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Autor Tópico: Krugman et al  (Lida 605854 vezes)

D. Antunes

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Re:Krugman et al
« Responder #1500 em: 2015-04-09 01:03:55 »
Rand Paul and the Empty Box

Nate Cohn tells us that Rand Paul can’t win as a libertarian, because there basically aren’t any libertarians. And that’s true. I wish I could say that Rand Paul can’t win because he believes in crank monetary economics, etc. But the truth is that these things matter much less than the fact that not many Americans consider themselves libertarian, and even those who do are deluding themselves.

But why? Think of a stylized representation of issue space: (anexo)

You might be tempted to say that this is a vast oversimplification, that there’s much more to politics than just these two issues. But the reality is that even in this stripped-down representation, half the boxes are basically empty. There ought in principle, you might think, be people who are pro-gay-marriage and civil rights in general, but opposed to government retirement and health care programs — that is, libertarians — but there are actually very few.

There’s also a corresponding empty box on the other side, which is maybe even emptier; I don’t even know a good catchphrase for it. (Suggestions?) I’m putting in “hardhats” to show my age, because I remember the good old days when rampaging union workers — who presumably supported pro-labor policies, unemployment benefits, and Medicare — liked to beat up dirty hippies. But it’s hard to find anyone like that in today’s political scene.

So why are these boxes empty? Why is American politics essentially one-dimensional, so that supporters of gay marriage are also supporters of guaranteed health insurance and vice versa? (And positions on foreign affairs — bomb or talk? — are pretty much perfectly aligned too).

Well, the best story I have is Corey Robin’s: It’s fundamentally about challenging or sustaining traditional hierarchy. The actual lineup of positions on social and economic issues doesn’t make sense if you assume that conservatives are, as they claim, defenders of personal liberty on all fronts. But it makes perfect sense if you suppose that conservatism is instead about preserving traditional forms of authority: employers over workers, patriarchs over families. A strong social safety net undermines the first, because it empowers workers to demand more or quit; permissive social policy undermines the second in obvious ways.

And I suppose that you have to say that modern liberalism is in some sense the obverse — it is about creating a society that is more fluid as well as fairer. We all like to laugh at the war-on-Christmas types, right-wing blowhards who fulminate about the liberal plot to destroy family values. We like to point out that a country like France, with maternity leave, aid to new mothers, and more, is a lot more family-friendly than rat-race America. But if “family values” actually means traditional structures of authority, then there’s a grain of truth in the accusation. Both social insurance and civil rights are solvents that dissolve some of the restraints that hold people in place, be they unhappy workers or unhappy spouses. And that’s part of why people like me support them.

In any case, bear this in mind whenever you read some pontificating about a libertarian moment, or whatever. There are almost no genuine libertarians in America — and the people who like to use that name for themselves do not, in reality, love liberty.

Krugman


Artigo interessante. Não sei se a explicação para não haver muitos libertários é essencialmente essa.
Eu sou economicamente a favor de impostos baixos e liberdade económica (com regulação estatal e forte combate à corrupção).
Em relação à política de costumes sou moderado.  Aceito que os casais homossexuais tenham direitos (embora seja contra o uso da palavra casamento para um casal homossexual, mas isso não é o mais relevante). Acho estranho que o aborto tenha prioridade no SNS e não pague taxas moderadores e penso que não é muito bom num contexto de envelhecimento da população, mas não tenho grandes problemas filosóficas com a sua legalização. Mas defendo a família como importante para a educação das novas gerações.
Estarei pois entre os libertários e os conservadores.
“Price is what you pay. Value is what you get.”
“In the short run the market is a voting machine. In the long run, it’s a weighting machine."
Warren Buffett

“O bom senso é a coisa do mundo mais bem distribuída: todos pensamos tê-lo em tal medida que até os mais difíceis de contentar nas outras coisas não costumam desejar mais bom senso do que aquele que têm."
René Descartes

Kin2010

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Re:Krugman et al
« Responder #1501 em: 2015-04-09 03:35:13 »
Ben S. Bernanke | March 31, 2015 11:00am

Why are interest rates so low, part 2: Secular stagnation
 
Three of the most important objectives for economic policy are:

Achieving full employment
Keeping inflation low and stable
Maintaining financial stability

Larry Summers’ secular stagnation hypothesis holds that achieving these three goals simultaneously may prove very difficult. (See Larry’s statement of the case and a collection of short pieces on the subject by prominent economists.)

The term “secular stagnation” was coined by Alvin Hansen in his 1938 American Economic Association presidential address, “Economic Progress and Declining Population Growth.” Writing in the latter stages of the Great Depression, Hansen argued that, because of apparent slowdowns in population growth and the pace of technological advance, firms were unlikely to see much reason to invest in new capital goods. He concluded that tepid investment spending, together with subdued consumption by households, would likely prevent the attainment of full employment for many years.

Hansen proved quite wrong, of course, failing to anticipate the postwar economic boom (including both strong population growth—the baby boom—and rapid technological progress). However, Summers thinks that Hansen’s prediction was not wrong, just premature. For a number of reasons—including the contemporary decline in population growth, the reduced capital intensity of our leading industries (think Facebook versus steel-making), and the falling relative prices of capital goods—Larry sees Hansen’s prediction of limited investment in new capital goods and an economy that chronically fails to reach full employment as relevant today. If the returns to capital today are very low, then the real interest rate needed to achieve full employment (the equilibrium real interest rate) will likely also be very low, possibly negative. The recent pattern of slow economic growth, low inflation, and low real interest rates (see below) motivates and is consistent with the secular stagnation hypothesis.

Notice, by the way, that the secular stagnation story is about inadequate aggregate demand, not aggregate supply. Even if the economy’s potential output is growing, the Hansen-Summers hypothesis holds that depressed investment and consumption spending will prevent the economy from reaching that potential, except perhaps when a financial bubble (like the housing bubble of the 2000s) provides an additional push to spending. However, Summers argues that secular stagnation will ultimately reduce aggregate supply as well, as growth in the economy’s productive capacity is restrained by slow rates of capital formation and by the loss of workers’ skills caused by long-term unemployment.

