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Autor Tópico: Krugman et al  (Lida 605855 vezes)

Lark

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Re:Krugman et al
« Responder #1580 em: 2015-04-22 18:04:53 »
capitalismo sem estado é um mito.
nunca existiu.
aliás o capitalismo só sobrevive porque o estado vem em seu socorro em alturas de aflição como 1929 ou 2008.

L
Be Kind; Everyone You Meet is Fighting a Battle.
Ian Mclaren
------------------------------
If you have more than you need, build a longer table rather than a taller fence.
l6l803399
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So, first of all, let me assert my firm belief that the only thing we have to fear is...fear itself — nameless, unreasoning, unjustified terror which paralyzes needed efforts to convert retreat into advance.
Franklin D. Roosevelt

Incognitus

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Re:Krugman et al
« Responder #1581 em: 2015-04-22 18:07:05 »
capitalismo sem estado é um mito.
nunca existiu.
aliás o capitalismo só sobrevive porque o estado vem em seu socorro em alturas de aflição como 1929 ou 2008.

L

Nem ninguém diz outra coisa. Não era isso que eu estava a dizer ali.

Mas discordo que o capitalismo não sobreviva sem ajuda do estado em alturas como 1929 ou 2008. Isso é não compreender como é que um mercado se auto-regula. 1929 e 2008 são dois exemplos de um mercado a funcionar mesmo na pior das circunstâncias.

--------

A única forma de o capitalismo não sobreviver é proibirem-no. O que tem consequências dramáticas, pois em poucas décadas quem o faça acaba a comer raízes, crianças e a vender-se por um par de jeans.
« Última modificação: 2015-04-22 18:08:15 por Incognitus »
"Nem tudo o que pode ser contado conta, e nem tudo o que conta pode ser contado.", Albert Einstein

Incognitus, www.thinkfn.com

Lark

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Re:Krugman et al
« Responder #1582 em: 2015-04-22 18:15:51 »
A única forma de o capitalismo não sobreviver é proibirem-no. O que tem consequências dramáticas, pois em poucas décadas quem o faça acaba a comer raízes, crianças e a vender-se por um par de jeans.

a que propósito é que vem isto?
não é possível mantermo-nos no tópico?
essas tiradas demagógicas são completamente desnecessárias.
não dizes directamente, mas implicitamente que escrevi ou quis dizer que o capitalismo devia ser extinto.
estás a falar para as massas?

L
Be Kind; Everyone You Meet is Fighting a Battle.
Ian Mclaren
------------------------------
If you have more than you need, build a longer table rather than a taller fence.
l6l803399
-------------------------------------------
So, first of all, let me assert my firm belief that the only thing we have to fear is...fear itself — nameless, unreasoning, unjustified terror which paralyzes needed efforts to convert retreat into advance.
Franklin D. Roosevelt

Zel

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Re:Krugman et al
« Responder #1583 em: 2015-04-22 18:18:43 »
ainda vou expulsar estes dois do forum  :D

Incognitus

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Re:Krugman et al
« Responder #1584 em: 2015-04-22 18:45:58 »
A única forma de o capitalismo não sobreviver é proibirem-no. O que tem consequências dramáticas, pois em poucas décadas quem o faça acaba a comer raízes, crianças e a vender-se por um par de jeans.

a que propósito é que vem isto?
não é possível mantermo-nos no tópico?
essas tiradas demagógicas são completamente desnecessárias.
não dizes directamente, mas implicitamente que escrevi ou quis dizer que o capitalismo devia ser extinto.
estás a falar para as massas?

L

Bem a  tua tirada

"aliás o capitalismo só sobrevive porque o estado vem em seu socorro em alturas de aflição como 1929 ou 2008."

Não é demagógica.

E a minha a dizer que não, que o capitalismo não morre por si aconteça o que acontecer, é?

Parece-me um critério absurdo.
"Nem tudo o que pode ser contado conta, e nem tudo o que conta pode ser contado.", Albert Einstein

Incognitus, www.thinkfn.com

Zel

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Re:Krugman et al
« Responder #1585 em: 2015-04-22 19:18:11 »
o criterio eh seguir sempre os ensinamentos do Krugman  :D

Lark

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Re:Krugman et al
« Responder #1586 em: 2015-04-22 21:15:47 »
Paul Krugman - New York Times Blog
 
Airbrushing Austerity

Ken Rogoff weighs in on the secular stagnation debate, arguing basically that it’s Minsky, not Hansen — that we’re suffering from a painful but temporary era of deleveraging, and that normal policy will resume in a few years.

As far as I can tell, however, Rogoff doesn’t address the key point that Larry Summers and others, myself included, have made — that even during the era of rapid credit expansion, the economy wasn’t in an inflationary boom and real interest rates were low and trending downward — suggesting that we’re turning into an economy that “needs” bubbles to achieve anything like full employment.

But what I really want to do right now is note something else, which is visible in the Rogoff piece and in many other things one reads lately — a backward-looking view of the austerity fever that swept policymaking circles in 2010 and airbrushes out the reality of intellectual folly. You see this sort of thing when people who predicted soaring interest rates from crowding out right away now claim that they were only talking about long-term solvency; when people who issued dire warnings about runaway inflation say that they were only suggesting a risk, or maybe talking about financial stability; and so on down the line.

