative to ours of considerable power. For a long time we had a position relative to theirs of considerable power because we could change gold almost at will. This is no longer possible—no longer acceptable. Therefore, we have gone to special drawing rights, which is also equitable and could take account of some of the LDC interests and which spreads the power away from Europe. And it's more rational in—
Secretary Kissinger: "More rational" being defined as being more in our interests or what?
Mr. Enders: More rational in the sense of more responsive to worldwide needs—but also more in our interest by letting—
Secretary Kissinger: Would it shock you? I've forgotten how SDR's are generated. By agreement?
Mr. Enders: By agreement.
Secretary Kissinger: There's no automatic way?
Mr. Enders: There's no automatic way.
Mr. Lord: Maybe some of the Europeans—but the LDC's are on our side and would not support them.
Mr. Enders: I don't think anybody would support them. Secretary Kissinger: But could they do it anyway?
Mr. Enders: Yes. But in order for them to do it anyway, they would have to be in violation of important articles of the IMF. So this would not be a total departure. (Laughter.) But there would be reluctance on the part of some Europeans to do this.
We could also make it less interesting for them by beginning to sell our own gold in the market, and this would put pressure on them.
Mr. Maw: Why wouldn't that fit if we start to sell our own gold at a price?
Secretary Kissinger: But how the hell could this happen without our knowing about it ahead of time?
Mr. Hartman: We've had consultations on it ahead of time. Several of them have come to ask us to express our views. And I think the reason they're coming now to ask about it is because they know we have a generally negative view.
Mr. Enders: So I think we should try to break it, I think, as a first position—unless they're willing to assign some form of demonetizing arrangement.
Secretary Kissinger: But, first of all, that's impossible for the French.
Mr. Enders: Well, it's impossible for the French under the Pompidou Government. Would it be necessarily under a future French Government? We should test that.
Secretary Kissinger: If they have gold to settle current accounts, we'll be faced, sooner or later, with the same proposition again. Then others will be asked to join this settlement thing.
Isn't this what they're doing?
Mr. Enders: It seems to me, Mr. Secretary, that we should try—not rule out, a priori, a demonetizing scenario, because we can both gain by this. That liberates gold at a higher price. We have gold, and some of the Europeans have gold. Our interests join theirs. This would be helpful; and it would also, on the other hand, gradually remove this dominant position that the Europeans have had in economic terms.
Secretary Kissinger: Who's with us on demonetizing gold?
Mr. Enders: I think we could get the Germans with us on demonetizing gold, the Dutch and the British, over a very long period of time.
Secretary Kissinger: How about the Japs?
Mr. Enders: Yes. The Arabs have shown no great interest in gold.
Secretary Kissinger: We could stick them with a lot of gold.
Mr. Sisco: Yes. (Laughter.)
Mr. Sonnenfeldt: At those high-dollar prices. I don't know why they'd want to take it.
Secretary Kissinger: For the bathroom fixtures in the Guest House in Rio. (Laughter.)
Mr. McCloskey: That'd never work.
Secretary Kissinger: That'd never work. Why it could never get the bathtub filled—it probably takes two weeks to fill it.
Mr. Sisco: Three years ago, when Jean3 was in one of those large bathtubs, two of those guys with speakers at that time walked right on through. She wasn't quite used to it. (Laughter.)
Secretary Kissinger: They don't have guards with speakers in that house.
Mr. Sisco: Well, they did in '71.
Mr. Brown: Usually they've been fixed in other directions.
Mr. Sisco: Sure. (Laughter.)
Secretary Kissinger: O.K. My instinct is to oppose it. What's your view, Art?
Mr. Hartman: Yes. I think for the present time, in terms of the kind of system that we're going for, it would be very hard to defend in terms of how.
Secretary Kissinger: Ken?
Mr. Rush: Well, I think probably I do. The question is: Suppose they go ahead on their own anyway. What then?
Secretary Kissinger: We'll bust them.
Mr. Enders: I think we should look very hard then, Ken, at very substantial sales of gold—U.S. gold on the market—to raid the gold market once and for all.
Mr. Rush: I'm not sure we could do it.
Secretary Kissinger: If they go ahead on their own against our position on something that we consider central to our interests, we've got to show them that that they can't get away with it. Hopefully, we should have the right position. But we just cannot let them get away with these unilateral steps all the time.
Mr. Lord: Does the Treasury agree with us on this? I mean, if this guy comes when the Secretary is out of the country—
Secretary Kissinger: Who's coming?
Mr. Enders: The Dutch Finance Minister—Duisenberg—and Zijlstra. I think it will take about two weeks to work through a hard position on this. The Treasury will want our leadership on the hardness of it. They will accept our leadership on this. It will take, I would think, some time to talk it through or talk it around Arthur Burns, and we'll have to see what his reaction is.
Mr. Rush: We have about 45 billion dollars at the present value—
Mr. Enders: That's correct.
Mr. Rush: And there's about 100 billion dollars of gold.
Mr. Enders: That's correct. And the annual turnover in the gold market is about 120 billion.
Secretary Kissinger: The gold market is generally in cahoots with Arthur Burns.
Mr. Enders: Yes. That's been my experience. So I think we've got to bring Arthur around.
Secretary Kissinger: Arthur is a reasonable man. Let me talk to him. It takes him a maddening long time to make a point, but he's a reasonable man.
Mr. Enders: He hasn't had a chance to look at the proposal yet.
Secretary Kissinger: I'll talk to him before I leave.4
Mr. Enders: Good.
Mr. Boeker: It seems to me that gold sales is perhaps Stage 2 in a strategy that might break up the European move—that Stage 1 should be formulating a counterproposal U.S. design to isolate those who are opposing it the hardest—the French and the Italians. That would attract considerable support. It would appeal to the Japanese and others. I think this could fairly easily be done. And that, in itself, should put considerable pressure on the EEC for a tentative consensus.
Mr. Hartman: It isn't a confrontation. That is, it seems to me we can discuss the various aspects of this thing.
Secretary Kissinger: Oh, no. We should discuss it—obviously. But I don't like the proposition of their doing something and then inviting other countries to join them.
Mr. Hartman: I agree. That's not what they've done.
Mr. Sonnenfeldt: Can we get them to come after the French election5 so we don't get kicked in the head?
Mr. Rush: I would think so.
Secretary Kissinger: I would think it would be a lot better to discuss it after the French election. Also, it would give us a better chance. Why don't you tell Simon this?
Mr. Enders: Good.
Secretary Kissinger: Let them come after the French election.
Mr. Enders: Good. I will be back—I can talk to Simon. I guess Shultz will be out then.6
Mr. Sonnenfeldt: He'll be out the 4th of May.
Mr. Enders: Yes. Meanwhile, we'll go ahead and develop a position on the basis of this discussion.
Secretary Kissinger: Yes.
Mr. Enders: Good.
Secretary Kissinger: I agree we shouldn't get a consultation—as long as we're talking Treasury, I keep getting pressed for Treasury chair-manship of a policy committee. You're opposed to that?7
[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to international monetary policy.]
1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Transcripts of Secretary of State Kissinger's Staff Meetings, 1973–1977, Entry 5177, Box 3, Secretary's Staff Meeting, April 25, 1974. Secret. According to an attached list, the following people attended the meeting: Kissinger, Rush, Sisco, Ingersoll, Hartman, Maw, Ambassador at Large Robert Mc-Closkey, Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Donald Easum, Hyland, Atherton, Lord, Policy Planning Staff member Paul Boeker, Eagleburger, Springsteen, Special Assistant to the Secretary of State for Press Relations Robert Anderson, Enders, Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs Jack Kubisch, and Sonnenfeldt.
2 Meeting in Zeist, the Netherlands, on April 22 and 23, EC Finance Ministers and central bankers agreed on a common position on gold, which they authorized the Dutch Minister of Finance, Willem Frederik Duisenberg, and the President of the Dutch central bank, Jelle Zijlstra, to discuss with Treasury and Federal Reserve Board officials in Washington. (Telegram 2042 from The Hague, April 24, and telegram 2457 from USEC Brussels, April 25; ibid., Central Foreign Policy Files)
3 Jean Sisco was Joseph Sisco's wife.
4 From April 28 to 29, Kissinger was in Geneva for talks with Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko.
5 France held a Presidential election on May 19.
6 George Shultz's tenure as Secretary of the Treasury ended on May 8, when he was replaced by William Simon.
7 The summary attached to the front page of the minutes notes that "The Secretary is inclined to oppose the proposal on grounds of non consultation by the Europeans as well as on the proposal's merits. The Secretary agreed to talk to Arthur Burns in this sense."
Fonte: http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v31/d63 (http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v31/d63)
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Já aqui tinha mencionado a importância do ouro no euro e na construção do euro. Bem como trazer os alemães para o campo francês [para relembrar os campo francês, ver posts acima] em 1978:
Cronologia abreviada do euro
1978 April 8: At EC summit, French President Valery Giscard d’Estaing and German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt propose establishment of European Monetary System.
1979 March 13: Establishment of European Monetary System and European Currency Unit. Eight currencies -- the Belgian and Luxembourg francs, French franc, deutsche mark, Danish krone, Dutch guilder, Italian lira and Irish pound -- take part in the exchange-rate mechanism limiting currency fluctuations.
[...]
Posto este preâmbulo, segue-se a transcrição da apresentação do Clemens Werner do Deutsche Bundesbank ocorrida a 30 de Setembro de 2013 na LBMA/LPPM Precious Metals Conference 2013 (http://www.lbma.org.uk/pages/?page_id=159&title=programme). Ênfase foi adicionada para mostrar desde quando o ouro é a pedra angular do euro.
Present Role of Gold as Part of the Foreign Reserves of the Deutsche Bundesbank
Clemens Werner
Deputy Head of the Market Operations Division, Deutsche Bundesbank
I. Preamble
Thank you very much, Terry. I have to say that Terry is a good swimmer as well: we had a competition once.
Terence Keeley
I lost.
Clemens Werner
II. Introduction
Thank you very much for giving me the opportunity to present some topics about gold. My presentation will be very short and it has three parts: firstly, I will look at the purpose of holding gold from the point of view of the Deutsche Bundesbank, with a brief look into history and then some words on the storage concept that was announced recently.
III. Classical Reasons to Hold Gold
I have selected six classical reasons to hold foreign reserves; two of them apply best for gold. I will not go into detail on all of them, however. Let us start with precautionary holdings; this means the traditional use of reserves as savings for a potential crisis. There is also confidence; gold can provide a level of confidence to a central bank’s balance sheet.
The other classical reasons are well known and apply perhaps more for foreign exchange reserves, like the intervention reason. Holding reserves to cover money in circulation has probably lost relevance slightly. Financing and transactions is another classical motive to hold reserves. Last but not least, the investment purpose, which is important for many central banks, but probably not a self-sufficient motive to hold foreign reserves.
IV. Functions and Attributes of Gold
In particular for gold, we can identify four functions and attributes:
- Universal acceptance – gold is accepted as the ultimate independent means of payment almost everywhere. Gold has no country and no currency risk. Gold has no rating.
- Diversification – gold provides an element of diversification to the foreign reserves of a central bank and for the balance sheet.
- Robustness – compared to other assets, gold is very robust against shocks, so it can be seen as an insurance in case of surprising events.
- Gold allows for the absorption of some volatility in the balance sheet. This is true in the case of the Bundesbank reserve, where we have large unrealised profits which are on the liability side and form a kind of buffer for the profit and loss account.
After Bretton Woods, gold could be seen more as a psychological anchor. The purpose of confidence and psychology are well connected to each other.
I have also added two official statements of the Bundesbank with respect to gold. I take the opportunity just to repeat them here because I think they are still valid:
- ‘Gold constitutes an essential component of the Bundesbank’s reserve assets and meets its needs for security and portfolio diversification.’ This assessment was given at a balance sheet press conference in 2006 and is still true.
- ‘Gold continues to perform an important element of ensuring confidence in the stability of the single currency and remains an important element of global monetary reserves.’
V. Eurosystem and Bundesbank Gold Holdings
Here you see the gold holdings of the Eurosystem and of the Bundesbank. You can see that some central banks within the Eurosystem have sold some gold since 1999 and that the Bundesbank has kept its gold holdings quite stable. In this period of time, there were several attempts and also some pressure for the Bundesbank to sell gold. However, in the end the Bundesbank decided not to sell a significant part of its gold reserves.
In terms of size, the Eurosystem is still a large gold holder with 346 million ounces, which is about 10,800 tonnes of gold. The Bundesbank still has 109 million ounces, which is about 3,391 tonnes of gold.
VI. Bundesbank Gold Reserves
1. History
I do not want to go into detail about the history. I can summarise it by saying the Bundesbank’s gold reserves were acquired with current account surpluses, within the European Payments Union and it also received large portions of gold from the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, from the Bank of England and from the BIS.
Here is another chart showing the size of the Bundesbank’s gold reserves. As you can see, between 1945 and 1950, right after the War, Germany had no gold reserves. After that, within the European Payments Union, German gold reserves increased up until 1971, when the dollar gold standard system broke down. Subsequently, these were treated more like passive holdings. You can see significant changes in 1979, when gold was transferred within a swap to the European Monetary Cooperation Fund in preparation of monetary union in Europe. This was transferred back and immediately after that the other important transaction was the transfer of gold to the ECB in 1999. The ECB received 7.46 million ounces from the Bundesbank and all participating national central banks in 1999.
2. Book Value
Here you see the same position expressed in terms of book value. You can see that in 1999 we switched over to a mark to market valuation in the balance sheet. At the end of 2012, the market value has come down recently, but still you can see the amount of unrealised profit.
3. Gold in the Balance Sheet
Another interesting chart is the share of gold within the Bundesbank’s balance sheet. It is interesting that the share has been quite stable. From when we started monetary union and at the end of 2012, the share of gold as part of the total assets of the Bundesbank was the same. At the same time, there was an impressive increase in the total assets of the Bundesbank and of many other central banks in the Eurosystem as well. If we used the consolidated Eurosystem balance sheet, the picture would look almost the same. You can also see the time when the balance sheet started to shrink slowly and the gold position decreased as well.