The Fed cannot reduce market (nominal) interest rates below zero, and consequently—assuming it maintains its current 2 percent target for inflation—cannot reduce real interest rates (the market interest rate less inflation) below minus 2 percent. (I’ll ignore here the possibility that monetary tools like quantitative easing or slightly negative official interest rates might allow the Fed to get the real rate a bit below minus 2 percent.)

Suppose that, because of secular stagnation, the economy’s equilibrium real interest rate is below minus 2 percent and likely to stay there. Then the Fed alone cannot achieve full employment unless it either (1) raises its inflation target, thereby giving itself room to drive the real interest rate further into negative territory by setting market rates at zero; or (2) accepts the recurrence of financial bubbles as a means of increasing consumer and business spending. It’s in this sense that the three economic goals with which I began—full employment, low inflation, and financial stability—are difficult to achieve simultaneously in an economy afflicted by secular stagnation.

Larry’s proposed solution to this dilemma is to turn to fiscal policy—specifically, to rely on public infrastructure spending to achieve full employment. I agree that increased infrastructure spending would be a good thing in today’s economy. But if we are really in a regime of persistent stagnation, more fiscal spending might not be an entirely satisfactory long-term response either, because the government’s debt is already very large by historical standards and because public investment too will eventually exhibit diminishing returns.

Does the U.S. economy face secular stagnation? I am skeptical, and the sources of my skepticism go beyond the fact that the U.S. economy looks to be well on the way to full employment today. First, as I pointed out as a participant on the IMF panel at which Larry first raised the secular stagnation argument, at real interest rates persistently as low as minus 2 percent it’s hard to imagine that there would be a permanent dearth of profitable investment projects.

As Larry’s uncle Paul Samuelson taught me in graduate school at MIT, if the real interest rate were expected to be negative indefinitely, almost any investment is profitable.

For example, at a negative (or even zero) interest rate, it would pay to level the Rocky Mountains to save even the small amount of fuel expended by trains and cars that currently must climb steep grades. It’s therefore questionable that the economy’s equilibrium real rate can really be negative for an extended period. (I concede that there are some counterarguments to this point; for example, because of credit risk or uncertainty, firms and households may have to pay positive interest rates to borrow even if the real return to safe assets is negative. Also, Eggertson and Mehrotra (2014) offers a model for how credit constraints can lead to persistent negative returns. Whether these counterarguments are quantitatively plausible remains to be seen.)

Second, I generally agree with the recent critique of secular stagnation by Jim Hamilton, Ethan Harris, Jan Hatzius, and Kenneth West. In particular, they take issue with Larry’s claim that we have never seen full employment during the past several decades without the presence of a financial bubble. They note that the bubble in tech stocks came very late in the boom of the 1990s, and they provide estimates to show that the positive effects of the housing bubble of the 2000’s on consumer demand were largely offset by other special factors, including the negative effects of the sharp increase in world oil prices and the drain on demand created by a trade deficit equal to 6 percent of US output. They argue that recent slow growth is likely due less to secular stagnation than to temporary “headwinds” that are already in the process of dissipating. During my time as Fed chairman I frequently cited the economic headwinds arising from the aftermath of the financial crisis on credit conditions; the slow recovery of housing; and restrictive fiscal policies at both the federal and the state and local levels (for example, see my August and November 2012 speeches.)

My greatest concern about Larry’s formulation, however, is the lack of attention to the international dimension. He focuses on factors affecting domestic capital investment and household spending. All else equal, however, the availability of profitable capital investments anywhere in the world should help defeat secular stagnation at home. The foreign exchange value of the dollar is one channel through which this could work: If US households and firms invest abroad, the resulting outflows of financial capital would be expected to weaken the dollar, which in turn would promote US exports. (For intuition about the link between foreign investment and exports, think of the simple case in which the foreign investment takes the form of exporting, piece by piece, a domestically produced factory for assembly abroad. In that simple case, the foreign investment and the exports are equal and simultaneous.) Increased exports would raise production and employment at home, helping the economy reach full employment. In short, in an open economy, secular stagnation requires that the returns to capital investment be permanently low everywhere, not just in the home economy. Of course, all else is not equal; financial capital does not flow as freely across borders as within countries, for example. But this line of thought opens up interesting alternatives to the secular stagnation hypothesis, as I’ll elaborate in my next post.

bernanke


Ora aqui está um artigo espectacular, muitíssimo bem escrito, claro. É um tipo de prosa que "força" um principiante como eu a aprender estas coisas! Compreendi tudo, por ele explicar tão bem. Já o artigo do L. Summers acima está confuso e pobremente escrito.


Lark

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Re:Krugman et al
« Responder #1502 em: 2015-04-09 07:49:49 »
Ora aqui está um artigo espectacular, muitíssimo bem escrito, claro. É um tipo de prosa que "força" um principiante como eu a aprender estas coisas! Compreendi tudo, por ele explicar tão bem. Já o artigo do L. Summers acima está confuso e pobremente escrito.

Mas não bate o krugman, na minha opinião. Em ritmo, em piada e mesmo em clareza. É mais denso. Mas foi uma surpresa agradável, lá isso foi.

L
Be Kind; Everyone You Meet is Fighting a Battle.
Ian Mclaren
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If you have more than you need, build a longer table rather than a taller fence.
l6l803399
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So, first of all, let me assert my firm belief that the only thing we have to fear is...fear itself — nameless, unreasoning, unjustified terror which paralyzes needed efforts to convert retreat into advance.
Franklin D. Roosevelt

vbm

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Re:Krugman et al
« Responder #1503 em: 2015-04-09 09:45:40 »
Ora aqui está um artigo espectacular, muitíssimo bem escrito, claro. É um tipo de prosa que "força" um principiante como eu a aprender estas coisas! Compreendi tudo, por ele explicar tão bem. Já o artigo do L. Summers acima está confuso e pobremente escrito.