So, in Rogoff’s version of austerity fever all that was really going on was that policymakers were excessively optimistic, counting on a V-shaped recovery; all would have been well if they had read their Reinhart-Rogoff on slow recoveries following financial crises.

Sorry, but no — that’s not how it happened. When I wrote about fear of invisible bond vigilantes and belief in the confidence fairy, I wasn’t inventing stuff out of thin air.

David Cameron didn’t say “Hey, we think recovery is well in hand, so it’s time to start a modest program of fiscal consolidation.” He said “Greece stands as a warning of what happens to countries that lose their credibility.” Jean-Claude Trichet didn’t say “Yes, we understand that fiscal consolidation is negative, but we believe that by the time it bites economies will be nearing full employment”. He said: "As regards the economy, the idea that austerity measures could trigger stagnation is incorrect … confidence-inspiring policies will foster and not hamper economic recovery, because confidence is the key factor today."

I can understand why a lot of people would like to pretend, perhaps even to themselves, that they didn’t think and say the things they thought and said. But they did.

krugman
« Última modificação: 2015-04-22 21:18:06 por Lark »
Be Kind; Everyone You Meet is Fighting a Battle.
Ian Mclaren
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If you have more than you need, build a longer table rather than a taller fence.
l6l803399
-------------------------------------------
So, first of all, let me assert my firm belief that the only thing we have to fear is...fear itself — nameless, unreasoning, unjustified terror which paralyzes needed efforts to convert retreat into advance.
Franklin D. Roosevelt

Lark

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Re:Krugman et al
« Responder #1587 em: 2015-04-22 22:35:32 »
Should You Read Ben Bernanke's Blog?
Author. Hedge fund adviser. Chatterbox. The former Fed chief has strong opinions and is eager to share them with you

Ben Bernanke's blog—titled, with the caution of a former Fed chairman, Ben Bernanke's Blog—is mainly for people with an insatiable interest in inflation targeting, the zero lower bound on rates, and the term premium on 10-year Treasury notes. In other words, people who got food thrown at them in middle school.
Yet it has its charms. Bernanke still knows how to get attention (now by other means than saying, or not saying, "measured steps"). Already he has started an online argument with former Treasury Secretary Larry Summers, himself a skilled combatant; criticized Germany for its big fat trade surplus; and, on Wednesday, offered what looked like unsolicited advice to his former colleagues on the Fed's rate-setting Federal Open Market Committee. He posted 10 times in the blog's first 17 days, a pretty good clip for a busy man, now a distinguished fellow in residence at the Brookings Institution.
The bearded one went quiet after he left the Fed at the end of January 2014, but it turns out he was just gathering momentum for an upward surge, like a breaching killer whale. He launched the blog on March 30. On April 8 his publisher unveiled the title and jacket of his forthcoming memoir, The Courage to Act. And yesterday the giant hedge fund Citadel announced it was hiring him as an outside senior adviser.
"Dear Ben: Better Pace Yourself ..." was the headline on a post by Bloomberg View columnist Barry Ritholtz. "All of this activity is starting to look a bit frenetic," he wrote.
Trolling a worthy adversary is a time-tested way to get attention in the blogosphere. When Bernanke went after Summers, who was considered a rival candidate for the Fed chairmanship, he managed to make it personal, writing, "As Larry’s uncle Paul Samuelson taught me in graduate school at MIT ... ." Summers responded to him on the blog. Bernanke responded to his response. Summers went silent.
Next up: the Germans. Bernanke wrote, "In a slow-growing world that is short on aggregate demand, Germany's trade surplus is a problem."
"I do think that Germany, as Europe's largest economy, has a special responsibility," Thiess Petersen, a senior expert with the German think tank Bertelsmann, answered when interviewed by the global edition of Handelsblatt, Germany's leading business and finance daily. "But the question is, what should they do about it?"
Former Fed chiefs Paul Volcker and Alan Greenspan have generally been circumspect about commenting on Federal Reserve policy. Bernanke has, too.
But in a speech Wednesday at an International Monetary Fund conference (which of course became a blog entry), Bernanke seemed to say that members of the Federal Open Market Committee should think twice about allowing the Fed's balance sheet to shrink as bonds mature.
"Of course, I have not been privy to the internal discussions, having left the Fed more than fourteen months ago, but I wonder if the case for keeping the balance sheet somewhat larger than before the crisis has been adequately explored," he said in the speech, "Monetary Policy in the Future," according to the prepared remarks on his blog.
He pulled back at the end of the talk, saying, "To be clear, I am not making a recommendation today about the ultimate size of the Fed's balance sheet. It's a complex issue that deserves more discussion. My aim today is to contribute to that discussion and encourage further public debate."
Bernanke's quiet demeanor and professorial appearance earned him the nickname Gentle Ben, but the financial crisis made it clear that he is not one to back down. Now we're seeing a new side of the former Princeton University economist: blogger provocateur. Be warned, though. Commentary on monetary policy is an acquired taste.

bloomberg
Be Kind; Everyone You Meet is Fighting a Battle.
Ian Mclaren
------------------------------
If you have more than you need, build a longer table rather than a taller fence.
l6l803399
-------------------------------------------
So, first of all, let me assert my firm belief that the only thing we have to fear is...fear itself — nameless, unreasoning, unjustified terror which paralyzes needed efforts to convert retreat into advance.
Franklin D. Roosevelt

Lark

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Re:Krugman et al
« Responder #1588 em: 2015-04-22 22:41:56 »
Ben S. Bernanke | April 15, 2015 1:40pm
 
I delivered the following remarks at the IMF's Rethinking Macro Policy III conference on April 15, 2015.

