The Argentine experience stands in sharp contrast to other recent financial crises. If one examines the stock market performance of other countries in the immediate months involving crises, one finds the following fall in stock market indexes: Mexico (December 1994-February 1995), 53.5%; Korea (July 1997-November 1997) 47.0%; Malaysia (July 1997-January 1998) 52.0%; and Thailand (July 1997-December 1998) 33.8%. Such pronounced drops in stock market values are the typical result expected during crises. Yet the Argentine market more than doubled in the early months of the crisis of 2001-2002. How can such a surprising event occur?
This paper analyzes the rise in Argentine stock prices as a result of investors using the stock market to shift funds out of Argentina (and pesos) into the United States (and dollars). By purchasing shares of Argentine stocks at home that are listed in the United States, investors were able to convert peso-denominated home-market shares into dollar-denominated American Depositary Receipts (ADRs) in the United States. This conversion of the underlying home-market shares into the derivative ADRs accomplished the shift of wealth out of Argentina and into dollars in the United States.
Muito criativa, a solução.
Existia e existe.
| No. | Company | Ticker | Exchange | Industry | S/U |
| 1 | Portugal Telecom | PT (http://finance.yahoo.com/q?s=PT) | New York Stock Exchange | Fixed Line Telecom. | S |
| 2 | Altri SGPS SA | ASGSY (http://finance.yahoo.com/q?s=ASGSY.PK) | OTC | Forestry & Paper | U |
| 3 | Banco BPI SA | BBSPY (http://finance.yahoo.com/q?s=BBSPY.PK) | OTC | Financial Services | U |
| 4 | Banco Comercial Portugues | BPCGY (http://finance.yahoo.com/q?s=BPCGY.PK) | OTC | Banks | U |
| 5 | Banco Espirito Santo | BKESY (http://finance.yahoo.com/q?s=BKESY.PK) | OTC | Financial Services | U |
| 6 | BRISA-Auto-Estradas de Portugal | BRSAY (http://finance.yahoo.com/q?s=BRSAY.PK) | OTC | IndustrialTransport. | S |
| 7 | Cimpor-Cimentos de Portugal, SGPS SA | CDPGY (http://finance.yahoo.com/q?s=CDPGY.PK) | OTC | Construct. & Materials | U |
| 8 | Energias de Portugal | EDPFY (http://finance.yahoo.com/q?s=EDPFY.PK) | OTC | Electricity | S |
| 9 | Galp Energia SGPS SA | GLPEY (http://finance.yahoo.com/q?s=GLPEY.PK) | OTC | Oil & Gas Producers | U |
| 10 | Inapa Group | IPGXY (http://finance.yahoo.com/q?s=IPGXY.PK) | OTC | Forestry & Paper | S |
| 11 | Jeronimo Martins SGPS SA | JRONY (http://finance.yahoo.com/q?s=JRONY.PK) | OTC | Food & Drug Retailers | U |
| 12 | Mota Engil SGPS SA | MTELY (http://finance.yahoo.com/q?s=MTELY.PK) | OTC | General Industrials | U |
| 13 | REN | RENZY (http://finance.yahoo.com/q?s=RENZY.PK) | OTC | Gas,H20 Multiutility | U |
| 14 | Semapa | SEMMY (http://finance.yahoo.com/q?s=SEMMY.PK) | OTC | General Industrials | U |
| 15 | Sonae Industria, SGPS, SA | SNIDY (http://finance.yahoo.com/q?s=SNIDY.PK) | OTC | Forestry & Paper | U |
| 16 | Sonae, SGPS, SA | SGPMY (http://finance.yahoo.com/q?s=SGPMY.PK) | OTC | Forestry & Paper | U |
| 17 | Sonaecom, SGPS, SA | SOVTY (http://finance.yahoo.com/q?s=SOVTY.PK) | OTC | Fixed Line Telecom. | U |
| 18 | Zon Multimedia | ZONMY (http://finance.yahoo.com/q?s=ZONMY.PK) | OTC | Media | S |
Segundo o artigo em anexo penso que dá para ter uma ideia do que são sponsored e unsponsored ADRs.
Que custos os ADRs costumam a trazer e como funcionam em termos de dividendos?
Se a empresa pagar dividendos, são descontados 2cts por ADR na data de pagamento. Nos ADR que detive são esses os unicos custos (mas eram todos sponsored suponho e que pagavam dividendos).
Esses 2cts só são pagos uma vez, mesmo que a empresa distribua dividendos 2 ou 4 vezes ao ano.Segundo o artigo em anexo penso que dá para ter uma ideia do que são sponsored e unsponsored ADRs.
Que custos os ADRs costumam a trazer e como funcionam em termos de dividendos?
No site da Interative Brokers [url]http://www.interactivebrokers.com/en/p.php?f=otherFees&p=adr-default[/url] ([url]http://www.interactivebrokers.com/en/p.php?f=otherFees&p=adr-default[/url]). Na realidade estou a ver que o o fee é entre 1 e 3cts. As minhas é que calhou ficar precisamente a meio do intervalo por isso disse 2cts.
