Grécia - Tópico principal

[Lark]

A necessidade de cortar a dívida no curto prazo NÃO é óbvia, porque o seu serviço, por mais 5-10 anos, continuará a ser inferior ao de Portugal ou Itália.

Assim, mesmo que mais tarde se ache que é necessário reestruturar essa dívida, essa conclusão ainda pode esperar anos.

Estranho é o insistir-se tanto que tal tenha que ocorrer JÁ.

é o IMF e o ECB que insistem.
se não consideram a dívida sustentável, dizem-lo.

o IMF mesmo depois dos arrears liquidados diz que não entra no acordo porque considera a dívida insustentável;
nos próprios estatutos do IMF está escrito que o IMF só pode emprestar a países cuja dívida seja sustentável.

o que eu acho estranho é atirar com a insustentabilidade para as calendas gregas, fazer de conta que no pasa nada.
extend and pretend como dizia o Varoufakis.

se o FMI não entrar no acordo não me parece que haja acordo.
pricipalmente com o ECB do seu lado.

portanto se os credores vão perder dinheiro, talvez o melhor seja preparar uma saída calma para o dracma, com a ajuda da UE e ECB, reestruturação e e finalmente empréstimo do FMI. Ainda podem recuperar qualquer coisa.

para Portugal a mesmíssima coisa:

a nossa dívida é ainda mais insustentável que a da Grécia.

já chega de extend e pretend para a grécia e de tapar o sol com uma peneira para Portugal.

L

[I. I. Kaspov]

Se for assim, a inflação poderá trazer algum benefício para uma população jovem e dinânica, e não certamente para a maioria de uma população envelhecida e poupada, e que não aprecia dívidas...

Bem os juros teoricamente poderiam proteger as contas bancarias  A pop envelhecida poderia simplesmente canalizar as suas a poupanças para o imobiliario;
mesmo o mercado de capitais iria ter um dinamismo que nos surpreenderia a todos;
bem eu nao estou aqui a defender que a opcao de inflaccao  seja a panaceia para  os problemas das pessoas   
 estou muito de acordo que inflaccao sem reformas por exemplo  no mercado laboral nao seria correcto;
parece-me no entanto que no atual contexto inflaccionar e a opcao correcta;

OK, agradeço o pronto esclarecimento!   

[vbm]

Sinto-me miseravelmente infeliz perante tanta eloquência de gente iluminada, nos mídia, no fórum, nas conversas de rua, sobre o que se passa actualmente na Grécia. Infeliz, porque sinto-me um estúpido à espera que um desses iluminados coloque as questões base e argumente essas mesmas questões. Mas, agora, discute-se só o que é actual e ninguém  mete o dedo na ferida e a esprema até o pus sair todo.

  Mas afinal, como é que a Grécia chegou a este ponto de falência técnica?  Quais foram as causas?  Quem foram os culpados?  Isto é básico . Sem se saber isto, não se pode tomar medidas de evitar a continuação dos problemas, nem de afastar da governança os que as causaram.

Discute-se planos de austeridade que não se faz a mínima ideia se são os adequados, pois não se discute as causas que levaram à presente situação. Discute-se ética, solidariedade, sem se saber o porquê do familiar estar pobre? Olha-se só para a árvore e que se lixe a floresta?

Bolas, devo ser o único estupidamente básico perante tanta pesporrência 

Continuando com a minha estupefacção, não entendo que diferença tem a actuação do syriza do habitual de outro partido anterior no poder na grécia, nomeadamente:

- Antes das eleições, prometeu acabar c/ austeridade, diminuir e renegociar a dívida, incluindo o slogan - não pagamos. Saída do euro caso não aceitassem as suas condições. Ganhou as eleições baseado nestas promessas.

- Depois de eleições, coerentemente fez um referendo para validar as suas promessas.


O que aconteceu?

- Fez exactamente o oposto a todas as promessas, e vai F... o Zé Povinho com a maior austeridade que a Grécia já teve, além de manter a dívida intacta.

 Mais conversas para quê?

Independentemente de concordar ou discordar da sua ideologia, para mim Varoufakis foi honesto, coerente e integro ao sair do Governo quando viu que teria que tomar ações contra a sua ideologia politica e depois ao votar contra essas mesmas medidas que discordava. 
Surpreendeu-me pela positiva.

No entanto, Adriano Moreira, que é um sábio, diz que Tsipras fez bem,
porque tal como o bispo de Silves, que um dia se terá rendido às circunstâncias,
procedeu exactamente como o bispo, o qual declarou:
- «Ao presente, não lhe vejo melhor remédio!»

É preciso ver que nem Varoufakis, nem Tsipras tinham por objectivo
sair da união da moeda única. Foi um compromisso claro com que foram eleitos.

Quando o referêndum foi decidido, logo na propaganda os do «Sim» e a Europa
aterrorizaram os eleitores que o «Não» equivaleria a sair do euro.

O governo garantiu que isso não seria assim, a única coisa que sucederia
com o «Não» era que a posição negocial grega seria reforçada.

Pois bem, por duro que Varoufakis pretendesse ter jogado,
Tsipras não arriscou por não ter possibilidade
de arriscar a expulsão:

«Ao presente, não lhe vejo remédio!»

Adriano Moreira considera que fez bem.