Thanks to the International Monetary Fund for inviting me to participate in this panel on "Monetary Policy in the Future." In the few minutes I have I'll offer some thoughts on the Fed's monetary policy framework, its tools for implementing monetary policy, and how both are likely to evolve as we return to a more historically normal economic and policy environment.

In January 2012 the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) issued for the first time a formal description of its policy framework, which has been re-approved each January since then.1 The framework document emphasizes the FOMC's commitment to a balanced approach in the pursuit of the Fed's two statutory objectives, price stability and maximum employment. The FOMC has given the public extensive guidance about how it defines those objectives, setting a symmetrical inflation target of 2 percent and reporting each quarter FOMC participants' estimates of the sustainable rate of unemployment. This policy framework is backed by substantial explanation and analysis, via the chairman's press conferences, FOMC meeting minutes, FOMC economic projections (including projections of the federal funds rate), testimony, and speeches.

The FOMC's policy framework corresponds to what Lars Svensson has called a targeting rule (see my 2004 speech, "The Logic of Monetary Policy" for further discussion). In a targets-based framework, the central bank forecasts its goal variables—inflation and employment, in the case of the Fed—and describes its policy strategy for bringing the forecasts in line with its stated objectives. Although targeting rules are not mechanical, they do provide a transparent framework that, importantly, is robust to changes in the structure of the economy or the effectiveness of monetary policy, so long as those changes can be incorporated into forecasts. Targeting rules also conform to the basic economic dictum that principals (in this case, Congress and the public) are better off monitoring their agents' outputs (in the case of the FOMC, the outcomes of policy choices) rather than their inputs (the specific settings of policy instruments).

The policy framework has improved the FOMC's communication, I believe. Today, for example, the Fed's commitment to 2 percent inflation is providing the public useful information about the FOMC's likely approach to policy in the year ahead. Moreover, the anchoring of inflation expectations that began under Volcker and Greenspan, and which I believe was further strengthened by the setting of a numerical definition of price stability, gave the Fed more scope to ease monetary policy in response to the Great Recession than it otherwise would have had.

Of course, no policy framework is without drawbacks, as attested by the difficulties the FOMC has faced in dealing with the zero lower bound on interest rates. If the Committee were to contemplate changing its framework, there are two directions it might consider.

The first would be to adopt what Svensson called an instrument rule, which specifies how the policy instrument, in the Fed's case the federal funds rate, will be set as a relatively simple function of a few variables. I am perfectly fine using such rules as one of many guides for thinking about policy, and I agree that policy should be as transparent and systematic as possible. But I am also sure that, in a complex, ever-changing economy, monetary policymaking cannot be trusted to a simple instrument rule. I was going to elaborate on this point, but I found a nice statement of the argument in a classic piece of research, which I'll quote in its entirety:

"Even with many such modifications, it is difficult to see how...algebraic policy rules could be sufficiently encompassing. For example, interpreting whether a rise in the price level is temporary or permanent is likely to require looking at several measures of prices (such as the consumer price index, the producer price index, or the employment cost index). Looking at expectations of inflation as measured by futures markets, the term structure of interest rates, surveys, or forecasts from other analysts is also likely to be helpful. Interpreting the level and the growth rate of the economy's potential output—which frequently is a factor in policy rules—involves predictions about productivity, labor-force participation, and changes in the natural rate of unemployment. While the analysis of these issues can be aided by quantitative methods, it is difficult to formulate them into a precise algebraic formula. Moreover, there will be episodes where monetary policy will need to be adjusted to deal with special factors. For example, the Federal Reserve provided additional reserves to the banking system after the stock-market break of October 19, 1987 and helped to prevent a contraction of liquidity and to restore confidence. The Fed would need more than a simple policy rule as a guide in such cases."

As some will have guessed, the quote is from John Taylor's classic 1993 paper introducing the Taylor rule, “Discretion versus Policy Rules in Practice” (pp. 196-7).

The second possible direction of change for the monetary policy framework would be to keep the targets-based approach that I favor, but to change the target. Suggestions that have been made include raising the inflation target, targeting the price level, or targeting some function of nominal GDP. Some of these approaches have the advantage of helping deal with the zero-lower-bound problem, at least in principle. My colleagues at the Fed and I spent a good deal of time during the period after the financial crisis considering these and other alternatives, and I think I am familiar with the relevant theoretical arguments. Although we did not adopt one of these alternatives, I will say that I don't see anything magical about targeting two percent inflation. My advocacy of inflation targets as an academic and Fed governor was based much more on the transparency and communication advantages of the approach and not as much on the specific choice of target. Continued research on alternative intermediate targets for monetary policy would certainly be worthwhile.