Passei a papel, as últimas transcrições.
Vou-me entreter no café! :)
(A ver se aprendo a ver.)

Lark

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Re:Krugman et al
« Responder #1504 em: 2015-04-11 15:47:09 »
um exemplo do krugman a escrever sobre outras coisas...
o homem escreve bem mesmo

Apple and the Self-Surveillance State

Like lots of people, I’m paying attention to the Apple Watch buzz, and doing some of my own speculation. Needless to say, I have no special expertise here. But what the heck; I might as well put my own thoughts out there.

So, here’s my pathetic version of a grand insight: wearables like the Apple watch actually serve a very different function — indeed, almost the opposite function — from that served by previous mobile devices. A smartphone is useful mainly because it lets you keep track of things; wearables will be useful mainly because they let things keep track of you.

As I’ve written before, these days I wear a Fitbit, not because I want precise metrics on my fitness regime — which I’m probably not getting — but precisely because the thing spies on me all the time, and therefore doesn’t let me lie to myself about my efforts. And to get that benefit, I don’t need to be able to read information off the device — the basic version is just a blank band, communicating its information by Bluetooth. All I need is to be able to check up on myself once or twice a day.

Now, in this case the only intended recipient of this information is myself, although for all I know the NSA, the Machine, and Samaritan are tracking me too. (If you’re not watching Person of Interest, you should be.) But it’s easy to imagine how a wristband that provides information to others could be very useful — easy to imagine because it already happens at Disney World, where the Magic Band tracks you, letting rides know that you have bought a ticket, restaurants know that you’ve arrived and what table you’re sitting at, and more.

And yes, I know that your phone can do some of this; but a wearable can gather more information while being, you know, wearable.

But will people want a Disney-like experience out in the alleged real world? Almost surely the answer is yes.

Consider the Varian rule, which says that you can forecast the future by looking at what the rich have today — that is, that what affluent people will want in the future is, in general, something like what only the truly rich can afford right now. Well, one thing that’s very clear if you spend any time around the rich — and one of the very few things that I, who by and large never worry about money, sometimes envy — is that rich people don’t wait in line. They have minions who ensure that there’s a car waiting at the curb, that the maitre-d escorts them straight to their table, that there’s a staff member to hand them their keys and their bags are already in the room.

And it’s fairly obvious how smart wristbands could replicate some of that for the merely affluent. Your reservation app provides the restaurant with the data it needs to recognize your wristband, and maybe causes your table to flash up on your watch, so you don’t mill around at the entrance, you just walk in and sit down (which already happens in Disney World.) You walk straight into the concert or movie you’ve bought tickets for, no need even to have your phone scanned. And I’m sure there’s much more — all kinds of context-specific services that you won’t even have to ask for, because systems that track you know what you’re up to and what you’re about to need.

Yes, it can sound kind of creepy. Even if there are protocols that supposedly set limits, revealing only what and to whom you want, there will tend to be an expansion of your public profile and contraction of your private space — not to mention the likelihood that the NSA, the Machine, and Samaritan are watching regardless. But two points here. First, most people probably don’t have that much to be private about; most of us don’t actually have double lives and deep secrets — at most we have minor vices, and the truth is that nobody cares. Second, lack of privacy is actually part of the experience of being rich — the chauffeur, the maids, and the doorman know all, but are paid not to tell, and the same will be be true of their upper-middle-class digital versions. The rich already live in a kind of privatized surveillance state; now the opportunity to live in a gilded fishbowl is being (somewhat) democratized.

So that’s my two cents (which purchase as much in digital terms as several hundred dollars back when). I think wearables will become pervasive very soon, but not so that people can look at their wrists and learn something. Instead, they’ll be there so the ubiquitous surveillance net can see them, and give them stuff.

krugman
Be Kind; Everyone You Meet is Fighting a Battle.
Ian Mclaren
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If you have more than you need, build a longer table rather than a taller fence.
l6l803399
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So, first of all, let me assert my firm belief that the only thing we have to fear is...fear itself — nameless, unreasoning, unjustified terror which paralyzes needed efforts to convert retreat into advance.
Franklin D. Roosevelt

vbm

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Re:Krugman et al
« Responder #1505 em: 2015-04-11 19:11:57 »
Já estou a ler os extractos :)

Para já, estou a 'gostar' do Bernanke.
Mas a economia é área de areia movediça,
tudo pelo que se abstrai com o ceteris paribus!

vbm

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Re:Krugman et al
« Responder #1506 em: 2015-04-11 19:53:39 »
E também estou a ler a colossal manipulação
colectiva de consciências para formatar
a apetência de compra de diamantes
e assim consolidar o monopólio (De Beers)
do respectivo comércio
a preços muito
acima do
real valor
dos ditos diamantes,
pedra perecível e incinerável
com a máxima facilidade, mas
mentalizada como eterna, como
apta a vincular amor imperecível,
ainda que tão fugaz como
o que quer se reduza
a cinzas, mas, mais
forte a narrativa,
mítica, de Marylin
«Diamonds are forever»   


« Última modificação: 2015-04-12 09:11:08 por vbm »

Lark

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Re:Krugman et al
« Responder #1507 em: 2015-04-12 01:44:11 »
There are two big lessons from GE’s announcement that it is planning to get out of the finance business. First, the much maligned Dodd-Frank financial reform is doing some real good. Second, Republicans have been talking nonsense on the subject. OK, maybe point #2 isn’t really news, but it’s important to understand just what kind of nonsense they’ve been talking.

GE Capital was a quintessential example of the rise of shadow banking. In most important respects it acted like a bank; it created systemic risks very much like a bank; but it was effectively unregulated, and had to be bailed out through ad hoc arrangements that understandably had many people furious about putting taxpayers on the hook for private irresponsibility.