Condena a Alemanha por nenhuma Europa
ir ser possível de construir na base de diktats
como o aplicado à Grécia.


Uma reviravolta séria é expectável na União Europeia.

Quanto a mim, o desejável é a Alemanha sair do euro
e que se entenda bilateralmente com a Rússia
para aprender «como elas mordem».

[Lark]

Um texto do Strauss-Kahn, onde fustiga as condições impostas à Grécia onde os credores não hesitaram em fragmentar a europa para alcançar uma vitória sobre a extrema esquerda

e que grande texto, pode dizer-se. muito bom, mesmo muito bom.

para que não gosta do slide share está aqui o pdf

L

[Lark]

também um bom texto do galbraith:

Greece, Europe, and the United States

“A progressive Europe—the Europe of sustainable growth and social cohesion—would be one thing. The gridlocked, reactionary, petty, and vicious Europe that actually exists is another. It cannot and should not last for very long.”

By James K. Galbraith

The full brutality of the European position on Greece emerged last weekend, when Europe’s leaders rejected the Greek surrender document of June 9, and insisted instead on unconditional surrender plus reparations. The new diktat—formally accepted by Greece yesterday—requires 50 billion euros’ worth of “good assets”–which incidentally do not exist—to be transferred to a privatization fund; all financial legislation passed since SYRIZA took control of parliament in January to be rolled back; and the “troika” (the European Commission, the European Central Bank, and the International Monetary Fund) to return to Athens. From now on, the Greek government must get approval from these institutions before introducing “relevant” legislation—indeed, even before opening that legislation for public comment. In short: as of now, Greece is no longer an independent state.

Comparisons have been drawn to the Treaty of Versailles, which set Europe on the path to Nazism after the end of World War I. But the 1968 Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia, which ended a small country’s brave experiment in policy independence, is almost as good an analogy. In crushing Czechoslovakia, the invasion also destroyed the Soviet Union’s reputation, shattering the illusions that many sympathetic observers still harbored. It thus set the stage for the final collapse of Communism, first among the parties of Western Europe and then in the USSR itself.

Six months ago one could hope that SYRIZA’s electoral victory would spark a larger discussion of austerity’s failure and inspire a continent-wide search for better solutions. But once it became clear that there was no support for this approach from Spain, Portugal, or Ireland; only polite sympathy from Italy and France; and implacable hostility from Germany and points north and east, the party’s goal narrowed. SYRIZA’s objective became carving out space for a policy change in Greece alone. Exit from the Euro was not an option, and the government would not bluff. SYRIZA’s only tool was an appeal to reason, to world opinion, and for help from outside. With these appeals, the Greeks argued forcefully and passionately for five months.

In this way, the leaders of the Greek government placed a moral burden on Europe. Theirs was a challenge based on the vision of “sustainable growth” and “social inclusion” that has been written into every European treaty from Rome to Maastricht—a challenge aimed at the soul of the European project, if it still had a soul. No one in the Greek government entertained illusions on that point; all realized that Greece might arrive at the end of June weakened, broke, and defenseless. But given the narrow margins for maneuver, which were restricted both by SYRIZA’s platform and the Greek people’s attachment to Europe, it was the only play they had.

European creditors responded with surprise, irritation, exasperation, obstinacy, and finally fury. At no time did the logic of the Greek argument—about the obvious failure, over the past five years, of austerity policies to produce the predicted levels of growth—make any dent. Europe did not care about Greece. After resigning as Greek finance minister, Yanis Varoufakis described the negotiation process:

The complete lack of any democratic scruples on behalf of the supposed defenders of Europe’s democracy. The quite clear understanding on the other side that we are on the same page analytically … [And yet] to have very powerful figures look at you in the eye and say “You’re right in what you’re saying, but we’re going to crunch you anyway.”

What Europe’s “leaders” do care about is power. They posture for their own parliaments and domestic polities. There is an eastern bloc, led by Finland, which is right-wing and ultra hard line. There is a model-prisoner group—Spain, Ireland, and Portugal—which is faced with Podemos and Sinn Fein at home and cannot admit that austerity hasn’t worked. There is a soft pair, France and Italy, which would like to dampen the threats from Marine Le Pen and Beppe Grillo. And there is Germany, which, it is now clear, cannot accept debt relief inside the euro zone, because such relief would allow other countries in trouble to make similar demands. Europe’s largest creditor would then face a colossal write-off, and the Germans would face the stunning realization that the vast debts built up to finance their exports over the past fifteen years will never be repaid.

SYRIZA was not some Greek fluke; it was a direct consequence of European policy failure. A coalition of ex-Communists, unionists, Greens, and college professors does not rise to power anywhere except in desperate times. That SYRIZA did rise, overshadowing the Greek Nazis in the Golden Dawn party, was, in its way, a democratic miracle. SYRIZA’s destruction will now lead to a reassessment, everywhere on the continent, of the “European project.” A progressive Europe—the Europe of sustainable growth and social cohesion—would be one thing. The gridlocked, reactionary, petty, and vicious Europe that actually exists is another. It cannot and should not last for very long.

What will become of Europe? Clearly the hopes of the pro-European, reformist left are now over. That will leave the future in the hands of the anti-European parties, including UKIP, the National Front in France, and Golden Dawn in Greece. These are ugly, racist, xenophobic groups; Golden Dawn has proposed concentration camps for immigrants in its platform. The only counter, now, is for progressive and democratic forces to regroup behind the banner of national democratic restoration. Which means that the left in Europe will also now swing against the euro.