Título: Re:Portugal, estratégia de defesa ...
Enviado por: Visitante em 2011-07-19 19:08:40
Citar
Só os produtos financeiros continuariam em Euros, mas mesmo esses só até à sua maturidade na qual seriam igualmente convertidos.
Esta conversão na maturidade talvez permita preservar o valor do capital nesse eventual cenário de saída do euro. Mas isto passa-se de igual forma com qualquer instituição a operar cá, seja nacional ou estrangeira.
Aliás, esta questão da preservação do capital por via da sua titularização já aqui foi abordada. Esta contribuição do Meteorologista é relevante e vem reforçar o que aqui já foi afirmado.
Só fica a faltar confirmar a taxa de câmbio a que será feita a conversão dos títulos. Na minha opinião não faz sentido utilizar uma taxa ex-ante.
Título: Re:Portugal, estratégia de defesa ...
Enviado por: Incognitus em 2011-07-11 12:08:41
Citação de: Visitante em 2011-07-11 12:07:25
No caso de títulos sob direito português, acções portuguesas, denominadas em euro, seriam denominads em escudo compulsivamente? Ou isso teria de ser feito em assembleia geral da sociedade?
Compulsivamente. Mas o efeito é mais relevante em titulos de dívida do que em acções, as acções pouco interessa em que moeda estão denominadas, só interessa o preço a que cotam, que seria sempre determinado num mercado livre.
Obrigado Zenith. Já agora, os teus ADRs são todos sponsored?
| SECTION 1 - All deposits, whether in pesos or foreign currency, in fixed term or current account, captured by financial institutions authorized to operate by the Central Bank of Argentina, in accordance with the provisions of Law 21,526 and its amendments, are included in the scheme of this Act. These deposits are considered intangible. SECTION 2 - The intangibility established in Article 1 means: the government, under any circumstances, can not alter the conditions agreed between the depositors and the financial institution, which means the prohibition of exchanging them for securities of the public debt, or other national government asset, or extend the payment thereof, or alter the agreed rates or currency of origin, or restructure the maturities, which will operate on the specified dates agreed between the parties. |
Prohibitions for financial institutions
Prohibitions for the population
|
| On January 6, 2002, the Duhalde government promulgated the “Ley de Emergencia Pública y Reforma del Régimen Cambiario” (Law on Public Emergency and Exchange System Reform) repealing convertibility and proceeding to the “pesificación” (conversion to pesos) of all credits extended by the financial system. On January 9, 2002, the government issued Decree 71/2002 laying down the new official exchange rate at 1.40 pesos per U.S. dollar. Furthermore, the decree regulates the de-dollarization of debts of natural and legal persons according to an Exchange rate of 1 peso = 1 U.S. dollar, keeping the other conditions as originally agreed upon. The corralito did not deteriorate the assets of Argentinean depositors maintaining its value (1 peso = 1 dollar). The corralón, however, did, breaking the law cited above 25,466. Years later, the Supreme Court would support this measure. Subsequently, on February 6, the government promulgated Decree No. 214/2002 called “Reorganización del Sistema Financiero” (Reorganization of the Financial System) which provided:
Thus establishing the so-called “asymmetric pesification” in which debts to the financial system were converted into pesos at a rate of one peso per dollar, but foreign currency deposits were recognized by financial institutions at $ 1.40 = U.S. $ 1. The difference was recognized by the national government with a bond that was given to banks to compensate for this “asymmetry.” |
Quem quiser uma perda de 30% ponha o dedo no ar! :D
The Argentine experience stands in sharp contrast to other recent financial crises. If one examines the stock market performance of other countries in the immediate months involving crises, one finds the following fall in stock market indexes: Mexico (December 1994-February 1995), 53.5%; Korea (July 1997-November 1997) 47.0%; Malaysia (July 1997-January 1998) 52.0%; and Thailand (July 1997-December 1998) 33.8%. Such pronounced drops in stock market values are the typical result expected during crises. Yet the Argentine market more than doubled in the early months of the crisis of 2001-2002. How can such a surprising event occur?
Aqui vamos nós de novo. Daqui a 60 os preços são actualizados e subirão mais do que teriam subido nestes 60 dias, já a prever e para se proteger do próximo congelamento de preços. Nada de novo debaixo do sol, era assim nos anos 80 na américa latina.