Most economists, I think, believe that the rise of shadow banking had less to do with real advantages of such nonbank banks than it did with regulatory arbitrage — that is, institutions like GE Capital were all about exploiting the lack of adequate oversight. And the general view is that the 2008 crisis came about largely because regulatory evasion had reached the point where an old-fashioned wave of bank runs, albeit wearing somewhat different clothes, was once again possible.

So Dodd-Frank tries to fix the bad incentives by subjecting systemically important financial institutions — SIFIs — to greater oversight, higher capital and liquidity requirements, etc.. And sure enough, what GE is in effect saying is that if we have to compete on a level playing field, if we can’t play the moral hazard game, it’s not worth being in this business. That’s a clear demonstration that reform is having a real effect.

Now, the more or less official GOP line is that the crisis had nothing to do with runaway banks — it was all about Barney Frank somehow forcing poor innocent bankers to make loans to Those People. And the line on the right also asserts that the SIFI designation is actually an invitation to behave badly, that institutions so designated know that they are too big to fail and can start living high on the moral hazard hog.

But as Mike Konczal notes, GE — following in the footsteps of others, notably MetLife — is clearly desperate to get out from under the SIFI designation. It sure looks as if being named a SIFI is indeed what it’s supposed to be, a burden rather than a bonus.

A good day for the reformers.

krugman
Be Kind; Everyone You Meet is Fighting a Battle.
Ian Mclaren
------------------------------
If you have more than you need, build a longer table rather than a taller fence.
l6l803399
-------------------------------------------
So, first of all, let me assert my firm belief that the only thing we have to fear is...fear itself — nameless, unreasoning, unjustified terror which paralyzes needed efforts to convert retreat into advance.
Franklin D. Roosevelt

Kin2010

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Re:Krugman et al
« Responder #1508 em: 2015-04-12 02:01:21 »
Também engraçado ver as expressões de desprezo do Krugman para com a Ayn Rand. Expressões como "o modelo monetário Atlas Shrugged" e assim. Há alturas em que um prémio Nobel tem que mostrar quem é quem, por mais sérios que estes pareçam, e mesmo que tenhm pretensões "eruditas", como a Ayn Rand e os modernos Tea Partys que a adoram. Fico às vezes com pena daqueles que o Krugman critica, ficam tão maltratados, e ele mostra-se tão superior, como seria de esperar de um Nobel e worldwide expert, que faz pena.



Zel

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Re:Krugman et al
« Responder #1509 em: 2015-04-12 07:44:23 »
Também engraçado ver as expressões de desprezo do Krugman para com a Ayn Rand. Expressões como "o modelo monetário Atlas Shrugged" e assim. Há alturas em que um prémio Nobel tem que mostrar quem é quem, por mais sérios que estes pareçam, e mesmo que tenhm pretensões "eruditas", como a Ayn Rand e os modernos Tea Partys que a adoram. Fico às vezes com pena daqueles que o Krugman critica, ficam tão maltratados, e ele mostra-se tão superior, como seria de esperar de um Nobel e worldwide expert, que faz pena.


o krugman eh incoerente e mal-educado e as vezes as suas criticas correm-lhe mal (o lark tenta-lhe copiar o estilo e creio que ate consegue)

deixo aqui a famosa resposta do niall  ferguson a um ataque que lhe foi dirigido pelo krugman e que desmonta o mito paul krugman com uma extensa analisa das suas previsoes

sao 3 partes no huffington post...

http://www.huffingtonpost.com/niall-ferguson/paul-krugman-euro_b_4060733.html
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/niall-ferguson/paul-krugman-housing-crisis_b_4067580.html
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/niall-ferguson/krugtron-the-invincible-p_b_4073956.html
 
« Última modificação: 2015-04-12 08:22:37 por Neo-Liberal »

tommy

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Re:Krugman et al
« Responder #1510 em: 2015-04-12 08:17:42 »
Krugman adora ouvir a sua voz/ler os seus escritos. Um pouco como o Lark. Não importa que ou digam coisas comprovadamente erradas ou completamente desadequadas ao país em questão.

http://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/krugman-us-uk-recovery-contradiction-by-jeffrey-d-sachs-2015-04

Citar
NEW YORK – It is truly odd to read Paul Krugman rail, time and again, against the British government. His latest screed begins with the claim that “Britain’s economic performance since the financial crisis struck has been startlingly bad.” He excoriates Prime Minister David Cameron’s government for its “poor economic record,” and wonders how he and his cabinet can possibly pose “as the guardians of prosperity.”

Hmm. In recent months, Krugman has repeatedly praised the US economic recovery under President Barack Obama, while attacking the United Kingdom’s record. But when we compare the two economies side by side, their trajectories are broadly similar, with the UK outperforming the United States on certain indicators.

Consider, first, the unemployment rate. In the fourth quarter of 2007, the UK’s rate was 5.2%. When Cameron’s government took office in May 2010, it was 7.9%. In the most recent reporting period (November 2014-January 2015), it was 5.7%. In the US, the unemployment rate in the fourth quarter of 2007 was 4.8%, 9.8% in March-May 2010, and 5.7% in November 2014-January 2015. In both countries, the unemployment rate is therefore slightly above the pre-crisis (end-2007) level, with no significant net difference over the business cycle from the end of 2007 until now.

Next, let’s look at the employment rate, which in the UK stood at 72.9% of the population aged 16-64 at the end of 2007. It fell to 70.4% by the time the Cameron government came to power, but since then has risen strongly, to 73.3% in November 2014-January 2015, an all-time high. In the US, by contrast, the employment rate was 62.8% at the end of 2007, 58.6% in March-May 2010, and then only slightly higher, at 59.2%, during November 2014-January 2015 – still below the pre-crisis level. This suggests that there are more discouraged workers in the US than in the UK.