As that happens, should the United States continue to support the euro, aligning ourselves with failed policies and crushed democratic protests? Or should we let it be known that we are indifferent about which countries are in or out? Surely the latter represents the sensible choice. After all, Poland, the Czech Republic, Croatia, and Romania (not to mention Denmark and Sweden, or for that matter the United Kingdom) are still out and will likely remain so—yet no one thinks they will fail or drift to Putin because of that. So why should the euro—plainly now a fading dream—be propped up? Why shouldn’t getting out be an option? Independent technical, financial, and moral support for democratic allies seeking exit would, in these conditions, help to stabilize an otherwise dangerous and destructive mood.

harpers

[Lark]

curioso: ao Tusk cheira-lhe a revolução no ar. sente um clima de Maio de 68.

Tusk: Europe was 'close to catastrophe' over Greece

European Council President Donald Tusk returned this week with a group of journalists from seven leading European newspapers, including Kathimerini, to the same room where on Sunday he held marathon talks with Greek Prime Minister Alexis Tsipras, French President Francois Hollande and German Chancellor Angela Merkel on Sunday and Monday to agree a new bailout deal.

In his interview, Tusk talks about how at 7 a.m. on Monday Greece's eurozone membership was hanging by a thread. He also gives his view on the role of German Finance Minister Wolfgang Schaeuble in the negotiations and the little-known part played by Dutch Prime Minister Mark Rutte.

Speaking of the eventual agreement, Tusk says it was necessary to avoid the real risk of chaos and possible bankruptcy. “This is the first step in a long process,” he says.

Some states are concerned over Germany's power in the EU. Do you believe that Berlin's reputation was damaged over the weekend of negotiations?

I think that Germany has emerged neither weakened nor strengthened from these negotiations. It was one of my main aims during these negotiations to avoid someone being a loser or a winner. If you followed the talks, they were also about dignity, humiliation and trust. History shows we cannot ignore such values.

I am quite sure that the resulting agreement between eurozone members states is actually a draw, meaning there are no winners or losers. There is a lack of enthusiasm, nobody is satisfied 100 percent. At the end of the day Germany had to sacrifice much more than other countries in terms of numbers and money – this was the main issue of the whole process.

What is your opinion of German Finance Minister Wolfgang Schauble's idea of a temporary Greek exit from the euro area?

I’m quite sure that this thinking represented by Schaeuble, but not only by Schaeuble. This possible controlled and prepared Grexit, intellectually, it’s legitimate. It’s nothing extravagant. For sure, this was a possible alternative in this process.

It’s just my intuition, but I think it’s also what Wolfgang Schaeuble believes. I think he sent this message very openly and clearly that for Europe and for Greece it would be better that Greece is out. But I’m absolutely sure that for Chancellor Merkel, it was only a useful tool in the negotiation, but for sure not her political aim. I have no doubt that for all of them, the leaders and Chancellor Merkel, the only political target was to avoid this risk of Grexit. For sure, this role of Schaeuble was useful as an argument which showed to Tsipras that the dramatic solution is quite realistic and achievable.

French President Francois Hollande had made clear that he was ready to do everything to avoid a Grexit. Do you think the Franco-German partnership is at risk?

President Hollande was more neutral and objective, but I think it was his presumption from the very beginning that he’s dedicated to this process for a solution, not tough negotiation. The division of roles was very natural. It was for all of us absolutely clear that, at the end of this process, we have to agree between Greece and Germany. For many reasons, not only because of money. This was a chance for President Hollande not to be in charge or be an arbiter, but a very active person and very helpful when it comes to moderating or calming down the emotions. He was really helpful in this context, because of his temperament.

Is it possible that European leaders wanted to prevent a Grexit at that moment, but set the process in motion to take place in, say, six months?

This agreement is not a guarantee for years. It was something we needed to avoid, this real risk of chaos and possible Greek bankruptcy – and, as a political result, also Grexit. But this is [not even] the first half in a football match, but the first step in a long-perspective work. For now, it works.

The voting in the Greek parliament was full of emotions and, for me, also a controversial message from [Prime Minister Alexis] Tsipras that he’s ready to support an agreement that he doesn’t believe in. That’s, in fact, very original. But I think it’s also very honest and authentic, because when I observed his face during the negotiations it was absolutely visible and tangible that he was not satisfied, and for him this is a really tough test. But it’s shows how difficult this process is and will be, for sure. But it shows also that, for now, it works.

How close did we come to Grexit?

The first sign that Grexit was possible was, of course, the result of the Eurogroup on Saturday. Not only because of the lack of a result, but because of this new mood and new words – this last sentence in the document about a possible Grexit. But also because of the irritation of almost all of them.

After the referendum, this irritation was very tangible. It meant the position of Tsipras was weaker, in fact, after the referendum than before – here, maybe not in Athens, but for sure here. This privatization fund was, for sure, very provocative for Tsipras.

The first signal that something like that could be accepted was a text message from Dutch PM [Mark] Rutte. When I showed them Rutte's proposal that 12.5 billion of the fund could be used to pay back the debt and 12.5 in investments, no one seemed particularly impressed but from that moment it was on the table.