Farmers will not drive Lamborghinis (or Why I disagree with Jim Rogers)
By Martin Sibileau
On January 8th 2013
http://sibileau.com/martin/2013/01/08/farmers-will-not-drive-lamborghinis-or-why-i-disagree-with-jim-rogers/ (http://sibileau.com/martin/2013/01/08/farmers-will-not-drive-lamborghinis-or-why-i-disagree-with-jim-rogers/)
This is my first letter of 2013. I was not able to write earlier as I was travelling in Argentina. The situation there is complex and fluid. It would seem easy to compare it to that of Venezuela, but that would be a dangerous reductionism. Three things really caught my attention and are related to what we are going through in the developed world:
a) Argentines, just like everyone else in this world, struggle to find acceptable assets to allocate their capital. This is striking because they have no capital markets and it would seem that real estate or the US dollar should be the no-brainer, natural alternatives. Yet, unlike in the past, they are not. However, the reasons for this go beyond the scope of today’s letter.
b) In spite of explicit acknowledgment by the Argentine government that the monetary base will grow at no less than a 40% per year (this is even embedded in the government budget projections), the government still manages to issue its currency. The country is still far from hyperinflation, although with high inflation. There are no definitive metrics given the media repression, but private estimates gauge it at no less than 25%.
c) Just like some analysts today see a bubble in the price of gold, there are analysts in Argentina who see a bubble in the price of the US dollar vs. that of the peso. This is a country that has gone through two hyperinflations and decades of high inflation within a single generation. I was astonished to see how easily the memory of all this was lost. This is so impressive that even Roberto Cachanosky, a leading Austrian voice in the country and who regularly writes at La Nación, had to devote one of his weekly columns to “explain” that the US dollar was not in a bubble.
Why do I bring this up? Because I still can’t find what the difference is between Ben Bernanke, who is telling me that he’s going to monetize US sovereign debt as long as the unemployment rate (as measured by the government) is not below 6.5%, and Mercedes Marcó del Pont (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mercedes_Marc%C3%B3_del_Pont) who openly says that monetizing debt does not lead to inflation (http://www.pagina12.com.ar/diario/economia/2-190369-2012-03-25.html) (as measured by the government) and that the Banco Central will monetize all the sovereign debt necessary to boost economic growth. As much as I hate acknowledging this, I am convinced Cristina Fernandez de Kirchner (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cristina_Fern%C3%A1ndez_de_Kirchner) is right when she says that the developed world lacks the moral authority to criticize her policies.
Real estate under high inflation: Context and assumptions
Let’s return now to the topic of the day, namely real estate as an inflation hedge. Today, I want to offer my family’s experience in the case of Argentina’s hyperinflation and their choice of real estate as the hedge against it. The context in which this story takes place is one of high inflation, in which the market knew two things: a) It was a point of no return, and b) It was going to get worse before it would get better.
I think it is clear that none of these points are visible today in the developed world. For instance, gold was sold last week simply because the FOMC minutes suggested that the same Fed that has to buy approx. 90% of the Treasury’s long-term debt issuance to keep rates from rising (without much success one must add), may end the purchases by the end of this year.
The context of the story was also one of increasing financial repression. As I suggested earlier (http://sibileau.com/martin/2012/12/18/what-causes-hyperinflations-and-why-we-have-not-seen-one-yet-a-forensic-analysis-on-dead-currencies/), inflation and financial repression are only two different sides of the same coin. And as inflation spikes, so do interest rates, for the trust in the system collapses. Only with higher rates can central banks sustain a target level of deposits, so that the coerced banking system sources the funds needed to buy sovereign debt. High nominal interest rates and inflation then, go hand in hand.
In such a context, there is no return and the market knows it will get worse. The fear of confiscation sets in. Confiscation can and did take place in two ways: a) Between private citizens/corporations, in which case, we are in the face of explicit wealth transfer from creditors to debtors or landlords to tenants, and b) from private citizens/corporations in favour of the state.
A true story
In 1973, Argentina decided to nationalize bank deposits and to impose a 100% reserve requirement. This measure however was not to last long and by 1976, the banking sector was again allowed to leverage on its deposits. To fight the increasing exodus from the system by depositors, the central bank decided to encourage deposits by paying interest on savings accounts deposits and charging a fine on current account deposits. By 1980, 90% of all deposits were in savings accounts under 90 days and the average lending rate was 35%. This brought about a spiralling quasi-fiscal deficit (i.e. a deficit at the central bank) that led to the hyperinflations of 1985 and 1989 (Read more about this –in Spanish- here)
It was in the context described above that my father first lost his first apartment and later bought a ranch as a hedge against the increasing inflation. The apartment in Buenos Aires was lost to a tenant, in the early 1970s, who took advantage of a new bill favouring tenants over landlords. That apartment was my parents’ first home and they had only vacated it because they were working outside Buenos Aires at the time. It was not their investment property. My father ended up negotiating a ridiculous discount to at least get something back, but he basically lost it all. There is really not much more to say in defense of the investment-in-condos thesis as a hedge against inflation (http://boombustblog.com/index.php?option=com_k2&Itemid=200079&id=1178&lang=en&view=item) (Remember that if rental contracts at one point, given high inflation, become denominated in a foreign currency or gold, the government will very likely fix the price of these assets (i.e. fx, gold) at an official rate, below the proper market prices. Landlords will receive that official rate and will not be able to challenge it in court).
