Forum Think Finance - Bolsa e Forex
Geral => Comunidade de Traders => Tópico iniciado por: hermes em 2013-10-11 10:44:11
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מנא, מנא, תקל, ופרסין
(http://www.thinkfn.com/forumbolsaforex/index.php?action=dlattach;topic=426.0;attach=3895;image)
Não há nada mais forte do que a realidade para ensinar o interesse de se poupar fora do sistema monetário.
Segue-se a notícia sobre o imposto de 10% sobre os depósitos proposto pelo FMI:
Le FMI préconise une taxe sur l'épargne des ménages
Dans un rapport, le FMI s'inquiète de l'endettement des Etats européens et propose donc une taxe de 10% sur l'épargne des ménages pour y remédier !
Le 10/10/2013 à 7:56
[url]http://www.bfmtv.com/economie/fmi-preconise-une-taxe-lepargne-menages-620528.html[/url] ([url]http://www.bfmtv.com/economie/fmi-preconise-une-taxe-lepargne-menages-620528.html[/url])
Un tout petit paragraphe à la toute fin d'un document de 49 pages, dans un rapport du FMI ([url]http://www.bfmtv.com/economie/france-inquiete-fmi-602784.html[/url]). Le genre de document que l'on commence justement à lire par la fin. Un paragraphe en forme de proposition: et si l'on créait un prélèvement une fois pour toute sur le capital ([url]http://www.bfmtv.com/economie/reforme-lepargne-moscovici-cazeneuve-partagent-orientations-rapport-483774.html[/url])?
Il y a évidemment un point d'interrogation, mais aussi un raisonnement charpenté. L'endettement des Etats avancés est tel qu'on n'a pas le choix. Une taxe sur l'épargne privée a l'avantage de ne pas perturber le système. Certains diront même qu'elle est juste.
Taxe prélevée une seule fois
Mais pour cela il faut deux conditions. Que personne ne puisse y échapper et être absolument certain qu'elle ne sera prélevée qu'une seule fois.
Le rapport évoque les travaux de plusieurs économistes basés sur des exemples historiques où l'hypothèse a été envisagée pour désendetter des Etats.
Puis, il conclut si l'on veut revenir à des niveaux d'endettement d'avant la crise et compte tenu des calculs concernant 15 pays de la zone euro, qu'il conviendrait de mettre en place une imposition de 10% sur tous les ménages disposant d'une épargne positive ([url]http://www.bfmtv.com/economie/francais-arretaient-depargner-consommer-492644.html[/url]).
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Entao mas esse dinheiro todo está nos bancos? Isto anda tudo maluco............são estes gajos profissionais.... os bancos se ficam sem 10% dos depositos ficam tesos e depois como é?
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Não, para os bancos seria neutro, apenas passariam 10% dos depósitos de clientes para um novo cliente (Estado).
Eventualmente só perderiam 10% dos próprios depósitos se também se lhes aplicasse - mas isso seria difícil pois estes poderiam minimizar brutalmente o dinheiro em depósitos, o que provocaria problemas na sociedade.
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Esses 10% passam a ter novo proprietário: o estado. Assim abatem a dívida [via consolidação] e não têm de fazer reformas desagradáveis / impopulares.
Não há maluquice nenhuma, à excepção dos aforradores que poupam dentro do sistema monetário.
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Não, para os bancos seria neutro, apenas passariam 10% dos depósitos de clientes para um novo cliente (Estado).
Eventualmente só perderiam 10% dos próprios depósitos se também se lhes aplicasse - mas isso seria difícil pois estes poderiam minimizar brutalmente o dinheiro em depósitos, o que provocaria problemas na sociedade.
Com a corrida que haveria de haver aos bancos, de certeza que perderiam muito mais que esses 10%.....
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Mas se os bancos custam a ter 10% de liquidez, de que serve o estado ficar com 10% de hipotecas sobre dividas, se precisa do dinheiro é para gastar, nomeadamente pagar reformas e salarios.
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O confisco vai acontecer ...
Mas isso , é o mal menor , o pior é a WW3. ???
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Com a corrida que haveria de haver aos bancos, de certeza que perderiam muito mais que esses 10%.....
A correr, é agora, não é depois do cavalo fugido que se tranca a porta ao estábulo. Pois aí não vale a pena fazer corridinho nenhum.
Mas se os bancos custam a ter 10% de liquidez, de que serve o estado ficar com 10% de hipotecas sobre dividas, se precisa do dinheiro é para gastar, nomeadamente pagar reformas e salarios.
O dinheiro nem sequer sai do banco. Há apenas mudanças de dono: aforrador -> estado -> beneficiário [funcionário público, reformado, etc.].
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Mas se os bancos custam a ter 10% de liquidez, de que serve o estado ficar com 10% de hipotecas sobre dividas, se precisa do dinheiro é para gastar, nomeadamente pagar reformas e salarios.
Os depósitos das pessoas passam a ser depósitos do Estado, que depois os pode gastar caso em que:
1) Ou passam a ser depósitos de outras pessoas novamente;
2) Ou abatem à dívida do Estado, baixando o passivo e o activo do banco, simultaneamente.
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Não, para os bancos seria neutro, apenas passariam 10% dos depósitos de clientes para um novo cliente (Estado).
Eventualmente só perderiam 10% dos próprios depósitos se também se lhes aplicasse - mas isso seria difícil pois estes poderiam minimizar brutalmente o dinheiro em depósitos, o que provocaria problemas na sociedade.
Com a corrida que haveria de haver aos bancos, de certeza que perderiam muito mais que esses 10%.....
Para isso não ocorrer uma medida destas tem que acontecer de surpresa, não é anunciada antecipadamente.
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O confisco vai acontecer ...
Mas isso , é o mal menor , o pior é a WW3. ???
...Isso não está já em curso? ;D
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Pode ser de surpresa mas depois, durante muitas décadas, não voltará a entrar dinheiro em nenhum banco.
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Nos artigos e sub links não encontrei o link para o report original do FMI. Alguém tem ?
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Se fizerem isso, os bancos abrem todos falencia em portugal e temos uma guerra civil, vão ver
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Pode ser de surpresa mas depois, durante muitas décadas, não voltará a entrar dinheiro em nenhum banco.
ah pois!
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Os meus amigos , com notícias destas , ainda andam otimistas com a bolsa .... :o
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Se for uma taxa exclusivamente sobre depositos bancarios ( e não imposto sobre fortuna), vai afectar essencialmente a classe média. Os pobres pouco tem, e para os ricos % em depositos é tanto mais residual quanto maior a fortuna.
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Os meus amigos , com notícias destas , ainda andam otimistas com a bolsa .... :o
Gaia, temos de ganhar pelo menos os 10% que nos querem expoliar............e como a bolsa ainda nao deu sinal de queda, estou longo e bem longo
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Pode ser de surpresa mas depois, durante muitas décadas, não voltará a entrar dinheiro em nenhum banco.
Pois, mas com o desenho do euro (http://www.thinkfn.com/forumbolsaforex/index.php/topic,530.0.html), os governos não têm outra solução que não sacrificarem os aforradores para se salvarem a si próprios no momento de aperto.
Já desvendaste metade da equação, falta a outra metade...
É por isso que digo: se as pessoas detestam este sistema monetário, vão odiar o próximo! [com a excepção dos libertários, gold bugs (da versão metálica), donas de casa indianas, etc.]. :D
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e a proteccao dos depositos bancarios abaixo de 100k, como eh ? sendo um imposto provavelmente nao fara diferenca, o que acham ?
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Não faria diferença.
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O confisco vai acontecer ...