That said, I want to raise a few practical concerns about the feasibility of changing the FOMC's target, at least in the near term. First, whatever its strengths and weaknesses, the current policy framework, with its two explicit targets and balanced approach, has the advantage of being closely and transparently connected to the Fed's mandate from Congress to promote price stability and maximum employment. It may be that having the Fed target other variables could lead to better results, but the linkages are complex and indirect, and there would be times when the pursuit of an alternative intermediate target might appear inconsistent with the mandate. For example, any of the leading alternative approaches could involve the Fed aiming for a relatively high inflation rate at times. Explaining the consistency of that with the statutory objective of price stability would be a communications challenge, and concerns about the public or congressional reaction would reduce the credibility of the FOMC's commitment to the alternative target.

Second, proponents of alternative targets have to accept the fact that, for better or worse, we are not starting with a blank slate. For several decades now, the Fed and other central banks have worked to anchor inflation expectations in the vicinity of 2 percent and to explain the associated policy approach. A change in target would face the hurdles of re-anchoring expectations and re-establishing long-term credibility, even though the very fact that the target is being changed could sow some doubts. At a minimum, Congress would have to be consulted and broad buy-in would have to be achieved.

Finally, a principal motivation that proponents offer for changing the monetary policy target is to deal more effectively with the zero lower bound on interest rates. But economically, it would be preferable to have more proactive fiscal policies and a more balanced monetary-fiscal mix when interest rates are close to zero. Greater reliance on fiscal policy would probably give better results, and would certainly be easier to explain, than changing the target for monetary policy. I think though that the probability of getting Congress to accept larger automatic stabilizers and the probability of their endorsing an alternative intermediate target for monetary policy are equally low.

A few words on policy tools: The depth of the Great Recession, together with the zero lower bound on interest rates, forced the Fed to devise new tools to make monetary policy more accommodative, including large-scale asset purchases and communication about the contingent future path of rates. Under more historically normal circumstances, when the zero lower bound is no longer a constraint, I expect that these tools will go back on the shelf. The operating instrument will once again be the federal funds rate and the communications framework will be the targets-oriented policy framework I described earlier. Importantly, the return to the use of the federal funds rate as the main policy instrument should be feasible even if the Fed's balance sheet remains quite large for a time. Although reserves in the banking system are not expected to return to pre-crisis levels for some years, the Fed has a number of instruments—including its authority to pay interest to banks on their excess reserves, as well as the ability to offer reverse repurchase agreements that effectively allow nonbanks to deposit at the Fed at a fixed interest rate—that should allow it to manage short-term interest rates effectively (see here and here for further discussion). Concerns about unwinding quantitative easing are therefore misplaced, in that the Fed's ability to tighten monetary policy at the appropriate time will not require that it sell assets or rapidly reduce the size of its balance sheet. To the extent that the large balance sheet has some residual effect on longer-term yields, the effects on the economy can be compensated for by changes in the federal funds rate.

The FOMC has indicated that it intends to let the Fed's portfolio run off over time, so that excess reserves in the banking system eventually return to levels comparable to those before the crisis. Of course, I have not been privy to the internal discussions, having left the Fed more than fourteen months ago, but I wonder if the case for keeping the balance sheet somewhat larger than before the crisis has been adequately explored. As I mentioned, a larger balance sheet should not affect the ability of the FOMC to change the stance of monetary policy as needed. Indeed, most other major central banks have permanently large balance sheets and are able to implement monetary policy without problems. Moreover, the fed funds market is small and idiosyncratic. Monetary control might be more, rather than less, effective if the Fed changed its operating instrument to the repo rate or another money market rate and managed that rate by its settings of the interest rate paid on excess reserves and the overnight reverse repo rate, analogous to the procedures used by other central banks.

Another potential advantage of a large balance sheet is that it facilitates the creation of an elastically supplied, safe, short-term asset for the private sector, in a world in which such assets seem to be in short supply. On the margin, the Fed's balance sheet is financed by bank reserves and by reverse repos, which can be thought of as reserves held at the Fed by nonbank institutions. From the private sector's point of view, Fed liabilities are safe, overnight assets that could be useful for cash management or as a form of reserve liquidity. In a system of so-called full allotments, these assets would be supplied by the Fed at a fixed interest rate. The Federal Reserve was created, in part, to provide "an elastic currency," so this provision of a liquid asset at a fixed rate seems consistent with the central bank's mission.

The principal objection to a permanently large balance sheet financed in part by a reverse repo program appears to be a concern about financial stability. The worry is that the availability of reverse repos would facilitate runs. For example, in a period of stress, money market funds might dump commercial paper in favor of Fed liabilities. I take that concern seriously but offer a few observations. First, the overall increase in liquidity in the financial system that would be the result of a larger Fed balance sheet would probably itself be a stabilizing factor, so that the net effect on stability is uncertain. Second, if private-sector entities ran to Fed liabilities, there are actions the Fed could take after the fact to mitigate the problem, including not only capping access to reverse repos but also recycling liquidity, for example, by increasing lending to banks (through the discount window) or to dealers (through repo operations). Finally, runs can occur even in the absence of a reverse repo program, as we saw during the crisis. Regulatory action to minimize the risk of or incentives for runs would seem to be the more direct way to deal with the issue. Put another way, if runs really are a major concern, getting rid of the Fed’s repo program alone seems an inadequate response.