In 1978, however, my father did purchase a ranch for investment purposes, in beautiful Patagonia. Today, I want to share this experience, vis-à-vis the thesis held by Jim Rogers because my father back then thought like Mr. Rogers today.
The Jim Rogers thesis
Briefly, Jim Roger’s thesis is old and simple (http://youtu.be/-u9gPykOkdA): The monetization of sovereign debt means higher commodity prices and owning a farm is a means to both profit from these higher commodity prices and protect one’s capital, invested in land. In Jim’s words, farmers will drive Lamborghinis (http://youtu.be/NoW1Keoushc).
Well, it may be true in the early stages of a hyperinflationary process. But as inflation arrives to stay and the money printing becomes structural, the financial repression that follows challenges the thesis. As well, just like in the first world today newer taxes or higher tax rates are being imposed on those lucky enough to be able to save and invest, back then politicians engaged in demagogy and established new laws to favour debtors and tenants over creditors and landlords. In my experience, under high inflation, the price of agricultural commodities rises in local currency terms because of shortages in production. There are shortages because producing is not profitable. Rising nominal prices therefore are not a signal to encourage production, but precisely the opposite; the reflection of supply shortages because producing is unprofitable. The unprofitability, of course, is caused by the government’s intervention via price controls (wages, foreign exchange), higher taxes, trade restrictions and outright confiscations. To expect that farmers will be able to receive international market prices for their produce under high inflation is naive at best. I know of no nation under high inflation, where its government would have not controlled exports (or their prices) of necessary goods (i.e. food), or forbidden imports of luxury goods.
The case of “Los Maitenes”
My father bought Los Maitenes (the name of the ranch) in 1978 with the simple idea of protecting his capital. He was not a rancher, although he knew the business well from my grandfather (who had managed an estancia for Mr. Bunge in the 1920s). Indeed, it was not a farming property in the sense Jim Rogers means: It is in the mountains and is for the purpose of raising cattle. Growing grains there is not efficient. However, whenever the price of grains rises (in US dollars) and the agricultural frontier shifts to the West, land formerly used for cattle in the Pampas needs to find a replacement and ranches in Patagonia get bid.
To my father’s disappointment, rates and the appreciation of the US dollar continued to outperform ranching. Under high inflation, soon everyone wanted to own (“stock up” would be a better word) products, but not producers. Nobody was interested in producing anything and it was not due to some behavioural problem, as Keynes and its followers always point to. Simply, the distortion in relative prices and the disappearance of credit for working capital (i.e. nobody in the business of “making stuff” could any longer reasonably calculate whether they did so at a profit or at a loss) was too high to bear. My father then became a forced long-term real estate investor. Nobody was interested in buying him out of the ranch. It was far better to keep playing the dangerous game of earning absurd returns in savings accounts deposits, subsidized by the central bank, or to keep your capital in foreign currency, fully liquid. It was a game that would last until 1989, when deposits in savings accounts were confiscated and paid back in bonds. In my view, we can see this same phenomenon playing out further down the road of this ongoing inflationary process, whereby gold would play the role the US dollar played in Argentina.
In the meantime, my family had managed to survive from other income sources until 1981. In that year, their most important source, a concession on a beach resort in Mar del Plata, was finally expropriated under the regime of General Galtieri. The thesis that owning a ranch was the final hedge against inflation and general chaos suddenly became a reality and in January 1982, my father set off to Patagonia. It was a three-day long trip with a trailer (see picture below). In this trailer, we would live the first three months.
Picture 1: A stop on the way to Los Maitenes, January 1982 (I am on the right, next to my mother and sister).
(http://www.thinkfn.com/forumbolsaforex/index.php?action=dlattach;topic=426.0;attach=7106;image)
A few months later, war broke with the UK over the Falkland Islands. Living in Patagonia, this meant that everything could be taken from us at any moment, if either the UK or Chile invaded. Fortunately, this scenario did not play out. However, during that first year at the ranch, my father found out that squatters were living in different parts of the property. Once again, even though he managed to negotiate a settlement with some of them, the government expropriated a few hectares from us. I am sure Mr. Rogers did not take into account this sort of inconveniences, but expropriation becomes very real when credit disappears and food shortages follow. As I wrote in my earlier letter (http://sibileau.com/martin/2012/12/18/what-causes-hyperinflations-and-why-we-have-not-seen-one-yet-a-forensic-analysis-on-dead-currencies/),”…thousands of years of Diaspora are screaming to us in the face that the advantage of gold as an easy-to-transport and store asset is not to be underestimated…”
From 1983 on, inflation began to grow exponentially. Soon, it became difficult to know if one was making or losing money. Relative prices in terms of US dollars fluctuated widely and in general, over the long term, everything tended to depreciate versus this currency (just as I expect prices to continue depreciating in terms of gold, if QE remains eternal). Without liquidity and credit, farmers began to barter. The most liquid items were alfalfa hay, flour, wire rolls, gasoline and meat. Contracts could be settled in alfalfa bales, 10-kilo flour bags, fencing wire rolls (1,000 meters per roll), and litres of gasoline or kilos of meat.