Looking at this, you can say that gold has done quite a good job as a safe haven asset. It performed quite well during these times of market turbulence and it has also, let us say, a counter-cyclical component, which you can see here.
VII. Management of Gold Reserves
There is no active management of gold reserves, no buying and selling every day. The gold position, as of July 2013, is €109 billion.
The Bundesbank has nine kilograms of unallocated gold, so less than one gold bar unallocated, the rest is stored at several locations; I will come back later to that.
The acquisition costs of the gold position are €73. After 1999, we had another level of acquisition costs that has something to do with the switch to mark to market accounting, but the effective acquisition costs are €73.
We do not do gold deposits currently. We did some gold deposits until 2007 for a very small part of the gold reserves in order to finance some of the storage costs, but there has not been a business case since 2007, as before.
There are some annual sales of gold: five to seven tonnes are sold to the Finance Ministry every year within a coin programme.
Last but not least, the Bundesbank also takes care of storage of the gold.
VIII. Storage and Relocation
Gold is stored only within central banks, but let me first give you some words about the objectives, of which there are three: security, liquidity and cost efficiency. Gold is stored at central banks with high international reputations in countries with democratic structures and with banks having the same or comparable security standards, like our own standards.
Of course, the environment changes and so the concept of storage is reviewed regularly. Some of the most significant changes occurred right after the reunification of Germany, when the reasons to store gold as far to the west and away from the ‘iron curtain’ no longer applied. Another event was the European currency; because of this it was no longer necessary to store gold in euro area countries. In the meantime, euro banknotes and coins had, for many years, tied up a large volume of world storage, which has now been opened up.
The Bundesbank has made several relocations of gold in 2000, when large quantities of gold were relocated from London to Frankfurt (around 900 tonnes) and further relocations have been announced recently, which you can see on our website. There will be a relocation of 300 tonnes of gold from New York to Frankfurt and 374 tonnes from Paris to Frankfurt. Within this relocation the London Good Delivery standard should be achieved.
I have a table showing you the gold holdings of the Bundesbank and the location where it is stored. As you can see, currently 1,000 tonnes are stored within Germany. The biggest part of the reserves is stored at the Federal Reserve Bank in New York, the Bank of England and Banque de France. This Bundesbank has made this public in a step towards more transparency within the management of the gold reserves and has also published its new target, where about 50% of gold will be stored in Germany with the remainder staying in New York and London.
IX. Conclusion
I hope I have given you some interesting information about the Bundesbank’s gold reserves. Thank you very much for your attention and I hope for an interesting discussion.
Terence Keeley
Thank you very much, Clemens. I suggest you sit down and drink a very large glass of water, because when you see the questions that are being asked of you – in fact, could we have a beer at the front table for Clemens?
Alex Gautier will speak next, from the Banque de France. Like Clemens, Alex comes from the markets operations side and directs these activities for the Banque de France. He has helped manage the Banque de France’s gold and foreign exchange reserves as well as the risk department, so he speaks with a great deal of authority. Despite having dual nationality – he also has a US passport which he showed me before this session – he does not speak English. Therefore, you should take your translation phone to your ear or are you going to try to do this in English, Alex? Bon chance.
Fonte: http://www.lbma.org.uk/assets/Werner%2020130930.pdf (http://www.lbma.org.uk/assets/Werner%2020130930.pdf)
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Pelo aspecto, parece que vai merda em direcção à ventoinha.
HSBC, Citigroup Said to Suspend Traders as Currency Probe Widens
By Liam Vaughan and Gavin Finch
2014-01-17T17:23:45Z
[url]http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-01-17/hsbc-says-it-suspended-two-london-foreign-exchange-traders-1-.html[/url] ([url]http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-01-17/hsbc-says-it-suspended-two-london-foreign-exchange-traders-1-.html[/url])
HSBC Holdings Plc (HSBA), Europe’s biggest bank by market value, and Citigroup Inc. (C) suspended four traders as the probe into the alleged manipulation of currencies widens.
HSBC suspended two London-based foreign-exchange traders, according to a statement today. Citigroup put two spot traders who specialized in G-10 currencies on leave, according to a person with knowledge of the matter who asked not to be identified because the matter is private.
The moves bring the total number of traders known to be fired, suspended or put on leave to at least 17 since Bloomberg News reported in June that employees at some firms said they shared information about their positions with counterparts at other banks to try and manipulate the WM/Reuters rates, a key benchmark in the $5.3 trillion-a-day currency market.
The world’s seven biggest foreign-exchange dealers have now all taken action against their employees as regulators in Washington, London and Switzerland investigate. Together, the firms account for about 70 percent of all currency trading globally, according to Euromoney Institutional Investor Plc. (ERM)
Deutsche Bank AG has the biggest market share at 15.2 percent, followed by Citigroup with 14.9 percent, Barclays Plc (BARC) at 10.2 percent, UBS AG (UBSN) with 10.1 percent, HSBC at 6.9 percent, JPMorgan Chase & Co. at 6.1 percent, and Royal Bank of Scotland Group Plc with 5.6 percent, according to the survey.
HSBC suspended London-based traders Edward Pinto and Serge Sarramegna, said a person with knowledge of the decision who asked not to be identified because the matter is private.
Deutsche Bank
Citigroup has put Anthony John in London and Andrew Amantia in New York on leave, according to another person with knowledge of the matter who asked not to be identified. None of the traders responded to e-mails and telephone calls seeking comment, while officials at their employers declined to comment.
The traders are the first to be suspended by HSBC, while Citigroup last week fired its head of European spot trading Rohan Ramchandani.
Deutsche Bank suspended several traders after combing through employees’ electronic communications using search terms negotiated with regulators late last year, a person familiar with the matter said this week. UBS suspended its co-chief dealer, Niall O’Riordan, while JPMorgan has put its chief dealer in London, Richard Usher, on leave. Edinburgh-based RBS has suspended foreign-exchange traders Paul Nash and Julian Munson. No individual or firm has been accused of any wrongdoing.
‘The Cartel’
At the center of investigations are instant-message groups with names such as “The Cartel,” “The Bandits’ Club,” “One Team, One Dream” and “The Mafia.” Their members exchanged information on client orders and agreed how to trade at the fix through the messaging platforms, five people with knowledge of the investigations said last month.
Traders on the chats say they were merely matching buyers and sellers ahead of the fix to minimize losses by avoiding trades at a time when prices typically fluctuate the most.
Still, many banks including Deutsche Bank, Citigroup, JPMorgan and Goldman Sachs Group Inc. have clamped down on the use of multi-bank instant-message groups.
Senior currency dealers raised the issue of how they communicate to officials at the Bank of England in April 2012, telling them about how they shared information about orders to reduce the risk of losses in the minutes before benchmarks are calculated, people with knowledge of the meeting said this week. The traders were concerned because regulators were scrutinizing instant messages in their investigations into rigging of the London interbank offered rate, the people said.
The Bank of England said it’s supporting the U.K. Financial Conduct Authority in its investigation into currency manipulation. In the U.S., the Federal Reserve is probing the matter, alongside the U.S. Justice Department. The European Union’s Competition Commission and Swiss Competition Commission are also investigating.
To contact the reporters on this story: Liam Vaughan in London at lvaughan6@bloomberg.net; Gavin Finch in London at gfinch@bloomberg.net
To contact the editor responsible for this story: Heather Smith at hsmith26@bloomberg.net
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Um bom resumo de onde estivemos, embora os documentos desclassificados acima mencionados apontem que o papel dos SDRs e a sua aceitação pelos europeus na década de 70 e seguintes não seja bem o que o autor pinta... além de que o apoio do Príncipe já não ser o que era (http://www.thinkfn.com/forumbolsaforex/index.php?topic=1879.0)...
The Rise of the Petroyuan and the Slow Erosion of Dollar Hegemony
By Flynt Leverett and Hillary Mann Leverett
On July 28, 2014
http://www.worldfinancialreview.com/?p=2621 (http://www.worldfinancialreview.com/?p=2621)
For seventy years, one of the critical foundations of American power has been the dollar’s standing as the world’s most important currency. For the last forty years, a pillar of dollar primacy has been the greenback’s dominant role in international energy markets. Today, China is leveraging its rise as an economic power, and as the most important incremental market for hydrocarbon exporters in the Persian Gulf and the former Soviet Union to circumscribe dollar dominance in global energy—with potentially profound ramifications for America’s strategic position.
Since World War II, America’s geopolitical supremacy has rested not only on military might, but also on the dollar’s standing as the world’s leading transactional and reserve currency. Economically, dollar primacy extracts “seignorage”—the difference between the cost of printing money and its value—from other countries, and minimises U.S. firms’ exchange rate risk. Its real importance, though, is strategic: dollar primacy lets America cover its chronic current account and fiscal deficits by issuing more of its own currency – precisely how Washington has funded its hard power projection for over half a century.
Since the 1970s, a pillar of dollar primacy has been the greenback’s role as the dominant currency in which oil and gas are priced, and in which international hydrocarbon sales are invoiced and settled. This helps keep worldwide dollar demand high. It also feeds energy producers’ accumulation of dollar surpluses that reinforce the dollar’s standing as the world’s premier reserve asset, and that can be “recycled” into the U.S. economy to cover American deficits.
Many assume that the dollar’s prominence in energy markets derives from its wider status as the world’s foremost transactional and reserve currency. But the dollar’s role in these markets is neither natural nor a function of its broader dominance. Rather, it was engineered by U.S. policymakers after the Bretton Woods monetary order collapsed in the early 1970s, ending the initial version of dollar primacy (“dollar hegemony 1.0”). Linking the dollar to international oil trading was key to creating a new version of dollar primacy (“dollar hegemony 2.0”)—and, by extension, in financing another forty years of American hegemony.
Gold and Dollar Hegemony 1.0
Dollar primacy was first enshrined at the 1944 Bretton Woods conference, where America’s non-communist allies acceded to Washington’s blueprint for a postwar international monetary order. Britain’s delegation—headed by Lord Keynes—and virtually every other participating country, save the United States, favoured creating a new multilateral currency through the fledgling International Monetary Fund (IMF) as the chief source of global liquidity. But this would have thwarted American ambitions for a dollar-centered monetary order. Even though almost all participants preferred the multilateral option, America’s overwhelming relative power ensured that, in the end, its preferences prevailed. So, under the Bretton Woods gold exchange standard, the dollar was pegged to gold and other currencies were pegged to the dollar, making it the main form of international liquidity.
There was, however, a fatal contradiction in Washington’s dollar-based vision. The only way America could diffuse enough dollars to meet worldwide liquidity needs was by running open-ended current account deficits. As Western Europe and Japan recovered and regained competitiveness, these deficits grew. Throw in America’s own burgeoning demand for dollars—to fund rising consumption, welfare state expansion, and global power projection—and the U.S. money supply soon exceeded U.S. gold reserves. From the 1950s, Washington worked to persuade or coerce foreign dollar holders not to exchange greenbacks for gold. But insolvency could be staved off for only so long: in August 1971, President Nixon suspended dollar-gold convertibility, ending the gold exchange standard; by 1973, fixed exchange rates were gone, too.
These events raised fundamental questions about the long-term soundness of a dollar-based monetary order. To preserve its role as chief provider of international liquidity, the U.S. would have to continue running current account deficits. But those deficits were ballooning, for Washington’s abandonment of Bretton Woods intersected with two other watershed developments: America became a net oil importer in the early 1970s; and the assertion of market power by key members of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) in 1973-1974 caused a 500% increase in oil prices, exacerbating the strain on the U.S. balance of payments. With the link between the dollar and gold severed and exchange rates no longer fixed, the prospect of ever-larger U.S. deficits aggravated concerns about the dollar’s long-term value.
These concerns had special resonance for major oil producers. Oil going to international markets has been priced in dollars, at least since the 1920s—but, for decades, sterling was used at least as frequently as dollars in order to settle transnational oil purchases, even after the dollar had replaced sterling as the world’s preeminent trade and reserve currency. As long as sterling was pegged to the dollar and the dollar was “as good as gold,” this was economically viable (https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/scpwps/ecbwp1651.pdf). But, after Washington abandoned dollar-gold convertibility and the world transitioned from fixed to floating exchange rates, the currency regime for oil trading was up for grabs. With the end of dollar-gold convertibility, America’s major allies in the Persian Gulf—the Shah’s Iran, Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia—came to favour shifting OPEC’s pricing system, from denominating prices in dollars to denominating them in a basket of currencies.
In this environment, several of America’s European allies revived the idea (first broached by Keynes at Bretton Woods) of providing international liquidity in the form of an IMF-issued, multilaterally-governed currency—so-called “Special Drawing Rights” (SDRs). After rising oil prices engorged their current accounts, Saudi Arabia and other Gulf Arab allies of the United States pushed for OPEC to begin invoicing in SDRs. They also endorsed European proposals to recycle petrodollar surpluses through the IMF, in order to encourage its emergence as the main post-Bretton Woods provider of international liquidity. That would have meant Washington could not continue to print as many dollars, as it wanted to support rising consumption, mushrooming welfare expenditures, and sustained global power projection. To avert this, American policymakers had to find new ways to incentivise foreigners to continue holding ever-larger surpluses of what were now fiat dollars.
Oil and Dollar Hegemony 2.0
To this end, U.S. administrations from the mid-1970s devised two strategies. One was to maximise demand for dollars as a transactional currency. The other was to reverse Bretton Woods’ restrictions on transnational capital flows; with financial liberalisation, America could leverage the breadth and depth of its capital markets, and it could cover its chronic current account and fiscal deficits by attracting foreign capital at relatively low cost. Forging strong links between hydrocarbon sales and the dollar proved critical on both fronts.
To forge such links, Washington effectively extorted its Gulf Arab allies, quietly conditioning U.S. guarantees of their security to their willingness to financially help the United States. Reneging on pledges to its European and Japanese partners, the Ford administration clandestinely pushed Saudi Arabia and other Gulf Arab producers to recycle substantial parts of their petrodollar surpluses into the U.S. economy through private (largely U.S.) (http://www.spi.ro/mybook.html) intermediaries, rather than through the IMF. The Ford administration also elicited Gulf Arab support for Washington’s strained finances, reaching secret deals with Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates for their central banks to buy large volumes of U.S. Treasury securities outside normal auction processes (http://www.spi.ro/mybook.html). These commitments helped Washington prevent the IMF from supplanting the United States as the main provider of international liquidity; they also gave a crucial early boost to Washington’s ambitions to finance U.S. deficits by recycling foreign dollar surpluses via private capital markets and purchases of U.S. government securities.
