Portugal: Recessão

[du Lac]

https://issuu.com/oecd.publishing/docs/prt-eo-june-2020-33/1?ff&backgroundColorFullscreen=%23e5e5e5
https://ec.europa.eu/info/business-economy-euro/economic-performance-and-forecasts/economic-performance-country/portugal/economic-forecast-portugal_en
https://www.ine.pt/ngt_server/attachfileu.jsp?look_parentBoui=442552290&att_display=n&att_download=y
https://www.bportugal.pt/sites/default/files/anexos/pdf-boletim/be_jun2020_p.pdf
https://www.clsbe.lisboa.ucp.pt/pt-pt/necep-quarterly-newsletter-61-q2-2-2-pt

[du Lac]

Centeno calls for rethink of EU debt and deficit rules
https://www.ft.com/content/88796666-8678-4f55-9b27-73f1f0ec357b

The outgoing president of the eurogroup has said Brussels should avoid “blindly” reapplying the EU’s debt and deficit limit rules after the Covid-19 crisis, warning that it could tip the bloc into a fresh recession.

Mário Centeno, who departs as head of the eurozone finance ministers this week, told the Financial Times that governments should use the pandemic and the pause on the normal application of EU budgetary limits that has followed to rethink the rule book, including the ceiling of 60 per cent of gross domestic product on national debt levels.

“What is important on the fiscal front for Europe in the coming months and years is the way we engineer the process of return to the application of the fiscal rules in a way that avoids prompting a recession,” Mr Centeno said.

Eurozone public debt is expected to expand to 102 per cent of GDP this year as governments have pumped money into their businesses and labour markets during months of economic hibernation.

“This crisis will result in large increases of public and private debt. It will require a strong investment push,” said Mr Centeno, who was nominated in June by Portugal’s government as the next governor of the country’s central bank.

“This is true for all countries. Applying the rules blindly could prove unrealistic under such circumstances, hurting the credibility of the framework.”

[du Lac]

https://www.pordata.pt/en/Portugal/Travel+and+tourism+account+as+a+percentage+of+GDP-2632
https://home.kpmg/xx/en/home/insights/2020/04/portugal-government-and-institution-measures-in-response-to-covid.html
https://www.clsbe.lisboa.ucp.pt/pt-pt/prosper-relatorio-quem-arcarA-com-os-custos-da-crise-covid-19-anAlise-de-empregos-em-risco-em-portugal
http://app.parlamento.pt/webutils/docs/doc.pdf?path=6148523063446f764c324679595842774f6a63334e7a637664326c756157357059326c6864476c3259584d7657456c574c33526c65485276637939776347777a4d793159535659744d5467756347526d&fich=ppl33-XIV-18.pdf&Inline=true

[Smog]

Um pouco de texto próprio com análise dava jeito. os papers servem de fundamento a uma argumentação e análise séria.

[Reg]

isto e totoloto  saber quanto cai

antes covid ja isto estava  mal caminho

agora   bolhas andaram adiar  rebentaram

mais turismo.....


ta bom funcionarios publicos em teletrabalho ganhar 100%

[du Lac]

Um pouco de texto próprio com análise dava jeito. os papers servem de fundamento a uma argumentação e análise séria.

O teu salário ficará congelado e pagarás mais de impostos. 

[Smog]

 Fiquei congelada com a profundidade da análise.
Costa fechou o pais em Março para poder ir buscar uns milhares de milhões ao Fundo da UE Covid. É possível que estoirem tudo com nacionalizações idiotas. TAP e EFACEC já lá vão. Entretanto o BCE prepara-se para por as garras em tudo o que seja valioso quando a economia dos países colapsar. É natural que Portugal inteiro perca a soberania a favor de bancos Centrais gananciosos.
Congelar o salário? A sério? Veremos se não me despedem entretanto.

[du Lac]

Fiquei congelada com a profundidade da análise.
Costa fechou o pais em Março para poder ir buscar uns milhares de milhões ao Fundo da UE Covid. É possível que estoirem tudo com nacionalizações idiotas. TAP e EFACEC já lá vão. Entretanto o BCE prepara-se para por as garras em tudo o que seja valioso quando a economia dos países colapsar. É natural que Portugal inteiro perca a soberania a favor de bancos Centrais gananciosos.
Congelar o salário? A sério? Veremos se não me despedem entretanto.