In the [summit] negotiations, there was just one time when I felt the risk was really close, really possible or probable. It was about 7 o’clock in the morning, when both of them – Chancellor [Merkel] and Prime Minister Tsipras – they wanted a pause.

For me, it was absolutely clear this was the end of the negotiation. In fact, they wanted to stop this summit, but they were not ready to say "this is the end," and it was an excuse. But it was very spontaneous. It’s also why it was so dangerous, because it was an authentic reaction, fatigue, also irritation. Both of them were absolutely sure they compromised too much.

It was a really interesting moment, because the difference at this very moment was so small. At this moment it was about 2.5 billion euros. In the end, the discussion was about how much money – virtual money – from this privatization fund would go to investment and how much to debt. The position of the chancellor was 10 billion for investment, and for Tsipras it was 15 billion. And the proposal was 12.5 billion for investment. For both of them, it was about 2.5 billion. At the same moment, they felt it was enough.

I told them, "If you stop this negotiation, I’m ready to say publicly: Europe is close to catastrophe because of 2.5 billion."

[Finance Minister Euclid] Tsakalotos and his team analyzed the proposal outside the room and then came back with the whole group with Tsirpas and Tsakalotos and some advisors saying they were ready to accept this with some changes, but it was nothing important. This Greek draft was actually acceptable to all of us.

You say that at 7 a.m. Grexit was the most possible scenario while the two sides were separated by 2.5 bln. What do you think made them change their mind?

I think it would be an exaggeration to say it was a sort of illumination but we were too close to leave this room. And when they realized that we have an agreement [with the exception of] one detail, I think that is very difficult to decide because it is my impression and then we needed in fact 10 minutes to draft last draft.

Did you feel that the Council was split into two, some supporting Greece and some being against it?

At about 11 p.m., it was clear that Germany was not the toughest country. Maybe not Germany, but for sure Chancellor Merkel was ready to compromise and some countries were afraid this compromise might be unacceptable to them or their parliaments. Everything was informal.

I received a signal that for a group of five member states, Rutte would be the best representative. I was naive, of course, because I thought at midnight we would be ready with the compromise. I knew that I should be 100 percent sure it was not only a compromise between Greece and Germany. I wanted to avoid this trap that some countries might ignore or oppose this possible compromise.

What role did the smaller countries play?

Smaller countries and the newer eurozone members were very patient. They said that they did not want to disturb these negotiations and for them Grexit was unacceptable.
 

Ideas and geopolitics


How significant is the geopolitical dimension of this deal in your opinion?

I was quite sure that there was no risk of financial contagion even if Greece is out. It wasn’t a slogan, it wasn’t propaganda when [ECB president Mario] Draghi and other institutions confirmed the eurozone is relatively safe today and the risk of contagion doesn’t exist. But for sure, after a dramatic event like Grexit, we could predict some political, ideological and geopolitical consequences.

I am really afraid of this ideological or political contagion, not financial contagion, of this Greek crisis. Today’s situation in Greece, including the result of the referendum and the result of the last general election, but also this atmosphere, this mood in some comments – we have something like a new, huge public debate in Europe. Everything is about new ideologies. In fact, it’s nothing new. It’s something like an economic and ideological illusion, that we have a chance to build some alternative to this traditional European economic system. It’s not only a Greek phenomenon.

This new intellectual mood, my intuition is it’s risky for Europe. Especially this radical leftist illusion that you can build some alternative to this traditional European vision of the economy. I have no doubt frugality is an absolutely fundamental value and a reason why Europe is the most prosperous part of the world…. My fear is this ideological contagion is more risky than this financial one.

Do you see a difference between the radical left and the extreme right?

For me, the atmosphere is a little similar to the time after 1968 in Europe. I can feel, maybe not a revolutionary mood, but something like widespread impatience. When impatience becomes not an individual but a social experience, this is the introduction for revolutions. I think some circumstances are also similar to 1968.

The most impressive for me was this tactical alliance between radical leftists and radical rightists, and not only in the European Parliament... The discussion about Greece, it means a discussion against austerity, a discussion against European tradition, anti-German in some part. Everything was provoking enthusiasm on both sides. It was quite symbolic.

It was always the same game before the biggest tragedies in our European history, this tactical alliance between radicals from all sides. Today, for sure, we can observe the same political phenomenon.

The main melody today is anti-European. When I say anti-European I mean this traditional thinking about the EU and the common currency, and of course anti-market, anti-liberal – in fact, something revolutionary. From time to time, I feel for them it doesn’t matter what kind of ideology it is.
 

Samaras 'more cooperative'


Some critics say it was a big mistake not to show [former conservative leader Antonis] Samaras more flexibility, and that we are now paying the price for this. Do you share this view?

For sure, Samaras was more cooperative when it came to the substance of this cooperation on assistance and reforms. I think the process of negotiations on a possible third program would have been easier. I think that’s nothing controversial. But I’m not sure the result of the last general election in Greece would have been different than what happened. I don’t like discussion after the fact. You have to be responsible, cautious and wise beforehand. It’s absolutely useless to pretend you’re the wiseguy after something happens.