Finally, there is output growth. In the UK, real (inflation-adjusted) GDP fell by 3.8% from the fourth quarter of 2007 to the second quarter of 2010. It then rose by 8.1% from that point until the fourth quarter of 2014. In the US, real GDP fell by 1.6% from the fourth quarter of 2007 to the second quarter of 2010, and then rose by 10.5% from then until the fourth quarter of 2014. Thus, both countries have experienced moderately high and broadly similar growth rates since May 2010, when Cameron’s government took power.

Yes, UK growth has been slightly slower, but the British economy has also faced, among other factors, the headwind of sharply falling North Sea oil production during this period, whereas the US benefited from a shale-oil boom. Obviously, neither of these long-term trends can be fairly attributed to the governments currently in office. In any case, during the past two years, from the fourth quarter of 2012 to the fourth quarter of 2014, the US economy grew by a cumulative 5.6% while the UK economy grew by 5.4%, essentially the same as the US.

Krugman seems to make much of the fact that the UK did not bounce back even more strongly from a larger output decline between the fourth quarter of 2007 and the fourth quarter of 2010 – a fall that occurred before the Cameron government took office. That is true, and measured UK productivity growth has remained low, but nobody can be sure why.

Perhaps the unsustainable pre-2008 bubble was larger in the UK; perhaps the UK’s structure (particularly the larger share of finance in its GDP and the continued decline in energy output) made the initial downturn less reversible. The UK has been more vulnerable than the US to the eurozone’s prolonged crisis. Moreover, subtle differences between the US and UK in national income accounting should be taken into account in comparing productivity trends.

The International Monetary Fund’s estimate of the output gap (see its World Economic Outlook database) for both countries does not suggest that, as of 2014, the UK is more cyclically depressed than the US. Indeed, in the IMF’s estimates at least, the opposite is the case. The IMF puts the UK output gap (as a percent of potential GDP) at 1.2%, compared to 3.5% in the US. Of course, both estimates are subject to questions of interpretation; the IMF assumes, for example, that the UK was operating well above potential GDP in 2006-8.

The fact is that the US and UK economies look rather alike in their overall cyclical patterns, with sharp downturns from 2007 to 2010 followed by recoveries in both jobs and GDP since then, and with a fairly rapid pace of recovery in the past two years. So, if Krugman praises the Obama recovery, he should also praise the Cameron recovery. They are very similar.

Perhaps more notable is that both the US and UK economies have cast considerable doubt on Krugman’s oft-repeated view that a robust recovery would require further fiscal stimulus, a position that he maintained at least until 2013. The post-2010 recoveries in both countries came despite significant cuts in the structural (cyclically adjusted) budget deficit, suggesting that both recoveries occurred in the face of fiscal contraction. According to the IMF estimates, the structural budget deficit was cut from 8.4% of potential GDP in 2010 to 4.1% in 2014 in the UK, and from 9.1% to 4% in the US during the same period.

Rather than lambasting Cameron while lauding Obama, Krugman should be praising both countries for their recoveries. The truth is that – barring another Greek tragedy – both the UK and US are finally out of the post-2008 crisis. It is time for both countries to move beyond short-term macroeconomic policy and turn their attention to the challenges of long-term sustainable development.

Automek

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Re:Krugman et al
« Responder #1511 em: 2015-04-12 12:19:32 »
Também engraçado ver as expressões de desprezo do Krugman para com a Ayn Rand. Expressões como "o modelo monetário Atlas Shrugged" e assim. Há alturas em que um prémio Nobel tem que mostrar quem é quem, por mais sérios que estes pareçam, e mesmo que tenhm pretensões "eruditas", como a Ayn Rand e os modernos Tea Partys que a adoram. Fico às vezes com pena daqueles que o Krugman critica, ficam tão maltratados, e ele mostra-se tão superior, como seria de esperar de um Nobel e worldwide expert, que faz pena.
Nos dias de hoje um prémio Nobel só é bom se for keynesiano. Se for liberal, como o Friedman, já é lixo.

Deus Menor

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Re:Krugman et al
« Responder #1512 em: 2015-04-12 19:25:45 »

Nos dias de hoje um prémio Nobel só é bom se for keynesiano. Se for liberal, como o Friedman, já é lixo.


É transversal a toda a actividade Política.

Eu quero acreditar que é o canto do cisne dos soixante-huitards, os que criaram a ilusão, banquetearam-se e deixaram-nos
a conta para pagar...


Lark

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Re:Krugman et al
« Responder #1513 em: 2015-04-12 22:34:02 »
Where Government Excels

As Republican presidential hopefuls trot out their policy agendas — which always involve cutting taxes on the rich while slashing benefits for the poor and middle class — some real new thinking is happening on the other side of the aisle. Suddenly, it seems, many Democrats have decided to break with Beltway orthodoxy, which always calls for cuts in “entitlements.” Instead, they’re proposing that Social Security benefits actually be expanded.

This is a welcome development in two ways. First, the specific case for expanding Social Security is quite good. Second, and more fundamentally, Democrats finally seem to be standing up to antigovernment propaganda and recognizing the reality that there are some things the government does better than the private sector.

Like all advanced nations, America mainly relies on private markets and private initiatives to provide its citizens with the things they want and need, and hardly anyone in our political discourse would propose changing that. The days when it sounded like a good idea to have the government directly run large parts of the economy are long past.

Yet we also know that some things more or less must be done by government. Every economics textbooks talks about “public goods” like national defense and air traffic control that can’t be made available to anyone without being made available to everyone, and which profit-seeking firms, therefore, have no incentive to provide. But are public goods the only area where the government outperforms the private sector? By no means.

One classic example of government doing it better is health insurance. Yes, conservatives constantly agitate for more privatization — in particular, they want to convert Medicare into nothing more than vouchers for the purchase of private insurance — but all the evidence says this would move us in precisely the wrong direction. Medicare and Medicaid are substantially cheaper and more efficient than private insurance; they even involve less bureaucracy. Internationally, the American health system is unique in the extent to which it relies on the private sector, and it’s also unique in its incredible inefficiency and high costs.

