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Counter Retail Trader

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Hedge Fund
« em: 2015-06-26 16:25:50 »
Reminiscences of a Baby Hedge Fund Principal LVII. How I raised the first $10 million client assets?

A list of accomplishments every Start-Up Hedge Fund Principal should target to achieve within first 2-3 years. Absolute Number One. Keeping a low cost operation. If you can achieve that, you can stretch self-financing duration from two years to four years, which will increase your odds of success. Number Two. Raising AUM north of $40-$50 million. Setting and implementing a marketing strategy to make that happen. Seeking, attracting respectable Third Party Marketers, looking for strategic partners should be in the plan. Building a brand by attending events, speaking at events, being consistent. Prospecting both HNWIs and Family Offices. Number Three. Negotiating and closing at least one financing deal before 24 months (assuming you started with 24 months of cash needed). Number Four. Prospecting, negotiating for an equity sale. This is also a financing deal and a more likely scenario than a bank loan. Number Four. Coaching and expanding the team for growth. Seeking, finding, recruiting new partners is a big part of this. At this point I would like to thank all of you who have read our humble memoirs. I think we all knew that this was going to end up as a book. Now seems to be a good time to stop writing in LinkedIn Groups. As part of the book I will interview 10-20 Family offices and 10-20 HNWIs who will tell their views about how to approach to them as a Start-Up Hedge Fund. Off course it will also include how we raised our first $10 million client assets among all this. Thank you all.

Counter Retail Trader

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Re: Hedge Fund
« Responder #1 em: 2015-07-01 15:09:53 »
Hedge Funds Fight to Save Puerto Rico Investments
By MICHAEL CORKERY and ALEXANDRA STEVENSONJUNE 30, 2015
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The financial district of San Juan, P.R., as seen in 2014. Credit Ricardo Arduengo/Associated Press
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Hedge funds like Appaloosa Management, Paulson & Company and Blue Mountain Capital gathered in a conference room at the Barclays offices in Midtown Manhattan last September to talk about what was then the hottest trade: Puerto Rico.

An hour into the conversation, however, it became clear that if things started going bad, not everyone in the room was going to get along. Some had wagered on real estate, while others had bought up the debts of the central government and its troubled electric utility.

Those divisions intensify an increasingly contentious battle the hedge funds are beginning to wage to salvage an investment that, less than a year ago, looked like a sure thing.

This week’s announcement by Gov. Alejandro García Padilla of Puerto Rico that the commonwealth may seek to delay debt payments has thrown the hedge funds’ investment strategies into turmoil.

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The governor said that at the rate the debt is developing, every person in Puerto Rico would owe creditors $40,000 by 2025.The Bonds That Broke Puerto RicoJUNE 30, 2015
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Gov. Alejandro García Padilla plans to discuss the island’s fiscal crisis on a televised broadcast on Monday night.Puerto Rico’s Governor Says Island’s Debts Are ‘Not Payable’JUNE 28, 2015
Even debts that appeared to be secure now seem in jeopardy, sending hedge funds and other investors scrambling to re-examine their legal rights and potential remedies should the government push for a restructuring.

A vast restructuring of the commonwealth’s bonds could scare away more risk-averse investors from buying them for many years to come, causing major problems for the hedge funds.

“Those investors are not coming back,” said Robert Donahue, a managing director at Municipal Market Analytics. “The hedge funds miscalculated and they are feeling the pain.”

While some hedge fund managers say they were caught off guard by Governor García Padilla’s call for a debt restructuring, they are not panicking, even as the price of some of their bond holdings has fallen 17 percent in the last two days.

They see the governor’s announcement as more of an opening salvo in a negotiation rather than an indication of imminent and widespread defaults, particularly on debts that Puerto Rico’s Constitution says must be repaid.

Some analysts say the governor’s announcement may have been intended in part to drive down the value of the hedge funds’ bonds so that the firms would be more willing to agree to concessions in order to minimize their losses.

“The Puerto Rico government has engaged in the creation of a crisis where there isn’t one,” said Hector Negroni, a principal at Fundamental Advisors, which owns Puerto Rico debt. “But I don’t think they will ultimately flout the rule of law. At the end of the day, they need to borrow money again. And no one will lend them money if they break the Constitution.”

Lending more money to Puerto Rico had been a major part of some hedge funds’ strategy. They planned to allow the commonwealth to help fund its operations with borrowed money so it could take steps to jump-start the economy.

When Puerto Rico issued $3.5 billion in general obligation bonds last March, a long list of hedge funds participated, including Paulson & Company and Och-Ziff Capital Management.

Paulson & Company immediately sold its approximately $120 million holding, according to a person familiar with the firm’s trading, and it was unclear whether the other hedge fund managers later sold their similarly sized positions.

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The bonds were sold last March at about 93 cents on the dollar. On Tuesday, the bonds were trading as low as 64 cents, according to Municipal Market Analytics.