To be clear, I am not making a recommendation today about the ultimate size of the Fed's balance sheet. It's a complex issue that deserves more discussion. My aim today is to contribute to that discussion and encourage further public debate.

ben bernanke
Be Kind; Everyone You Meet is Fighting a Battle.
Ian Mclaren
------------------------------
If you have more than you need, build a longer table rather than a taller fence.
l6l803399
-------------------------------------------
So, first of all, let me assert my firm belief that the only thing we have to fear is...fear itself — nameless, unreasoning, unjustified terror which paralyzes needed efforts to convert retreat into advance.
Franklin D. Roosevelt

Deus Menor

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Re:Krugman et al
« Responder #1589 em: 2015-04-22 22:43:41 »

Bernanke's quiet demeanor and professorial appearance earned him the nickname Gentle Ben, but the financial crisis made it clear that he is not one to back down. Now we're seeing a new side of the former Princeton University economist: blogger provocateur. Be warned, though. Commentary on monetary policy is an acquired taste.



A Bloomberg a lançar o Ben para a Política...

Lark

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Re:Krugman et al
« Responder #1590 em: 2015-04-22 22:50:30 »
Be Kind; Everyone You Meet is Fighting a Battle.
Ian Mclaren
------------------------------
If you have more than you need, build a longer table rather than a taller fence.
l6l803399
-------------------------------------------
So, first of all, let me assert my firm belief that the only thing we have to fear is...fear itself — nameless, unreasoning, unjustified terror which paralyzes needed efforts to convert retreat into advance.
Franklin D. Roosevelt

Lark

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Re:Krugman et al
« Responder #1591 em: 2015-04-22 23:01:14 »
Debt supercycle, not secular stagnation
Kenneth Rogoff 22 April 2015

Weak, post-Crisis growth has been blamed on secular stagnation. This column argues that the ‘financial crisis/debt supercycle’ view provides a more accurate and useful framework for understanding what has transpired and what is likely to come next. The difference matters. Unlike secular stagnation, a debt supercycle is not forever. After deleveraging and borrowing headwinds subside, expected growth trends might prove higher than simple extrapolations of recent performance might suggest.

I want to address a narrow yet fundamental question for understanding the current challenges facing the global economy.1 Has the world sunk into ‘secular stagnation’, with a long future of much lower per capita income growth driven significantly by a chronic deficiency in global demand? Or does weak post-Crisis growth reflect the post-financial crisis phase of a debt supercycle where, after deleveraging and borrowing headwinds subside, expected growth trends might prove higher than simple extrapolations of recent performance might suggest (Lo and Rogoff 2015)?

I will argue that the financial crisis/debt supercycle view provides a much more accurate and useful framework for understanding what has transpired and what is likely to come next. Recovery from financial crisis need not be symmetric; the UK and perhaps the UK have reached the end of the deleveraging cycle, while the Eurozone, due to weaknesses in its construction, is still very much in the thick of it. China, having markedly raised economy-wide debt levels in response to the crisis originating in the West, now faces its own challenges from high debt, particularly local government debt.

The case for a debt supercycle
The evidence in favour of the debt supercycle view is not merely qualitative, but quantitative. The lead up to and aftermath of the 2008 global financial crisis has unfolded like a garden variety post-WWII financial crisis, with very strong parallels to the baseline averages and medians that Carmen Reinhart and I document in our 2009 book, This Time is Different (Reinhart and Rogoff 2009). The evidence is not simply the deep fall in output and subsequent very sluggish U-shaped recovery in per capita income that commonly characterise recovery from deep systemic financial crises. It also includes the magnitude of the housing boom and bust, the huge leverage that accompanied the bubble, the behaviour of equity prices before and after the Crisis, and certainly the fact that rises in unemployment were far more persistent than after an ordinary recession that is not accompanied by a systemic financial crisis. Even the dramatic rises in public debt that occurred after the Crisis are quite characteristic.

Of course, the Crisis had unique features, most importantly the euro crisis that exacerbated and deepened the problem. Emerging markets initially recovered relatively quickly, in part because many entered the Crisis with relatively strong balance sheets. Unfortunately, a long period of higher borrowing by both the public sector and corporates has left emerging markets vulnerable to an echo of the advanced-country financial crisis, particularly as growth in China slows and the US Fed contemplates raising interest rates.

Modern macroeconomics has been slow to get to grips with the analytics of how to incorporate debt supercycles into canonical models, but there has been much progress in recent years (see Geanokoplos 2014 for a survey) and the broad contours help explain the now well-documented empirical regularities. As credit booms, asset prices rise, raising their value as collateral, thereby helping to expand credit and raise asset prices even more. When the bubble ultimately bursts, often catalysed by an underlying adverse shock to the real economy, the whole process spins into a harsh and precipitous reverse.

Of course, policy played an important role. However, there has been far too much focus on orthodox policy responses and not enough on heterodox responses that might have been better suited to a crisis greatly amplified by financial market breakdown. In particular, policymakers should have more vigorously pursued debt write-downs (e.g. subprime debt in the US and periphery-country debt in Europe), accompanied by bank restructuring and recapitalisation. In addition, central banks were too rigid with their inflation target regimes. Had they been more aggressive in getting out in front of the Crisis by pushing for temporarily elevated rates, the problem of the zero lower bound might have been avoided. In general, failure to more seriously consider the kinds of heterodox responses that emerging markets have long employed is partly a reflection of an inadequate understanding of how advanced countries have dealt with banking and debt crises in the past (Reinhart et al. 2015).