Mas isso , é o mal menor , o pior é a WW3. ???
Projecto e executo Bunkers, chave na mão. Se não têm terreno para o Bunker, também alugo ... :D
http://www.swissinfo.ch/por/especiais/a_suica_dos_recordes/recordes_mundiais/Bunkers_para_todos.html?cid=7488246 (http://www.swissinfo.ch/por/especiais/a_suica_dos_recordes/recordes_mundiais/Bunkers_para_todos.html?cid=7488246)
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o suicos pensam muito no futuro
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Nos anos 60 o campeão era a Albânia, em que tinha um regime comunista mas hostil a Moscovo e por isso receava ataques nucleares dos dois lados.
Nunca fui Albânia mas parece que paisagem está cheia de coisas destas
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Nos artigos e sub links não encontrei o link para o report original do FMI. Alguém tem ?
A publicação do FMI em questão está aqui:
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/fm/2013/02/pdf/fm1302.pdf (http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/fm/2013/02/pdf/fm1302.pdf)
Segue-se a parte em questão [pág. 58 do pdf]:
Box 6. A One-Off Capital Levy?
The sharp deterioration of the public finances in many countries has revived interest in a “capital levy” — a one-off tax on private wealth — as an exceptional measure to restore debt sustainability.1 The appeal is that such a tax, if it is implemented before avoidance is possible and there is a belief that it will never be repeated, does not distort behavior (and may be seen by some as fair). There have been illustrious supporters, including Pigou, Ricardo, Schumpeter, and—until he changed his mind—Keynes. The conditions for success are strong, but also need to be weighed against the risks of the alternatives, which include repudiating public debt or inflating it away (these, in turn, are a particular form of wealth tax—on bondholders—that also falls on nonresidents).
There is a surprisingly large amount of experience to draw on, as such levies were widely adopted in Europe
after World War I and in Germany and Japan after World War II. Reviewed in Eichengreen (1990), this experience suggests that more notable than any loss of credibility was a simple failure to achieve debt reduction, largely because the delay in introduction gave space for extensive avoidance and capital flight—in turn spurring inflation.
The tax rates needed to bring down public debt to precrisis levels, moreover, are sizable: reducing debt ratios to end-2007 levels would require (for a sample of 15 euro area countries) a tax rate of about 10 percent on households with positive net wealth.2
1 As for instance in Bach (2012).
2 IMF staff calculation using the Eurosystem’s Household Finance and Consumption Survey (Household Finance and Consumption Network, 2013); unweighted average.
Os 10% parece ser uma média sobre todos os depósitos da UE, ou então todos pagam, incluindo os países nórdicos... Parece-me pouco plausível tamanha solidaridade, pelo que o imposto deverá ser pelos cidadãos de cada país e aí a dolorosa deve ser maior.
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deve ser aplicado em funcao da residencia oficial, o que quer dizer que eu estou isento :D
na realidade deveriam aplicar a todas as contas independentemente da morada e apenas nalguns paises
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Neo,
Para quem tenha conta na Suiça, aí residente, qual o juros que pagam em depósitos a prazo?
Claro que o montante é importante, mas considera pequenos valores.
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Neo,
Para quem tenha conta na Suiça, aí residente, qual o juros que pagam em depósitos a prazo?
Claro que o montante é importante, mas considera pequenos valores.
as condicoes nao sao iguais para contas de residentes locais ou no estrangeiro. pagam pouco, recebo uns 0.5% e ainda levo com taxas mensais
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Uma medida destas só teria uma remota hipótese de ser aceitável se primeiro se acabassem com as offshores, para aplicar a levy a todos, sem o a classe política e seus amiguinhos se safarem.
Além disso não vejo por que é que não deveria de haver progressividade nisto. Por que não cobrar muito mais aos ricos?
E por que só cobrar nos depósitos e não noutros activos?
Bom, de qq modo este é um de milhares de papers que o FMI publica com ideias estrambólicas que quase nunca são implementadas.
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Pois, o tipo de estudos que serve precisamente de parra para os políticos justificarem as suas acções em momentos de grande necessidade para taparem as suas vergonhas.
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Neo,
Para quem tenha conta na Suiça, aí residente, qual o juros que pagam em depósitos a prazo?
Claro que o montante é importante, mas considera pequenos valores.
as condicoes nao sao iguais para contas de residentes locais ou no estrangeiro. pagam pouco, recebo uns 0.5% e ainda levo com taxas mensais
Eles entregam informação à AT? Ou podes esquecer-te de declarar a conta cá em Portugal? Há quem se tenha esquecido de declarar 5%M de euros no IRS por isso não me julguem
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Neo,
Para quem tenha conta na Suiça, aí residente, qual o juros que pagam em depósitos a prazo?
Claro que o montante é importante, mas considera pequenos valores.
as condicoes nao sao iguais para contas de residentes locais ou no estrangeiro. pagam pouco, recebo uns 0.5% e ainda levo com taxas mensais
Eles entregam informação à AT? Ou podes esquecer-te de declarar a conta cá em Portugal? Há quem se tenha esquecido de declarar 5%M de euros no IRS por isso não me julguem
eu sou residente aqui e nao tenho esse problema mas teoricamente entregam a informacao, na pratica duvido muito
se abrires conta nao des o teu numero fiscal, da o passaporte :D
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Eles entregam informação à AT? Ou podes esquecer-te de declarar a conta cá em Portugal? Há quem se tenha esquecido de declarar 5%M de euros no IRS por isso não me julguem
Já houve tantos programas de regularização de capitais no estrangeiro que é só esperar pelo próximo.
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Mesmo dando o nr do Passaporte, o fisco sabe que foram trasnferidos x milhares de euros para uma conta no estrangueiro, deve ser fácil verificar isso, a não ser que deposite o dinheiro no balcão, tipo gangster...
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A SOLUÇÃO (http://armstrongeconomics.com/2013/10/13/solution/)
Em especial destaco o que ele escreve sobre a Suiça.
Mas vale a pena ler tudo.
The shaky global economy already is besieged by other threats, including the sudden drop in exports from China for September. We are headed into this debt vortex from which rational minds simply cannot prevail. We are plagued by old politicians too entrenched in the system to see that the road they are on leads to total destruction no different from communism. If the government claims it owns everything and pays you $25,000 a year to live or they tax and fine everything leaving you with only $25,000 at the end of the day, what is the difference? That is like saying we are a free society but you have to request permission to protest or even travel. Our so-called democracies are merely corrupt republics and we have ZERO say in anything material.
Ultimately, to answer the many questions I get about how to reform the political system, let me say this. Switzerland is an example of probably the best political system ever devised – that of the Republic of Genoa. The leaders hold that position for one year only. The top rich families of Genoa were the ruling class. However, each family had its turn for one year only. Genoa was run not in a some mythical contest between the rich and the poor, but as a corporation in competition with Venice and Florence. When the competitive focus is external rather than internal class competition, then the whole benefits from the competition against other states. The short duration of a Doge (leader) ensured that he would pass no law that was Draconian for he would soon suffer that same fate. Likewise, laws were fair because next year he would be subjected to retaliation.
The Swiss system submits individual issues to a public vote only if it is constitutional. That should be expanded to tax power etc. Today, everything should be submitted to a public vote. You log on to your computer and vote. Those who do not have one, go to the local library. If this is the case, the number of laws will diminish. After all, man has written billions of laws trying to improve upon the Ten Commandments by manipulating society while they are at it.