Many of the same hedge funds have been offering to lend the government as much as $2.9 billion in a bond supported by a fuel tax. But the government has refused to negotiate a deal in recent months, hedge funds managers say.

Aides to Governor García Padilla said in an interview last week that they had not ruled out borrowing more money from hedge funds, but that they first needed to examine all their options, including a vast restructuring of current debts. The aides added that the initial deal terms were too onerous.

Some hedge funds had invested in Puerto Rico debt, expecting a restructuring all along. Firms like Blue Mountain Capital have bought up bonds owed by the Puerto Rico Electric Power Authority at steep discount. On Tuesday, the utility was close to a deal that would avert a default and possibly allow some of its creditors to eventually profit from their investments in its $9 billion in debt.

Until this week, a restructuring of general obligation bonds, which carry a constitutional guarantee to repay, seemed like an impossibility, making the hedge funds’ investment look bulletproof.

For the hedge funds, the idea was to lend the money at high interest rates, then flip the bonds to traditional municipal bond investors, like mutual funds, once the fiscal crisis on the island had passed. As part of that strategy, some of the hedge funds circulated research last summer arguing that Puerto Rico’s problems were overstated.

But Governor García Padilla is now contending exactly the opposite, releasing a report by former officials at the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank that says that Puerto Rico’s deficit is worse than it appears and that the commonwealth cannot solve its problems without restructuring its debts, possibly even its general obligation bonds.

Still, Puerto Rico’s relationship with the hedge fund industry is complicated. At the same time the government is gearing up for a series of restructurings with hedge funds and other creditors, officials are courting investments in the broader economy.

Hedge funds have been among the few investors willing to take a chance that Puerto Rico can turn things around.

Puerto Rico’s biggest hedge fund cheerleader in New York has been the billionaire John A. Paulson. Mr. Paulson told investors at an investment conference in San Juan last year that Puerto Rico’s economy was turning a corner. He went as far as to predict it would be the Singapore of the Caribbean, referring to the Southeast Asian city-state that is considered the region’s biggest economic success story.

Mr. Paulson bought up some of the island’s most exclusive luxury hotels, including the St. Regis Bahia Beach Resort, the Condado Vanderbilt Hotel and the La Concha Renaissance hotel and tower.

And he has acted as a de facto liaison between the commonwealth and Wall Street.

Mr. Paulson recently suggested that Puerto Rico officials attend the hedge fund industry’s biggest event of the year — the SkyBridge Alternatives Conference in Las Vegas, according to Alberto Bacó Bagué, Puerto Rico’s secretary of economic development.

Mr. Paulson met with Mr. Bagué on the sidelines of the conference and helped arrange a meeting with James J. Murren, the chief executive of MGM Resorts, Mr. Bagué said.

“He is building a home, and he is validating our economic model with all his colleagues and friends and the investments that he has,” Mr. Bagué said.

Counter Retail Trader

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Re: Hedge Fund
« Responder #2 em: 2015-07-01 16:37:36 »
http://blogs.cfainstitute.org/investor/2015/06/30/an-easier-way-to-understand-hedge-fund-leverage/

An Easier Way to Understand Hedge Fund Leverage
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By Eric Petroff, CFA
Categories: Alternative Investments, Guide
An Easier Way to Understand Hedge Fund Leverage
Absolute return goals are widely used in the hedge fund industry and are achieved through leverage and alpha relative to various market betas. As a result, it is possible to create a valuation-based “rule of thumb” computation for the implied leverage that hedge fund strategies need given market valuations.

Traditional metrics, such as notional, nominal, and net leverage, can be confusing or annoying for investors to interpret given their composition and spectrum of values. Candidly, using these traditional metrics does not seem the most efficient way to communicate leverage to the average investment committee member, who may have trouble understanding all the underlying calculations. Clearly, we need a simpler solution that better reflects the implied leverage clients are asking their managers to take.

Because leverage is a direct function of valuations, which are a result of the absolute return goals set by managers and their clients, a leverage metric can be derived from basic algebra and a couple of easy assumptions.

We call this computation the Implied Hedge Fund Leverage Ratio™. It is simple to use and gives a pragmatic understanding of the leverage associated with any hedge fund strategy based on prevailing market valuations.

Why Does This Concept Matter Now?

This issue is relevant now because we are in a low-return, challenging alpha environment as a result of monetary stimulus compressing valuations and the cross-volatility of asset returns. These issues are succinctly illustrated with a few charts that show the cross-volatility of developed market equity returns (proxy for pricing opportunities) and implied returns for major asset classes before, during, and after the last bear market.

Russell Equity Cross Volatility Index
Russell-Equity-Cross-Volatility-Indices

Earnings and Dividend Yields (Implied Returns)
Earnings and Dividend Yields (Implied Returns)

Yields to Maturity

Yields to Maturity

What Is the Implied Hedge Fund Leverage Ratio Equation?

The first part of the Implied Hedge Fund Leverage Ratio is based on the assumption that the manager’s gross returns must meet the client’s expected return goal net of management and incentive fees.