For me the argument that the euro is responsible for the Greek crisis is absurd. We know what is the reason of the crisis in Greece. I find it very interesting and spectacular that after the whole anti-European campaign in Greece, 82 percent of the Greeks are pro-euro. The common sense of the people on the street can be wiser than brilliant articles in newspapers.

kathimerini

[Zenith]

Pra os fãs da austeridade, aqui está um site onde podem gerar aleatoriamente medidas de austeridade

http://www.random-austerity-measure-generator.com/#

Algumas que me deu

Portugal should donate at least 976062 Euros to Germany.

Italy should close some hospitals. Let's say 125% of them.

Italy should austerize some of it's landmarks and rename the 'Coloseum' to 'Normaloseum'.

Any type of greek cheese pie should not contain cheese.

ao fim de algum tempo começam a repetir-se com paises ou pessoas diferentes.

[Merkel]

Tsipras has to write 'I will stay in the EU' 164771 times.

[Lark]

Greek seas needs to be 2% less blue.

[D. Antunes]

The IMF Says The Greek Deal Is Not Viable


forbes

E quer que a Europa perdoe grande parte da dívida grega de modo a que os gregos possam pagar tudo ao próprio FMI!

Não tenho dúvidas que, para o FMI, isso seja bom.

[D. Antunes]

Em Itália não sei, mas em Portugal o serviço da dívida também não estará num ponto historicamente elevado, pleo que mesmo que se ache necessário reestruturar, não tem que ser já.

Reestruturar já apenas significa que os devedores não são sérios e não querem sequer tentar pagar, mesmo quando historicamente o sacrifício que lhes é pedido não é particularmente elevado.

Claro, pagar qualquer dívida impõe sempre ALGUM sacrifício.

Eu acho que Portugal deveria ter exigido, não taxas de juro tão baixas como as gregas, mas que o peso dos juros no PIB não fosse superior ao que acontece na Grécia.
Acho que , neste ponto, o governo português esteve mal.

Mas actualmente a questão é: qual actualmente a melhor estratégia para Portugal lidar com a dívida?

[Lark]

The IMF clears its throat very, very loudly on Greece
Why did the IMF take on the Eurogroup over Greece? I have a theory.


Last week, the Financial Times’ Edward Luce bemoaned the failure of the United States to push the Eurogroup towards greater leniency on Greece:

Both the Obama administration and the International Monetary Fund — a tool of US global financial power — were ready to argue Greece’s corner with its European creditors. But the Syriza government’s antics have made life impossible for Greece’s friends. The US has long urged Europe to write off some of Greece’s debts in exchange for restructuring — but to no avail. On Europe, the US has been neither strong nor wrong, but weak and right ….

Perhaps there is little more America can do than continue as Europe’s “trusted adviser”, albeit one that is usually ignored.

I bring this up now because just when it seemed like the Greek financial crisis had reached its dysfunctional, Eurogroup-imposed outcome, the International Monetary Fund dropped one hell of a bombshell:

The International Monetary Fund threatened to withdraw support for Greece’s bailout on Tuesday unless European leaders agree to substantial debt relief, an immediate challenge to the region’s plan to rescue the country.

The aggressive stance sets up a standoff with Germany and other Eurozone creditors, which have been reluctant to provide additional debt relief. The I.M.F role is considered crucial for any bailout, not only to provide funding but also to supervise Greece’s compliance with the terms.

A new rescue program for Greece “would have to meet our criteria,” a senior I.M.F. official told reporters on Tuesday, speaking on the condition of anonymity. “One of those criteria is debt sustainability.”

The IMF’s position was laid out in its most recent IMF staff analysis of Greece’s public debt sustainability. The analysis takes a fair number of swipes at Syriza’s management of Greece’s economy, as well as the costs that the last two weeks have probably inflicted on the Greek economy. But it also notes:

Greece’s debt can now only be made sustainable through debt relief measures that go far beyond what Europe has been willing to consider so far ….

Greece is expected to maintain primary surpluses for the next several decades of 3.5 percent of GDP. Few countries have managed to do so ….

The dramatic deterioration in debt sustainability points to the need for debt relief on a scale that would need to go well beyond what has been under consideration to date—and what has been proposed by the ESM [European Stability Mechanism]. There are several options. If Europe prefers to again provide debt relief through maturity extension, there would have to be a very dramatic extension with grace periods of, say, 30 years on the entire stock of European debt, including new assistance…..  Other options include explicit annual transfers to the Greek budget or deep upfront haircuts.

Buried underneath the technocratic language are some major shocks for the Eurogroup. First, as the Daily Telegraph’s Ambrose Evans-Pritchard explains, proposing ideas like large ongoing fiscal transfers to Greece is “the worst nightmare of the northern creditor states.”

Second, as the Financial Times’ Peter Spiegel and Shawn Donnan note, Germany pushed hard to keep the IMF involved in any deal on Greece:

IMF involvement in Greece’s rescue has been critical to a German-led group of eurozone hardliners who believe the European Commission, one of the other Greek bailout monitors, is not sufficiently rigorous in its evaluations.

The issue became one of the major sticking points during all-night negotiations between Alexis Tsipras, the Greek prime minister, and Angela Merkel, his German counterpart, at the weekend, with Mr Tsipras repeatedly refusing to accept IMF participation in a new bailout.

According to EU officials, Ms Merkel stood firm on the issue, telling the Greek premier there would be no bailout — and therefore “Grexit” from the eurozone — without a formal request made to the IMF for participation in a new programme ….