([url]http://www.thinkfn.com/forumbolsaforex/index.php?action=dlattach;topic=1489.0;attach=13848;image[/url])
USIntAs%Total
If we shorten the term of office, eliminate second terms, then the people in office will really be the people and not career politicians losing touch with reality. TAXES are no longer necessary at the federal level. Print what we need to cover the cost of government. Those who think that will be inflationary are unfamiliar with the facts. Virtually 70% of the national debts is accumulative interest payments that do nothing by subsidize banking and eliminates capital that would otherwise be lent to the private sector expanding the economy and truly lifting the VELOCITY of money..
If the $17 trillion in debt was invested in the private sector, can you imagine the amount of jobs that would be created? Eliminate the payroll tax and the cost of labor will drop sharply bringing jobs back home. Taxes are
necessary for state and local government that cannot print money. There also, we must privatize government as much as possible because ONLY a private company will meet its obligations. Pensions are unfunded in the public sector because they assumed they would always be able to raise taxes. They are morons for they never looking at the math behind such a model. The City of Detroit collapsed because 50% of current taxes went to pensions driving taxes higher to sustain the operating costs of the government.
These are just a few of the issues we will have to deal with in the years ahead. The system can be reformed. We must eliminate the old guard who refuse to see the light because they are the very problem. This is part of the political reform process that will begin after 2016.
([url]http://www.thinkfn.com/forumbolsaforex/index.php?action=dlattach;topic=1489.0;attach=13849;image[/url])
We will be publishing the entire proposal
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O Hermes sempre à frente. Agora é que parece que a coisa está a chegar ao mainstream português (devem andar a ler o TH :D)
[url]http://expresso.sapo.pt/fmi-sugere-imposto-de-10-sobre-a-riqueza-das-familia=f835648#ixzz2hm5yGkvH[/url] ([url]http://FMI[/url] sugere imposto de 10% sobre a riqueza das família
Ler mais: [url=http://expresso.sapo.pt/fmi-sugere-imposto-de-10-sobre-a-riqueza-das-familia=f835648#ixzz2hm5yGkvH)]FMI sugere imposto de 10% sobre a riqueza das família
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Uma medida destas só teria uma remota hipótese de ser aceitável se primeiro se acabassem com as offshores, para aplicar a levy a todos, sem a classe política e seus amiguinhos se safarem.
Isto seria essencial, para que fosse minimamente aceitável. Mesmo assim, para mim é uma forma de resolver o problema totalmente asquerosa. Quem obteve capital por actividades legais e cumprindo a lei, já pagou toneladas de impostos.
Mas caso isto vá avante, infelizmente, a sugestão do Kin, para que a coisa fosse minimamente justa, não avançaria.... é totalmente contra os interesses dos legisladores e dos parasitas que andam associados aos primeiros :(
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O objectivo do Estado não é ser justo - como diz o tópico, o dinheiro vai-se buscar onde o há. O Estado vai buscar o dinheiro onde consegue, onde é mais fácil. Por isso é que coisas como os combustíveis chegam a ter taxas efectivas de imposto de 100%. Não porque sejam luxos, mas porque é fácil de cobrar ali.
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Eu entendo totalmente isso e não tenho ilusões sobre estes temas. É mesmo assim como dizes.... infelizmente.
O título do tópico está muito bem colocado, por isso mesmo.
Por não ter ilusões nessas matérias é que disse que a questão que o Kin levantou, nunca iria avante.
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E por existir essa busca sempre da via mais fácil, é que existe tanta dificuldade em executar reformas fiscais e estruturais com "pés e cabeça"....
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E como se fosse a isto?
Só com o guito no cofre?
Se tiver tudo investido, tenho que vender 10% da carteira para dar ao Estado?
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E como se fosse a isto?
Só com o guito no cofre?
Se tiver tudo investido, tenho que vender 10% da carteira para dar ao Estado?
Vão aos depósitos, caso contrário não era necessário a surpresa.
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Se uma coisa destas fosse avante claro que tinha de ser de surpresa, como diz o Hermes. E a ser de surpresa o mais certo era ser uma coisa simples, extremamente injusta entre detentores de vários instrumentos. Com a complexidade dos instrumentos que existem é impossível conseguir abranger tudo. É nos depósitos e toca a andar.
Senão imagine-se: Ora este tipo tem uma carteira de 10 acções... Ah mas espera, em três delas está curto. Como é que fazemos ? Aquele tem contratos de futuros, o outro tem um straddle de opções e a seguir está um com leaps muito OOM que não valem nada.
Epá, então e o gajo ali do lado que está longo no EURUSD com alavancagem de 50x ? Porra, agora apareceu aqui um que tem um estruturado, indexado a 4 acções, que só se vence daqui a 3 anos.
Fonix... Martela mas é os depósitos a prazo e acabou-se.
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E se alguém estiver curto E alavancado, produzindo depósitos bem em excesso do valor do portfolio, desgraçam-no sem piedade e pode ir queixar-se para tribunal onde daqui a 20 anos lhe dão razão... :D
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Porra, livremo-nos nós de um dia ter o maquiavélico Inc como assessor das finanças. :D
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E quem deve...tipos crédito à habitação ou outro... também vai deixar de dever tanto...
seria o justo.... mas não!
Que injustiça!
Se fizerem o corte dos ditos 10%, os bancos portugueses vão deixar de ter certo tipo de clientes... porque a maioria nunca mais vai confiar...
dass.... o loby dos Bancos não vai deixar!
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Realmente o dinheiro vai se buscar onde o há....
Parece que a taxa sobre transacções financeiras vai avançar.
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e a proteccao dos depositos bancarios abaixo de 100k, como eh ? sendo um imposto provavelmente nao fara diferenca, o que acham ?
se o guito daí resultante chegar acho que manterão a garantia
não manter a garantia é um risco demasiado elevado
pode haver um bank run, mesmo depois, pela quebra de confiança
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Protecção a depósitos bancários até 100.000€ penso que é para falências de instituições financeiras.
Quem tiver mais que 5.000€ já será considerado rico e capitalista e poderá levar com a "talhada necessária".
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Protecção a depósitos bancários até 100.000€ penso que é para falências de instituições financeiras.
Quem tiver mais que 5.000€ já será considerado rico e capitalista e poderá levar com a "talhada necessária".
não entendi a questão das falências bancárias
para mim a falência está garantida é se houver uma quebra de confiança dessas
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Protecção a depósitos bancários até 100.000€ penso que é para falências de instituições financeiras.
Quem tiver mais que 5.000€ já será considerado rico e capitalista e poderá levar com a "talhada necessária".
não entendi a questão das falências bancárias
para mim a falência está garantida é se houver uma quebra de confiança dessas
A protecção é contra a falência de bancos, não contra o confisco. Obviamente, não há protecção estatal contra o confisco estatal. Não percebo qual é a tua dúvida.
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Protecção a depósitos bancários até 100.000€ penso que é para falências de instituições financeiras.