And there’s another major example of government superiority: providing retirement security.

Maybe we wouldn’t need Social Security if ordinary people really were the perfectly rational, farsighted agents economists like to assume in their models (and right-wingers like to assume in their propaganda). In an idealized world, 25-year-old workers would base their decisions about how much to save on a realistic assessment of what they will need to live comfortably when they’re in their 70s. They’d also be smart and sophisticated in how they invested those savings, carefully seeking the best trade-offs between risk and return.

In the real world, however, many and arguably most working Americans are saving much too little for their retirement. They’re also investing these savings badly. For example, a recent White House report found that Americans are losing billions each year thanks to investment advisers trying to maximize their own fees rather than their clients’ welfare.

Continue reading the main storyContinue reading the main storyContinue reading the main story
You might be tempted to say that if workers save too little and invest badly, it’s their own fault. But people have jobs and children, and they must cope with all the crises of life. It’s unfair to expect them to be expert investors, too. In any case, the economy is supposed to work for real people leading real lives; it shouldn’t be an obstacle course only a few can navigate.

And in the real world of retirement, Social Security is a shining example of a system that works. It’s simple and clean, with low operating costs and minimal bureaucracy. It provides older Americans who worked hard all their lives with a chance of living decently in retirement, without requiring that they show an inhuman ability to think decades ahead and be investment whizzes as well. The only problem is that the decline of private pensions, and their replacement with inadequate 401(k)-type plans, has left a gap that Social Security isn’t currently big enough to fill. So why not make it bigger?

Needless to say, suggestions along these lines are already provoking near-hysterical reactions, not just from the right, but from self-proclaimed centrists. As I wrote some years ago, calling for cuts to Social Security has long been seen inside the Beltway as a “badge of seriousness, a way of showing how statesmanlike and tough-minded you are.” And it’s only a decade since former President George W. Bush tried to privatize the program, with a lot of centrist support.

But true seriousness means looking at what works and what doesn’t. Privatized retirement schemes work very badly; Social Security works very well. And we should build on that success.

krugman
Be Kind; Everyone You Meet is Fighting a Battle.
Ian Mclaren
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If you have more than you need, build a longer table rather than a taller fence.
l6l803399
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So, first of all, let me assert my firm belief that the only thing we have to fear is...fear itself — nameless, unreasoning, unjustified terror which paralyzes needed efforts to convert retreat into advance.
Franklin D. Roosevelt

Incognitus

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Re:Krugman et al
« Responder #1514 em: 2015-04-13 00:57:50 »
Pode-se concordar com a vasta maioria desse texto. A Medicare podia bem ser expandida a todos os cidadãos. O mercado livre nunca funcionará bem na saúde porque quem decide não é geralmente quem paga.

A Medicare com o paciente a escolher onde é tratado mantém a maior parte do que interessa no mercado livre, ao mesmo tempo que o adapta a essa circunstância. E já é assim que o programa funciona, apenas não abrange todas as pessoas.

Quanto à segurança social, um misto seria provavelmente o melhor. Um mínimo disponível para qualquer pessoa, e a partir daí complementado como cada indivíduo quisesse, ou via um plano do Estado ou via um plano privado, em ambos os casos capitalizados. No caso do Estado até o poderia capitalizar a uma taxa de dívida pública longa.

"Nem tudo o que pode ser contado conta, e nem tudo o que conta pode ser contado.", Albert Einstein

Incognitus, www.thinkfn.com

Zel

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Re:Krugman et al
« Responder #1515 em: 2015-04-15 02:04:57 »
os gurus do lark dizem burrices atras de burrices.

vejamos o que dizia o bernanke em 2004 enquanto a crise de 2008 ja cozinhava

"the low-inflation era of the past two decades has seen not only significant improvements in economic growth and productivity but also a marked reduction in economic volatility, both in the United States and abroad, a phenomenon that has been dubbed “the Great Moderation.” Recessions have become less frequent and milder, and quarter-to-quarter volatility in output and employment has declined significantly as well. The sources of the Great Moderation remain somewhat controversial, but as I have argued elsewhere, there is evidence for the view that improved control of inflation has contributed in important measure to this welcome change in the economy." (Bernanke 2004)

Zel

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Re:Krugman et al
« Responder #1516 em: 2015-04-15 02:12:32 »
o facto do lark ignorar cegamente o desastroso track record dos seus gurus e continuar aqui a admira-los como se tivessem o conhecimento perfeito exemplifica bem a sua forma de pensar ultra-religiosa e sem espaco para a duvida ou pensamento independente. na realidade este topico eh uma especia de altar em honra dos gurus do lark. aqui nao ha debate mas sim veneracao.  :D
« Última modificação: 2015-04-15 02:18:26 por Neo-Liberal »

Lark

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Re:Krugman et al
« Responder #1517 em: 2015-04-15 02:24:10 »
Why are interest rates so low, part 4: Term premiums
 
Longer-term interest rates are quite low around the world. Figure 1 below shows ten-year government bond yields since 1990 for the United States, Canada, Germany, the United Kingdom, and Japan. The downward trend is clear. Moreover, further sharp declines in longer-tem yields have occurred over the past year or so. For example, in the US, ten-year Treasury yields have fallen from around 3 percent at the end of 2013, to about 2.5 percent during the summer of 2014, to around 1.9 percent today. The recent renewed decline was unexpected by most observers, including me. Why are longer-term interest rates so low? And why have they fallen even further recently, despite signs of strength in the US economy?



To explain the behavior of longer-term rates, it helps to decompose the yield on any particular bond, such as a Treasury bond issued by the US government, into three components: expected inflation, expectations about the future path of real short-term interest rates, and a term premium. At present, all three components are helping to keep longer-term interest rates low. Inflation is low and expected to remain so, so lenders are not demanding higher returns to compensate for anticipated losses in their purchasing power. Short-term interest rates are also expected to remain low, as bondholders appear pessimistic about growth prospects and the sustainable returns to capital in coming years. When short-term rates are expected to remain low, longer-term rates tend to get bid down as well.