But the IMF is now making clear that if Germany wants it to remain on board then Berlin will have to make room for significant debt relief.

So Germany has insisted that the IMF is the arbiter of rigorous evaluations — and the IMF has now come out and said that Germany has unrealistic expectations of Greece. And based on the press clippings, IMF officials leaked to every financial reporter in Washington.

In their story, Spiegel and Donnan also added this cryptic paragraph:

[The IMF] also has the backing of the US, which has argued for debt relief in recent days. Jack Lew, the US Treasury secretary, is flying to Europe on Wednesday for meetings with European finance officials starting with Mario Draghi, the head of the European Central Bank.

This is interesting because there have been a few under-the-radar indications that the United States has exercised its muscle a bit to make sure that the IMF stays independent of the Eurogroup. For example, a few weeks ago the Europeans wanted to suppress the publication of an earlier IMF debt sustainability report that had bolstered Syriza’s case for debt relief just before the Greek referendum. Reuters reported that within the IMF Executive Board, “There was no vote but the Europeans were heavily outnumbered and the United States, the strongest voice in the IMF, was in favour of publication.”

So is the IMF acting now as the agent of the United States here? That’s probably an inference too far. The new IMF staff analysis was circulated to, but not discussed with nor approved by the Executive Board. Still, perhaps another way of thinking about this is that the United States set up the permissive condition for the IMF staff economists to speak truth to power. As I noted in The System Worked, both the United States and the IMF staff economists have rejected the ordoliberal diagnosis of Greece (though Christine Lagarde appears to have been more sympathetic).  So perhaps the US insistence that the IMF publish their last debt sustainability analysis emboldened the Fund to start throwing its weight around.


We’ll see whether, going forward, the United States and the IMF are both strong and right.

wapo

[D. Antunes]

Se for assim, a inflação poderá trazer algum benefício para uma população jovem e dinânica, e não certamente para a maioria de uma população envelhecida e poupada, e que não aprecia dívidas...

Bem os juros teoricamente poderiam proteger as contas bancarias  A pop envelhecida poderia simplesmente canalizar as suas a poupanças para o imobiliario;
mesmo o mercado de capitais iria ter um dinamismo que nos surpreenderia a todos;
bem eu nao estou aqui a defender que a opcao de inflaccao  seja a panaceia para  os problemas das pessoas   
 estou muito de acordo que inflaccao sem reformas por exemplo  no mercado laboral nao seria correcto;
parece-me no entanto que no atual contexto inflaccionar e a opcao correcta;

A inflação iria comendo as pensões. Politicamente tornar-se-ia mais fácil reduzir esse custo.

[Reg]

Se for assim, a inflação poderá trazer algum benefício para uma população jovem e dinânica, e não certamente para a maioria de uma população envelhecida e poupada, e que não aprecia dívidas...

Bem os juros teoricamente poderiam proteger as contas bancarias  A pop envelhecida poderia simplesmente canalizar as suas a poupanças para o imobiliario;
mesmo o mercado de capitais iria ter um dinamismo que nos surpreenderia a todos;
bem eu nao estou aqui a defender que a opcao de inflaccao  seja a panaceia para  os problemas das pessoas   
 estou muito de acordo que inflaccao sem reformas por exemplo  no mercado laboral nao seria correcto;
parece-me no entanto que no atual contexto inflaccionar e a opcao correcta;

A inflação iria comendo as pensões. Politicamente tornar-se-ia mais fácil reduzir esse custo.

 Para não perder voto, inflacao esconde jogo, e exelente jogo politico

[Kin2010]

A necessidade de cortar a dívida no curto prazo NÃO é óbvia, porque o seu serviço, por mais 5-10 anos, continuará a ser inferior ao de Portugal ou Itália.

Assim, mesmo que mais tarde se ache que é necessário reestruturar essa dívida, essa conclusão ainda pode esperar anos.

Estranho é o insistir-se tanto que tal tenha que ocorrer JÁ.

A meu ver, o FMI e outras instituições que propoem perdão de dívida para a Grécia agora também concordam com isso, mas pretendem que, a médio longo prazo, o mesmo se faça com a dívida portuguesa. Esta também é provavelmente impagável e eles sabem-no. Mas não podem dizê-lo abertamente agora, isso não seria tolerado pelas opiniões públicas da Europa do norte.

[Lark]

Fuga para a frente; este é que é o euro-controlador maximus não é o schauble.

France’s Hollande Proposes Creation of Euro-Zone Government

French President Francois Hollande said that the 19 countries using the euro need their own government complete with a budget and parliament to cooperate better and
overcome the Greek crisis.

“Circumstances are leading us to accelerate,” Hollande said in an opinion piece published by the Journal du Dimanche on Sunday. “What threatens us is not too much Europe, but a lack of it.”

While the euro zone has a common currency, fiscal and economic policies remain mostly in the hands of each member state. European Central Bank President Mario Draghi made a plea this week for deeper cooperation between the euro members after political squabbles over Greece almost led to a rupture in the single currency.
Countries in favor of more integration should move ahead, forming an “avant-garde,” Hollande said.