Fiscal policy (one of the instruments of the orthodox response) was initially very helpful in avoiding the worst of the Crisis, but then many countries tightened prematurely, as IMF Managing Director Christine Lagarde rightly noted in her opening speech to the “Rethinking Macro Policy III” conference. Slowing the rate of debt accumulation was one motivation, as she notes, but let us not have collective amnesia. Overly optimistic forecasts played a central role in every aspect of most countries’ responses to the crisis. No one organisation was to blame, as virtually every major central bank, finance ministry, and international financial organisation was repeatedly overoptimistic. Most private and public forecasters anticipated that once a recovery began it would be V-shaped, even if somewhat delayed. In fact, the recovery took the form of the very slow U-shaped recovery predicted by scholars who had studied past financial crises and debt supercycles. The notion that the forecasting mistakes were mostly due to misunderstanding fiscal multipliers is thin indeed. The timing and strength of both the US and UK recoveries defied the predictions of polemicists who insisted that very slow and gradual normalisation of fiscal policy was inconsistent with recovery.

Secular stagnation
Of course, secular factors have played a role, as they always do in both good times and bad. Indeed, banking crises almost invariably have their roots in deeper real factors driving the economy, with the banking crisis typically being an amplification mechanism rather than a root cause.

What are some particularly obvious secular factors? Well, of course, demographic decline has set in across most of the advanced world and is at the doorstep of many emerging markets, notably China. In the long run, global population stabilisation will be of huge help in achieving sustainable global economic growth, but the transition is surely having profound effects, even if we do not begin to understand all of them.

Another less-trumpeted secular factor is the inevitable tapering off of rising female participation in the labour force. For the past few decades, the ever greater share of women in the labour force has added to measured per capita output, but the main shift is likely nearing an end in many countries, and as such will no longer contribute to growth.

Then there is also the supercycle of Asia’s rise in the global economy, particularly China. Asian growth has been pushing up IMF estimates of global potential growth for three decades now. As China shifts to a more consumption-based domestic-demand-driven growth model, its growth will surely taper off, with significant effects around the globe on consumers’ real incomes and on commodity prices, among other factors. As Asian growth slows, global growth will likely tend back towards its 50 year average.

Going forward, perhaps the most difficult secular factor to predict is technology. Technology is the ultimate driver of per capita income growth in the classic Solow growth model. Some would argue that technology is stagnating, with computers and the internet being a relatively modest and circumscribed advance compared to past industrial revolutions. Perhaps, but there are reasons to be much more optimistic. Economic globalisation, communication and computing trends all suggest an environment highly conducive to continuing rapid innovation and implementation, not a slowdown. Indeed, I personally am far more worried that technological progress will outstrip our ability to socially and politically adapt to it, rather than being worried that innovation is stagnating. Of course, given tight credit in the aftermath of the financial crisis, some technologies may have been ‘trapped’ by lack of funding. But the ideas are not lost and the cost to growth is not necessarily permanent.

What of Solow’s famous 1987 remark that “You can see the computer age everywhere but in the statistics”? Perhaps, but one has to wonder to what extent the statistics accurately capture the welfare gains embodied in new goods during a period of such rapid technological advancement. Examples abound. In advanced countries, the possibilities for entertainment have expanded exponentially, with consumers having at their fingertips a treasure-trove of music, films and TV that would have been unimaginable 25 years ago. Quality-of-health improvements through the low-cost use of statins, ibuprofen and other miracle drugs are widespread. It is easy to be cynical about social media, but the fact is that humans enormously value connectively, even if GDP statistics really cannot measure the consumer surplus from these inventions. Skype and other telephony advances allow a grandmother to speak with a grandchild face to face in a distant city or country. Disruptive technologies such as Uber point the way towards vastly more efficient uses of the existing capital stock. Yes, there are negative trends such as environmental degradation that detract from welfare, but overall it is quite likely that measured GDP growth understates actual growth, especially when measured over long periods. It is quite possible that future economic historians, using perhaps more sophisticated measurement techniques, will evaluate ours as an era of strong growth in middle-class consumption, in contradiction to the often polemic discussion one sees in public debate on the issue.

All in all, the debt supercycle and secular stagnation view of today’s global economy may be two different views of the same phenomenon, but they are not equal. The debt supercycle model matches up with a couple of hundred years of experience of similar financial crises. The secular stagnation view does not capture the heart attack the global economy experienced; slow-moving demographics do not explain sharp housing price bubbles and collapses.

Low real interest rates mask an elevated credit surface
What about the very low value of real interest rates? Low rates are often taken as prima facie by secular stagnation proponents, who argue that only a chronic demand deficiency could be responsible for steadily driving down the global real interest rate. The steady decline of real interest rates is certainly a puzzle, but there are a host of factors. First, we do not actually observe the true economic real interest rate; that would require a utility-based price index that is extremely difficult to construct in a world of rapid change in both the kinds of goods we consume and the way we consume them. My guess is that the true real interest rate is higher, and perhaps this bias is larger than usual. Correspondingly, true economic inflation is probably considerably lower than even the low measured values that central banks are struggling to raise.