The focus of this post, though, is on the behavior of term premiums—the third component of bond yields. Briefly, a term premium is the extra return that lenders demand to hold a longer-term bond instead of investing in a series of short-term securities (a new one-year security each year, for example). Typically, long-term yields are higher than short-term yields, implying that term premiums are usually positive (investors require extra compensation to hold longer-term bonds instead of short-term securities).

Term premiums cannot be directly observed but must be estimated from data on short-term and longer-term interest rates. Figure 2 below shows the ten-year yield on US government bonds and the associated term premium since 1961, as estimated in recent work by Tobias Adrian, Richard K. Crump, and Emanuel Moench at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York. For example, on January 2 of last year, an investor holding a ten-year Treasury bond earned a 3.2 percent yield, of which 1.6 percentage points (the estimated term premium) was the investor's compensation for holding a longer-term security. As the figure shows, like overall yields, term premiums have generally trended down since the early 1980s. The figure also shows the sharp decline in both longer-term yields and term premiums over the past year or so.



So what moves term premiums? The key factors are (1) changes in the perceived riskiness of longer-term securities and (2) changes in the demand for specific securities (or classes of securities) relative to their supply.

Risk. All else equal, term premiums on longer-term securities will be higher when investors are more risk-averse and/or the perceived risk of holding those securities is high. Historically, the most important risk for long-term bondholders has been the risk of unexpected inflation. Figure 2 shows term premiums rising from very low levels in the 1960s, peaking in the late 1970s and early 1980s, and generally on a downward trend since then. Bondholders were unconcerned about inflation in the 1960s, but the high inflation of the 1970s and early 1980s increased the risk of holding longer-term bonds. Since the 1980s, inflation and inflation fears have receded steadily, and bondholders have accordingly been willing to accept less compensation for bearing inflation risk.

Uncertainty about the near-term outlook for the economy or monetary policy also raises the riskiness of bonds. Researchers have found that term premiums tend to rise in recessions; they also rise in periods in which there is greater disagreement among economic forecasters. Merrill Lynch has devised a useful, market-based measure of uncertainty about the future course of interest rates, called the MOVE index (for Merrill Lynch Option Volatility Estimate). Higher values of MOVE indicate times when traders are willing to pay more for protection against unexpected movements in interest rates. Figure 3 below, based on a second paper by Adrian, Crump, and Moench, along with Michael Abrahams, shows that the estimated term premium and the MOVE index move together, consistent with the idea that more uncertainty and risk raise term premiums. For example, MOVE increased during the "taper tantrum" episode of the summer of 2013, a period when markets became especially uncertain about prospects for monetary policy.



As Figure 3 shows, term premiums have recently been zero or even slightly negative. That's consistent with the fact that, in a world of low inflation and accommodative monetary policy, as we have today, holding longer-term bonds may actually reduce the overall risk of investors' portfolios. For example, bad news about the economic outlook hurts stocks, but tends to be good for bond prices (which are inversely related to yields), as a weaker outlook implies that central banks will have to hold rates lower for longer. Bonds can also provide a hedge against the risk of deflation, since falling consumer prices increase the real value of the fixed dollar payments that bondholders receive. If longer-term bonds are a hedge against risk, then investors should be willing to accept low or even negative compensation for holding bonds rather than short-term securities.

Supply and demand for specific types of securities. In textbooks, the demand for securities depends only on their riskiness and expected return. In reality, securities may have other appealing features, such as liquidity (easy salability) or the ability to satisfy regulatory requirements. Therefore, changes in the demand for or supply of specific bonds can affect their term premiums. Treasury bonds, because of their unrivaled liquidity and safety, often attract extra investor demand in times of global economic or political upheaval. Treasuries are also often the asset of choice for foreign governments that want to hold large quantities of foreign exchange reserves.

Alan Greenspan’s “conundrum” of 2006, when the Fed raised short-term rates but long-term rates didn’t follow, appears to have been the result of an unusually low term premium, as can be seen in Figure 3. The "global saving glut" and the associated demand for Treasuries by foreign central banks and sovereign wealth funds may account for the low value of the term premium around 2006. Reduced uncertainty about the course of interest rates, as indicated by the low value of the MOVE index in 2006 (Figure 3), was likely also a factor.

After lowering short-term interest rates nearly to zero in December 2008, the Fed sought to ease policy further by buying large amounts of longer-term securities (quantitative easing). Quantitative easing increased the demand for longer-term government securities, thereby lowering the term premiums on them. Abrahams, Adrian, Crump, and Moench, in their research referenced above found that the term premiums on ten-year Treasury securities fell, cumulatively, by about 1.1 percentage points on days that quantitative easing measures were announced.

Changes in regulation and market practices also affect the demand for safe, liquid assets, such as Treasury securities, lowering their term premiums. For example, new regulations require banks to hold ample liquidity and securities dealers to post more collateral in derivatives transactions. Insurance companies and pension funds also face rules that effectively require them to hold significant amounts of safe, longer-term bonds. This mandated demand seems likely to put downward pressure on longer-term yields for the foreseeable future.

What's the bottom line? Overall, the behavior of term premiums helps explain the generally low level of longer-term interest rates in recent years (together, of course, with subdued inflation expectations and the market’s expectation that short-term rates will also remain low). The low level of term premiums in turn reflects a number of factors, including: minimal investor concern about inflation; relatively low uncertainty about the likely future course of interest rates (as shown by the MOVE index in Figure 3); a strong global demand for safe, liquid assets (for use as international reserves, for example, and to satisfy regulatory requirements); and quantitative easing programs by central banks.