A few years later, the Carter administration struck another secret deal with the Saudis, whereby Riyadh committed to exert its influence to ensure that OPEC continued pricing oil in dollars (http://www.spi.ro/mybook.html). OPEC’s commitment to the dollar as the invoice currency for international oil sales was key to broader embrace of the dollar as the oil market’s reigning transactional currency. As OPEC’s administered price system collapsed in the mid-1980s, the Reagan administration encouraged universalised dollar invoicing for cross-border oil sales on new oil exchanges in London and New York. Nearly universal pricing of oil—and, later on, gas—in dollars has bolstered the likelihood that hydrocarbon sales will not just be denominated in dollars, but settled in them as well, generating ongoing support for worldwide dollar demand.
In short, these bargains were instrumental in creating “dollar hegemony 2.0.” And they have largely held up, despite periodic Gulf Arab dissatisfaction with America’s Middle East policy, more fundamental U.S. estrangement from other major Gulf producers (Saddam Husseinn’s Iraq and the Islamic Republic of Iran), and a flurry of interest in the “petro–Euro” in the early 2000s. The Saudis, especially, have vigorously defended exclusive pricing of oil in dollars (http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=azY26ubt4eqQ). While Saudi Arabia and other major energy producers now accept payment for their oil exports in other major currencies, the larger share of the world’s hydrocarbon sales continue to be settled in dollars, perpetuating the greenback’s status as the world’s top transactional currency. Saudi Arabia and other Gulf Arab producers have supplemented their support for the oil-dollar nexus with ample purchases of advanced U.S. weapons; most have also pegged their currencies to the dollar—a commitment which senior Saudi officials describe as “strategic.” While the dollar’s share of global reserves has dropped, Gulf Arab petrodollar recycling helps keep it the world’s leading reserve currency.
The China Challenge
Still, history and logic caution that current practices are not set in stone. With the rise of the “petroyuan,” movement towards a less dollar-centric currency regime in international energy markets—with potentially serious implications for the dollar’s broader standing—is already underway.
As China has emerged as a major player on the global energy scene, it has also embarked on an extended campaign to internationalise (http://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/files/chathamhouse/public/Research/International%20Economics/0912bp_subacchi_huang.pdf) its currency (http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/reports/2012/2/renminbi%20monetary%20system%20prasad/02_renminbi_monetary_system_prasad.pdf). A rising share of China’s external trade is being denominated and settled in renminbi; issuance of renminbi-denominated financial instruments is growing. China is pursuing a protracted process of capital account liberalisation essential to full renminbi internationalisation, and is allowing more exchange rate flexibility for the yuan. The People’s Bank of China (PBOC) now has swap arrangements with over thirty other central banks—meaning that renminbi already effectively functions as a reserve currency.
Chinese policymakers appreciate the “advantages of incumbency” the dollar enjoys; their aim is not for renminbi to replace dollars, but to position the yuan alongside the greenback as a transactional and reserve currency. Besides economic benefits (e.g., lowering Chinese businesses’ foreign exchange costs), Beijing wants—for strategic reasons—to slow further growth of its enormous dollar reserves. China has watched America’s increasing propensity to cut off countries from the U.S. financial system as a foreign policy tool, and worries about Washington trying to leverage it this way; renminbi internationalisation can mitigate such vulnerability. More broadly, Beijing understands the importance of dollar dominance to American power; by chipping away at it, China can contain excessive U.S. unilateralism.
China has long incorporated financial instruments into its efforts to access foreign hydrocarbons. Now Beijing wants major energy producers to accept renminbi as a transactional currency—including to settle Chinese hydrocarbon purchases—and incorporate renminbi in their central bank reserves. Producers have reason to be receptive. China is, for the vastly foreseeable future, the main incremental market for hydrocarbon producers in the Persian Gulf and former Soviet Union. Widespread expectations of long-term yuan appreciation make accumulating renminbi reserves a “no brainer” in terms of portfolio diversification. And, as America is increasingly viewed as a hegemon in relative decline, China is seen as the preeminent rising power. Even for Gulf Arab states long reliant on Washington as their ultimate security guarantor, this makes closer ties to Beijing an imperative strategic hedge. For Russia, deteriorating relations with the United States impel deeper cooperation with China, against what both Moscow and Beijing consider a declining, yet still dangerously flailing and over-reactive, America (http://nationalinterest.org/feature/the-sino-russian-hydrocarbon-axis-grows-10508?page=show).
For several years, China has paid for some of its oil imports from Iran with renminbi; in 2012, the PBOC and the UAE Central Bank set up a $5.5 billion currency swap, setting the stage for settling Chinese oil imports from Abu Dhabi in renminbi—an important expansion of petroyuan use in the Persian Gulf. The $400 billion Sino-Russian gas deal that was concluded this year apparently provides for settling Chinese purchases of Russian gas in renminbi; if fully realised, this would mean an appreciable role for renminbi in transnational gas transactions.
Looking ahead, use of renminbi to settle international hydrocarbon sales will surely increase, accelerating the decline of American influence in key energy-producing regions. It will also make it marginally harder for Washington to finance what China and other rising powers consider overly interventionist foreign policies—a prospect America’s political class has hardly begun to ponder.
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Parece-me que isto está mal explicdo. Qual é o problema de um país comprar petróleo e pagar em yuan? Isso deverá funcionar sempre que a entidade que lhe vende o petróleo queira aceitar o yuan. Só há razão para não querer aceitá-los se o yuan se tender a desvalorizar. Ora, se têm preferido receber em USD é porque o USD tem sido das moedas mais estáveis. É só isso que faz estas transacções tenderem a ser feitas em USD.
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É uma questão de tamanho [poder militar]. Uma coisa é o Iraque, o Irão ou a Líbia [petróleo por dinares de ouro] outra coisa é a Rússia ou a China. Uma timeline resumida para perceberes a questão.
America’s Petrodollar System: A Timeline of the Rise and Fall of the U.S. Dollar
By Jerry Robinson
On May 17, 2011
[url]http://ftmdaily.com/ftm-financial-news-update/americas-petrodollar-system-a-timeline-of-the-rise-and-fall-of-the-us-dollar/[/url] ([url]http://ftmdaily.com/ftm-financial-news-update/americas-petrodollar-system-a-timeline-of-the-rise-and-fall-of-the-us-dollar/[/url])
HOUSTON, TX
Last week, I spent a lot of time explaining America's petrodollar system over the course of several articles. (If you missed them, you can get started here ([url]http://ftmdaily.com/energy-crisis/the-petrodollar-system-101-the-beginning/[/url]).)
Some of our readers have asked me to provide an overview of the timeline of the rise and fall of the U.S. Dollar. So, here is a brief working timeline of the rise and fall of the petrodollar system, which has been serving to prop up the U.S. Dollar since President Richard M. Nixon closed the international gold window in 1971.
1933… The United States leaves the gold standard in the wake of the Great Depression. America outlaws private ownership of gold.
1944… A war-torn and financially decimated global economy agrees to make the U.S. Dollar the world reserve currency. This arrangement, known as the Bretton Woods agreement, pegs the value of the U.S. Dollar to a fixed amount of gold. The dollar/gold peg is set at $35 per ounce. This arrangement officially earns the U.S. Dollar the title of "world reserve currency", as it replaces the British Pound as the international medium of exchange. The gold-backing to the U.S. dollar helps to restore global financial confidence thereby bringing much needed calm to the tumultuous economic era. (By making the U.S. Dollar easily convertible into gold, it is soon considered "as good as gold.") Interestingly, despite this arrangement, it is still illegal for American citizens to own gold.
1960's… The Vietnam War and the Great Society government spending combine to create a general international tension regarding America's fiscal health.
1971… After several nations begin redeeming their paper U.S. dollars for the safety of gold, President Richard M. Nixon closes the gold window. In this year, the world enters the first completely fiat monetary system.
1972-1973… Without gold backing, Washington is concerned that global demand for the U.S. "paper" dollar could subside.
1973-1974… To maintain global dollar demand, Washington creates the petrodollar system. The first to enter this arrangement is Saudi Arabia. The Saudis agree to price all of their oil in U.S. dollars and even to invest some of their profits into U.S. Treasury securities. In exchange, the U.S. provides weapons to the Saudis, along with U.S. military bases to "protect" the Saudi oil fields.
Late 1970's… Washington makes similar deals with almost all OPEC nations. Those oil-producing nations who agree to denominate their oil in dollars and then invest their profits into U.S. Treasurys get weapons and "protection." The petrodollar system, created in the Nixon-Kissinger era, was likely one of the most brilliant economic moves in recent political memory. However, the system began breaking down around a decade ago.
2000… On September 24, Iraq's Saddam Hussein declares that his country will no longer price oil in U.S. dollars, but in euros instead.
2003… Iraq is invaded by the U.S. Iraq's oil supplies are removed from a "petro-euro" system back to a petrodollar system.
2005 to present… Iran, Venezuela, Syria, and North Korea (also known as the "Axis of Evil") threaten to move away from dollar-based oil transactions.
2011… Russia begins selling its oil to China in rubles. In tomorrow's article, I will give my final observations and commentary on the rise and fall of the U.S. Dollar.
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Kin2010, quanto ao funcionamento do petrodólar tens a seguir e no ficheiro pdf em anexo uma boa explicação.
Meet the System That Will Collapse the U.S. Dollar
By Jerry Robinson
On May 10, 2011
[url]http://ftmdaily.com/energy-crisis/the-petrodollar-system-101-the-beginning/[/url] ([url]http://ftmdaily.com/energy-crisis/the-petrodollar-system-101-the-beginning/[/url])
Over the last few articles, I have explained the reality of peak oil. However, this is just one factor of America’s looming energy crisis. Another major component that is vital to understand is something known as the breakdown of the Petrodollar system. Today, I will begin explaining exactly what this system and why you should understand it.
In the early 1970’s, the international gold standard had collapsed, and America was beginning to live far beyond its means. And despite facing unemployment and inflation, America displayed few signs of the kind of fiscal discipline that could prevent future complications. But just like today, fixing the root of the problem was not the concern of Washington. Instead, the primary concern of those governing America was how to maintain its position of economic dominance on the global stage. In order to ensure continued hegemonic power and thereby preserve an increasing demand for the dollar, Washington needed a plan. That plan came in the form of thepetrodollar system
But what exactly is the petrodollar system? First, let’s begin by defining the “petrodollar.”
A petrodollar is a U.S. dollar that is received by an oil producer in exchange for selling oil. It’s really that simple: Money – in our case, U.S. dollars – received in exchange for oil.
Despite the seeming simplicity of this arrangement of “dollars for oil,” the petrodollar system is actually highly complex and one with many moving parts. It is this complexity that prevents the petrodollar system from being properly understood by the American public. Allow me to provide a very basic overview regarding the history and the mechanics of the petrodollar system. Once you understand this “dollars for oil” arrangement, I believe that it will provide you with a more accurate understanding of what motivates America’s foreign policy. Let’s take a closer look.
The petrodollar system originated in the early 1970’s in the wake of the Bretton Woods collapse. In a series of highly secret meetings, the U.S. – represented by then U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger according to many commentators – and the Saudi Royal Family made a powerful agreement. According to the agreement, the U.S. offered military protection for Saudi Arabia’s oil fields. What did the U.S. want in exchange? For Saudi Arabia to agree to price all of their oil sales in U.S. dollars and to then invest their surplus oil proceeds into U.S. Treasury Bills. This system was later referred to as “petrodollar recycling” by Henry Kissinger. The Saudis agreed and the petrodollar system was born.
By 1975, all of the oil-producing nations of OPEC had agreed to price their oil in dollars and to hold their surplus oil proceeds in U.S. government debt securities as well. Today, the U.S. maintains a major military presence in much of the Persian Gulf region, including the following countries: Bahrain, Iraq, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, and Yemen.
Today, virtually all oil transactions are made in U.S. dollars. This means that if you want to buy a barrel of oil anywhere in this world, you must pay for it with U.S. dollars. If you do not have U.S. dollars, you must obtain them somehow. One way is to simply convert your currency for U.S. dollars on the exchange markets. Or, products can be exported to U.S. in exchange for U.S. dollars.
For example, if you are in Japan, you must first convert your yen into dollars to purchase oil. Mexico must convert its pesos to dollars to buy oil, and so on. This should help partially explain much of East Asia’s export-led strategy. Japan, for example, has very few natural resources, including oil. It must import large amounts of oil and to do this requires that they have U.S. dollars. So Japan manufactures a Honda and ships it to the U.S. and immediately receives payment in U.S. dollars.
The petrodollar system has proven very beneficial to the U.S. economy. In essence, America receives a double loan out of every oil transaction. First, oil consumers are required to purchase oil in U.S. dollars. Second, the excess profits from the oil-producing nations are often transferred to U.S. government debt securities. This arrangement provides two large benefits to the U.S. It increases global demand both for U.S. dollars and for U.S. debt securities.
Additionally, having oil priced in dollars means that the U.S. can, in essence, print money to buy oil and then have the oil producers hold the debt that was created by printing the money in the first place. What other nation, besides America, can print money to buy oil and then have the oil producers hold the debt for the printed money?
Obviously, the petrodollar system was a brilliant political and economic move on the part of U.S. strategists. Washington, knowing that the demand curve for oil would increase dramatically with time, positioned the dollar as the primary medium of exchange for all oil transactions. This single move created a growing international demand for both the U.S. dollar and U.S. debt – all at the expense of oil producing nations.
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Já que referem os Petrodólares deixo algumas imagens que podem ajudar a ver se as mudanças anunciadas serão importantes.