Quem tiver mais que 5.000€ já será considerado rico e capitalista e poderá levar com a "talhada necessária".
não entendi a questão das falências bancárias
para mim a falência está garantida é se houver uma quebra de confiança dessas
A protecção é contra a falência de bancos, não contra o confisco. Obviamente, não há protecção estatal contra o confisco estatal. Não percebo qual é a tua dúvida.
a protecção é contra a falência de bancos, tudo bem...interpretei o escrito doutra forma
de qualquer forma essa protecção visa sobretudo criar clima de confiança
confisco ou falência o que interessa para o depositante é ter uma garantia mínima que lhe permita confiar no sistema
se o confisco descer a fasquia da garantia quanto a mim há o perigo real dum bank run
qualquer pessoa, entre um pack que não dá segurança e remunera mal e o colchão lá de casa optará pelo colchão
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a protecção é contra a falência de bancos, tudo bem...interpretei o escrito doutra forma
de qualquer forma essa protecção visa sobretudo criar clima de confiança
confisco ou falência o que interessa para o depositante é ter uma garantia mínima que lhe permita confiar no sistema
se o confisco descer a fasquia da garantia quanto a mim há o perigo real dum bank run
qualquer pessoa, entre um pack que não dá segurança e remunera mal e o colchão lá de casa optará pelo colchão
Por isso é que se atira a bomba enquanto (quase) toda a gente está confortavelmente instalada no bunker. :D
Além disso, depois de cavalo fugido, não vale a pena trancar a porta ao estábulo. Mais ainda, a partir daí a confiança não é um problema. Basta impedir temporariamente as transferências para o exterior. Por isso os políticos podem simplesmente pensar: podem correr, mas não se vão esconder! :D
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a protecção é contra a falência de bancos, tudo bem...interpretei o escrito doutra forma
de qualquer forma essa protecção visa sobretudo criar clima de confiança
confisco ou falência o que interessa para o depositante é ter uma garantia mínima que lhe permita confiar no sistema
se o confisco descer a fasquia da garantia quanto a mim há o perigo real dum bank run
qualquer pessoa, entre um pack que não dá segurança e remunera mal e o colchão lá de casa optará pelo colchão
Por isso é que se atira a bomba enquanto (quase) toda a gente está confortavelmente instalada no bunker. :D
Além disso, depois de cavalo fugido, não vale a pena trancar a porta ao estábulo. Mais ainda, a partir daí a confiança não é um problema. Basta impedir temporariamente as transferências para o exterior. Por isso os políticos podem simplesmente pensar: podem correr, mas não se vão esconder! :D
vale a pena trancar a porta do estábulo se se pensar que mais cavalos podem fugir
eu não falo de transferências para o exterior mas simplesmente de sacar o dinheiro dos bancos
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aplicam limites de levantamento diário baixos, tal como foi feito na Grécia e Chipre.
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vale a pena trancar a porta do estábulo se se pensar que mais cavalos podem fugir
eu não falo de transferências para o exterior mas simplesmente de sacar o dinheiro dos bancos
Essa é a 1ª parte, a do atirar a bomba para dentro do bunker. A 2ª [a do poderem correr, mas não se poderem esconder] é para convencer que o tratamento do mal está feito e que não vêm mais injeções atrás.
De qq forma é o que acontece quando as pessoas querem mudar as regras do jogo a seu belo prazer: os visados não vão a jogo, i.e. a ovelha não comparece ao jantar e os lobos que se comam uns aos outros. :D
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O FMI está a reverlar-se uma autêntica caverna de Aladino. :D
Segue-se a proposta do FMI para um mundo mais seguro e repleto de novas oportunidades, nomeadamente a de "segurador". (http://www.thinkfn.com/forumbolsaforex/Smileys/yarex2/evil.gif)
Did An Obscure IMF Document Start a Global Bail-In Revolution?
By Daniel Amerman CFA
11/21/2013
http://www.financialsense.com/contributors/daniel-amerman/did-an-obscure-imf-document-start-a-global-bail-in-revolution (http://www.financialsense.com/contributors/daniel-amerman/did-an-obscure-imf-document-start-a-global-bail-in-revolution)
When revolutions start, it's not uncommon for almost nobody to notice. It may take years or even decades before historians can look back, point a finger and say "that's where it really began."
An obscure International Monetary Fund "Staff Discussion Note" may have already started a "Bail-In" financial revolution that could transform the global investment world.
In this quite remarkable document, the staff discusses a world where risks to the global financial system have not gone away — but are worse than ever. As candidly discussed, the "SIFI" (systemically important financial institution) problem has not been improving, but instead has been getting worse than ever — and there doesn't appear to be any solution under existing contract law and bankruptcy law.
More risk than ever is concentrated in fewer financial institutions, while there is no way under existing law to unwind a failure of one of these institutions without risking triggering global financial chaos. Moreover, there is a deadly feedback loop between these "too-big-to-fail" institutions and sovereign governments. That is, as the IMF staff discusses, the bailing out of these massive institutions can bankrupt sovereign governments, and sovereign governments going bankrupt can wipe out the "too-big-to-fail" institutions.
So the IMF staff has come up with an audacious plan for how the globe can emerge from this seemingly impossible situation. The key word is "insurance".
The proposal is to take selected classes of investments, and retroactively decide that these assets aren't really assets at all. Indeed, the owners of these assets have — without realizing they've done it — agreed to provide insurance for the global financial system. So if a major crisis arises, the global financial system merely goes to these unknowing "insurance" providers and helps itself to their assets effectively, and the crisis is dealt with. It's a miracle solution!
Now there is the issue that some investors might actually object to this taking of their investment assets for the greater good of society. Which is exactly why the IMF staff recommends that this be done by way of statutory law, in a manner that overrides contract law — and is involuntary, with no investor permission needed. It would also be retroactive as needed, thus applying to people who already own these classes of investments.
After the bail-ins of the Cypriot banks and the Polish retirement system, the development of bail-in procedures is spreading rapidly around the world, including the EU, Canada and the United States. What is fascinating and troubling - though perhaps not surprising - is how global politicians are in practice completely changing the "bail-in" concept, setting aside the IMF-proposed changes that could have forced genuine banking reforms and potentially increased global financial stability, and instead are creating a broader threat to investors.
Moody's Investors Service has already lowered the credit ratings of Morgan Stanley, Goldman Sachs, JP Morgan Chase and Bank of New York Mellon in anticipation of possible future bail-ins. Moody's accompanying statement explained: "Rather than relying on public funds to bail out one of these institutions, we expect that bank holding company creditors will be bailed-in and thereby shoulder much of the burden to help recapitalize a failing bank."
A World at Risk
The IMF Staff Discussion Note is titled, "From Bail-Out To Bail-In: Mandatory Debt Restructuring Of Systemic Financial Institutions". Originally released in 2012, it could be viewed as a source document for the global movement to bail-ins. The note is available on the International Monetary Fund website, and a link for downloading the PDF is below:
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/sdn/2012/sdn1203.pdf (http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/sdn/2012/sdn1203.pdf)
(The original discussion is well worth reading, and this analysis refers to particular document page numbers within it. Please note, as is often the case with PDF documents, that the page number in the actual document (which is what you will see if you print it out) is one off from the electronic PDF page number.)
One of the main questions explored in the document is just why the IMF believes that the world needs these major changes in the laws and how investments are treated.
While positive headlines abound in the media about rising stock markets and improving conditions, as it turns out, the International Monetary Fund staff sees a quite different picture. What they see are serious ongoing risks to the global financial order that are being caused by the major financial institutions around the world — which they refer to as SIFIs, otherwise known as "too-big-to-fail" institutions.
As covered on document page 4 (PDF page 5), there are three different ways in which the failure of even a single SIFI can imperil the entire global financial order.
The first major risk is "direct counterparty risk", with the SIFIs having an extraordinarily complex web of hundreds of trillions of dollars of interlocking commitments and contracts between themselves. The failure of a single SIFI could trigger a chain reaction of losses that would spread like dominoes, knocking down one SIFI after another — as well as other banks and investors around the world.
The second major risk is one of "liquidity". Since SIFIs rely heavily on borrowing, if the sources of their funds flee in the event of trouble, this would leave the SIFIs potentially insolvent unless they could quickly sell assets to cash out departing lenders, which would rapidly drive down prices, and with everyone selling assets together this could create a global "fire sale" on investments that's enough to crash the world's financial system in a matter of days.