“Europe has let its institutions weaken and the 28 European Union member countries are struggling to agree to move ahead,” Hollande said on Sunday in a text which was also a homage to his mentor Jacques Delors, a former European Commission President who proposed similar ideas.
Draghi called for the creation of a shared treasury within 10 years in a joint proposal with politicians including European Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker and Eurogroup President Jeroen Dijsselbloem last month.

bloomberg

[Lark]

The euro is a disaster even for the countries that do everything right
By Matt O'Brien July 17 
 

The euro might be worse for you than bankruptcy.

That, at least, has been the case for Finland and the Netherlands, which have actually grown less than Iceland has since 2007. Iceland, you might recall, basically went bankrupt in 2008.

Now, it's true that Finland and the Netherlands have had their fair share of economic problems, but those should have been manageable. Neither country is a basket case, and both have done what they were supposed to do. In other words, they've followed the rules, and the results have still been a catastrophe. That's because the euro itself is. Or, if you want to be polite, the common currency is "imperfect, and being imperfect is fragile, vulnerable, and doesn't deliver all the benefits it could." That was European Central Bank chief Mario Draghi's verdict on Thursday.

So what's happened to them? Well, just your run-of-the-mill bad economic news. It's only a slight exaggeration to say that Apple has kneecapped Finland's economy. Its two biggest exports were Nokia phones and paper products, but, as the country's former prime minister Alex Stubb has said, the iPhone killed the former and the iPad killed the latter. Now, the normal way to make up for this would be to cut costs by devaluing your currency, except that Finland doesn't have a currency to devalue anymore. It has the euro. So instead it's had to cut costs by cutting wages, which not only takes longer, but also causes more economic damage since you have to fire people to convince them to take pay cuts. The result has been a recession longer than anything in Finland's living memory, longer even than its great depression in the early 1990s. It hasn't helped, of course, that the rules of the euro zone have forced Finland's government to cut its budget at the same time that all this has been happening.

It's been a different kind of story in the Netherlands. Its goods are more than competitive abroad—its trade surplus is an absurd 10 percent of economic output—but its domestic spending is a problem. The Netherlands had a huge housing bubble, fueled, in part, by the fact that interest payments are fully tax deductible, that has since deflated some 20 percent. That's left Dutch households with a bigger debt burden than anyone else in the euro zone. On top of that, there's been the usual austerity to keep its recovery from being much—or any—of one. Indeed, the Netherlands' economy was slightly smaller at the end of 2014 than it was at the end of 2007. That's a lot better than Finland, whose economy has shrunk 5.2 percent during that time, but, as you can see below, it still lags the 1.1 percent growth Iceland has eked out.



Now, it's hard to do worse than Iceland. It basically turned its entire economy into a hedge fund that collapsed in 2008. Its banks defaulted, its government had to be bailed out, and its currency collapsed 60 percent. Not only that, but, between 2009 and 2014, Iceland did nearly twice as much austerity as the Netherlands and 12 times as much as Finland. And if that wasn't enough, Iceland's economic jeremiad also includes high household debt and capital controls that have prevented people from moving money out of the country and dissuaded them from moving it in.

But despite all this, Iceland has still managed to outperform Finland and the Netherlands. How is that possible? Well, it doesn't have the euro. It has its own currency, the krona. And as much as it hurt Iceland's people to lose 60 percent of their purchasing power on imported goods when the krona fell that much, it helped Iceland's economy by making their goods more competitive overseas. That was enough to keep what could have been a depression from turning into anything other than a bad recession.

The euro, though, does the opposite. Countries can't devalue their currencies or cut interest rates or even spend more when they get into trouble, and so they stay in trouble. All they can do is cut wages, cut spending, and then cut wages some more as penance for whatever economic transgressions they may or may not have committed. The euro straitjacket, in other words, turns ordinary problems into extraordinary ones (Finland) and extraordinary problems into historic ones (Greece). And that can happen whether or not you follow the rules.

The euro is a capricious god, meting out punishment to sinners and saints alike.

Matt O'Brien

[Lark]

Mario Draghi issued a resounding indictment of the ‘fragile euro’

ECB chief: Currency doesn’t deliver benefits it should
Whatever happened to doing “whatever it takes?”

That was European Central Bank President Mario Draghi’s pledge to hold the European shared currency together back in 2012, as the market was panicking about the possibility that a fiscally stressed European country might be forced out of the bloc.

While Draghi had previously proclaimed that the euro was “irreversible,” the ECB chief’s comments on Thursday were much less emphatic, with Draghi stating that it wasn’t up to the central bank to determine whether or not Greece remains part of the shared currency.

“This is a damning indictment of Europe’s single currency area from the individual who almost single-handedly averted a breakup of the bloc three years ago,” Nicholas Spiro, managing director of Spiro Sovereign Strategy, a London-based advisory firm, in a note.

Had Draghi talked similarly in 2012, “all hell would have broken loose in the markets,” Spiro said.

On Thursday, the market either didn’t notice Draghi’s rhetorical shift or didn’t care to fret about it, with the focus squarely on shoring up Greece’s teetering banking sector.

According to a tally by Danske Bank, 18 out of the 23 questions Draghi took during his news conference were about Greece. Draghi used the opportunity to emphasize that the ECB always operated under the assumption that Greece would remain a part of the euro.