Perhaps more importantly, in a world where regulation has sharply curtailed access for many smaller and riskier borrowers, low sovereign bond yields do not necessarily capture the broader ‘credit surface’ the global economy faces (Geanokoplos 2014). Whether by accident or design, banking and financial market regulation has hugely favoured low-risk borrowers (governments and cash-heavy corporates), knocking out other potential borrowers who might have competed up rates. Many of those who can borrow face higher collateral requirements. The elevated credit surface is partly due to inherent riskiness and slow growth in the post-Crisis economy, but policy has also played a large role. Many governments, particularly in Europe, have rammed down the throats of pension funds, banks, and insurance companies. Financial repression of this type not only effectively taxes middle-income savers and pensioners (who receive low rates of return on their savings) but also potential borrowers (especially middle-class consumers and small businesses), which these institutions might have financed to a greater extent if they were not required to be so overweight in government debt.

Surely global interest rates are also affected by the massive balance sheet expansions that most advanced-country central banks have engaged in. I don’t believe this is as important as the other effects I have discussed (even if most market participants would say the reverse). Global quantitative easing by advanced countries and sterilised intervention operations by emerging markets have also surely had a very large impact on bringing down market volatility measures.

The fact that global stock market indices have hit new peaks is certainly a problem for the secular stagnation theory, unless one believes that profit shares are going to rise massively further. I won’t pretend there is one simple explanation for the stock-bond disconnect (after all, I have already listed several). But one important observation follows the work of my colleague Robert Barro. He has shown that in canonical equilibrium macroeconomic models (could be Keynesian, but his is not), small changes in the market perception of tail risks can lead both to significantly lower real risk-free interest rates and a higher equity premium. Another one of my colleagues, Martin Weitzman, has espoused a different variant of the same idea based on how people form Bayesian assessments of the risk of extreme events.

Indeed, it is not hard to believe that the average global investor changed their general assessment of all types of tail risks after the global financial crisis. The fact that emerging market investors are playing a steadily increasing role in global portfolios also plausibly raises generalised risk perceptions, since of course many of these investors inhabit regions that are still inherently riskier than advanced countries. I don’t have time to go into great detail here, though I have discussed the idea for many years in policy writings (Rogoff 2015), and have explored the idea analytically in a recent paper with Carmen and Vincent Reinhart (Reinhart et al. 2015). Of course, a rise in tail risks will also initially cause asset prices to drop (as they did in the financial crisis), but then subsequently they will offer a higher rate of return to compensate for risk. All in all, a rise in tail risks seems quite plausible, even if massive central bank intervention sometimes masks the effect in market volatility measures.

What are the policy differences between the debt supercycle and secular stagnation view?
When it comes to government spending that productively and efficiently enhances future growth, the differences are not first order. With low real interest rates, and large numbers of unemployed (or underemployed) construction workers, good infrastructure projects should offer a much higher rate of return than usual.

However, those who would argue that even a very mediocre project is worth doing when interest rates are low have a much tougher case to make. It is highly superficial and dangerous to argue that debt is basically free. To the extent that low interest rates result from fear of tail risks a la Barro-Weitzman, one has to assume that the government is not itself exposed to the kinds of risks the market is worried about, especially if overall economy-wide debt and pension obligations are near or at historic highs already. Obstfeld (2013) has argued cogently that governments in countries with large financial sectors need to have an ample cushion, as otherwise government borrowing might become very expensive in precisely the states of nature where the private sector has problems. Alternatively, if one views low interest rates as giving a false view of the broader credit surface (as Geanokoplos argues), one has to worry whether higher government debt will perpetuate the political economy of policies that are helping the government finance debt, but making it more difficult for small businesses and the middle class to obtain credit.

Unlike secular stagnation, the debt supercycle is not forever. As the economy recovers, the economy will be in position for a new rising phase of the leverage cycle. Over time, financial innovation will bypass some of the more onerous regulations. If so, real interest rates will rise though the overall credit surface facing the economy will flatten and ease.

Sundry unrelated issues
Let me conclude by briefly touching on a few further issues. First, it is unfortunate that in the debate over the size of government, there is far too little discussion of how to make government a more effective provider of services. The case for having a bigger government can be strengthened when combined with ways of finding out how to make government better. Education would seem to be a leading example. Second, inequality within advanced countries is certainly a problem and plausibly plays a role in the global shift to a higher savings rate. Tax policy should be used to address these secular trends, perhaps starting with higher taxes on urban land, which seems to lie at the root of inequality in wealth trends. I am puzzled again, however, that those who claim to be interested in inequality from a fairness perspective pay so much attention to the world’s upper middle class (the middle class of advanced countries), and so little attention to the true global middle class. Shouldn’t a factory worker in China should get the same weight in global welfare as one in France? If so, the past 30 years have largely been characterised by historic decreases in inequality (Rogoff 2014), not rises as many seem to believe. In any event, these are all important issues, but should not be confused with longer-term output per capita trends.

Concluding remarks
In sum, the case for describing the world as being in a debt supercycle is both theoretically and empirically compelling. The case for secular stagnation is far thinner. It is always very difficult to predict long-run future growth trends, and although there are some headwinds, technological progress seems at least as likely to outperform over the next two decades as it is to exhibit a sharp slowdown.