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"For example, if you are in Japan, you must first convert your yen into dollars to purchase oil. Mexico must convert its pesos to dollars to buy oil, and so on. This should help partially explain much of East Asia’s export-led strategy. Japan, for example, has very few natural resources, including oil. It must import large amounts of oil and to do this requires that they have U.S. dollars. So Japan manufactures a Honda and ships it to the U.S. and immediately receives payment in U.S. dollars."
Mas essa necessidade de primeiro trocar um outra currency por USD não deriva de nenhuma lei, certo? Deriva do facto de os produtores de crude preferirem receber em USD. Se alguns deixarem de preferir podem haver transacções com outras moedas e é isso que se está a ver agora.
Até em bitcoins eles se disporiam a receber, se tivessem garantias de que trocavam as bitcoins rapidamente por um activo mais estável com custos mínimos.
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Não resulta de nenhuma lei, resulta sim do petróleo ser facto [não de jure] americano.
Tal é o resultado da estratégia brilhante do Kissinger de convencer a casa de Saud a aceitar vender petróleo apenas em dólares e a usá-los para comprar dívida do tio Sam, a troco de proteção e de uns "brinquedos" militares.
Tal como o Breton Woods 1 tinha as suas contradições que levaram à queda do dólar, também o Breton Woods 2 tem as suas contradições --o dilema de Triffin. Aliás, quando Triffin descobriu o dilema, voltou para a Europa para arquitectar o euro e esta foi a solução:
The euro, probably more than any other currency, represents the mutual confidence at the heart of our community. It is the first currency that has not only severed its link to gold, but also its link to the nation-state. It is not backed by the durability of the metal or by the authority of the state. Indeed, what Sir Thomas More said of gold five hundred years ago – that it was made for men and that it had its value by them – applies very well to the euro.
Source: [url]http://www.ecb.eu/press/key/date/2002/html/sp020509.en.html[/url] ([url]http://www.ecb.eu/press/key/date/2002/html/sp020509.en.html[/url])
[As reservas do BCE é a moeda emitida pelo conservador e confiável Banco Central da Natureza com a inovação do câmbio ser variável, i.e. o valor de mercado.]
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Mas uma moeda, para funcionar como tal, tem de ter valor em si, não pode tê-lo só por haver nela confiança, mas sim tê-la por também valer por si mesma. Essa razão que indicaste de o dólar ter persistido a ser moeda internacional, mesmo sem ouro, por ser divisa exigida no pagamento de fornecimentos de petróleo - exigência acordada entre a América, a Arábia Saudita e as multinacionais norte-americanas - é uma justificação da prorrogação da vida da divisa como moeda valiosa e até de reserva, mas apenas por mais... uns tempos. O que há, que valha, e não seja facilmente desvalorizável por facilidade de oferta, e a que a emissão de moeda possa ligar-se!?
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O que há, que valha, e não seja facilmente desvalorizável por facilidade de oferta, e a que a emissão de moeda possa ligar-se!?
O câmbio livre entre o euro e o ouro.
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O que há, que valha, e não seja facilmente desvalorizável por facilidade de oferta, e a que a emissão de moeda possa ligar-se!?
O câmbio livre entre o euro e o ouro.
Câmbio livre... quer dizer que flutua? Segundo a quantidade relativa de euros e ouro... detido onde? Por quem? O BCE? E o Banco tem assim tanto ouro que se permita quantitative easing de euros? A Zona Euro é excedentária em exportações, e acumula divisas?
Como é isso do câmbio livre euro-ouro?
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Hermes,
Continuas a achar que o Euro não vai desaparecer?
Achas que vai no futuro ser ainda mais forte?
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Hermes,
Continuas a achar que o Euro não vai desaparecer?
Achas que vai no futuro ser ainda mais forte?
Continuo.
As dores do euro são inevitáveis [quem vai à guerra e dá e leva], ou melhor, as dores de alguns governos, são as dores da prestes [no sentido histórico] a tornar-se velha ordem do dólar e da alavancagem sobre ele fundada.
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O valor de uma moeda assenta no valor da capacidade produtiva do pais que a emite (habitualmente associada a estabilidade e força da legislação).
Actualmente, o país mais produtivo do mundo é os USA por isso o dólar é a moeda mais forte.
Por exemplo, a Suiça com o seu franco tb podia desempenhar esse papel, mas ao contrario dos USA não tem dimensão.
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Câmbio livre... quer dizer que flutua? Segundo a quantidade relativa de euros e ouro... detido onde? Por quem? O BCE? E o Banco tem assim tanto ouro que se permita quantitative easing de euros? A Zona Euro é excedentária em exportações, e acumula divisas?
Como é isso do câmbio livre euro-ouro?
É o preço de mercado do ouro como actualmente, mas com a diferença que será sem alavancagem e por isso terá de ter uma maior profundidade compativél com o que agora é feito na LBMA:
Esta subida é um pouco estranha , geopolitica ?
Sim, o Ocidente valoriza e compra "ouro" enquanto que o Oriente e o Médio Oriente valoriza e compra ouro. O sistema funciona muito bem até que o ouro no Ocidente não consegue suportar o peso do "ouro", devido à hemorragia do ouro para onde é mais valorizado. Dito por outras palavras, o problema é que é necessário ouro para criar "ouro" e o motor do sistema financeiro ocidental pára quando se lhe acaba o combustível:
Although the physical market for gold and silver is distributed globally, most wholesale OTC trades are cleared through London. The average daily volume of gold and silver cleared at the London Bullion Market Association (LBMA) in November 2008 was 18.3 million ounces (worth $13.9 billion) and 107.6 million ounces (worth $1.1 billion) respectively. This means that an amount equal to the annual gold mine production was cleared at the LBMA every 4.4 days, and to the annual silver production every 6.2 days.[1] The Gold Anti-Trust Action Committee claims that clearing data substantially understates the true amount of gold traded, due to the netting of trades in the calculation of Clearing Statistics.[2] They claim the LBMA market is $5.4 trillion a year.
Fonte: [url]http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/London_bullion_market[/url] ([url]http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/London_bullion_market[/url])
Ou seja, tais volumes não são volumes de commodities mas sim de divisas.
Quando a confiança no sistema actual se sumir [e isso é inevitável, pois a Europa e a China deixaram de pagar a corveia ao tio Sam (comprar mais dívida pública)], terás a metamorfose do euro em 6 tempos:
- A revalorização do ouro pelo trauma da implosão do dólar;
- A espansão das reservas do BCE, em que a revalorização das reservas de ouro mais que preenche o vácuo deixado pelas reservas em dólares;
- O BIS a chegar a barriga ao balcão a criar um mercado apenas físico do ouro, a fim de reestabelecer o mais rápido possível a confiança na nova ordem monetária;
- O euro usado como a nova moeda transaccional, mas sem a corveia da necessidade de comprar dívida pública do novo suberano, pois toda a gente tem bem presente o descalabro do tio Sam e por isso os excedentes serão usados para vender euros e comprar ouro;
- O euro a moeda transacional de referência, pois a reservas de ouro do Eurogrupo são as maiores do planeta e por isso o BCE/Eurogrupo é quem tem a capacidade de criar o mercado mais líquido e com maior profundidade;
- Ao mesmo tempo, a zona euro é a maior economia do planeta e a única com a balança comercial equilibrada [poucas razões para diluir o euro] e com um mercado líquido ao lado, gerido pelo BIS a por os políticos na linha.
Então todo mundo verá como foi resolvido o dilema de Triffin:
The euro, probably more than any other currency, represents the mutual confidence at the heart of our community. It is the first currency that has not only severed its link to gold, but also its link to the nation-state. It is not backed by the durability of the metal or by the authority of the state. Indeed, what Sir Thomas More said of gold five hundred years ago – that it was made for men and that it had its value by them – applies very well to the euro.
Source: [url]http://www.ecb.eu/press/key/date/2002/html/sp020509.en.html[/url] ([url]http://www.ecb.eu/press/key/date/2002/html/sp020509.en.html[/url])
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Obrigado, Hermes.
Tenho de ler e reflectir no que aqui dizes. Só li ainda a 1ª parte do discurso do Presidente do BCE de 2002. E logo vi uma coisa incompleta: as "quatro" funções da moeda:i. meio de troca; ii. unidade de conta; iii. reserva de valor; iv. preenchimento das funções i, ii, iii, na comunidade onde a moeda circula, i.e., confiança nessa moeda. Aqui a primeira 'incompletude': abstrai do modo como as outras comunidades que não utilizam essa moeda, se comportam, confiam aceitam ou não, essa moeda nas suas relações inter-nações, de modo a regularizar o respectivo intercâmbio de comércio e garantia de validade das relações de crédito. E, até onde li - sóa 1ªpágina, aos "costumes disse nada".
Mas eu ainda estou intrigado com o teu enunciado: «câmbio livre euro-ouro»! Queres tu dizer que o Banco emissor de euros age assim: - se o ouro valoriza, o banco expande os euros, porque o ouro que tem vale comercialmente mais; se o ouro diminui de preço, o banco recolhe euros (pede emprestado) para que as suas notas continuem valiosas e com bom poder de compra. É isto? E funciona? Desiste de contraciclo?
Hermes, descreve lá a cadeia repercutiva dos comportamentos racionais dos agentes económicos para eu perceber como é isso do «câmbio livre euro-ouro» - que se realmente for algo intermédio entre o automatismo violente do padrão-ouro e a liberdade política de dirigismo económico, eu acharei uma maravilha. E eu preciso que me ensinei, não me mandes ir ler, para isso é que fóruns são bestiais!
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very nice stuff! tnx hermes hi5!
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E ainda, Hermes, um outro aspecto da questão: o Victor Constâncio.
Não gosto do Victor Constâncio.
Não o conheço pessoalmente,
mas tenho razões para não gostar.
Sei que foi ele o primeiro a obrigar o escudo e o juro a correlacionarem-se com os as taxas vigentes no exterior, adequando a inflação, o câmbio e o juro nominal aos valores do mercado financeiro lá fora.
Antes dele, não havia essa disciplina.
Já na nacionalização do BPN sem arruinar a SLN (Galilei) e não 'empandeirar a banqueta em dois tempos', foi um desastre.
Quanto ao euro, foi um 'anjinho'! Enganado, a todo o comprimento. Porém, não foi o único. Outros, o foram. Imaginou que o endividamento excessivo seria fundamentalmente um problema do Banco Central Emissor do euro, porquanto lhe cumpre gerir a moeda e mantê-la como unidade de valor estável. De modo que, não seria prioritariamente o país quem tinha de se preocupar excessivamente com a dívida excessiva.
Nisto, o governo alemão, embora tenha alguma razão, enganou o próprio Banco Central, ao proibir-lhe de ir 'apagar fogos', o que era a sua obrigação como "bombeiro e motorista". Só agora Draghi está a exigir fazer o que lhe compete como "motorista e bombeiro". E o governo da Alemanha está a preparar as coisas com seriedade para que os accionistas, os credores, os grandes depositantes e os estados sejam os primeiros a serem prudentes. No entanto, parece-me, o sistema do euro, globalmente, vai ter de assumir a dívida excessiva dos estados-membros, acima de 50 ou 60% do respectivo PIB. e que todos arquem com o respectivo ónus ao pro-rata do PIB de cada um.
O Constâncio, embora enganado, como os outros, vai acabar por ter alguma razão. Até me parece que ele está lá no Banco para não fazer muito barulho e executar as medidas que irão ser aprovadas.
Bom.
Mas a mim o que me interessava, era que explicasses isso do câmbio flutuante euro-ouro.
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vbm, o câmbio flutuante euro - ouro é a "mesma" coisa que o câmbio flutuante euro - dólar ou qq outra moeda - dólar, excpeto que no lugar do dólar está o ouro -- a divisa do conservador e confiável Banco Central da Natureza. Cada Banco Central segue a política que lhe aprouver [dentro das competências que lhe foram incumbidas], no limite até que se lhe acabe o ouro [tal e qual agora, só que agora é até que se lhe acabe os dólares].
A metamorfose do euro é este ser o caminho mais líquido e com maior profundidade para efectuar tal câmbio e em certo sentido ser tão bom como o ouro, pois a taxa de inflação do ouro é 2%, tal como a taxa de inflação média imposta pelos estatutos do BCE a fim de tornar tão indiferente quanto possível a posse de euros ou de ouro.
O preço a pagar pelo resto do mundo é a senhoriagem de 2% de inflação ao ano no uso transaccional da moeda [euros], com a diferença que o resto do mundo não tem de pagar a corveia de comprar a dívida pública europeia para segurar o euro, tal como acontece agora com o dólar, vide questão "Víctor Constâncio".
Quanto ao "Víctor Constâncio", o BCE só tem de responder ao seu mandato de manter uma inflação média de 2% ao ano e velar para que o sistema monetário europeu continue minimamente funcional, pois só as democracias grandes é que sustentam burros a pão de ló [democracias pequenas, não, principalmente nesta em que é exigida unanimidade para alterar o quer que seja].
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o câmbio flutuante euro - ouro é a "mesma" coisa que o câmbio flutuante euro - dólar ou qq outra moeda
Ora, então, o BCE comprará mais ouro quando ele for mais barato e menos, ou venderá mesmo, se ele estiver mais caro. Os países aforradores de ouro tendem a procura-lo quando temem convulsão ou insegurança política, e preferem rendimento quando a paz reina. Por este motivo, não me parece que a senhoriagem do ouro se limite ao encarecimento de 2% ao ano, como o euro também (gostaria de) faz(er). É mais flutuante, e não vejo que o euro consiga ser âncora mais segura, até porque - tal como o dólar - endividou-se para lá do razoável, e será economicamente tentado a repercutir essa 'corveia' a países terceiros que a paguem... Além de vulnerabilidades internas: p.e., há enorme clamor de 2% de inflação ser verdadeira deflação que estagna e deprime toda a economia. Como vai resistir-se a tais protestos?
Contudo, ter uma moeda que pudesse ser uma unidade de cálculo estável seria ideal e permitiria grande seriedade na actividade produtiva, na riqueza e nos negócios.