The most crucial news was the ECB president’s decision to raise emergency liquidity assistance to Greek banks by 900 million euros ($982 million) without toughening the rules governing the collateral the banks must post in return for the funding. That gives Greek banks, which have been closed for more than two weeks, some breathing room, though capital controls are likely to remain in place for some time.

The move was a recognition of the Greek parliament’s approval of the tough austerity measures demanded in return for a third bailout, as well as the agreement in principle by eurozone governments on a bridge loan that will tide Greece over until its bailout is up and running—and would allow Greece to make a €3.5 billion repayment due on July 20.

“The decision to grant bridge financing as well as today’s ECB decision to increase ELA are no game-changer, yet, but at least a symbolic leap of faith,” said Carsten Brzeski, eurozone economist at ING in Brussels

The ECB bought Greece more time with its decision to raise the amount of emergency liquidity available to the country’s banks, but Draghi used his bully pulpit to give Greece a vote of confidence while simultaneously highlighting the euro’s deep design flaws.

Draghi described the monetary union as “imperfect, and being imperfect is fragile, vulnerable and doesn’t deliver…all the benefits that it could if it were to be completed.”
Draghi said the situation underscored the need for further economic and political integration in the eurozone.

Draghi also took the opportunity to join the International Monetary Fund in singing from the debt-relief hymnal. Draghi told reporters that the concept of debt relief has always been “uncontroversial” and that the only question has been about how to accomplish it within Europe’s legal framework.

The IMF has argued that Greece’s debt load is unsustainable and must be trimmed, signaling it could walk away from a third bailout if debt relief isn’t offered. Germany, meanwhile, has insisted that the scope for debt relief within the rules governing the eurozone is very limited.

It was Draghi’s pledge in 2012 that helped pull the eurozone from the brink. The statement, followed by the development of the never-used Outright Monetary Transactions program, was credited with quelling a panic in a credit markets.

Now, Draghi is offering fewer assurances about the solidarity of the currency bloc. After almost single-handedly saving the euro, he’s now signaling that it’s fate rests with Europe’s elected politicians.

market watch

[Lark]

What reveals the "black book" of Grexit
ELENI VARVITSIOTIS

Jean - Claude Juncker before the start of the summit described the Greek prime minister all the details of a Grexit, giving him to understand the legal and political context of such a decision.


On the 13th floor of the building Verlaymont in Brussels, a few meters from the office of the European Commission President, Jean-Claude Juncker, stored in a special security room and in a safe Greece's exit plan from the Eurozone. There, in a multi-page volume, written in less than a month from 15-member team of the European Commission, answered questions on how to tackle such an outflow, including, as shocking as it may sound, even the possibility of the country out of the Treaty Schengen, and not only being driven outside the euro, but also outside the EU

Greece can free last week by the imminent threat of exit from the Eurozone, with the start of negotiations for third memorandum, but, as told "K", the President of the Council, Donald Tusk, this agreement "is only first step. " Until the dramatic summit on Greece, which followed a few 24hours after the referendum on the draft many heard but nothing was confirmed. But in the early hours Wednesday, when he had ended the meeting, the podium of the European Council, the European Commission President, visibly angry with his handling of Greek prime minister, revealed in dozens of reporters that the project exists and is ready.

According to European official, in that the European Commission Summit already had a bound volume, a multi-page document, which described the Greek prime minister, before the start of the session, by the same Mr. Juncker with all the details of a Grexit , giving him to understand the legal and political context of such a decision. In multipage document in accordance with European official who has the ability to know its contents, there are detailed answers to 200 questions that would arise in case Grexit.

These questions, as he explains official, are interrelated, as an exit from the euro would create a cascade of events, which would evolve in a relatively short time. From
the drachmopoiisi economy to foreign exchange controls that would take place at the country's borders and which will ultimately lead at the exit of Greece from the Schengen Treaty.

The authors of the draft, according to European official, conducted under conditions of absolute secrecy.

A special group of 15 people of the European Commission, by direct contact with Greece started to prepare, and was also in direct contact with a number of senior officials and DGs in the European Commission who had expertise in specific areas.

The writing of the project started when the expiry date of the program (end of June) was approaching, so it is the Commission prepared for every eventuality, and by the time the referendum was announced, Friday, June 26, the relevant procedures were accelerated. The weekend of the work referendum intensified, so now two days later, Tuesday of that Synod, the project has been finalized.

According to well-informed source, involved in creating the plan worked "suffer the pain" as typically describe the "K" and "overwhelmed" because they could not believe that things had reached this point, and most of them had direct involvement with the Greek rescue programs.

The European Commission also was hoped that even until the last minute solution would be found as members of this group knew better than anyone the consequences exit of Greece from the Eurozone and understand the cost of such a decision.

One of those involved with direct knowledge of Greek reality in the critical phase of the training, he said the rest of the group that "if implemented this plan, the streets of Athens will sound tracks of tanks."

traduzido pelo google translator kathimerini

[Lark]

One of those involved with direct knowledge of Greek reality in the critical phase of the training, he said the rest of the group that "if implemented this plan, the streets of Athens will sound tracks of tanks."

Alexis Tsipras at some point decided that his government, our government, was at gunpoint. We were given a choice between being executed and capitulating and he decided that capitulation was the optimal strategy.

já dá para ir tendo uma ideia o que era a gun[point] e o que o varoufakis entende por 'execução'.

L