Bartering, my father survived those years. He hired men to plant, irrigate and harvest the alfalfa lots in the ranch, on a partnership basis. Whatever alfalfa bales he managed to keep, he used them to further buy cattle or to pay for labour. The cattle were then bartered at the nearest general store to buy groceries. Anything outside the bartering circle became extremely expensive (clothes, fuel, electronics, etc.), as cattle or alfalfa bales had to be first exchanged for currency.
The years of high inflation were years of self-sufficiency. It took us about seven years to build our house, for we had to produce our own bricks (adobe), stucco and wood. Below is a picture worth a thousand words: In it, we see Don Onofre Grandón, carpenter, working a poplar tree just cut down at the property to produce one of the rafters for the roof frame of our house. Circled far in the back, we can see a stock of adobe bricks also produced at the ranch. This picture was taken on January 1989, during the last hyperinflation.
Picture 2: House building under hyperinflation
(http://sibileau.com/martin/wp-content/uploads/2013/01/Jan-08-2013-2.jpg)
The picture above is comparable to a painting of the London’s Carpenter’s Company in the late Middle Ages (http://www.thecarpenterscompany.co.uk/files/45A664EF-1D05-4941-A26C-9983012B0170.aspx/wallpanel-carp-xmas-card-we.jpg). Any European peasant resuscitated from the Middle Ages would immediately recognize and feel familiar with this scene. This is a typical scene of a farm in times of hyperinflation. And it makes perfect sense: Under the Pax Romana, the owners of villas (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Roman_villa) were rich. When hyperinflation finally destroyed the Roman Empire under Diocletian (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Diocletian), owning a villa was a liability, as one could not trade the produce without price controls or safe transportation and was further subject to either looting by barbarians or confiscatory taxation by Rome.
The above picture shows a scene of non-monetary exchange, no access to a Home Depot, no credit, no capital markets nor commodity markets (either spot or futures). The sight of harvesting machines, highly capitalized farmers participating in commodity futures markets are completely foreign to a hyperinflationary scenario. Such a sight belongs to farming under stable relative prices and available credit. Eventually, both came back after the peso collapsed and became convertible to the US dollar, in 1991. It was only after the hyperinflationary episode, when the peso as legal tender was fully repudiated, that farming became again a productive enterprise, when the government had no choice but to become friendlier to open markets and seriously diminish any form of financial repression.
Epilogue
The story I just shared is definitely not what Jim Rogers has in mind. During those years, holding US dollars or taking the risk of financing the government with deposits at the banks far outperformed any productive project. However, at one point (in 1989), even financing the government ended up a losing proposition, and term-deposits were confiscated (see the announcement of the confiscation here (http://youtu.be/DaGuTk-dER4?t=2m22s))
US dollars (or any other stable foreign fiat currency), in the end, were king. When I extrapolate my personal experience to our current situation, I feel confident that holding physical gold to the end will also be the winning strategy. Hence, my disagreement with Jim Rogers: Farmers will not drive Lamborghinis if inflation spikes (http://youtu.be/NoW1Keoushc).
During those years, the government constantly sought to manipulate the price of the US dollar or to discourage everyone from holding foreign exchange. This too is happening with gold and I expect it will become more pronounced in the years ahead.
Frau Eisenmenger let a room to the gentleman from the American Mission — just as Garbo's father in The Joyless Street was able to do — and received for it ten times the rent which, in accordance still with the wartime rent restriction Act, she herself paid for the whole flat. On a now slender quantity of negotiable cigars, on her daughter's earnings, on that rent, and on the diminishing real income from her burgeoning shares, she tackled the first months of 1920.
[...]
Blackett noted that the rent restriction Acts hit much the same classes, who were 'forced to starvation in order to subsidise the German workman's wages and the employer's profits'. The bread and rail subsidies, financed by inflation, combined with the rent restriction, enabled the foreigner to buy German goods well below world prices and, if he lived in or visited Germany, to travel, eat and occupy houses at ridiculously cheap rates. 'A gradual process of buying up and carrying off Germany's movable capital, secondhand furniture, pianos, etc., is taking place at the expense of Germany as a whole.'
Foreigners were also buying up real property and interests in factories and all kinds of businesses. To some extent this was at the expense of the workman whose wages lagged behind the climbing cost of living, but it was mainly at the expense of the middle classes whose capital was destroyed and largely exported. The exporting industrialists could just keep their heads above water, Blackett thought, but the others making goods out of partly imported material could not possibly replace it with a continually rapidly falling mark.
[...]
