Grécia - Tópico principal

[Vanilla-Swap]

A Grécia tem 147 Toneladas de ouro.

O Tsipras ainda pode no prego as toneladas de ouro e pagar aos credores.

[Incognitus]

http://news.forexlive.com/!/greece-reiterates-that-pension-cuts-arent-on-the-table-20150617

* Greece willing to make concessions but pension cuts cannot be on agenda
* Athens does not have the money to make IMF payment on June 30 without creditor deal
* Greece can only accept deal that's 'economically viable'
* Proposes bonds held by ECB transferred to ESM but many other solutions possible if there is debt relief

[Zel]

a grecia esta a arrastar isto o mais possivel para que o dinheiro saia do pais, isso aumenta a sua leverage nas negocioes

[Incognitus]

a grecia esta a arrastar isto o mais possivel para que o dinheiro saia do pais, isso aumenta a sua leverage nas negocioes

A Europa é um bocado burra nisso ... ou é de propósito.

[Automek]

caso o bce fique a arder com os 80b da ELA tem de haver aumento de capital perto desse montante comparticipado pelos vários estados ?
o banco de Portugal tem 1.75% daquilo
https://www.ecb.europa.eu/ecb/orga/capital/html/index.en.html

[Incognitus]

Logo inventariam um esquema em que ninguém tivesse que entrar com montante nenhum.

[Zel]

Logo inventariam um esquema em que ninguém tivesse que entrar com montante nenhum.

um emprestimo do bce a si proprio, ehhe

[Vanilla-Swap]

Geralmente os rebeldes acabam por morrer por uma traição, quem trairá Tsipras.

[camisa]

a grecia esta a arrastar isto o mais possivel para que o dinheiro saia do pais, isso aumenta a sua leverage nas negocioes

li algures que se os gregos já tiverem decidido sair do euro, ganham em engonhar o mais possível porque quanto mais dinheiro sair dos bancos até final do mês, mais entra do BCE via ELA funding, ou seja, vão sacar euros até à última gota 

[camisa]

Greek Debt Committee Just Declared All Debt To The Troika "Illegal, Illegitimate, And Odious"
Submitted by Tyler Durden on 06/17/2015 - 11:24
"Greece not only does not have the ability to pay this debt, but also should not pay this debt first and foremost because the debt emerging from the Troika’s arrangements is a direct infringement on the fundamental human rights of the residents of Greece. Hence, we came to the conclusion that Greece should not pay this debt because it is illegal, illegitimate, and odious."

muito bom! e com conclusões curiosamente similares às de um comité idêntico em Portugal 

[Pip-Boy]

Eheh, esse Greek Debt Committee é onde anda o Francisco Louça, não admira as conclusões

http://observador.pt/2015/06/16/francisco-louca-no-parlamento-grego-4a-e-5a-feira-para-auditoria-a-divida/

[pedferre]

Eu aproveitaria para dizer também que a permanência da Grécia na UE e no Euro é cada vez mais ilegal, ilegitima, e acima de tudo odiada por todos os restantes paises. 

[Automek]

a grecia esta a arrastar isto o mais possivel para que o dinheiro saia do pais, isso aumenta a sua leverage nas negocioes

li algures que se os gregos já tiverem decidido sair do euro, ganham em engonhar o mais possível porque quanto mais dinheiro sair dos bancos até final do mês, mais entra do BCE via ELA funding, ou seja, vão sacar euros até à última gota 

e hoje o bce lá aumentou a ELA de 83 para 84.1b.
ninguém quer o odioso da culpa.

muito se devem estar os gregos a rir destes tansos todos.

[Incognitus]

Greek Debt Committee Just Declared All Debt To The Troika "Illegal, Illegitimate, And Odious"
Submitted by Tyler Durden on 06/17/2015 - 11:24
"Greece not only does not have the ability to pay this debt, but also should not pay this debt first and foremost because the debt emerging from the Troika’s arrangements is a direct infringement on the fundamental human rights of the residents of Greece. Hence, we came to the conclusion that Greece should not pay this debt because it is illegal, illegitimate, and odious."

muito bom! e com conclusões curiosamente similares às de um comité idêntico em Portugal 

Aos olhos dessa ideologia toda a dívida é odiosa, pois representa uma falta clara de solidariedade.

