bem o que é interessante é debater opiniões diferentes e a minha é diferente :
é uma verdade que inflaccionar é uma forma de não pagar ou desvalorizar o que se paga, é claro que os arrendatários são punidos num contexto de inflacção, em todo o caso foram-no nessa altura sobretudo por
politicas de congelamentos de rendas; politicas são politicas e portanto susceptiveis de serem mudadas ajustadas ...
Agora será que também não existe um reverso da medalha para esse tipo de negocio quando estamos num contexto monetário forte : muito mais directo e menos subtil ou seja o incumprimento puro e duro no pagamento das rendas ? na minha opinião uma moeda forte não resolve o problema do arrendamento como negocio; o problema vem ao de cima de outra maneira.
em relação ao facto de os activos de um país poderem ser vendidos ao desbarato num contexto de moeda fraca mas isso isso não acontecerá também com moeda forte ?
a comparação isolada ou focada em determinados sectores entre as vantagens de uma moeda forte e fraca per si não fazem grande sentido. O que faz sentido é comparar a economia real que se tem com uma moeda forte e a economia real que se tem como uma moeda fraca;
Qual é a logica de em Portugal termos uma economia forte com estado e banca fortes porque financiados artificialmento pelo exterior e uma economia com uma expressão mediocre porque exposta á competição internacional e por isso em forte desvantagem competitiva ?
Qual é o país que vai resultar de tudo isto ? Um país com 7 milhões de habitantes e fortemente envelhecido (porque os velhos não emigram ); onde é que se vai arranjar dinheiro para pagar as pensões de reformas num contexto destes as pessoas trabalham até morrer ? é uma hipotesse
Que empresas mesmo Portuguesas investirão num país de velhos ? Uma recessão prolongada sería uma expressão fraca para caracterizar uma situação destas na verdade a economia entraria pura e simplesmente em declinio.
e voltando a questão inicial o que é que acontecerá aos activos imobiliarios cujo o valor tanto se teme nessa conjuntura ?
No fundo, o efeito sobre o imobiliário e terrenos agrículas foi bastante semelhante ao que se passou na República de Weimar. Seguem-se alguns excerptos do livro "When money dies" a mostrá-lo:
Citar
Frau Eisenmenger let a room to the gentleman from the American Mission — just as Garbo's father in The Joyless Street was able to do — and received for it ten times the rent which, in accordance still with the wartime rent restriction Act, she herself paid for the whole flat. On a now slender quantity of negotiable cigars, on her daughter's earnings, on that rent, and on the diminishing real income from her burgeoning shares, she tackled the first months of 1920.
[...]
Blackett noted that the rent restriction Acts hit much the same classes, who were 'forced to starvation in order to subsidise the German workman's wages and the employer's profits'. The bread and rail subsidies, financed by inflation, combined with the rent restriction, enabled the foreigner to buy German goods well below world prices and, if he lived in or visited Germany, to travel, eat and occupy houses at ridiculously cheap rates. 'A gradual process of buying up and carrying off Germany's movable capital, secondhand furniture, pianos, etc., is taking place at the expense of Germany as a whole.'
Foreigners were also buying up real property and interests in factories and all kinds of businesses. To some extent this was at the expense of the workman whose wages lagged behind the climbing cost of living, but it was mainly at the expense of the middle classes whose capital was destroyed and largely exported. The exporting industrialists could just keep their heads above water, Blackett thought, but the others making goods out of partly imported material could not possibly replace it with a continually rapidly falling mark.
[...]
In the second half of June it became necessary again to double the salaries of government officials, and to give higher grants to the war-wounded, to'widows, to pensioners and to the unemployed, in and out of the Ruhr, An additionaL reason for these increases, over and above the general fall in the mark's purchasing power, was that the poorer classes, especially the rentiers, would soon no longer be able to afford the price of bread. Agricultural interests had become angry about the 'Umlage', the forced delivery of the first two million tons of wheat produced each year which enabled half the total supply of bread to be sold cheap. From August onwards farmers were to be paid at world prices because, when obliged to sell wheat cheaply, they still had to pay the world price for fertilisers. The change in policy, from subsidising food to subsidising the needy, may have satisfied the farmers; but the extra subsidies for the poor soon became worthless again.
[...]
Those with foreign currency, becoming easily the most acceptable paper medium, had the greatest scope for finding bargains. The power of the the dollar, in particular, far exceeded its nominal rate of exchange. Finding himself with a single dollar bill early in 1923, von der Osten got hold of six friends and went to Berlin one evening determined to blow the lot; but early the next morning, long after dinner, and many nightclubs later, they still had change in their pockets. There were stories of Americans in the greatest difficulties in Berlin because no-one had enough marks to change a five-dollar bill: of others who ran up accounts (to be paid off later in depreciated currency) on the strength of even bigger foreign notes which, after meals or services had been obtained, could not be changed; and of foreign students who bought up whole rows of houses out of their allowances
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