In the second half of June it became necessary again to double the salaries of government officials, and to give higher grants to the war-wounded, to'widows, to pensioners and to the unemployed, in and out of the Ruhr, An additionaL reason for these increases, over and above the general fall in the mark's purchasing power, was that the poorer classes, especially the rentiers, would soon no longer be able to afford the price of bread. Agricultural interests had become angry about the 'Umlage', the forced delivery of the first two million tons of wheat produced each year which enabled half the total supply of bread to be sold cheap. From August onwards farmers were to be paid at world prices because, when obliged to sell wheat cheaply, they still had to pay the world price for fertilisers. The change in policy, from subsidising food to subsidising the needy, may have satisfied the farmers; but the extra subsidies for the poor soon became worthless again.
[...]
Those with foreign currency, becoming easily the most acceptable paper medium, had the greatest scope for finding bargains. The power of the the dollar, in particular, far exceeded its nominal rate of exchange. Finding himself with a single dollar bill early in 1923, von der Osten got hold of six friends and went to Berlin one evening determined to blow the lot; but early the next morning, long after dinner, and many nightclubs later, they still had change in their pockets. There were stories of Americans in the greatest difficulties in Berlin because no-one had enough marks to change a five-dollar bill: of others who ran up accounts (to be paid off later in depreciated currency) on the strength of even bigger foreign notes which, after meals or services had been obtained, could not be changed; and of foreign students who bought up whole rows of houses out of their allowances.
Quando vi a actualização deste tópico pensei que era sobre os recentes desenvolvimentos. Há uns dias atrás foi conseguido um acordo por parte do governo com o retalho para o congelamento dos preços... :D
E para além disso o governo está a dizer às empresas para não colocarem anúncios nos jornais.
[url]http://www.washingtonpost.com/business/argentinas-price-freeze-now-hits-opposition-newspapers-with-supermarket-advertising-ban/2013/02/08/64b04eaa-7232-11e2-b3f3-b263d708ca37_story.html[/url] ([url]http://www.washingtonpost.com/business/argentinas-price-freeze-now-hits-opposition-newspapers-with-supermarket-advertising-ban/2013/02/08/64b04eaa-7232-11e2-b3f3-b263d708ca37_story.html[/url])
Aqui vamos nós de novo. Daqui a 60 dias os preços são actualizados e subirão mais do que teriam subido nestes 60 dias, já a prever e para se proteger do próximo congelamento de preços. Nada de novo debaixo do sol, era assim nos anos 80 na américa latina.
Eles na Venezuela não têm a Merkel para chatear, é só prosperidade.
Chávez ordena encerramento das lojas Zara por 72 horasFonte: BPINet
25/02/2013
Hugo Chávez, presidente da Venezuela, ordenou o encerramento temporário, durante 72 horas, das lojas Zara para que estas procedam a uma modificação dos preços, fruto da desvalorização do bolívar, segundo noticia o “Cinco Días”.
A medida obrigará a que os proprietários das lojas permaneçam sem as abrir durante três dias, para que possam ajustar os preços, que alegadamente estavam com margens excessivas. As autoridades acusam as lojas de terem remarcado os preços com a desvalorização da moeda.
Osiris Pacheco, funcionário da autoridade venezuelana, explicou aos meios de comunicação que encontraram na Zara “margens excessivas, sendo preciso verificar as estruturas de custos destes estabelecimentos”. Acrescentou que as lojas vão continuar fechadas, para evitar a imposição de novas sanções.
Na Venezuela existem 22 contratos de franquia do grupo Inditex, dos quais nove são Zara, nove são Bershka e quatro são Pull & Bear. O porta-voz do grupo afirmou que as lojas que foram fechadas não afectam o grupo porque são franchisados.
Não deve faltar muito para passarem a ter as prateleiras vazias.
No fundo, o efeito sobre o imobiliário e terrenos agrículas foi bastante semelhante ao que se passou na República de Weimar. Seguem-se alguns excerptos do livro "When money dies" a mostrá-lo:.
Citar
Frau Eisenmenger let a room to the gentleman from the American Mission — just as Garbo's father in The Joyless Street was able to do — and received for it ten times the rent which, in accordance still with the wartime rent restriction Act, she herself paid for the whole flat. On a now slender quantity of negotiable cigars, on her daughter's earnings, on that rent, and on the diminishing real income from her burgeoning shares, she tackled the first months of 1920.
[...]
Blackett noted that the rent restriction Acts hit much the same classes, who were 'forced to starvation in order to subsidise the German workman's wages and the employer's profits'. The bread and rail subsidies, financed by inflation, combined with the rent restriction, enabled the foreigner to buy German goods well below world prices and, if he lived in or visited Germany, to travel, eat and occupy houses at ridiculously cheap rates. 'A gradual process of buying up and carrying off Germany's movable capital, secondhand furniture, pianos, etc., is taking place at the expense of Germany as a whole.'
Foreigners were also buying up real property and interests in factories and all kinds of businesses. To some extent this was at the expense of the workman whose wages lagged behind the climbing cost of living, but it was mainly at the expense of the middle classes whose capital was destroyed and largely exported. The exporting industrialists could just keep their heads above water, Blackett thought, but the others making goods out of partly imported material could not possibly replace it with a continually rapidly falling mark.