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O objectivo principal não é ser a âncora, isso seria um padrão ouro clássico e nos anos 70, mesmo havendo a possibilidade, ninguém o quiz... O objectivo é ser o melhor middle man para um mercado líquido e com profundidade, embora em média seja uma âncora, provavelmente para períodos superiores a 10 anos. O preço do ouro passa sim a ser mais uma alavanca para gerir a economia [um pouco como agora, quando o BCE acha o câmbio do dólar demasiado elevado ou baixo, toma a medida que lhe aprouver para solucionar esse problema].
O endividamento não é do euro, é dos estados, pois a zona euro tem e teve a balança comercial equilibrada com o resto do mundo. Quanto às dívidas dos estados, estas serão pagas a peso de ouro após a revalorização, pelo que este não se vai todo embora para o BCE.
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Sr. hermes: na sua opinião; who are the good guys? ;)
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Os países mencionados nesta thread foram a França e a Holanda e depois a Alemanha, pelo que os good guys deverão estar algures aí.
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;) Espero que o plano deles esteja à altura da Old Europe.. :D
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O objectivo principal não é ser a âncora, isso seria um padrão ouro clássico e nos anos 70, mesmo havendo a possibilidade, ninguém o quiz... O objectivo é ser o melhor middle man para um mercado líquido e com profundidade, embora em média seja uma âncora, provavelmente para períodos superiores a 10 anos. O preço do ouro passa sim a ser mais uma alavanca para gerir a economia [um pouco como agora, quando o BCE acha o câmbio do dólar demasiado elevado ou baixo, toma a medida que lhe aprouver para solucionar esse problema].
O endividamento não é do euro, é dos estados, pois a zona euro tem e teve a balança comercial equilibrada com o resto do mundo. Quanto às dívidas dos estados, estas serão pagas a peso de ouro após a revalorização, pelo que este não se vai todo embora para o BCE.
Se o Banco Central vai variar a cotação da moeda segundo a paridade que lhe pareça adequada à equivalência do ouro, comprando-o se barato demais, vendendo-o se excessivamente caro, sem dúvida fará desse modo a melhor gestão do stock do material precioso.
Ignoro é se essa gestão assim condicionada corresponderá bem ou mal às necessidades de comércio da zona do euro com o exterior e se agirá em política pró-cíclica ou anti-cíclica da economia.
Quanto às dívidas excessivas dos estados-membros discordo que os défices e os excedentes acumulados nos doze anos decorridos do euro não sejam mutualizados em grande medida e geridos centralmente pelo banco com o resto do mundo e suas divisas. Não foi claro para governo nenhum que a falha no PEC quanto ao rácio da dívida/PIB se revestiria da severidade de resolução que os excedentários pretendem agora exigir dos deficitários.
Se esse pré-aviso ou advertência tivesse sido claro e transparente, a União deveria ter intervindo com máximo rigor na violação de tais rácios: o que não fez com membro nenhum. Que arque agora com as responsabilidades da política frouxa e de engano que usou contra os Estados, e suporte como encargo comum o excessivo endividamento que permitiu.
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vbm, quem te ouve falar até fica a pensar que o BCE não tem nenhuma alavanca com que "brincar" e que ia passar a ter só uma.
Quanto ao resto, os países entraram de livre e expontânea vontade no euro, endividaram-se de livre e expontânea vontade e politicamente não era possível nem ninguém quereria estragar a festa. Obviamente que esse países iriam dizer para se irem f****, agora o c* ensina a c**** e o problema resolve-se por si mesmo.
Give me control over a nation's money supply and I care not who makes it's laws.
Depois há mais dois factores:
1. A China chegou a barriga ao balcão mal os Bancos Centrais da zona euro afastaram a barriga do balcão em 2001/2002...
2. Ninguém quer ser visto com o carrasco do padrão dólar, é mais simples deixar as contradições do sistema presente minar o dólar por dentro, i.e. deixar a FED fazer o trabalho do carrasco, imprimindo o dólar sem abandono.
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Mas os Americanos querem formar um espaço comercial com a União Europeia~
e possivelmente formar uma nova moeda, o verdadeiro eurodólar...
Pode ser interessante, mas não basta ter armas para comerciar,
nem apenas gadgets, fluindo da conquista do Espaço,
par ser um exportador-credor.
O petróleo ajudaria muito:
- ou inventam o que o substitua,
ou aprendem de vez como lidar
com o médio oriente...
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http://blog.mpettis.com/2014/08/can-pedro-sanchez-save-the-psoe/ (http://blog.mpettis.com/2014/08/can-pedro-sanchez-save-the-psoe/)
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As ideias do Hermes,
no sistema euro/ouro.
«Germany’s best contribution to recovery in the euro zone would be to let wages rise. Whether they are already doing so will not become clear for months, because Germany reports the relevant statistics more slowly than most. But the willingness is there. In July Jens Weidmann, the president of the Bundesbank, Germany’s notoriously hawkish central bank, caused a sensation by calling for pay rises of 3% on average (comprising 2% inflation in the medium term plus 1% in productivity increases). A new minimum wage should also nudge wages up. It will take effect in 2015 at €8.50 ($11.22) an hour, more than 40% of the median wage.»
«Rising German wages would represent the “natural Hume mechanism at work,
but with euros instead of gold,” says Michael Burda,
an economist at Berlin’s Humboldt University. By this he means
the process first described by David Hume in the 18th century,
under which countries on the gold standard adjusted
to imbalances not by letting currencies appreciate or depreciate
but through rising or falling prices and wages.
In effect, Mr Burda says, the euro zone has imposed
a gold standard on its 18 members.
Prices and wages are falling in
several crisis countries.
Germany could help by letting its wages rise
—if it is willing to accommodate this.
If not, there is a serious risk that deflation
could take hold across the euro zone as a whole.»
(Artigo no The Economist de Aug.30th-Sept.5th, 2014)
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Mas para mim, não é intuitivo porquê a deflação haja de ser assim tão inconveniente...?
Dá-me a sensação que as pessoas passariam a preferir qualidade, destituindo
o interesse em bens e produtos que de facto não valem nada,
reorientando assim a produção para artigos de real valor.
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Eis a política a seguir o caminho da menor resistência, quem sabe se com um empurrão gentil na direcção certa...
European Parliament Calls For Excluding Russia From SWIFT System
On 15:02 18/09/2014
[url]http://en.ria.ru/business/20140918/193052405/European-Parliament-Calls-For-Excluding-Russia-From-SWIFT-System.html[/url] ([url]http://en.ria.ru/business/20140918/193052405/European-Parliament-Calls-For-Excluding-Russia-From-SWIFT-System.html[/url])
MOSCOW, September 18 (RIA Novosti) – In a resolution adopted Thursday, the European Parliament called on the EU member states to consider excluding Russia from the Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication (SWIFT) financial transaction system.
The European Parliament ([url]http://en.ria.ru/world/20140918/193051833/European-Parliament-Calls-For-Cancellation-of-South-Stream.html[/url]) “calls for the EU to consider excluding Russia from… the Swift system,” the resolution reads.
The European Parliament does not develop projects and is not responsible for making decisions concerning sanctions. All the bills on restrictive measures are elaborated by the European Commission, the final decision rests with the individual EU countries.
The calls by the European Parliament come just a week after the United States and the European Union implemented new sanctions against Russia targeting the country's banking, energy and defense sectors. Moscow has repeatedly stated that Russia is not a party to Ukraine's internal conflict, and said that Western sanctions run counter to the principles of international law.
This spring, Russian authorities started searching for ways to decrease Russian financial markets" dependence on SWIFT, when a number of banks were hit by Western sanctions.
SWIFT binds together 10,000 financial organizations in 210 countries, providing the infrastructure for $6 billion in interbank operations every day. The vast majority of bank-to-bank transactions are conducted via SWIFT, which allows foreign banks to request information concerning clients and block operations if the obtained data does is unsatisfactory. Experts say that switching to an alternative transaction system may take at least a year.
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Como represália, se o euro incluir o ouro no pacote das divisas
a que indexará a cotação da moeda, poderemos ter
a Rússia a interferir no mercado do ouro,
forçando a zona euro a um 'baile'
de subidas e descidas
de preços e salários!
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A Rússia tornou-se o maior produtor munidal de ouro e o Banco Central Russo tem acumulado reservas de ouro rapidamente.
Quanto aos políticos europeus vão falar muito e fazer pouco [tanto mais que o general Inverno é muito poderoso]. Isso é o suficiente para manter os russos focados na criação da alternativa ao SWIFT.
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Há duas ideias aqui sobre o Euro e que já fui questionando o Hermes acerca disso.
Deixo mais umas achas.... podemos vir a ser queimados ...
Espero que o hermes tenha razão... mas...
...The amount of dollar haters out there is staggering. They just cannot see that the US debt of $17 trillion is not a negative – it is a positive when there is $30 trillion in central bank reserves and country wealth funds. There are NOT ENOUGH dollars to go around when there is no other place to stuff your money. This is a global problem that Europe has decided to inflict upon the world with its brain-dead idea of trying to create a single currency without a single government. OOPS – too late now. Confidence has been lost thanks to France. France’s dream of competing with the USA and surpassing it – well Hollande wiped that dream from the slate – as the Italians would say – Arrivederci Francia.
Gold-Paper
Gold-bugEven gold has fallen for two weeks since the turn in the ECM. Gold’s Benchmark was 9/15 and that producing a low warns indeed we will see lower prices ahead. The second part to the metals report is Silver. This covers silver in all the major currencies, the silver/gold ratio, and the conclusion for the targets in time and price with respect to gold and silver. The third part is Platinum, Palladium, and Copper. The gold promoters just can’t get it through their head, sometimes there are bigger issues to consider like the global economy and where do the metals really fit in.
$ Euro sinking
The Euro is trading at the 127 level and it is sinking rapidly. We have critical support at the 122-123 level and a weekly closing below 122.44 will warn we have serious problems ahead for Europe. The Monthly Bearish Reversal lies at 125.52 and is September closes below this level, watch-out for November. Even a monthly closing BELOW 129.78 will be a sell-signal for Europe.
Dean Martin’s Arrivederci Roma may take on the status of a theme song for Europe pretty soon. This is what we get letting lawyers with ego problems run governments when they are obviously highly questionable to have practiced law to start with. We need REAL people to grab a hold of this mess before it is way too late or perhaps Eric Clapton’s – Good Night Irene might be next to the final song we sing - Don McLean’s – American Pie.
armstrong
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Alguns vão ser todos queimados, dependendo de onde construiram a sua casa financeira, juntamente com as moedas actuais até à metamorfose do euro.
Depois, o desequilíbrio da balança comercial americana significa que o tio Sam vai ter de exportar parte das suas reservas de ouro para comprar produtos ao resto do mundo para conseguir justificar a sua existência. Tal processo aumentará as reservas de ouro da zona euro, quer o tio Sam não pague a dívida, quer não pague a dívida.
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«quer não quer não pague»
e sem dúvida, não o fará,
para o que tem um bom
argumento nuclear.
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Pois, mas depois vem o argumento nuclear do resto do mundo, este só trabalhará para o tio Sam, se este lhe pagar... e dinheiro nenhum do tio Sam vai servir, vão ter de ser mesmo os aneis.
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Há duas ideias aqui sobre o Euro e que já fui questionando o Hermes acerca disso.
Deixo mais umas achas.... podemos vir a ser queimados ...
Espero que o hermes tenha razão... mas...
...The amount of dollar haters out there is staggering. They just cannot see that the US debt of $17 trillion is not a negative – it is a positive when there is $30 trillion in central bank reserves and country wealth funds. There are NOT ENOUGH dollars to go around when there is no other place to stuff your money. This is a global problem that Europe has decided to inflict upon the world with its brain-dead idea of trying to create a single currency without a single government. OOPS – too late now. Confidence has been lost thanks to France. France’s dream of competing with the USA and surpassing it – well Hollande wiped that dream from the slate – as the Italians would say – Arrivederci Francia.
Gold-Paper
Gold-bugEven gold has fallen for two weeks since the turn in the ECM. Gold’s Benchmark was 9/15 and that producing a low warns indeed we will see lower prices ahead. The second part to the metals report is Silver. This covers silver in all the major currencies, the silver/gold ratio, and the conclusion for the targets in time and price with respect to gold and silver. The third part is Platinum, Palladium, and Copper. The gold promoters just can’t get it through their head, sometimes there are bigger issues to consider like the global economy and where do the metals really fit in.
$ Euro sinking
The Euro is trading at the 127 level and it is sinking rapidly. We have critical support at the 122-123 level and a weekly closing below 122.44 will warn we have serious problems ahead for Europe. The Monthly Bearish Reversal lies at 125.52 and is September closes below this level, watch-out for November. Even a monthly closing BELOW 129.78 will be a sell-signal for Europe.
Dean Martin’s Arrivederci Roma may take on the status of a theme song for Europe pretty soon. This is what we get letting lawyers with ego problems run governments when they are obviously highly questionable to have practiced law to start with. We need REAL people to grab a hold of this mess before it is way too late or perhaps Eric Clapton’s – Good Night Irene might be next to the final song we sing - Don McLean’s – American Pie.
armstrong
Este texto é tão parvo que nem vê que a descida do euro é uma coisa de há muito considerada como desejável para os países do sul incluindo a França poderem recuperar.
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Pois, mas depois vem o argumento nuclear do resto do mundo, este só trabalhará para o tio Sam, se este lhe pagar... e dinheiro nenhum do tio Sam vai servir, vão ter de ser mesmo os aneis.
Mas o que os EUA devem
são dólares. Logo, pagam
dólares e quitam o que devem.
Prima facie, no problem!
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Se não vez o problema, arranjo-te já um contrato vitalício para te pagar zero pelo teu trabalho. :D
O problema, vbm, é que o teu esquema só pode ser feito uma vez. É que depois não há dólares suficientes que paguem o trabalho do resto do mundo. Ou seja, xeque mate.
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Eu sei. Mas a América esteve 200 anos sem precisar da China e do que buscava na Europa pagava por troca directa de produção sua, i.e., tinha contas equilibradas no Ocidente. Logo, paga o que deve com dólares e depois paga o que compra com o que exporta. Where is the big problem (for them, anyway)!? I don´t see it.
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Não pior cego do que aquele que não quer ver.