O BCE é o que permite receberes um salário em euros. Portugal não é soberano, não controla a moeda que usa, é uma província nos confins do império germânico.

[Smog]

pois, pois...

[du Lac]

pois, pois...

Em 2022, após as eleições alemãs de 2021, o Costa irá dar-te a factura... 

[du Lac]

https://www.bportugal.pt/intervencoes/artigo-de-opiniao-do-governador-carlos-da-silva-costa-na-reuters-time-collectively

The pandemic crisis will have a profound impact on the world economy. Its duration and size are still surrounded by great uncertainty. Although temporary, this shock risks leaving long-lasting scars if policymakers and authorities do not coordinate their responses.

To an exogenous shock common to all economies, authorities initially responded uncoordinatedly. As the virus spread and the economic consequences of the pandemic became clear, efforts were deployed to coordinate policy response, but so far the burden has lain mostly on individual nations. Monetary policy eased significantly, cushioning the impact of the shock by providing ample liquidity.

Labour market policies, payment moratoria and government guarantees on loans to corporates, among others, have been deployed across countries. Regulators and supervisors have adopted complementary measures exploring the flexibility of the existing regulatory framework to mitigate the immediate impact on banks’ balance sheets.

The impact of the adopted policies will be a function of the structural features of the economies’ productive sectors, the liquidity and solvency positions of economic agents, the available fiscal space, as well as timing and policymakers’ clairvoyance (linked to the timely identification of problems, quality of policies and sufficiency of response). A clear distinction needs to be made across four stages of policies: (i) relief (payment moratoria), (ii) repair (recapitalisation of viable firms), (iii) recover (launch of domestic demand and productive investment), and (iv) reorient (towards sustainable and digital development).

As economies emerge from the pandemic, pre-existing financial vulnerabilities will be compounded by additional public and private sector debt ensuing from policy action. Corporate and household debt burdens risk becoming unmanageable in case of severe economic contraction, putting at stake their solvency. Authorities and policymakers should make use of the oxygen balloon created by payment moratoria and regulators’ flexibility to implement solutions to reduce insolvency risks.

In the European context, the Next Generation EU proposal is timely and goes in the right direction. However, it raises important challenges to companies and banks’ asset quality as it aims to reorient the economy but fails to timely support the repair and recovery stages: we will not be able to reorient business models if in the meantime companies go bankrupt.

As the IMF recently noted, “policy support will need to gradually shift toward encouraging people to return to work, and to facilitating a reallocation of workers to sectors with growing demand and away from shrinking sectors.” Policy options need to be exploited to prevent the current corporate liquidity crisis from evolving into an insolvency crisis: avoiding the ‘zombification’ of companies and of the labour market is now of the essence.

Before policymakers unwind measures adopted at the peak of the crisis, solutions need to be implemented to enable the capitalisation of companies and avoid cliff effects. Proposals have been put forward comprising the possibility to “convert government guaranteed credit into equity or quasi-equity in the form of preferred shares or, for privately held firms, higher profit taxes in the future”. Options to identify and triage unviable firms deserve careful consideration while mitigating risks to labour markets and social cohesion. For unviable firms, expedited insolvency procedures should be implemented to preserve value. At European level, these solutions need to be coordinated under the auspices of the Capital Markets Union development so as to avoid national solutions protecting local firms and economic sectors that would risk the singleness of the EU market.

On the banking sector the impact will reverberate through asset quality dynamics with increased non-performing loan ratios. Systemic TARP-style solutions will be required at European level, even if implemented at national level. These will require additional flexibility concerning the interplay between state aid and the Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive compatible with the challenge at hand. Moral hazard issues related to pre-pandemic risk-taking behaviour will arise and need to be addressed politically as a means to gain trust to reinvigorate the Banking Union project. Unless Member States address this as a matter of urgency, we risk a repeat of the discussions post-sovereign debt crisis, with the ensuing consequences to the economic recovery and trust in European institutions, already stressed by the health crisis response.

Notwithstanding the improvements observed in the European banking system post-global financial crisis, the situation is uneven across countries. As asset quality and profitability deteriorate, over-capacity will reveal itself amid a renewed push for digital solutions fast forwarded by the lockdown period.