What about the decline in longer-term yields since early 2014? In the US at least, that decline is somewhat surprising, as economic fundamentals have recently seemed more consistent with rising, not falling, longer-term yields. The year 2014 was a good one on the whole for the U.S. economy, with three million jobs created, and longer-term inflation expectations appeared to remain stable. By the process of elimination, with fundamentals stable or improving, much of the decline in yields over the past year must reflect a sharp drop in term premiums. That's in fact what Figure 3 shows.



Figure 4, provided by Tobias Adrian, takes a closer look at some components of Treasury yields since the beginning of 2013. The 10-year yield, in green, rose sharply during the taper tantrum of 2013, then fell through 2014. The dark blue line shows the estimated term premium. The difference between the yield and the term premium is the risk-neutral yield, plotted in light blue in Figure 4. The risk-neutral yield, an estimate of what the 10-year Treasury yield would be if investors were indifferent to risk, actually rose through 2014, implying that the recent decline in yields is entirely due to a falling term premium.

That naturally raises the question of why the term premium has recently fallen by so much. The answer is not obvious. Fed policy doesn't seem to explain the decline, as purchases of Treasuries under the quantitative easing program wound down last year. The MOVE index suggests that uncertainty about bond yields has not declined appreciably over the past year (see Figure 3). Regulatory changes have increased the demand for Treasuries, but those rules are being phased in over a long period and are thus not good explanations of the sharp recent swing in term premiums.

Two possible explanations for the recent moves come to mind. First, during 2014, economic weakness outside the US, especially in Europe, increased the expectation of additional quantitative easing abroad. In January 2015 the European Central Bank did indeed announce a substantial program of securities purchases. The anticipation of these purchases, together with the ongoing central bank purchases in Japan and elsewhere, may be "spilling over" into the demand for US Treasuries, pushing down their term premium. Second, the surprising decline in the price of oil occurred at about the same time as the decline in longer-term yields. Falling oil prices may have reduced investors' perception of longer-term inflation risk while also signaling weakness in the global economy. Neither of these explanations is completely satisfying. Thus, the recent decline in longer-term yields and term premiums in the US remains something of a puzzle.

ben bernanke
Be Kind; Everyone You Meet is Fighting a Battle.
Ian Mclaren
------------------------------
If you have more than you need, build a longer table rather than a taller fence.
l6l803399
-------------------------------------------
So, first of all, let me assert my firm belief that the only thing we have to fear is...fear itself — nameless, unreasoning, unjustified terror which paralyzes needed efforts to convert retreat into advance.
Franklin D. Roosevelt

Lark

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Re:Krugman et al
« Responder #1518 em: 2015-04-15 02:25:44 »
German wage hikes: A small step in the right direction
 
The Wall Street Journal reports this morning that German workers are receiving bigger wage increases. This is good news, and not just for German workers. As I discussed in a recent post, Germany's trade surplus—the largest in the world, relative to GDP—is a drag on European and global growth. In a world that is short of aggregate demand, Germany's trade surplus redirects spending away from other countries, reducing output and incomes abroad. Higher wages in Germany should promote spending by German households on both domestic goods and imports, reducing the imbalance.

Allowing wages to rise is not a concession by Germany but rather part of what the country signed on to when it joined the euro zone. Germany has been insistent that the so-called peripheral countries increase their competitiveness through slower wages rises or even wage cuts. Wage increases in Germany are an equally important, and symmetrical, part of this necessary adjustment process. Moreover, this adjustment involves no German sacrifices. German firms, which will be slightly less cost-competitive, may export less but they will also see greater demand at home. German workers are unambiguously better off, receiving higher wages commensurate with their higher productivity.

The wage increases are steps in the right direction, but relatively small steps. More gains for German workers in the future would be both warranted and a win-win proposition for Germany and its trade partners.

ben bernanke
Be Kind; Everyone You Meet is Fighting a Battle.
Ian Mclaren
------------------------------
If you have more than you need, build a longer table rather than a taller fence.
l6l803399
-------------------------------------------
So, first of all, let me assert my firm belief that the only thing we have to fear is...fear itself — nameless, unreasoning, unjustified terror which paralyzes needed efforts to convert retreat into advance.
Franklin D. Roosevelt

Pecunia...Olet!

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Re:Krugman et al
« Responder #1519 em: 2015-04-15 13:23:46 »
"Why are interest rates so low, part 4: Term premiums" - Bernanke

A tentativa de justificar a queda recente das taxas de juro nos USA com noção de "term premium" fez-me recordar outros académicos que em 1999/2000 se desdobravam em artigos e livros sobre "risk premium" para justificar coisas como Dow 36,000!

Eu não tenho nada contra taxas de juro baixas. Mas não consigo esconder o espanto de ver o ex-presidente do FED, que foi o principal responsável pela distorção da componente "procura" face à "oferta" no mercado de Treasuries nos últimos anos, fique surpreendido com os actuais movimentos de taxas de juro... "Thus, the recent decline in longer-term yields and term premiums in the US remains something of a puzzle." Afinal os modelos do FED não conseguiram prever estes efeitos? Quê? Para o bem de todos esperemos que este seja o único efeito não desejado da política monetária do FED.

A análise fechada que faz é muito limitada. O mercado de Treasuires, tendo a dimensão que tem, não funciona isolado no seu mundo de "inflation expectations" and "term premiums". Então e o movimento de valorização do USD, e a crescente falta de alternativas de investimento financeiro com perfis de risco/retorno aceitáveis, e o incentivo a assumir mais risco (de taxa de juro), e o re-investimento pelo FED dos cupões e reembolsos, e a pressão provocada pelas yields negativas nos prazos curtos (e na Europa até já nos prazos longos)... a lista poderia continuar.

Afinal, apenas um ex-presidente do FED que ainda vive agarrado ao "ceteris paribus". Ou que começa a preparar o terreno para justificar que foi "o mercado" e não "o FED" que provocou os excessos/distorções (neste caso, na opinião do Bernanke, taxas de juro de longo prazo mais baixas do que a situação económica justificaria?).