[camisa]

vou formar 1 comité comigo mesmo e denunciar a minha dívida ao banco como odiosa pois atenta contra os meus direitos humanos, afinal o direito à habitação está inclusivamente consagrado na nossa constituição! 

[Incognitus]

vou formar 1 comité comigo mesmo e denunciar a minha dívida ao banco como odiosa pois atenta contra os meus direitos humanos, afinal o direito à habitação está inclusivamente consagrado na nossa constituição! 

É de ir ao balcão e mostrar asco por aqueles agiotas que tentam explorar até um direito básico como esse.

[JoaoAP]

a grecia esta a arrastar isto o mais possivel para que o dinheiro saia do pais, isso aumenta a sua leverage nas negocioes

li algures que se os gregos já tiverem decidido sair do euro, ganham em engonhar o mais possível porque quanto mais dinheiro sair dos bancos até final do mês, mais entra do BCE via ELA funding, ou seja, vão sacar euros até à última gota 

Como não entendo...
Expliquem por favor, como saindo os euros é mlhor para eles?

Como entra do BCE, se foram para a Bancarrota?
 

[tommy]

A teoria é do Hans-Werner Sinn,
http://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/varoufakis-ecb-grexit-threat-by-hans-werner-sinn-2015-05

MUNICH – Game theorists know that a Plan A is never enough. One must also develop and put forward a credible Plan B – the implied threat that drives forward negotiations on Plan A. Greece’s finance minister, Yanis Varoufakis, knows this very well. As the Greek government’s anointed “heavy,” he is working Plan B (a potential exit from the eurozone), while Prime Minister Alexis Tsipras makes himself available for Plan A (an extension on Greece’s loan agreement, and a renegotiation of the terms of its bailout). In a sense, they are playing the classic game of “good cop/bad cop” – and, so far, to great effect.

Plan B comprises two key elements. First, there is simple provocation, aimed at riling up Greek citizens and thus escalating tensions between the country and its creditors. Greece’s citizens must believe that they are escaping grave injustice if they are to continue to trust their government during the difficult period that would follow an exit from the eurozone.

Second, the Greek government is driving up the costs of Plan B for the other side, by allowing capital flight by its citizens. If it so chose, the government could contain this trend with a more conciliatory approach, or stop it outright with the introduction of capital controls. But doing so would weaken its negotiating position, and that is not an option.

Capital flight does not mean that capital is moving abroad in net terms, but rather that private capital is being turned into public capital. Basically, Greek citizens take out loans from local banks, funded largely by the Greek central bank, which acquires funds through the European Central Bank’s emergency liquidity assistance (ELA) scheme. They then transfer the money to other countries to purchase foreign assets (or redeem their debts), draining liquidity from their country’s banks.

Other eurozone central banks are thus forced to create new money to fulfill the payment orders for the Greek citizens, effectively giving the Greek central bank an overdraft credit, as measured by the so-called TARGET liabilities. In January and February, Greece’s TARGET debts increased by almost €1 billion ($1.1 billion) per day, owing to capital flight by Greek citizens and foreign investors. At the end of April, those debts amounted to €99 billion.

A Greek exit would not damage the accounts that its citizens have set up in other eurozone countries – let alone cause Greeks to lose the assets they have purchased with those accounts. But it would leave those countries’ central banks stuck with euro-denominated TARGET claims vis-à-vis Greece’s central bank, which would have assets denominated only in a restored drachma. Given the new currency’s inevitable devaluation, together with the fact that the Greek government does not have to backstop its central bank’s debt, a default depriving the other central banks of their claims would be all but certain.

A similar situation arises when Greek citizens withdraw cash from their accounts and hoard it in suitcases or take it abroad. If Greece abandoned the euro, a substantial share of these funds – which totaled €43 billion at the end of April – would flow into the rest of the eurozone, both to purchase goods and assets and to pay off debts, resulting in a net loss for the monetary union’s remaining members.

All of this strengthens the Greek government’s negotiating position considerably. Small wonder, then, that Varoufakis and Tsipras are playing for time, refusing to submit a list of meaningful reform proposals.