The third major risk is one of "contagion", where the failure — or even looming failure — of one major institution introduces a psychology of panic into the marketplaces, which by itself is more enough to bring down the global financial order. After all, perception can and does create reality when it comes to financial markets.
Now all of these risks received a great deal of attention after the global banking system nearly went under in 2008, and in theory they were supposed to have been taken care of by restricting the ability of the SIFIs to take risks, and also by reducing the percentage of the world's financial assets that are held by the SIFIs.
However, as covered at the bottom of page 4 (PDF page 5) — this hasn't been working out in practice.
To the contrary, there has been an even greater consolidation of assets into these "too-big-to-fail" banks and financial institutions than there ever was before the crisis started. As a result, this has created "unsustainable public finances", where the extraordinary cost of conventional bail-outs potentially threatens the solvency of the nations themselves. And such a sovereign insolvency could in turn trigger insolvency for the SIFIs. So again we have a toxic feedback loop between the SIFIs and the nations that must bail them out in the attempt to avert global financial collapse.
The IMF also identifies the related problem of a "shadow banking system" which also creates systemic risk, but is not subject to the same regulations as the formal banking system.
As discussed on page 8 of the document (PDF page 9), there are two other major problems with the global financial system that feed into these three major risks, making them far more dangerous.
One of them is that because these major financial institutions are generally exposed to a huge amount of risk in their derivatives holdings — which on a global basis dwarf the equity that they have — these derivatives in an insolvency situation could lead to a "disorderly unwinding" which could disrupt the financial markets. In other words, it could lead to a global financial meltdown — although the IMF staff uses a little more carefully chosen vocabulary.
The other core problem, as analyzed by the IMF staff, is that general corporate insolvency proceedings do not provide sufficient tools to manage the risks to financial stability when it comes to a SIFI failing. Which means that under existing law, there simply isn't the capability to manage this — except by bringing in massive amounts of public funds from already financially stressed sovereign states, which then risk triggering their own insolvencies, which then also risk triggering the insolvencies of other SIFIs in this toxic feedback loop.
Plainly put, the existing laws can't handle the problems that have been created by this intertwined world of "too-big-to-fail" institutions that continue to take massive financial risks for private gain, seemingly beyond the control of the sovereign nations, even as the sovereign nations dealing with their own financial problems increasingly lack the credible financial resources to massively bail-out these institutions without risking their own solvency. So the bail-outs are unaffordable, but yet a failure to bail-out would lead to swift global financial chaos.
The Insurance Loophole
For an outside but rational investor, the solution might seem to be obvious. We didn't have this problem before the SIFIs — so get rid of these "too-big-to-fail" financial institutions. Break them up. Restrict their ability to take risks if the public is necessary as a backstop for them to take risks. Unlimited and unregulated risks are fine, but only those which their private investors / owners can actually afford to take. So that in the event of bad decisions leading to failure, the private investors may be wiped out, but no public backstop is needed.
And in doing so, the need for the public to bail-out these institutions would end, as would the toxic feedback loop between the SIFIs and the effectively bankrupt sovereign nations.
Now the IMF staff is aware of this obvious solution, but is very careful not to touch upon it, other than perhaps to implicitly say it just hasn't been working.
That is because the core of the problem is political. The SIFIs are simply too politically powerful for them to be broken up by the politicians of the sovereign developed nations. It's simply not politically practical for the governments to change the behavior of these institutions — even though they place the stability of the entire global financial system at risk on a daily basis.
So when considered from a practical political perspective, another solution needs to be found.
The alternative solution that the IMF document proposes is to use "bail-ins" instead of "bail-outs". My recent article titled, "Bail-ins & Taking Private Wealth", explains in further detail the concept of bail-ins, and how they're currently being used in the real world.
http://www.financialsense.com/contributors/daniel-amerman/bail-ins-taking-private-wealth (http://www.financialsense.com/contributors/daniel-amerman/bail-ins-taking-private-wealth)
One way of looking at a bail-in is that it is the opposite of a bail-out. In the case of a bail-out, when there's an issue with a bank (or government, or government retirement system) not having enough assets available to meet the claims against it, funds are brought in from the general public, supposedly to serve the needs of the general public.
With a bail-in, there is no bankruptcy, but assets are taken from selected investor classes, thereby reducing the claims against the corporation. Solvency is therefore achieved and the needs of the general public are met, but without the general public having to actually pay for it.
Now while the IMF document uses the term "bail-ins", they also offer a quite different way of explaining the process, as shown on page 7 (PDF page 8). As stated, "the bail-in capital could be seen as a form of insurance (provided by creditors) against bank insolvency".
Now if we think through this approach — this way of finding completely new solutions for a system that otherwise lacks solutions, the implications are global, and they are extraordinary.
The way it works is that in the event of a potential financial meltdown, the government — or international organization — identifies particular investment types and classes of investors. These investors hold assets, and in some cases these assets are the liabilities (such as bonds) of the institution that is in trouble.
The government effectively says to these investors, "you may think that you own an asset, but what you've really done is you have underwritten an insurance policy. And if this institution in which you've invested your assets should run into financial difficulty, you have in fact pledged your assets to prevent the insolvency of the corporation, for the greater good of the global financial order".
Now the owner of the investment asset had no idea when they made the investment that they were doing this. They've never received an insurance premium for taking this risk. But nonetheless, a category of investment assets are retroactively declared to be insurance, and they can effectively absorb all the losses and keep the SIFI — or the government, or the public retirement system — solvent for the benefit of all.
Using Statutory Law to Override Contract Law
The second half of the article is linked below. Subjects covered include:
Four approaches that the IMF staff recommends that governments use for minimizing the legal issues associated with taking investor assets.
IMF-recommended investor protections, and their plan for using investment markets to incentivize the big banks and other SIFIs to voluntarily reduce risks.
The rapid development of bail-in procedures around the world - and how in practice, politicians are dropping the investor protection recommendations, broadening the threat to investors, and removing the proposed market-driven threats to the politically powerful "Too-Big-To-Fail" institutions.
How bail-ins and other interventions are intended to hold the global financial system together through changing the basic rules governing the law, money and investments, even as they facilitate a redistribution of wealth which is not understood by the general public.
Segue-se a 2.ª parte.
Did An Obscure IMF Document Start a Global Bail-In Revolution?
By Daniel Amerman CFA
http://danielamerman.com/articles/2013/IMFbailinB.html (http://danielamerman.com/articles/2013/IMFbailinB.html)
Using Statutory Law To Override Contract Law
Now because the investors – whose assets are essentially funding the insurance that preserves the major financial institutions – didn't actually realize that what they were doing was pledging their assets to guarantee the payment on insurance claims, there's a case to be made that this could be a bit sticky from a contract law perspective. Given that this didn't appear anywhere in the prospectus.
Which brings us back to our previous discussion from page 8. One of the reasons for bail-ins in the first place is that using the current laws as written for traditional bankruptcy proceedings simply doesn't work to try to unwind one of these "too-big-to-fail" banks. Per the IMF staff it can't be done, as there's simply too much global risk and damage.
So there are three key paragraphs on page 12 (PDF page 13) that address this. The first one is that "there are compelling arguments in favor of an approach that minimizes the role of the courts". Keep those judges out of it in other words, as they might not do what they're supposed to do. Indeed, the IMF explicitly recommends not allowing the judiciary the ability to reverse this resolution, although it could be allowed to award damages in some instances.
Instead, it is more appropriate for the "decisions to be taken by the banking authorities". In other words, the very same regulators who failed to properly regulate the banks and allowed the disastrous situation to be created in the first place are the best possible experts resolve the crisis.