Again, the US appears to be near the tail end of its leverage cycle, Europe is still deleveraging, while China may be nearing the downside of a leverage cycle. Though many factors are at work, the view that we have lived through a debt supercycle, marked by a severe financial crisis (Lo and Rogoff 2015), is far more constructive for policy analysis than the view that the world is suffering from long-term secular stagnation due to a chronic shortfall of demand.

vox
Be Kind; Everyone You Meet is Fighting a Battle.
Ian Mclaren
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If you have more than you need, build a longer table rather than a taller fence.
l6l803399
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So, first of all, let me assert my firm belief that the only thing we have to fear is...fear itself — nameless, unreasoning, unjustified terror which paralyzes needed efforts to convert retreat into advance.
Franklin D. Roosevelt

Zel

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Re:Krugman et al
« Responder #1592 em: 2015-04-22 23:21:44 »
e agora a minha opiniao  :D

acho que eh uma mistura do "debt supercycle" com a "wage arbitrage" asiatica e a demografia
« Última modificação: 2015-04-22 23:23:35 por Neo-Liberal »

vbm

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Re:Krugman et al
« Responder #1593 em: 2015-04-22 23:48:41 »
Hei de ler! :)

Zel

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Re:Krugman et al
« Responder #1594 em: 2015-04-23 11:45:23 »
Friedrich Hayek: Why Intellectuals Drift Towards Socialism

Zel

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Re:Krugman et al
« Responder #1595 em: 2015-04-23 11:46:37 »

Incognitus

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Re:Krugman et al
« Responder #1596 em: 2015-04-23 11:52:07 »
Uma coisa no debate da desigualdade que nunca aparece, é que nunca ninguém comenta a brutal diferença que existe entre alguém que cria um negócio que serve milhões ou um bilião de outras pessoas de alguma forma, versus alguém que nem sequer a si próprio se consegue servir e necessita de apoios para se alimentar, vestir, viver sem ser um marginal...

Ou mesmo a diferença entre alguém que colabora no primeiro projecto (sem ser o seu fundador), versus alguém que está na segunda situação. A produção deste trabalhador para os outros é infinitamente superior à do segundo indivíduo, porque o segundo tem um rendimento negativo (ou zero, se quisermos ser simpáticos). E mesmo acima desse patamar, ainda existirão diferenças de 10x, 100x, 1000x, 10000x entre umas ocupações e outras (já remuneradas).
"Nem tudo o que pode ser contado conta, e nem tudo o que conta pode ser contado.", Albert Einstein

Incognitus, www.thinkfn.com

mig

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Re:Krugman et al
« Responder #1597 em: 2015-04-23 12:07:00 »
Uma coisa no debate da desigualdade que nunca aparece, é que nunca ninguém comenta a brutal diferença que existe entre alguém que cria um negócio que serve milhões ou um bilião de outras pessoas de alguma forma, versus alguém que nem sequer a si próprio se consegue servir e necessita de apoios para se alimentar, vestir, viver sem ser um marginal...

Ou mesmo a diferença entre alguém que colabora no primeiro projecto (sem ser o seu fundador), versus alguém que está na segunda situação. A produção deste trabalhador para os outros é infinitamente superior à do segundo indivíduo, porque o segundo tem um rendimento negativo (ou zero, se quisermos ser simpáticos). E mesmo acima desse patamar, ainda existirão diferenças de 10x, 100x, 1000x, 10000x entre umas ocupações e outras (já remuneradas).

Ainda não percebeste que o pleno emprego nunca mais volta? a tecnologia veio substituir o homem, e o rendimento mínimo garantido é o único caminho para a sociedade voltar a ter paz e estabilidade.
« Última modificação: 2015-04-23 12:09:23 por mig »

Zenith

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Re:Krugman et al
« Responder #1598 em: 2015-04-23 12:17:04 »
Uma coisa no debate da desigualdade que nunca aparece, é que nunca ninguém comenta a brutal diferença que existe entre alguém que cria um negócio que serve milhões ou um bilião de outras pessoas de alguma forma, versus alguém que nem sequer a si próprio se consegue servir e necessita de apoios para se alimentar, vestir, viver sem ser um marginal...

Ou mesmo a diferença entre alguém que colabora no primeiro projecto (sem ser o seu fundador), versus alguém que está na segunda situação. A produção deste trabalhador para os outros é infinitamente superior à do segundo indivíduo, porque o segundo tem um rendimento negativo (ou zero, se quisermos ser simpáticos). E mesmo acima desse patamar, ainda existirão diferenças de 10x, 100x, 1000x, 10000x entre umas ocupações e outras (já remuneradas).

Essa glorificação individual é uma repetição dos livros de história ou poemas épicos que atribuem ao rei ou ao general todo o mérito nas vitórias militares, não tem nenhum cabimento.
Se não tivesse existido o Sam Walton o Wal Mart não existiria, mas o panorama do comércio a retalho seria idêntico (possivelemnete com empresas mais pequanas), se não tivesse existido o Steve Jobs ou Bill Gates aí talvez tivesse exitido um atraso de meia duzia de anos (no maximo) mas revolução da informática pessoal teria existido à mesma.

Deus Menor

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Re:Krugman et al
« Responder #1599 em: 2015-04-23 12:23:45 »
o rendimento mínimo garantido é o único caminho para a sociedade voltar a ter paz e estabilidade.

Para mim o rendimento mínimo garantido seria:

- um vale para utilizar no arrendamento
- senhas do comida diária

ou seja , uma ajuda para alojamento e comida diária, nem mais nem menos.

Quem fosse beneficiário do RMG, não poderia ter:
- carro
- telemóvel
- tv cabo
- internet e computadores