The ECB bears considerable responsibility for this situation. By failing to produce the two-thirds majority in the ECB Council needed to limit the Greek central bank’s self-serving strategy, it has allowed the creation of more than €80 billion in emergency liquidity, which exceeds the Greek central bank’s €41 billion in recoverable assets. With Greece’s banks guaranteed the needed funds, the government has been spared from having to introduce capital controls.

Rumor has it that the ECB is poised to adjust its approach – and soon. It knows that its argument that the ELA loans are collateralized is wearing thin, given that, in many cases, the collateral has a rating below BBB-, thus falling short of investment grade.

If the ECB finally acknowledges that this will not do, and removes Greece’s liquidity safety net, the Greek government would be forced to start negotiating seriously, because waiting would no longer do it any good. But, with the stock of money sent abroad and held in cash having already ballooned to 79% of GDP, its position would remain very strong.

In other words, thanks largely to the ECB, the Greek government would be able to secure a far more favorable outcome – including increased financial assistance and reduced reform requirements – than it could have gained at any point in the past. And if Greece exits, a large share of the acquired resources measured by the TARGET balances and the cash that has been printed would turn into an endowment gift for an independent future.

Many people in Europe seem to believe that Varoufakis, an experienced game theorist but a political neophyte, does not know how to play the cards that Greece has been dealt. They should think again – before Greece walks away with the pot.

Mas há quem já tenha vindo dizer que não é bem assim.
http://www.bloombergview.com/articles/2015-06-02/does-greece-have-a-diabolical-plan-b-

By Leonid Bershidsky

Perhaps the most baffling thing about the current Greek crisis is the sheer stubbornness of the country's leaders: Don't they understand they are committing economic suicide by refusing to make more concessions to the country's creditors? What are they playing at?

Hans-Werner Sinn, president of the Ifo Institute for Economic Research in Munich and an adviser to the German government, has a chilling answer to this question. In his view, every day that Greek Prime Minister Alexis Tsipras and Finance Minister Yanis Varoufakis maintain their irritating good cop-bad cop routine, the euro area digs itself deeper into a financial hole, which is what the Greeks want. The way it does that, according to Sinn, is by funding Greek capital flight, which the Tsipras government intentionally allows.

It's a riff on Sinn's old obsession with countries' balances in the euro zone's interbank payment system, Target2. When Greeks get money out of the country -- by, say, acquiring German property -- they draw the money from a Greek bank, which becomes liable to the central bank of Greece for the amount. It, in turn, develops a debit at the European Central Bank. The German bank that receives the money from the house purchase now has a claim on the Bundesbank, which has a claim on the ECB.

The net result is that when all this Greek money borrowed from the ECB flees the country, Greece's Target balance becomes more negative. And in recent months, that's what's been happening at an alarming rate:


In effect, Sinn wrote in a column for Project Syndicate, Greek capital flight has been funded by the ECB. It provides money to the Bank of Greece so it can maintain the liquidity of local banks (the current limit on this assistance is set at 80.2  billion euros, or $88.4 billion). Clients of the Greek banks then move the liquidity out of the country. Sinn wrote:

    A Greek exit would not damage the accounts that its citizens have set up in other eurozone countries -- let alone cause Greeks to lose the assets they have purchased with those accounts. But it would leave those countries’ central banks stuck with Greek citizens’ euro-denominated TARGET claims vis-a-vis Greece’s central bank, which would have assets denominated only in a restored drachma. Given the new currency’s inevitable devaluation, together with the fact that the Greek government does not have to backstop its central bank’s debt, a default depriving the other central banks of their claims would be all but certain.

The German economist argues that the Greek government is procrastinating on purpose -- to allow the negative Target balance to build up, increasing the potential fallout for Europe if it doesn't ease pressure on Greece to reform and pay its debts, and thereby strengthening its negotiating position.

This would be flattering to game theorist Varoufakis, implying that he has outsmarted the leaders of Germany and France in the debt talks. In the event of a Greek default on the Target balance, the ECB would probably need to be recapitalized. According to their shares in the ECB's paid-up capital, Germany would have to contribute 25.6 percent and France 20.1 percent of the necessary amount. That means between January and April, their combined exposure increased by 10.4 billion euros -- a high price to pay for stubbornly demanding that Greece come up with a coherent reform plan.