There's also the problem of getting creditor approval that might be required in a bankruptcy. The IMF document addresses this as well, stating that "the need for quick and decisive action in the interest of financial stability pleads against incorporating a procedure for creditor approval". Getting creditor approval can be a very messy part when going through a bankruptcy proceeding – therefore it's simply eliminated with the bail-in structure.
Perhaps most important of all is the bottom paragraph on page 12, which states that "bail-ins should be applied to existing debt as well as debt issued after the bail-in power is enacted".
In other words, this is retroactive when it comes to investment decisions. In theory, the IMF proposals are based on nations enacting bail-in legislation in advance, so investors are warned, and the yields on securities that are subject to bail-in should rise proportionately as the market evaluates the insurance premium that it should be receiving for providing this protection to other investors.
However, in the real world, as the IMF acknowledges, when you need the assets – you need the assets. So the government takes them, regardless of whether the investor had any idea at the time they made the investment that they would be subject to becoming "insurance" and having their assets effectively taken and converted into potentially worthless equity.
Theory Versus Practice
It should be noted that not everything in this IMF staff discussion note is bad, not by any means, and I encourage you to take the time to read the full discussion. There are numerous aspects that I think many free market-oriented investors would find to be quite appealing.
For example, as part of a bail-in, the bank management that made the bad decisions is expected to be fired.
Also, existing shareholders are supposed to bear the brunt of the loss, and in most cases see the entire value of their shares wiped out before other investors see their own claims involuntarily converted to insurance and equity.
And this is supposed to happen in a transparent manner in which investors understand exactly what they're getting into, before they make the investment. Given that investors then explicitly understand they are investing money that can be taken in a bail-in, the yields they receive should, in theory, fully reflect this.
The SIFIs are supposed to be required to hold a certain percentage of their liabilities in securities that are subject to bail-in, and the market rates they have to pay to attract investors for this effective "insurance" should act as a brake on their taking risky actions, which in practice banking authorities have been unable to prevent.
So in theory – if every essential aspect were enforced and if it were not retroactively applied to investors – the IMF proposal is a very interesting plan when it comes to both incentives and capitalization. The new "insurance" debt may increase the real capitalization of the SIFI by two or three times, radically reducing the chances that a public bail-out would be needed.
Top management and boards of directors would face three new kinds of incentives to stop risking vast sums of public monies in the pursuit of private gain. First, they have to convince the market that risks are under control – and if not, the insurance premium component needed to sell the new securities will put a squeeze on profits that will bring on shareholder pressures for a change in management.
Second, management and boards lose the ability to negotiate, strike deals, take advantage of their insider connections with powerful politicians, or – to not put too fine of point on it – blackmail the public when they get into trouble. Instead, there is no bankruptcy or negotiations, new management and a new board are brought in by the new owners, and former executives are left cleaning their desks out with little leverage.
Third, if they don't like that new incentive structure – they have powerful incentives to not become a SIFI or to stop being one. They are then free to take whatever risks they so choose that are allowable for their type of organization – but without any public guarantees underwriting the risks they take (other than deposit insurance).
So there is a case to be made that if the exact structure were to be enacted, which includes various forms of investor protections as proposed in the IMF discussion note, this could be a net positive for the stability of the global banking system, and an intriguing methodology for using the market to rein in excessive risks that are being taken by major banking institutions, which as a practical matter neither politicians and regulators have been able to do.
But that brings us back to the source of this problem in the first place, and why things have so far been working differently with bail-ins in practice than as proposed by the IMF in theory.
The core problem is one of politics.
The reason this situation exists in the first place is because of politics. And when it comes down to an acute financial crisis – politics continue to rule. So it might be naïve to expect that nations would use this framework the way in which the staff has proposed. Instead, political considerations are likely to rein supreme.
Which means that in the real world, bail-ins are likely to work in a quite different manner – exactly as has happened with the limited cases we've seen in the world so far. Cyprus didn't follow the IMF framework with its bank bail-ins. Neither did Poland with its retirement system bail-in. They just used the massive involuntary taking-from-private-sector-investors component in order to dodge bankruptcy.
Canada's proposal for bail-in rules is also quite troubling in this regard. As can be seen on page 145 (PDF page 155) of the document (linked below), the language is all about the taking from private investors – but there is nothing about the specific securities covered, or the required percentages of "insurance" type securities relative to assets or equities, or the displacement of current shareholders and management.
http://www.budget.gc.ca/2013/doc/plan/budget2013-eng.pdf (http://www.budget.gc.ca/2013/doc/plan/budget2013-eng.pdf)
Even more troubling are the rapid and major changes being made to the EU's bail-in legislation, as described in the November 13, 2013 Reuters article, "Plan To Raid Bank Creditors Could Shatter Europe's Calm".
"I hope that serious investors know what they are investing in," said Gunnar Hokmark, a member of the European Parliament who plays a central role in shaping the new law.
"Everything is to be seen as bail-in-able. Depositors are, in the end, bail-in-able. If anyone would be surprised by that, they have been away from the debate for quite a long time."
Originally pencilled in for 2018, these rules will be finalised and possibly accelerated by European Union countries and the bloc's parliament in the coming weeks.
http://uk.reuters.com/article/2013/11/13/eu-banks-crisis-idUKL5N0IX4LQ20131113 (http://uk.reuters.com/article/2013/11/13/eu-banks-crisis-idUKL5N0IX4LQ20131113)
In other words, none of the "good stuff" is there when it comes to using market forces and incentives to cure the SIFI problem. There just appears to be a new and massive source of involuntary funding from investors, which doesn't seem to disturb the cozy relationship between politicians, banking regulators, and the politically powerful senior banking executives.
Perhaps these missing components will be there if and when the actual regulations are issued? We can only hope - but it sure doesn't look like it at this point.
What is rapidly emerging instead, in both Europe and North America, is an enabling mechanism for the taking of wealth from those who are judged to be able to bear the pain, so that the general population is bailed out without paying the cost, and in the real world – the politically powerful are still likely to be insulated.
Dysfunctional Global Finances & Governmental Interventions
Something else to keep in mind is that the banking institutions don't have a problem in isolation. Rather, as covered in the IMF document, their fate is closely interwoven with the sovereign governments. So we have a global financial system which remains at high risk, and if sufficiently stressed these institutions could still bring down the global financial order in a very short period of time, potentially even a few days. We know stress will come – we just don't know quite when and where.
Derivatives-led contagion and counterparty risk can still bring down the global financial system like a house of cards – absent powerful interventions.
The governments themselves are deeply in debt, the overall global economy continues to underperform, and many nations have far greater promises which have been made to their populations than they currently have the funds to pay, or are likely to have the funds in the future. So "stimulus" programs keep the global economies running, even as the debts continue to mount up.
And the leading source of government insolvencies over the long term is unfunded and unpayable government promises for retirement benefits.
So we have three separate but tightly interlocked components, with those being effectively bankrupt sovereign governments, effectively bankrupt public retirement systems, and a global system of major financial institutions who have entered into interlocking derivatives contracts, that are subject to collapse at any time when the next major financial stress hits the system.
All three are tightly interlocked; all three are dysfunctional. And the whole thing is held together by increasingly aggressive government interventions. Quantitative easing is of course a government intervention, and the "bail-ins" are another form of government intervention. These stresses grow worse each year as the populations of the United States, Europe and Japan continue to get a little bit older on average, even as the jobs for the young – that are needed to pay for those retirement promises – continue to fail to materialize.
This situation is entirely outside the current media message that the world is getting healthy again and these crises are receding in the rearview mirror. Instead they're escalating, and the system remains more at risk than ever, as covered in the IMF report.