This value is derived as

Rg = Rc/(1 – I) + F,
where

Rg = Gross needed return
Rc = Client return hurdle/expectation for investing
I = Incentive fees as a percent of profits
F = Fees
Furthermore, once a client’s return hurdle is known, implied portfolio leverage can be calculated by using an appropriate beta for the strategy and the client’s alpha expectations.

This value is derived as

L = Rg/(B + A),
where

L = Implied leverage to market beta
Rg = Gross needed hedge return
B = Market beta associated with strategy
A = Alpha expected by client
How Are Betas Selected for Various Strategies?

Hedge fund managers generally dislike being associated with market betas because their strategies are usually complex and involve securities far more complicated than, say, the S&P 500 Index. However, derivatives are derived from market betas and are, therefore, driven by them. The following are examples of how betas can be selected for a few common strategies.

Long–Short Equity Managers

For this strategy, we use the S&P 500 because these managers’ returns follow the index very closely over time.
Credit Managers

For a credit manager, beta is a direct function of the manager’s level of credit risk (or the yield to maturity).
Arbitrage Managers

These managers calculate potential profits relative to their cost of capital, which is the centerpiece of any arbitrage calculation. Any investment must exceed the cost of capital to be undertaken, making this the baseline for pre-leverage returns, a relationship that can be seen in aggregate performance over time for these strategies. Therefore, for arbitrage managers, we select the cost of capital as the beta.
Commodity Trading Strategies

Selecting this beta is more theoretical in nature but rather simple to derive because the return expectation for most natural resources over time is the cost of capital, making this the baseline return for holding commodities.
Examples of the Equation

Before calculating examples of the Implied Hedge Fund Leverage Ratio, we need to make a few basic assumptions:

The client’s return goal is 10% net of fees. This assumption is based on long-term public market returns, expected manager alpha, a small illiquidity premium, and common hedge fund manager return goals.
Expected alpha in March 2009 is 6% given tremendous opportunities resulting from the credit crisis.
Expected alpha for March 2007 and March 2015 is reduced to 2% given the challenging alpha environment.
Management fees are 1% and incentive fees are 20% of profits
Example 1: Long–Short Equity Manager

Implied Leverage Ratios for Long/Short Equity Managers

Implied Leverage Ratios for Long/Short Equity Managers

Implied equity returns for the Russell 1000 Index are used as the beta in the above leverage calculations and happen to show a tremendous difference among these dates.

Example 2: Credit Manager

Implied Leverage Ratios for Credit-Based Hedge Fund Strategies

Implied Leverage Ratios for Credit-Based Hedge Fund Strategies

This example uses the Barclays US High Yield Index as the beta for a credit-based hedge fund strategy operating in the middle range of the credit spectrum. Again, we can see how market valuations affect potential leverage and that implied leverage is higher now than before the last bear market.

Example 3: Arbitrage Manager

Implied Leverage Ratios for Arbitrage Strategies

Implied Leverage Ratios for Arbitrage Strategies

For this example, we use the Barclays US Credit Index as the beta, or the cost of capital, and baseline return expectation that must be exceeded for any investment to be made pre-leverage. We can clearly see the effects of low interest rates on implied leverage ratios given March 2015 values.

Example 4: Commodity Manager

Implied Leverage Ratios for Commodity Managers

Implied Leverage Ratios for Commodity Managers

As mentioned earlier, the long-term cost of capital is the baseline return expectation for most natural resources. Consequently, we use the Barclays US Long Credit Index as the beta for this calculation.

These examples are interesting and would likely draw criticism from the hedge fund industry regarding their efficacy. Nonetheless, the theories are sound from a big picture perspective and tell us conclusively that capital market conditions are very conducive to high levels of leverage.

Increasing Leverage during a Low-Return Environment Is a Bad Idea

Seeing implied leverage ratios similar to those prior to the last bear market is not the best thing from a risk management perspective. The examples given clearly show how robust equity valuations, low fixed-income yields, and lowered alpha opportunities strongly encourage managers to take on additional leverage to meet clients’ return goals.

Leveraging low-returning/highly valued assets always presents the possibility for significant downside during a sudden market correction. Recall the low-return environment of 2007 and that hedge funds generally lost around 20% the following year. Furthermore, the last thing you want to do is leverage expensive assets prior to a reversion in valuations, which is inevitable when monetary policy eventually gets unwound.

The good news for the hedge fund industry is that if this happens slowly, hedge funds will likely do fine. If it does not happen slowly, returns could look a lot more like those in 2008. Either way, now may be a good time to dimension leverage in your hedge fund portfolio.

We don’t need complex calculations to discern how valuations affect hedge funds. The equation is just simple math, and that’s the beauty of it.

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All posts are the opinion of the author. As such, they should not be construed as investment advice, nor do the opinions expressed necessarily reflect the views of CFA Institute or the author’s employer.

Image credit: ©iStockphoto.com/FrankRamspott

Tags: hedge funds, leverage, valuation