[...]
In the second half of June it became necessary again to double the salaries of government officials, and to give higher grants to the war-wounded, to'widows, to pensioners and to the unemployed, in and out of the Ruhr, An additionaL reason for these increases, over and above the general fall in the mark's purchasing power, was that the poorer classes, especially the rentiers, would soon no longer be able to afford the price of bread. Agricultural interests had become angry about the 'Umlage', the forced delivery of the first two million tons of wheat produced each year which enabled half the total supply of bread to be sold cheap. From August onwards farmers were to be paid at world prices because, when obliged to sell wheat cheaply, they still had to pay the world price for fertilisers. The change in policy, from subsidising food to subsidising the needy, may have satisfied the farmers; but the extra subsidies for the poor soon became worthless again.
[...]
Those with foreign currency, becoming easily the most acceptable paper medium, had the greatest scope for finding bargains. The power of the the dollar, in particular, far exceeded its nominal rate of exchange. Finding himself with a single dollar bill early in 1923, von der Osten got hold of six friends and went to Berlin one evening determined to blow the lot; but early the next morning, long after dinner, and many nightclubs later, they still had change in their pockets. There were stories of Americans in the greatest difficulties in Berlin because no-one had enough marks to change a five-dollar bill: of others who ran up accounts (to be paid off later in depreciated currency) on the strength of even bigger foreign notes which, after meals or services had been obtained, could not be changed; and of foreign students who bought up whole rows of houses out of their allowances
Um respeito pelos princípios eliminaria a necessidade de um debate sobre moeda forte ou fraca. A única moeda aceitável eticamente é uma moeda forte.
Mal se passa a fronteira do brasil para a argentina percebe-se logo que se entrou num pais bem pior... e olhem que o brasil nao eh grande exemplo.
Evolution in Argentina
Argentina is a wonderful example of how the inevitable evolution of democracies towards greater entitlements at the cost of those that for the time being remain productive (or, in more generic terms, socialism...) destroys countries and societies.
In Argentina's case, they call it "Peronism" - a populist, welfare-state, socialist approach that started 70 years ago and today, in a radicalized version, remains the main inspiration of the present socialist government.
What makes Argentina such wonderful example?
Mainly the fact that Argentina had everything to be one of the richest countries in the world.
A relatively homogenous and industrious population coming from a wide European basis, amazing natural resources, wide spaces allowing for cheap, large-scale agricultural production, etc..
In fact, between the beginning of the XX century and the start of peronism, around 1945, it really was one of the richest, most developed, and fastest growing countries in the world!
In short:
- By 1900 Argentina was the 8th richest country in the world (on a per-capita basis).
- By 1929 Argentina was the 4th richest country in the world (on a per-capita basis).
- By the end of WWII (1945) Argentina was arguably the richest large county in the world (!!!) in a per-capita basis (or the second, behind the USA, depending on the exact metrics used).
That was the moment Peronism hit the country. Argentina's downfall started, and was quite fast (we can measure it in a single lifetime, about 70 years).
The fact that Argentina's recent history is so interesting and could teach so much (if people were ready to learn from the mistakes of the others) means there is a vast literature about this subject, from books (a good example: "Argentina: An Economic Chronicle. How One of the Richest Countries in the World Lost Its Wealth") to a vast number of online articles.
A Google search with the 3 words "Argentina" "economic" "downfall" finds about half a million entries (!!!), and good articles about the subject can easily be counted in thousands!
Some examples:
- Argentina's collapse - A decline without parallel
- How to Destroy a Rich Country
- What Happened to Argentina?
(But, really, there are literally thousands of articles about it - although, obviously, some are better than others.)
Anyway, the funniest part of the story is the full blown economic destruction of the country in the last 15 years, at the capable hands of the Kirshner couple (first Nestor, then Cristina).
Cristina, in particular, seems bent on terminal destruction of the country, at a level close to Chavez/Maduro in Venezuela, Ceausescu in Romania, or Mugabe in Zimbabwe.
Anyway, in Argentina things keep evolving in line with what could be expected.
State spending grows to fulfil the populist promises that (still) win elections; economy gets worse and worse; tax collection get more and more insufficient to cover state spending; state "regulation” (including administrative price fixing, export limitations, extreme currency controls, etc.) increases, to try to prevent reality from happening; the only "solution" is printing more and more fiat money, ending in hyperinflation, ruin, and chaos...
Following regularly the news of these countries is very interesting. At present there are several cases of extreme socialist approaches in Latin America, but I particularly like to follow the evolution of Venezuela and Argentina.
What is happening there is a good lesson to prepare us all for the future of our own countries, and of our civilization in general.