However, despite five years of crisis – the financial order hasn't collapsed yet. And while it certainly could collapse at any time as a result of a political miscalculation, there's frankly no need for the global financial order to collapse. Indeed it could continue to exhibit a surprising stability over time – albeit a completely dysfunctional stability from the perspective of most savers and investors.
How do the governments of the world take this three-part combination of high risk and fragile banks, effectively insolvent governments, and effectively insolvent government retirement programs, and maintain them through time without triggering a collapse?
This is the central question. It is what I have been warning my readers about for some years now, and there are answers.
However, the answers don't lie within the "system as we know it". Instead, what will be (and what is being) done is to change the "system", lest it be destroyed. Which means we should expect extraordinary changes when it comes to 1) the nature of the law, 2) the nature of money itself, and 3) the nature of investments.
While keeping those three categories of changes in mind, it is important to consider the two departments within the International Monetary Fund which cooperated in preparing this extraordinary document. They were the Legal Department, and the Monetary and Capital Market Department. In other words, the departments who deal with the 1) law, 2) money, and 3) investments.
The International Monetary Fund understands exactly how this process works, as does the Federal Reserve, as does United States Treasury department.
To maintain order within dysfunctional underlying economies and avoid financial collapse, the nature of money is changed, the nature of investments are changed, and the law itself is changed over time.
This isn't optional. If those are not done, the system collapses. And everything possible will be done – and is being done right now, in real time – by those currently in power just to avoid such a collapse.
Crucially, this process of changing the law, investments and money is not being done in a neutral or altruistic manner. The difference between the IMF Staff Discussion Note, and EU parliament member Gunnar Hokmark's casual dismissal of the key provisions of that Note as being long-obsolete in the real political world is quite telling.
Bail-Ins are no longer about reforming politically powerful banks using market-based principles – that concept was forced out early when economic theory met the reality of raw political power. What is left is governments wielding a much bigger "stick" when it comes to the ability to take investor assets without restraint.
Bail-Ins and quantitative easing aren't just about finding solutions to crisis that work for the equal benefit of us all. Rather, let me suggest that a pervasive systemic crisis creates opportunities for the politically-driven redistribution of wealth for the benefit of powerful insiders, particularly when the nature of these redistributions is sufficiently complex to keep the average voter or investor from understanding what is happening.
Given this situation, there are few tasks that are more essential for investors over the coming years and decades, than understanding this close three-way relationship between: 1) the underlying dysfunctional economic fundamentals; 2) how those dysfunctions drive governmental interventions in the form of changing the law, money, and investments; and 3) the resulting market changes across multiple investment categories such as precious metals, real estate, stocks and bonds.
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Depois do artigo do FMI e do aviso do Bundesbank, não há como afirmar que não foram avisados.
Bundesbank calls for capital levy to avert government bankruptcies
Mon Jan 27, 2014 6:03am EST
[url]http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/01/27/us-eurozone-crisis-bundesbank-idUSBREA0Q0HV20140127[/url] ([url]http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/01/27/us-eurozone-crisis-bundesbank-idUSBREA0Q0HV20140127[/url])
(Reuters) - Germany's Bundesbank said on Monday that countries about to go bankrupt should draw on the private wealth of their citizens through a one-off capital levy before asking other states for help.
The Bundesbank's tough stance comes after years of euro zone crisis that saw five government bailouts. There have also bond market interventions by the European Central Bank in, for example, Italy where households' average net wealth is higher than in Germany.
"(A capital levy) corresponds to the principle of national responsibility, according to which tax payers are responsible for their government's obligations before solidarity of other states is required," the Bundesbank said in its monthly report.
It warned that such a levy carried significant risks and its implementation would not be easy, adding it should only be considered in absolute exceptional cases, for example to avert a looming sovereign insolvency.
The International Monetary Fund discussed the option in a report in October and said that reducing debt ratios to end-2007 levels for a sample of 15 euro area countries, a tax rate of about 10 percent on households with positive net wealth would be required.
The German Institute for Economic Research calculated in 2012 that in Germany a 10-percent levy on a tax base derived from a personal allowance of 250,000 euros would add up to around 230 billion euros. It did not give a figure for crisis countries due to lack of sufficient data.
Greece has been granted bailout funds of 240 billion euros from the euro area, its national central banks and IMF to protect it from a chaotic default and possible exit from the euro zone. Not all funds have been paid out yet.
In Germany, however, the Bundesbank said it would not support an implementation of a recurrent wealth tax, saying it would harm growth.
Recent reforms and adjustments in the euro zone's struggling
countries - Ireland, Greece, Spain, Italy, Cyprus and Portugal - have improved conditions for sustainable growth, the Bundesbank said, but remained concerned about high debt levels.
It was still a key challenge to drive down public as well as private debt and the ECB's upcoming bank health checks could help to address current problems in the banking sector.
A successful test could also help to wean banks in the euro zone periphery countries off ECB funding, the Bundesbank said.
"It is not the purpose of European monetary policy to ensure solvency of national banking systems or governments and it cannot replace necessary economic adjustments or bank balance sheet clean ups," the Bundesbank said.
(Reporting by Eva Taylor Editing by Jeremy Gaunt)
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¿Fue usted quién pidió un confisco?
Spain says to charge tax of 0.03 percent on bank deposits
MADRID, July 4 Fri Jul 4, 2014 10:01am EDT
[url]http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/07/04/spain-tax-deposits-idUSL6N0PF2SF20140704[/url] ([url]http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/07/04/spain-tax-deposits-idUSL6N0PF2SF20140704[/url])
(Reuters) - Spain on Friday said it would introduce a blanket taxation rate of 0.03 percent on all bank account deposits, in a move aimed at harmonising regional tax regimes and generating revenues for the country's cash-strapped autonomous communities.
The regulation, which could bring around 400 million euros ($546 million) to the state coffers based on total deposits worth 1.4 trillion euros, had been tipped as a possible sweetener for the regions days after tough deficit limits for this year and next were set by the central government.
Deputy Prime Minister Soraya Saenz de Santamaria announced the move at a news conference following a weekly cabinet meeting.
Spain is aiming for an end-of-year deficit of 5.5 percent after ending 2013 with a deficit of 6.6 percent of gross domestic product, just short of its 6.5 percent target. The regions have been set a deficit limit of 1 percent of GDP.
The government had last year fixed a zero percent tax rate on deposits across the 17 autonomous communities to prevent some of them charging their own rates, but never ruled out raising the taxation level.
The country has one of the lowest tax takes in the European Union after a burst property bubble crippled the construction sector, one of the largest contributors to government coffers.
Madrid passed in June a blueprint for tax reform which aims to cut income and corporate taxes to stimulate consumer demand and investment in the midst of a nascent economic recovery. ($1 = 0.7331 Euros) (Reporting by Paul Day; Editing by Julien Toyer and Hugh Lawson)
Ei-lo que chegou:
Spain Institutes Tax On Savings; Will They Now Raise It to 10%?
Saturday, July 19, 2014
[url]http://www.economicpolicyjournal.com/2014/07/spain-institutes-tax-on-savings-will.html[/url] ([url]http://www.economicpolicyjournal.com/2014/07/spain-institutes-tax-on-savings-will.html[/url])
An EPJ reader emails:
Some time ago you posted: [url]http://www.economicpolicyjournal.com/2014/07/watch-out-for-that-banana-peel-eu-just.html[/url] ([url]http://www.economicpolicyjournal.com/2014/07/watch-out-for-that-banana-peel-eu-just.html[/url])
Recently, the EU announced that it is looking into legislation to allow the savings of EU citizens to "be used to fund long-term investments to boost the economy and help plug the gap left by banks since the financial crisis."