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Não acredito que o Estados Unidos estejam a deixar que a sua moeda deixe de ser reserva mundial e nem sequer estarem a aperceber-se disso. E se estiverem a aperceber-se disso e nada fazem é porque deve estar controlado ou assim o querem.
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Não pior cego do que aquele que não quer ver.
Eu quero ver!
Mas a dívida externa americana
a quanto ascende afinal?
Não é apenas de um ano
de produção interna bruta do país?
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o problema da frança nunca foi o dólar, mas sim o deutsche mark
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paga o que deve com dólares e depois paga o que compra com o que exporta.
Thanks VBM, já escrevi isso várias vezes para o Hermes, mas parece haver uma dissociação cognitiva em defesa do Oiro. :)
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O oiro é realmente aceite para quitação de dívidas.
Como tal, dá credibilidade aos estados que o detenham
como reserva para pagamento em situações-limite.
Mas vários outros bens fundamentam
a credibilidade dos estados
dos países que os produzam.
O petróleo, p.e., é a base do poder de pagar
desse que se auto denomina 'estado islâmico'
ou 'califado de Bagdad'.
Mas outro bem que vale ouro
é a segurança e o poder militar.
De modo que, os E.U.A
por certo têm meios
de resolver as suas dívidas.
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Mais do que a capacidade militar os EUA tem a maior capacidade produtiva a nível de todo o mundo que advém da legislação laboral, de instituições fortes (nomeadamente o sistema de justiça) e de uma consciência colectiva de trabalho e direito à propriedade.
O Hermes parece esquecer-se que os EUA não tem a população da Índia, do Brasil ou da China. Uma elevada percentagem de Americanos tem uma instrução superior ao dos Europeus. Basta analisar as 50 melhores universidades a nível mundial.
Os EUA estão longe de viver exclusivamente da dívida que emitem!!!!!
Cmps
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Também tenho andado a pensar se uma grande vantagem deles não é, pelo menos em muitas tecnológicas, trabalharem em grupo para uma missão. Dá a ideia que por cá pensa cada um mais em si próprio, no "what's in it for me".
É claro que as remunerações muito elevadas pagas nos EUA em tecnológicas também facilitam isso.
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As,
Concordo contigo, excepto na educação ou instrução superior à dos Europeus.
É certo que se edita na América mais livros de filosofia do que no resto do Mundo,
mas mesmo assim duvido que tenham uma instrução superior à europeia.
São especializados demais para o serem. No entanto, qualquer
desvantagem que porventura haja na Europa,
o Carlos Moedas vais resolvê-la em breve!
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Nas universidades de topo, os EUA estão acima de todos os outros de longe. E logo a seguir vem o UK.
Na educação básica os EUA estão muito abaixo de outros países desenvolvidos, da Europa do Norte e Ásia. São os americanos que o reconhecem.
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As universidades de topo, nos E.U., são excessivamente
especializadas para terem uma categoria indiscutível.
No entanto, nelas faz-se e edita-se a investigação
científica e tecnológica de topo do planeta.
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Hermes,
Atendendo aos desenvolvimentos, ainda mantens tudo que escreveste sobre o Euro?
Achas que com os problemas da Grécia, Suiça que deixou...o peg, endividamento dos vários países, dinheiro a sair da Eurolândia... claúsula das compras agora pelo BCE...
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JoaoAP,
Três questões:
* Para onde vai a sustentabilidade do sistema moentário internacional [padrão dólar]?
* A Eurolândia ainda tem a ganhar com a metamorfose do euro (http://www.thinkfn.com/forumbolsaforex/index.php/topic,703.msg158871.html#msg158871)?
* Os políticos atuais conseguem mudar a arquitetura do euro (http://www.thinkfn.com/forumbolsaforex/index.php/topic,530.msg143056.html#msg143056)?
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A União Monetaria e o Euro não vão muito longe, ainda poderemos andar aqui uns anos nisto, mas como disse e muito bem concordo em 100% com o que disse Pedro Arroja, porque a Europa não tem uma cultura homogénea, desde os Países do sul até aos nórdicos existem diferenças enormes, e alem disso muitos Países não tem cultura democrática, lembrar que a Monarquia está presente na Europa e alguns Países que são agora Republicanos foram até há pouco tempo Monárquicos, enfim... muita coisa diferente entre todos eles.
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A União Monetaria e o Euro não vão muito longe, ainda poderemos andar aqui uns anos nisto, mas como disse e muito bem concordo em 100% com o que disse Pedro Arroja, porque a Europa não tem uma cultura homogénea, desde os Países do sul até aos nórdicos existem diferenças enormes, e alem disso muitos Países não tem cultura democrática, lembrar que a Monarquia está presente na Europa e alguns Países que são agora Republicanos foram até há pouco tempo Monárquicos, enfim... muita coisa diferente entre todos eles.
Haverá, ou melhor, há todas essas diferenças que enumeras;
mas em quê isso há de colidir com ter uma moeda comum?
Se a cotação externa da moeda corresponder
às variações do comércio externo global
dos países dessa união monetária,
o comércio intracomunitário
fica imune a variações
de câmbio,
e o extracomunitário adequar-se-á ao balanceamento
das transacções do conjunto como o resto do mundo.
Dir-se-á, o pior é a desigualdade entre os países membros,
e os ciclos económicos diferenciados que atravessem,
a que a unidade monetária sendo um valor médio
penalizará ou beneficiará diferentemente
cada um.
Mas, e porque é que não há de ser assim?
Bom, uma razão é que tender-se-á a perder a diversidade
o que pressupostamente considerar-se-ia valioso...
Mas a intenção da união foi mesmo a de homogeneizar
o desenvolvimento de todos.
O que parece ir acontecer dadas as dificuldades
que as Alemanhas, os Reinos Unidos,
as 'Repúblicas' Italianas, e os
'Países' da vizinha Espanha
atravessam...
Enquanto nós, os mais atrasados,
vamos finalmente começar a crescer!
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Existe uma tendência natural devido á posição geográfica dos países do sul do norte e centro, podemos radicalizar e olharmos para a africa, e porque africa, porque em termos geográficos fica numa zona de muito calor, onde o ser humano não tem a mesma atitude de um nórdico. Aqui na europa existem grandes diferenças entre os nórdicos e países do sul, e depois temos ainda o problema dos periféricos, isto tudo alem das culturas de todos estes países serem muito diferentes, e isso levaria seculos para equilibrar todos esses desequilíbrios, eu não acredito que países do centro da europa passem a vida a dar dinheiro aos periféricos
Poderíamos pensar em fazer uma coisa parecida com os estados unidos, mas temos que nos lembrar que os estados unidos nasceram há pouco mais de 200 anos e nasceram todos ao mesmo tempo(apenas tiveram que acertar com os indios), e a europa não, a europa tem centenas de anos tal como a conhecemos agora respeitando as fronteiras claro.
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As diferenças de cultura existem realmente e as nações são distintas também.
Pensando essas diferenças, parece-me até desejável que se mantenham.
Não estou nada interessado em tornar-me nórdico ou ver ao meu redor
uma data de nórdicos. E mais: quando, aqui há já muitos anos
estive em Estocolmo e na Lapónia, achei o país espantoso,
um ambiente de sossego e suavidade de uma sensação
de quase um planeta extraterrestre! e belíssimo.
Estas diferenças, oxalá subsistam todas.
A moeda comum pode não ocasionar
grandes diferenças de preço,
mas os rendimentos per capita
por certo divergirão diferenciando
o tipo de consumo nacional.
Eu prevejo ou presumo que cada país
europeu vá aprofundar a sua economia
dualista, um sector moderno,
quase franchisado, e outro
local, 'indígena'! :)
A dignidade social, civil, política,
tem de ser absolutamente a mesma
para os cidadãos que trabalhem num
ou noutro sector. Lá os rendimentos
podem divergir moderadamente, mas
a igualdade cívica e política tem de ser
salvaguardada.
Depois, vai ser preciso mudar a 'cabeça' atrasada
dos nosso pseudojornalistas e de vários políticos
que estão convencidos que cada país tem de estar
sempre a crescer, e que não pode estar
sem crescimento nenhum! quando
é óbvio que pode com a população
constante e o rendimento menos
desigualmente distribuído.
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O rendimento menos desigualmente distribuído não vai ser fácil. Portugal tem uma fatia de pessoas que não consegue competir com ninguém e cuja produção estará estruturalmente próxima de zero, e outra fatia que consegue competir com os melhores do mundo (e os melhores do mundo vêem a sua produtividade explodir devido à evolução tecnológica). O resultado é que naturalmente a diferença entre estas duas fatias estará sempre a crescer muito rapidamente, mesmo que vão sendo tomadas medidas para pontualmente as reaproximar.
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O rendimento menos desigualmente distribuído não vai ser fácil. Portugal tem uma fatia de pessoas que não consegue competir com ninguém e cuja produção estará estruturalmente próxima de zero, e outra fatia que consegue competir com os melhores do mundo (e os melhores do mundo vêem a sua produtividade explodir devido à evolução tecnológica). O resultado é que naturalmente a diferença entre estas duas fatias estará sempre a crescer muito rapidamente, mesmo que vão sendo tomadas medidas para pontualmente as reaproximar.
A porção de pessoas que nada consegue produzir com interesse para o mercado, e muito menos inovar bens que tecnologicamente se expandam por todo o lado, não tornará tal porção de gente numa mera inutilidade se ela, pelo mero facto de existir e viver, aí estiver para ser descoberta e conhecida. Aqui há muitos anos, no tempo do Salazar-profundo, chegava a pensar-se que certos inactivos à beira-mar, na Nazaré ou Peniche, e um pouco por outras terras, que nada faziam nem se percebe de que viviam, eram, seriam, pagos pelo SNI para enfeitar a paisagem turística! :) como uma espécie de figurantes. A mim parece-me que o sistema económico dualizar-se-á inevitavelmente e que a economia 'indígena', local, pode ter menores rendimentos, mas com a demografia e a imigração controlada, pode não só sobreviver mas viver condignamente, com instrução, cultura e valor de si e da sua região pátria. [Não esquecer que a qualidade de vida aumenta numa sociedade com diferenças sociais ou regionais, mas de igual condignidade cívica].
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O rendimento menos desigualmente distribuído não vai ser fácil. Portugal tem uma fatia de pessoas que não consegue competir com ninguém e cuja produção estará estruturalmente próxima de zero, e outra fatia que consegue competir com os melhores do mundo (e os melhores do mundo vêem a sua produtividade explodir devido à evolução tecnológica). O resultado é que naturalmente a diferença entre estas duas fatias estará sempre a crescer muito rapidamente, mesmo que vão sendo tomadas medidas para pontualmente as reaproximar.
A porção de pessoas que nada consegue produzir com interesse para o mercado, e muito menos inovar bens que tecnologicamente se expandam por todo o lado, não tornará tal porção de gente numa mera inutilidade se ela, pelo mero facto de existir e viver, aí estiver para ser descoberta e conhecida. Aqui há muitos anos, no tempo do Salazar-profundo, chegava a pensar-se que certos inactivos à beira-mar, na Nazaré ou Peniche, e um pouco por outras terras, que nada faziam nem se percebe de que viviam, eram, seriam, pagos pelo SNI para enfeitar a paisagem turística! :) como uma espécie de figurantes. A mim parece-me que o sistema económico dualizar-se-á inevitavelmente e que a economia 'indígena', local, pode ter menores rendimentos, mas com a demografia e a imigração controlada, pode não só sobreviver mas viver condignamente, com instrução, cultura e valor de si e da sua região pátria. [Não esquecer que a qualidade de vida aumenta numa sociedade com diferenças sociais ou regionais, mas de igual condignidade cívica].
Sobreviver condignamente não impede a desigualdade de crescer a grande velocidade.
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Sobreviver condignamente não impede a desigualdade de crescer a grande velocidade.
Tenho em mente o caso sueco,
onde se vive diferentemente
em Estocolmo e em Khiruna.
A desigualdade de património
não se repercute totalmente
na de rendimento, e esta
não é tão acentuada
que a instrução e
a educação não
a esbatam e
assim tornem possível
a convivialidade social,
sexual e cultural!
A mobilidade horizontal - no espaço -
e vertical - no tempo -, fica garantida
económica e socialmente!
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Com a imigração maciça, a desigualdade na Suécia também deverá aumentar ao longo do tempo, pois também estão a criar uma fatia de população razoavelmente incapaz de competir internacionalmente (e em alguns casos, sequer com vontade de o fazer).
Isto será mitigado pelo sistema social Sueco, tal como é pelo Português. Porém, como os benefícios vindos do apoio social são relativamente fixos e o crescimento do rendimento da fatia melhor remunerada/mais produtiva da sociedade será tendencialmente crescente, a desigualdade mesmo assim deverá aumentar.
Esse efeito já começa a ser visível mesmo após taxas e transferências.
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O efeito de crescimento da desigualdade de rendimento, presumo, é devido a um acréscimo conjuntural de descobertas científicas e inovações tecnológicas que não se manterão indefinidamente e a distorção de rendimentos esbater-se-á. A aritmética de Picketty de a taxa de juro (remuneração do aforro) tender a absorver a quase totalidade da taxa de crescimento do produto - e assim explicar que os ricos ficam cada vez mais ricos e os pobres mais pobres - ignora que a dinâmica das sociedades tanto pode virar-se a proteger o capital como a valorizar o trabalho produtivo e o pouco produtivo, podendo inclusive, passar a praticar taxas de juro negativas ou simplesmente a destruir capital pelo desencadeamento de guerras. De modo que, a desigualdade de rendimento só é altamente prejudicial quando a incultura grassa!
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O efeito de crescimento da desigualdade de rendimento, presumo, é devido a um acréscimo conjuntural de descobertas científicas e inovações tecnológicas que não se manterão indefinidamente e a distorção de rendimentos esbater-se-á. A aritmética de Picketty de a taxa de juro (remuneração do aforro) tender a absorver a quase totalidade da taxa de crescimento do produto - e assim explicar que os ricos ficam cada vez mais ricos e os pobres mais pobres - ignora que a dinâmica das sociedades tanto pode virar-se a proteger o capital como a valorizar o trabalho produtivo e o pouco produtivo, podendo inclusive, passar a praticar taxas de juro negativas ou simplesmente a destruir capital pelo desencadeamento de guerras. De modo que, a desigualdade de rendimento só é altamente prejudicial quando a incultura grassa!