In this context, to preserve (local) financial stability efforts must be made to establish an enabling European framework for the orderly management of failing banks of locally systemic importance, combining elements of the resolution and liquidation frameworks, with a view to minimising losses and protecting depositors and non-financial borrowers. Such a framework should include the definition of high-level principles to be agreed by all Member States for application at national level. For those banks assessed as not having (European) public interest, there should be room for manoeuvre in view of national preferences. Recourse to alternative measures as foreseen in the Directive on Deposit Guarantee Schemes or to public funds, as an ultimate backstop, should be thus considered. Without risk-sharing and pan-European banks, sovereigns need to find the means to protect competition in their local markets and to safeguard the flow of funding to the economy in the event branches and subsidiaries of foreign banks exit during a downturn.

Such options should be clearly decoupled from (past) bailout discussions and the ensuing political and social consequences. Few things can be more destructive to public trust in European institutions than threats to financial stability, and Member States can only avoid jeopardising European social and political cohesion by acting pre-emptively.

Confronted with a storm, we were able to take shelter (relief) but we now need to repair the damage and ensure that we are able to recover and reorient the economies to weather new storms. As we did not finish repairing the roof when the sun was shining, let us now collectively repair the pipelines while we have an umbrella, so as not to stifle the recovery.

[du Lac]

https://eco.sapo.pt/especiais/costa-silva-quer-mais-estado-na-economia-e-vai-buscar-o-filosofo-karl-polanyi/

Por isso é que Costa Silva reivindica para este novo ciclo económico em Portugal um papel mais interventivo do Estado na economia, “para impedir o colapso de empresas relevantes, para investir nos serviços públicos, para dar maior segurança ao mercado de trabalho e para promover uma melhor distribuição da riqueza e reduzir as desigualdades”.

https://eco.sapo.pt/especiais/noticia-eco-da-alta-velocidade-entre-lisboa-e-porto-ao-cluster-do-hidrogenio-dez-propostas-do-plano-de-costa-silva/

António Costa Silva já entregou ao Governo a primeira proposta de plano de recuperação da economia para os próximos dez anos. São 119 páginas e dezenas de propostas. Mas não há contas.

[du Lac]

https://observador.pt/2020/07/09/rio-segue-pisadas-de-costa-na-oposicao-e-vai-apresentar-programa-para-a-decada/

Rio segue pisadas de Costa na oposição e vai apresentar programa para a década

[vbm]

E o António Costa e Silva!?

Ficaram todos à rasca,
com o que dele poderia vir?

LOL

[du Lac]

https://www.lusa.pt/article/xcXCnRzKdKbbl9NQRvg2IDMSZM5iuSI1/défice-de-2020-vai-ser-revisto-para-7-ministro-das-finanças

O ministro das Finanças disse hoje que vai rever em alta a estimativa de défice público para um valor próximo dos 7% para acomodar as alterações ao Orçamento do Estado Suplementar aprovadas pelo parlamento durante a votação na especialidade.

https://www.lusa.pt/article/xcXCnRzKdKaAbg8C2y47ZzMSZM5iuSI1/previsões-macroeconómicas-serão-atualizadas-oportunamente-mas-não-para-já-joão-leão

O ministro de Estado e das Finanças, João Leão, admitiu hoje que “oportunamente” poderá ser feita uma revisão das projeções económicas, mas não para já, devido ao atual contexto de elevada incerteza.

[du Lac]

https://expresso.pt/economia/2020-07-09-Nao-vamos-ter-ilusoes-Antonio-Costa-Silva-esta-duas-vezes-mais-pessimista-do-que-o-Governo

Consultor alerta que a queda do PIB português pode chegar aos 12% em 2020. Situação de muitas empresas pode deteriorar-se significativamente já a partir de setembro

[Bs]

No dia a dia não parece apontar para os 12% mas sabe-se lá. O chocante são estas coisas da TAP e do novobanco.
No tursimo nota-se de fato um bocado.

[du Lac]

No dia a dia não parece apontar para os 12% mas sabe-se lá. O chocante são estas coisas da TAP e do novobanco.
No tursimo nota-se de fato um bocado.

O 3o trimestre apanha a pancada do turismo. No 4o as escolas irão reabrir? Quem fica com as crianças para os pais irem trabalhar? Nos próximos tempos as revisões do PIB deverão ser em baixa...

[Tridion]

 O du Lac está a pintar um quadro negro para Portugal!

(Perceberam o trocadilho de palavras!? Entre du Lac e pintar!?...g'anda piada que acabei de fazer)

[vbm]

Como é que faz uma via férrea rápida Porto-Lisboa?