On Friday, the Spanish government approved a 0.03% tax on all bank deposits. It's btw a retroactive tax.. They're going back to January 1st.
A few regions of Spain had already implemented the tax, but the Spanish government now expanded it.
From 2 weeks ago:
[url]http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/07/04/spain-tax-deposits-idUSL6N0PF2SF20140704[/url] ([url]http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/07/04/spain-tax-deposits-idUSL6N0PF2SF20140704[/url])
Speculation that this would happen. From over a year ago.
[url]http://www.zerohedge.com/news/2013-03-19/spain-preparing-its-own-deposit-levy[/url] ([url]http://www.zerohedge.com/news/2013-03-19/spain-preparing-its-own-deposit-levy[/url])
The amount they're confiscating is pretty small and won't solve the problems they claim to be solving, so one has to wonder:
Could this be a test case for the 10% confiscation of savings the IMF recommended last year?
From the IMF's Fiscal Monitor (Oct 2013)
The sharp deterioration of the public finances in many countries has revived interest in a “capital levy”— a one-off tax on private wealth—as an exceptional measure to restore debt sustainability. The appeal is that such a tax, if it is implemented before avoidance is possible and there is a belief that it will never be repeated, does not distort behavior (and may be seen by some as fair).
...
The tax rates needed to bring down public debt to precrisis levels, moreover, are sizable: reducing debt ratios to end-2007 levels would require (for a sample of 15 euro area countries) a tax rate of about 10 percent on households with positive net wealth.
A minha aposta é que o economicpolicyjournal está enganado. O confisco será bem menor, mas será todos os anos... Os governos não vão matar a galinha dos ovos de ouro, mas vão depená-la completamente...
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Isso vai chegar cá num instante...
Já sobre os juros pagas forte e feio...
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It's btw a retroactive tax.. They're going back to January 1st.
Roubo descarado :(
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"Spain says to charge tax of 0.03 percent on bank deposits"
Tire todo o seu dinheiro dos bancos, JÁ.
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Num país onde o Estado controla 50% da riqueza e regulamenta muito para lá de 50% da actividade económica, não espanta que existam pontos de contacto entre fortunas e Estado. Também não espanta que no gerir de milhares de pessoas e milhões de negócios, aconteçam coisas menos lícitas em alguns momentos (e coisas como abater sobreiros certamente não serão as piores).
Mas no meio disto, não se deve tirar valor ao que significa fazer e vender cimento, prédios, distribuir produtos, fazer banca, etc. Há serviços e produtos que são vendidos, e produzi-los e vendê-los gera fortunas.
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É apenas inflação por outro nome.
De resto, se não querem que César vos tire o dinheiro que vos dá, não poupem na moeda de César.
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É mesmo para aplicar?
Estou boquiaberto, não consigo acreditar!
Espanha não é o Chipre, isto é um precedente gravíssimo :(
Já estou como diz o Kin ......
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Já estou a ver que sim ....
http://www.zerohedge.com/news/2014-06-26/nirp-strikes-spain-create-tax-bank-deposits (http://www.zerohedge.com/news/2014-06-26/nirp-strikes-spain-create-tax-bank-deposits)
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Vão alterar a Constituição para taxar os depósitos ... tive que ler 3 vezes para acreditar.
A economia paralela vai ter um boom mais que justificado e legitimado.
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Mas e se tiver em activos financeiros? Ações, obrigações, CFD´s futuros...
Ai já não taxam?
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É impossível de "prever", mas como já foi dito anteriormente, o mais fácil será atacar os depósitos.
Mas existirão com certeza soluções mais "criativas" como por exemplo o que a Polónia fez (podes procurar por Poland bail-in).
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Juntando as opiniões dos posts da pág 3 do tópico ( Daniel Amerman), gentilmente colocadas pelo hermes (obrigado, são posst muito instrutivos e informativos), mais as citações retiradas das próprias instituições como o FMI, Bundesbank e o cenário que temos por aqui com o "BES" (e sabe-se lá se não há mais), parece que o nosso escalpe será bem maior que os 0.03%
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Não me expliquei bem.
Penso que o filme seja assim:
1.º Introduz-se uma taxa extraordinária de 0.03%.
2.º A taxa extraordinária passa a permanente e aplica-se todos os anos.
3.º Vai-se subindo aos poucos e terá como limite superior os 70% não taxados dos juros...
Os outros activos já têm, pois vem aí a taxa Tobin para cada transacção... E prevejo que os políticos vão valer-se desta para justificar o meter da mão na massa dos depósitos.
Porquê roubar 10% de uma vez, quando se pode roubar muito mais em perpetuidade?
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Subirá a venda de cofres!
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Vai subir é meter o guito noutro país e não declarar nada cá.
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Vai subir é meter o guito noutro país e não declarar nada cá.
tera de ser fora da UE e com taxas de juro muito baixas
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Subirá a venda de cofres!
É claro que não!
Basta que o imposto sobre o principal seja inferior aos 70% que ainda sobram dos juros.
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Subirá a venda de cofres!
É claro que não!
Basta que o imposto sobre o principal seja inferior aos 70% que ainda sobram dos juros.
Não percebo como,
mas assevera-lo tão escorreito
que se calhar é verdade.
De qualquer modo,
se o contexto for mesmo
de deflação é uma questão
de «fazer as contas» para
cada padrão de gasto.
Além disso, o aluguer de cofres
nos bancos nem sequer é muito caro.
Mas ignoro se há seguro contra roubo
ou incêndio em cofres de bancos.
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Subirá a venda de cofres!
É claro que não!
Basta que o imposto sobre o principal seja inferior aos 70% que ainda sobram dos juros.
Além disso, o aluguer de cofres
nos bancos nem sequer é muito caro.
Os bancos que eu em tempos contactei não tinham cofres alugar, estão todos ocupados e, em alguns, existia uma longa fila de espera.
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Subirá a venda de cofres!
É claro que não!
Basta que o imposto sobre o principal seja inferior aos 70% que ainda sobram dos juros.
Além disso, o aluguer de cofres
nos bancos nem sequer é muito caro.
Os bancos que eu em tempos contactei não tinham cofres alugar, estão todos ocupados e, em alguns, existia uma longa fila de espera.
O Banif tem para dar e vender!
E é bem bonita a sala... ((acho que só há em Aveiro, Porto e Lisboa)).
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Os bancos que eu em tempos contactei não tinham cofres alugar, estão todos ocupados e, em alguns, existia uma longa fila de espera.
O Montepio tem ou tinha,
há não muito tempo.
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Vai subir é meter o guito noutro país e não declarar nada cá.
tera de ser fora da UE e com taxas de juro muito baixas
uma das consequências de ter dinheiro estacionado em off-shore é sofrer erosão via inflação...
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a verdadeira solucao eh ir viver para outro pais, com melhor condicoes e poucos impostos
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uma das consequências de ter dinheiro estacionado em off-shore é sofrer erosão via inflação...
[/quote]
é uma chatisse do caraças! metade é gamado a outra meia é pra fugir ao fisco.... :D que se lixem os trocos .
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e não dá para investir através da off-shore?
Colocar o dinheiro um fundo ou num instrumento financeiro com mais risco?
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a verdadeira solucao eh ir viver para outro pais, com melhor condicoes e poucos impostos
A verdadeira solução é ter apenas dinheiro para o dia a dia e para algum imprevisto. Fora esse dinheiro, fora com poupanças em promessas alheias: promessas, é necessária força de vontade para as cumprir; desejos, é necessária força de vontade para lhes resistir.