Se ainda presumes isso é porque não compreendeste o que eu disse. Tens que compreender três coisas:
1) A fatia com maior rendimento vê os seus rendimentos crescer intrinsicamente rápido, pois essa fatia estará sempre a reflectir quem mais beneficia dos avanços tecnológicos e de produtividade que são constantes. A ftria pode nem ser composta das mesmas pessoas, mas as que estarão nessa fatia serão tendencialmente as que mais beneficiam dos avanços;
2) A fatia com menor rendimento vê os seus rendimentos serem estáveis. Quer porque não produz quase nada, onde o rendimento será próximo de zero, quer porque se obtém rendimento ele virá via transferências do Estado que serão razoavelmente estáveis;
3) A desigualdade é calculada dividindo o rendimento da fatia do topo pelo rendimento da fatia do fundo - logo, intrinsecamente e num mundo cada vez mais produtivo, essa desigualdade sofre uma pressão brutal para aumentar em todos os momentos desde que os países sejam capitalistas (o que leva a aumentos de produtividade e produção tendencialmente constantes, ditados pela concorrência e pela vontade de vencer todos os outros no mercado).
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As diferenças de cultura existem realmente e as nações são distintas também.
Pensando essas diferenças, parece-me até desejável que se mantenham.
Não estou nada interessado em tornar-me nórdico ou ver ao meu redor
uma data de nórdicos. E mais: quando, aqui há já muitos anos
estive em Estocolmo e na Lapónia, achei o país espantoso,
um ambiente de sossego e suavidade de uma sensação
de quase um planeta extraterrestre! e belíssimo.
Estas diferenças, oxalá subsistam todas.
A moeda comum pode não ocasionar
grandes diferenças de preço,
mas os rendimentos per capita
por certo divergirão diferenciando
o tipo de consumo nacional.
Eu prevejo ou presumo que cada país
europeu vá aprofundar a sua economia
dualista, um sector moderno,
quase franchisado, e outro
local, 'indígena'! :)
A dignidade social, civil, política,
tem de ser absolutamente a mesma
para os cidadãos que trabalhem num
ou noutro sector. Lá os rendimentos
podem divergir moderadamente, mas
a igualdade cívica e política tem de ser
salvaguardada.
Depois, vai ser preciso mudar a 'cabeça' atrasada
dos nosso pseudojornalistas e de vários políticos
que estão convencidos que cada país tem de estar
sempre a crescer, e que não pode estar
sem crescimento nenhum! quando
é óbvio que pode com a população
constante e o rendimento menos
desigualmente distribuído.
Pelo que escreves vai ser preciso mudar muita coisa!!! o que acho quase impossível, por isso eu digo a moeda e a união não deverão ter futuro muito longo
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Se ainda presumes isso é porque não compreendeste o que eu disse. Tens que compreender três coisas:
1) A fatia com maior rendimento vê os seus rendimentos crescer intrinsecamente rápido, pois essa fatia estará sempre a reflectir quem mais beneficia dos avanços tecnológicos e de produtividade que são constantes. A fatia pode nem ser composta das mesmas pessoas, mas as que estarão nessa fatia serão tendencialmente as que mais beneficiam dos avanços;
2) A fatia com menor rendimento vê os seus rendimentos serem estáveis. Quer porque não produz quase nada, onde o rendimento será próximo de zero, quer porque se obtém rendimento ele virá via transferências do Estado que serão razoavelmente estáveis;
3) A desigualdade é calculada dividindo o rendimento da fatia do topo pelo rendimento da fatia do fundo - logo, intrinsecamente e num mundo cada vez mais produtivo, essa desigualdade sofre uma pressão brutal para aumentar em todos os momentos desde que os países sejam capitalistas (o que leva a aumentos de produtividade e produção tendencialmente constantes, ditados pela concorrência e pela vontade de vencer todos os outros no mercado).
:)) Considero ingénuos e não provados os pressupostos, que destaquei, que alicerçam as conclusões que atinges, da desigualdade crescente, que reputo impossível. O enunciado 2) é o único que me parece provável e, espero, preenchido com uma população culta!
O que te leva a crer em avanços tecnológicos e crescimento da produtividade constante!? Não me parece nada forçoso ou determinado. Os ciclos de inovação nascem, desenvolvem-se a atenuam-se naturalmente. Vê lá os telemóveis! Atingirão um ponto de nenhuma evolução ulterior; à maturidade sucederá a saturação do mercado.
Além de a evolução tecnológica ser a acima descrita, acresce que a lei geral económica não é nunca a do acréscimo indefinido da produtividade, mas antes a lei dos rendimentos decrescentes, i.e., precisamente a tendência à produtividade desacelerada, e até decrescente, p.e., por limitação ecológica ou de recursos naturais.
Quanto aos 'heróis' capitalistas com vontade de vencer os outros no mercado, deixa-me rir, :), porque acho graça. Os capitalistas são uns pobres coitados que arrostam com dificuldades de toda a ordem, têm imenso medo da concorrência, que os arruína em dois tempos, e sem a estratégia de grandes políticos de visão e condições bem favoráveis, não conseguem fazer nada de jeito, senão digladiarem-se entre si, e formar monopólios sem concorrência.
Capitalismo eficaz, precisa do Estado por detrás!
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O crescimento constante da produtividade é óbvio, porque todas as empresas em concorrência fazem por ele continuamente (as que não o fazem num mercado concorrencial acabam por ser ultrapassadas e destruídas). Tentam melhorar os produtos, tentam acrescentar-lhes funcionalidade e qualidade, tentam torná-los mais baratos de produzir, etc.
O resto penso que não compreendeste. Imagina que estamos a falar de corredores e que existe uma melhoria constante da sua performance (da mesma forma que aqui existe uma maior produtividade). Imagina que depois seleccionas apenas a fatia dos melhores desses corredores. Não serão sempre os mesmos, mas os melhores estarão sempre a melhorar. Se depois comparares esses corredores a pessoas normais que caminham sempre à mesma velocidade, a diferença será sempre cada vez maior. Porque estás a comparar os mais rápidos e em melhoria constante, a outros que andam sempre à mesma velocidade.
Enfim, a coisa é relativamente óbvia.
Quanto aos 'heróis' capitalistas com vontade de vencer os outros no mercado, deixa-me rir, :) , porque acho graça. Os capitalistas são uns pobres coitados que arrostam com dificuldades de toda a ordem, têm imenso medo da concorrência, que os arruína em dois tempos, e sem a estratégia de grandes políticos de visão e condições bem favoráveis, não conseguem fazer nada de jeito, senão digladiarem-se entre si, e formar monopólios sem concorrência.
Essa é uma opinião absurda, apenas passível de ser detida por alguém que nunca tenha colocado os pés num centro comercial ou supermercado, ou procurado um produto na Ebay. Ou comprado um smartphone. Ou um carro.
Isso, ou uma negação completa do que se passa à volta da pessoa, claro.
----------------
Nota ainda que muita desta melhoria NÃO existe nova tecnologia. A nova tecnologia permite saltos rápidos, mas entre evoluções tecnológicas existe uma melhoria constante na mesma, resultante de curvas de aprendizagem, concorrência, melhorias técnicas e logísticas, milhares de factores diferentes.
-----------------
Enfim, exibes continuamente uma forma de ver o mundo pouco compatível quer com a realidade, quer com factos e dados facilmente comprováveis.
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Está bem. De facto, a minha visão é outra. Mas não importa. A realidade é como é, e o devir por muito que surpreenda quaisquer inteligíveis tendências, sempre exibirá o poder de serpentear quaisquer obstáculos e reformular todas as suposições de constância que os modelos de previsão adoptem.
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Está bem. De facto, a minha visão é outra. Mas não importa. A realidade é como é, e o devir por muito que surpreenda quaisquer inteligíveis tendências, sempre exibirá o poder de serpentear quaisquer obstáculos e reformular todas as suposições de constância que os modelos de previsão adoptem.
Ainda assim, não devias fechar os olhos ao que eles vêem sempre que passam por uma grande superfície comercial.
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Ainda não consegui ler o tópico todo com atenção, bem como todos os links associados; e há coisas que estarão fora das minhas capacidades.
De qualquer forma, há muita informação, logo muito obrigado Hermes.
O programa "bazuca" está naquela fase de "lua de mel". O nome colou. As populações, que estão cansadas das medidas de ajustamento tomadas anteriormente adoraram a "bazuca", os partidos políticos vislumbram uma forma de terem mais folga (mantendo o seu modo de operação actual sem terem que abordar assuntos mais "delicados") e está a ser feito um massivo trabalho de demonização da deflação.
Na minha opinião, em que num assunto tão complexo, apenas estarei a ver uma parte do quadro total, há dois factores que estão a ser muito pouco valorizados ou até nada falados.
O primeiro será a reacção do eleitorado mais conservador em países como a Alemanha e companhia. Não será que isto irá alienar um bocado estas pessoas do projecto europeu? E inflacionar as quotas de partidos mais extremistas nesses mesmos países? Penso que terá muita importância já que estamos a falar dos países que são as locomotivas da UE.
A segunda questão está ligada com este tópico. Enquanto o ponto anterior ainda tenho visto algumas pessoas abordarem, a segunda questão está a passar completamente fora do radar.... mas também posso ser eu a ver mal "o filme". Segundo o que percebi os bancos centrais de cada país terão bastante responsabilidade em caso de default.
Segundo a tabela do Hermes (http://www.thinkfn.com/forumbolsaforex/index.php/topic,530.msg22933.html#msg22933 (http://www.thinkfn.com/forumbolsaforex/index.php/topic,530.msg22933.html#msg22933)) e esta mais actual (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gold_reserve (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gold_reserve)), Portugal terá cerca de 382 500 kg de ouro, algo como 12 297 849 onças. Algo como 15 8960 000 000 USD.
Esse ouro poderá ser usado como meio de pagamento no caso de o BdP ficar entalado em relação ao BCE?
Parece-me que a ideia do Hermes é que tais reservas poderão ter um papel estratégico bastante alto num cenário futuro. Estando Portugal bastante numa posição bastante alta na lista (15º lugar) não poderemos nós estar a arriscar um activo bastante interessante a nível estratégico, em troca da algo que agora parece maravilhoso (a bazuca do BCE), mas que poderá ter um efeito baixo e de prazo limitado?
PS: Alterações para melhorar o texto
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Ainda assim, não devias fechar os olhos ao que eles vêem sempre que passam por uma grande superfície comercial.
Dá-me graça de sorriso, estes cuidados pequenos pelos caprichos do povoléu e suas comadres. Não que se deva desprezar coisas pequenas e miúdas. Podem ser bem interessantes e por certo, porventura omnipresentes à cabeceira de um moribundo. E tudo é respeitável e humano. Não estou portanto a gozar. Até de minha escolha, já decidi o almofadão para a minha hora final: o da minha avó, para a mesma finalidade! :)
No entanto, as 'grandes' superfícies comerciais não valem coisa nenhuma! Não é por elas que passam os grandes negócios, mas apenas os de natureza terminal, com empregados e comerciantes consignatários precários, ambos pagos com ganhos incertos e sem futuro.
O grande comércio, a grande praça das transacções, pouco tem a ver com o consumidor final, os próprios retalhistas não passando de escoadouro de produtos invendáveis à beira da falência. O grande comércio é engenhado em toda a produção intermediária entre o agro-silvicultor, o mineiro, as fábricas e os grandes armazéns grossistas.
Tudo se reduz a uma negociação de stocks de produtos intermediários e de meios de produção de produtos intermediários, com o software tecnológico a dar tratos à imaginação criativa de gadgets finais com os quais se possa ludibriar o grande público, para o que se impõe emitir incultura maciça pela televisão, internet, e até produtos de tipografia que aparentam ser 'livros'!!!
A negociação de stocks corresponde à transacção de uma quantidade física de bens, já produzida - se por encomenda de algo a produzir, a condição situacional do comprador e do vendedor é quase a mesma, por a capacidade instalada da fábrica existir pronta a laborar, o que equivale na prática a um stock potencial - que, por exemplo, no caso da pesca pode equivaler a uma venda e recompra sucessiva da quantidade de pescado do porão da embarcação ainda antes de qualquer captura ter ocorrido, de modo a buscar a última melhor cotação de entrega! -, e este tipo de compra/venda de stocks é sempre estrénua luta stressante, onde umas vezes se ganha, outras se perde.
É a jusante deste processo esgotante que surgem as grandes superfícies comerciais, elas próprias resultado de um prévio imenso negócio imobiliário, a que ocorrem os rentistas de todos os quadrantes, esperançados numa renda futura que se veja, bafejados pela sorte se algum trespasse jeitoso alcançam ou a comprar ou a vender um espaço-loja, mas todos com a espada de Dâmocles de um negócio com rendimentos decrescentes, com a falência no horizonte, ao cabo de sucessivas campanhas de saldos de monos.
O povoléu é o que menos importa em todo este comércio - não obstante a simpatia com que no Porto, cada cliente é sempre bem acolhido; digo bem, no Porto, porque em Lisboa, «estão-se nas tintas»! :) - porque os produtos pouco interessam, não tem utilidade nem valor intrínseco, satisfazem necessidades ilusórias, só presentes na mente por incultura e alienação induzida, pela política cultural servidora dos paquidérmicos interesses comerciais. Note-se que, mesmo no caso das mercearias dos duopolistas o embuste do povoléu é real pela baixa qualidade dos alimentos processados, de um modo geral nefastos para a saúde por formarem uma alimentação desequilibrada.
De maneira que,
como se dizia nos documentários
noticiosos, prévios dos filmes da minha infância,
«Assim Vai o Mundo!» :)
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Thunder, realmente com tanta gente em lua de mel, não é claro quem vai fazer o almoço ou o jantar. :D
O primeiro será a reacção do eleitorado mais conservador em países como a Alemanha e companhia. Não será que isto irá alienar um bocado estas pessoas do projecto europeu?