The problem with Sinn's logic is that it makes no sense for Greece to default on its Target balance. As Karl Whelan of University College Dublin pointed out in a 2013 paper, Greece would still need to settle international payments in euros even if it were to leave the euro zone. Four countries from outside the currency area -- Bulgaria, Denmark, Poland and Romania -- are connected to Target2, because they have significant euro-denominated trade. So would Greece after the so-called Grexit. Besides, Whelan wrote, "because there is no maturity date for Target2 liabilities, the claims can be honored simply by making the necessary interest payments. The cost of making these payments would be relatively low even when adjusting for the decline in the value of Greek nominal GDP after a currency devaluation."

In other words, the threat that Greece would cut itself off from euro clearance by defaulting on a timeless, low-cost debt (the interest paid on it now is so close to zero as to make no difference) is far-fetched. While it might be tempting to ascribe Greek recalcitrance to Varoufakis's diabolical cunning, the more obvious explanation -- that the Greek government is constrained by its election promises and lacks good negotiators -- is probably the correct one.

Contrary to Sinn's assertion, time is not on Greece's side: If it runs out of cash to pay salaries and pensions, as it may do as soon as this month, a default on the Target balance won't do it much good.

[Kin2010]

Estou chocado com o banimento do Lark. Ele sempre deu contributos muito válidos, muitos deles altamente técnicos, para o forum. Ele justifica muitas vezes as suas opiniões postando artigos e links. O facto de ele ter tantas discussões com o Inc e muitos outros, em matérias de economia que têm implicações e ramificações para a política e mesmo para a moral, é natural. Acho que o forum precisa de opiniões assim, tem a ganhar com o debate. Eu aprendi muito com o posts do Lark. Além disso, se é verdade que muitas das intervenções do Lark parecem politizadas, no sentido em que defendem certos pontos de vista político-morais aplicados à economia, não é menos certo que os outros foristas todos, sem excepção, também fazem muitos comentários sobre implicações político-morais. Há muitos posts neste forum, mesmo no forum de mercados que dizem que "isto é justo/injusto porque....", a falar sobre a Grécia ou sobre empresas, ou sobre o GEs, ou sobre as pensões, etc. Sendo assim, todos ou quase todos os tópicos do forum sempre estiveram politizados, o Lark não fez nada de diferente dos outros. E já agora, na qualidade do raciocínio, e na profundidade da análise, e no nível de justificação, os posts do lark são dos mais elevados que o forum tem, muito muito acima da média. Aqui fica assim a minha opinião de que este banimento é injustificado. Peço ao Inc que reconsidere.

[jeab]

Estou chocado com o banimento do Lark. Ele sempre deu contributos muito válidos, muitos deles altamente técnicos, para o forum. Ele justifica muitas vezes as suas opiniões postando artigos e links. O facto de ele ter tantas discussões com o Inc e muitos outros, em matérias de economia que têm implicações e ramificações para a política e mesmo para a moral, é natural. Acho que o forum precisa de opiniões assim, tem a ganhar com o debate. Eu aprendi muito com o posts do Lark. Além disso, se é verdade que muitas das intervenções do Lark parecem politizadas, no sentido em que defendem certos pontos de vista político-morais aplicados à economia, não é menos certo que os outros foristas todos, sem excepção, também fazem muitos comentários sobre implicações político-morais. Há muitos posts neste forum, mesmo no forum de mercados que dizem que "isto é justo/injusto porque....", a falar sobre a Grécia ou sobre empresas, ou sobre o GEs, ou sobre as pensões, etc. Sendo assim, todos ou quase todos os tópicos do forum sempre estiveram politizados, o Lark não fez nada de diferente dos outros. E já agora, na qualidade do raciocínio, e na profundidade da análise, e no nível de justificação, os posts do lark são dos mais elevados que o forum tem, muito muito acima da média. Aqui fica assim a minha opinião de que este banimento é injustificado. Peço ao Inc que reconsidere.

Faço minhas as tuas palavras.  Inc. reconsidera , pois o Lark é uma mais valia a este fórum, independentemente do feitio chato