É claro que será má, mas as coisas parecem estar começar a evoluir depressa (http://www.thinkfn.com/forumbolsaforex/index.php/topic,330.msg165902.html#msg165902)... Se as pessoas detestam este sistema monetário, vão odiar o próximo (http://www.thinkfn.com/forumbolsaforex/index.php/topic,703.msg158871.html#msg158871).
A segunda questão está ligada com este tópico. Enquanto a primeira tenho visto algumas pessoas abordarem a segunda está a passar completamente fora do radar.... mas também posso ser eu a ver mal "o filme". Segundo o que percebi os bancos centrais de cada país terão bastante responsabilidade em caso de default.
Segundo a tabela do Hermes ([url]http://www.thinkfn.com/forumbolsaforex/index.php/topic,530.msg22933.html#msg22933[/url] ([url]http://www.thinkfn.com/forumbolsaforex/index.php/topic,530.msg22933.html#msg22933[/url])) e esta mais actual ([url]http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gold_reserve[/url] ([url]http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gold_reserve[/url])), Portugal terá cerca de 382 500 kg de ouro, algo como 12 297 849 onças. Algo como 15 8960 000 000 USD. Esse ouro poderá ser usado como meio de pagamento no caso de o BdP ficar entalado em relação ao BCE?
Parece-me que a ideia do Hermes é que tais reservas poderão ter um papel estratégico bastante alto num cenário futuro. Estando Portugal bastante numa posição bastante alta na lista (15º lugar) não poderemos nós estar a arriscar um activo bastante interessante a nível estratégico, em troca da algo que agora parece maravilhoso (a bazuca do BCE), mas que poderá ter um efeito baixo e de prazo limitado?
O ouro não vai sair de Portugal. Tal como o de Chipre também não saiu. No novo sistema monetário a dívida vai ser desvalorizada relativamente ao ouro.
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O ouro não vai sair de Portugal. Tal como o de Chipre também não saiu. No novo sistema monetário a dívida vai ser desvalorizada relativamente ao ouro.
A net não dá para pensar...
É mais difícil. Não li o diálogo que precede
este enunciado:
«A dívida desvalorizará face ao ouro.»
Aplicando-a ao nosso caso: 300 t de ouro não valem
uns € 180*10^9, mas tenderão a valer! Assim sendo,
tudo menos pagar em ouro. Mas será que o euro
desvalorizará assim tanto!? Emitir-se-á tanto
euro quanto a Arábia Saudita determine?
Procura inelástica, está nos livros.
E se tudo continuar a embaratecer?
Por muito que o juro baixe,
perder no que quer
se faça, continue
previsão
maior?
Nem sequer o ouro encarecerá!
Hum...
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Com a quantidade massiva de dinheiro novo que vai ser impresso na Europa, não será necessário comprar mais ouro? Ou desvaloriza-se simplesmente o euro relativamente ao ouro que se tem?
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Vai tudo aplicar-se a melhorar balanços,
em turnover da dívida, e mutação
de dívida em capital próprio.
O ouro tenderá a equiparar-se
ao elevado nível dos património global líquido.
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Thunder, realmente com tanta gente em lua de mel, não é claro quem vai fazer o almoço ou o jantar. :D
O primeiro será a reacção do eleitorado mais conservador em países como a Alemanha e companhia. Não será que isto irá alienar um bocado estas pessoas do projecto europeu?
É claro que será má, mas as coisas parecem estar começar a evoluir depressa ([url]http://www.thinkfn.com/forumbolsaforex/index.php/topic,330.msg165902.html#msg165902[/url])... Se as pessoas detestam este sistema monetário, vão odiar o próximo ([url]http://www.thinkfn.com/forumbolsaforex/index.php/topic,703.msg158871.html#msg158871[/url]).
A segunda questão está ligada com este tópico. Enquanto a primeira tenho visto algumas pessoas abordarem a segunda está a passar completamente fora do radar.... mas também posso ser eu a ver mal "o filme". Segundo o que percebi os bancos centrais de cada país terão bastante responsabilidade em caso de default.
Segundo a tabela do Hermes ([url]http://www.thinkfn.com/forumbolsaforex/index.php/topic,530.msg22933.html#msg22933[/url] ([url]http://www.thinkfn.com/forumbolsaforex/index.php/topic,530.msg22933.html#msg22933[/url])) e esta mais actual ([url]http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gold_reserve[/url] ([url]http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gold_reserve[/url])), Portugal terá cerca de 382 500 kg de ouro, algo como 12 297 849 onças. Algo como 15 8960 000 000 USD. Esse ouro poderá ser usado como meio de pagamento no caso de o BdP ficar entalado em relação ao BCE?
Parece-me que a ideia do Hermes é que tais reservas poderão ter um papel estratégico bastante alto num cenário futuro. Estando Portugal bastante numa posição bastante alta na lista (15º lugar) não poderemos nós estar a arriscar um activo bastante interessante a nível estratégico, em troca da algo que agora parece maravilhoso (a bazuca do BCE), mas que poderá ter um efeito baixo e de prazo limitado?
O ouro não vai sair de Portugal. Tal como o de Chipre também não saiu. No novo sistema monetário a dívida vai ser desvalorizada relativamente ao ouro.
Talvez não tenha colocado a minha ideia de uma forma clara. A questão não seria a curto prazo.
A questão seria o facto do BdP ficar responsável por 80% de "futuros problemas". No fundo o BCE parece querer lavar as suas mãos em relação a futuros problemas. O cenário pintado de que isto é uma "mutualização das dívidas" parece-me que está um bocado longe da realidade e este detalhe importante está a passar "entre os pingos da chuva".
Logo se o BdP atravessa-se em relação à 80% de potenciais problemas, no caso de acontecerem defaults na dívida que é responsabilidade do BdP, o ouro que temos está à salvo? E que não está claro para mim como irá funcionar essa divisão de responsabilidades entre o BCE e os BC de cada um dos países. Só foi referida a percentagem da divisão, mas de certeza que existirão detalhes que muitas vezes são fundamentais em questões futuras. E nesses detalhes não poderá o BCE vir pedir responsabilidades ao BdP? E o "pagamento" dessas responsabilidades não poderá ser em ouro? Isto sou eu a divagar .....
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Isto é uma mutualização mas ao contrário :)
Também concordo que o pormenor dos 80/20 está a passar como se nada fosse.
Acho que terá influência na yields, cada banco central/país fica responsável por si próprio, caso imprimem muito e depois entrem em default, 80% do problema fica contido a esse país.
Como é que o ouro entra na história é que já não sei...
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Com a quantidade massiva de dinheiro novo que vai ser impresso na Europa, não será necessário comprar mais ouro? Ou desvaloriza-se simplesmente o euro relativamente ao ouro que se tem?
Não precisa. Dois gráficos para o mostrar.
(http://www.thinkfn.com/forumbolsaforex/index.php?action=dlattach;topic=426.0;attach=21506;image)
source: http://www.investing.com/analysis/what-you-need-to-know-about-china%E2%80%99s-massive-gold-hoard-220377 (http://www.investing.com/analysis/what-you-need-to-know-about-china%E2%80%99s-massive-gold-hoard-220377)
As reservas estimadas da China são inferidas pelas importações passadas.
(http://www.thinkfn.com/forumbolsaforex/index.php?action=dlattach;topic=426.0;attach=21509;image)
source: http://blog.thomsonreuters.com/index.php/gold-reserves-graphic-of-the-day/ (http://blog.thomsonreuters.com/index.php/gold-reserves-graphic-of-the-day/)
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o ouro portugues esta guardado onde?
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o ouro portugues esta guardado onde?
Se for em Portugal e os comunistas/socialistas tiverem chegado até ele, metade já deve ser tungsténio... :D
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Thunder,
Estás a assumir que vamos impludir sozinhos e que não há o interesse dos EUA e Japão implodirem ao mesmo tempo. Quando isso acontecer o papel na chega. Embora a Europa muito gritasse contra a realidade presente, principalmente a França, na década de 70 e quisessem sim ouro, tiveram de sustentar o tio Sam porque não tinham uma alternativa com profundidade de mercado. Agora esse problema está resolvido, pois temos o euro, e o tio Sam tem um problema.
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Isto é uma mutualização mas ao contrário :)
Também concordo que o pormenor dos 80/20 está a passar como se nada fosse.
Acho que terá influência na yields, cada banco central/país fica responsável por si próprio, caso imprimem muito e depois entrem em default, 80% do problema fica contido a esse país.
Como é que o ouro entra na história é que já não sei...
Realmente está, a fanfarra e a festarola abafam tudo. A ideia é que tivemos basicamente uma mutualização da dívida.
Thunder,
Estás a assumir que vamos impludir sozinhos e que não há o interesse dos EUA e Japão implodirem ao mesmo tempo. Quando isso acontecer o papel na chega. Embora a Europa muito gritasse contra a realidade presente, principalmente a França, na década de 70 e quisessem sim ouro, tiveram de sustentar o tio Sam porque não tinham uma alternativa com profundidade de mercado. Agora esse problema está resolvido, pois temos o euro, e o tio Sam tem um problema.
Hermes, a tabela com o valor de ouro/GDP em % é impressionante. O Japão nessa tabela fica bastante mal.... Mas nada de admirar dadas as políticas do BoJ.
Sim isso é verdade, dificilmente estaremos totalmente isolados numa situação dessas, e a existência de interesses comuns poderá ser a nossa proteção.
Todas estas questões são altamente complexas e há muito para absorver. Vou continuar a ler o tópico, os links e mais info que encontre sobre o assunto. Mas parece-me evidente que o paradigma actual a nível de fiat money e outras questões como a acumulação de dívida pelos diversos agentes (particulares, empresas, estados) provocará mutações mais cedo ou mais tarde.
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Se percebo o Hermes, ele defende o euro por o verificar mais ligado ao ouro do que qualquer outra divisa. No entanto, quer a Índia, quer a China, e mesmo a Rússia como extractora de ouro das suas minas, têm mais ouro do que os estados da UE. A mim, impressiona-me a importância do ouro porque, em novo, num dos meus primeiros empregos, eu defendia que a emissão da moeda desligada do ouro era um sistema mais racional porque obedeceria ao que se procurasse conseguir e planeasse. Mas o meu administrador, contrapunha que o automatismo da produção e stockagem do ouro era um sistema mais fiável do que a vontade volúvel dos governos... e claro, hoje vejo que ele era mais sábio e prudente... mas, independentemente desta razão prudencial, política, o que me faz pensar, enquanto razão profunda para o ouro ser moeda real e efectiva de pagamento e liquidação de dívidas é mesmo ele ser uma mercadoria como as demais, e durável, mensurável, aceite universalmente, nem superabundante, nem simplesmente... fictícia. Mas tudo é misterioso, e sem produção e bens reais, o ouro em si não serve para nada...
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Muito engraçados os documentos desclassificados e a transcrição da reunião do Kissinger.
Acho bastante piada a este tipo de documentos. É engraçado comparar as opiniões da altura com os desenvolvimentos que depois vão acontecendo.
Um dos meus favoritos é o veto do presidente Andrew Jackson (http://avalon.law.yale.edu/19th_century/ajveto01.asp) ao "Second Bank of US" (10 de Julho de 1832)
Visto sob o prisma da situação da indústria bancária e financeira actual é uma leitura super interessante.
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Dinamarca quer ser o primeiro país sem dinheiro físico (http://visao.sapo.pt/dinamarca-quer-ser-o-primeiro-pais-sem-dinheiro-fisico=f819440#ixzz3ay7mM0Ar)
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Hermes,
Mantens tudo o que afirmaste até agora? Todas as tuas premissas se mantêm ainda válidas?
É que com o BCE a fazer o que faz, as medidas de controlo de moeda e riqueza, desde França com levantamentos, agora com a Grécia a querer controlar tudo... começo agora a ter muitas dúvidas que o euro se mantenha.
Os países a virarem à esquerda, a não quererem o euro...
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Mantenho
Lembra-te que não disse que a transição seria um mar de rosas. Mais ainda, disse que se as pessoas detestam este sistema monetário, vão odiar o próximo!
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Deixo somente pela curiosidade do modelo "Hamiltonian Model" que não conhecia e não conheço ainda bem. Tenho de ler melhor.
Mas é deveras interessante os textos nas ligações que deixo a seguir.
Euro & the Hamiltonian Model
“The Euro & the Hamiltonian Model” is a special report looking at the failed structural design of the euro that caused it to collapse. This report compares the structure of the euro and its fatal flaw in contrast to the Hamiltonian model that succeeded in creating a single nation and a single currency.
Encontrei aqui algo, mas vou ter de reler novamente:
https://www.minneapolisfed.org/publications/the-region/the-bank-that-hamilton-built (https://www.minneapolisfed.org/publications/the-region/the-bank-that-hamilton-built) (2007)
Será que ele quer dizer que o BCE deveria seguir um esquema do que está descrito na ligação de cima? Assim, em cada país deveria de haver um banco que...?
Também aqui:
http://andreaskluth.org/2013/12/11/the-euro-crisis-seen-through-3-historical-models/ (http://andreaskluth.org/2013/12/11/the-euro-crisis-seen-through-3-historical-models/) (2013)
Tem algo interessante e explica 3 modelos...interessante.
The Euro crisis seen through 3 historical models
...
Three historical models
We could analyse the euro crisis and the entire European Union today through three historical precedents which each would imply a possible solution.
Using the formula “Model | Precedent | Solution”:
Leadership/hegemony | Pax Britannica or Pax Americana | Pax Germanica
Deep integration | Alexander Hamilton’s Federalism in America | United States of Europe
Loose integration without hegemony | Holy Roman Empire | Muddling through
...
Notice, however, that these EU bonds would have nothing to do with the “eurobonds” that are being discussed. Those eurobonds would instead be bonds issued (in the analogy) by California but guaranteed by Texas and the other 49 states jointly. Neither America nor Switzerland has, or could have, such an arrangement. Eurobonds (where Germany in effect vouches for Greece) in fact belong properly into the Pax Germanica model, not into the Hamiltonian model.
...