In this spirit, here are a couple of recent articles about the new, improved, Price Controls 2.0 in Argentina:
- Argentina to Tighten Food Price Controls as Inflation Quickens
- Argentine peso at new lows as food price controls take effect
[url]http://slowcrashnavigating.blogspot.pt/2014/01/evolution-in-argentina.html?showComment=1389629053155#c1797613232967286957[/url] ([url]http://slowcrashnavigating.blogspot.pt/2014/01/evolution-in-argentina.html?showComment=1389629053155#c1797613232967286957[/url])
Moeda a derreter, juntamente com outros emergentes.
O Chile também está a levar forte, assim deverá ser mais complicado ultrapassar o PIB de Portugal.
[url]http://knowmore.washingtonpost.com/2014/02/03/now-is-when-you-should-take-that-trip-to-argentina/[/url] ([url]http://knowmore.washingtonpost.com/2014/02/03/now-is-when-you-should-take-that-trip-to-argentina/[/url])
Moeda a derreter, juntamente com outros emergentes.
O Chile também está a levar forte, assim deverá ser mais complicado ultrapassar o PIB de Portugal.
[url]http://knowmore.washingtonpost.com/2014/02/03/now-is-when-you-should-take-that-trip-to-argentina/[/url] ([url]http://knowmore.washingtonpost.com/2014/02/03/now-is-when-you-should-take-that-trip-to-argentina/[/url])
Moeda a derreter, juntamente com outros emergentes.
O Chile também está a levar forte, assim deverá ser mais complicado ultrapassar o PIB de Portugal.
[url]http://knowmore.washingtonpost.com/2014/02/03/now-is-when-you-should-take-that-trip-to-argentina/[/url] ([url]http://knowmore.washingtonpost.com/2014/02/03/now-is-when-you-should-take-that-trip-to-argentina/[/url])
Irra... ir lá compensa!!
Estive a ler e diz-se que confortavelmente, com hotel bom e a comer em bons restaurantes 200 pesos é suficiente e isto na capital... se fosse nas provincias 90 pesos por dia poderia ser suficiente... ora, atendendo que no mercado negro 1 euros = 15 pesos, estamos a falar de 13 euros por dia! Com hotel, restaurantes!
o piorr é o avião :D
Bom mesmo, é aproveitar os preços baratos para passar uns meses a viajar pela Patagónia, sem data de regresso marcada. Mais ou menos como fez este senhor. É uma das minhas viagens de sonho :D
Bom mesmo, é aproveitar os preços baratos para passar uns meses a viajar pela Patagónia, sem data de regresso marcada. Mais ou menos como fez este senhor. É uma das minhas viagens de sonho :D
Entao e se eu for lá de férias, chegar lá comprar IMENSOS pesos e depois fizer o rate quando estiver a voltar à taxa oficial? Será que me deixam por ser turista?
Ainda dava para ficar com a viagem de borla lol ou fazer uns profits. Tipo vender 4 mil euros lá a comprar a Blue e depois usar os pesos "remanescentes" e comprar dólares pela via oficial sendo turista não sei se é permitido.
Entao e se eu for lá de férias, chegar lá comprar IMENSOS pesos e depois fizer o rate quando estiver a voltar à taxa oficial? Será que me deixam por ser turista?
Ainda dava para ficar com a viagem de borla lol ou fazer uns profits. Tipo vender 4 mil euros lá a comprar a Blue e depois usar os pesos "remanescentes" e comprar dólares pela via oficial sendo turista não sei se é permitido.
se é para comprar IMENSOS pesos acho que eles recebem-te de braços abertos... :D
segundo fontes " argentinas " (eh eh ) as pessoas perderam quando se desindexou a moeda ao USD cerca da 60 % dos seus depositos via poder de compra, nem é preciso falar em limites de levantamentos de depositos; é claro que ter activos reais via casas ou acções compensa logo ... como compensará numa saída para o escudo/peseta ou Dracma ...
Eu se fosse aos Argentinos nem punha os pés no tribunal em NY, aliás: nem lá tinha ido logo para começar. Continuava a pagar a dívida renegociada e pronto. Se os credores quiserem podem ir levantá-la fora dos EUA, por exemplo. Se o governo dos EUA impede os pagamentos de chegar aos credores, eles que mudem de país. É por alguma razão que a dívida dos países tem a palavra "soberana" no nome...
Hoje em dia os EUA nem sequer são fornecedores de produtos de monta, portanto a capacidade de impor seja o que for é próxima de zero.
PS: O meu comentário anterior não invalida o facto da Argentina ser muito mal gerida e pouco confiável. O PIB per capita era o 4º mundial em 1930, agora anda pelo 60º...
quem aceitou essa jurisdicao foram os argentinos
quem aceitou essa jurisdicao foram os argentinos
Podem deixar de aceitar a seu belo prazer: são soberanos... há um risco extra associado a qualquer contrato com uma entidade soberana, porque esta pode decidir unilateralmente não o cumprir e tu não podes fazer grande coisa quanto a isso.
quem aceitou essa jurisdicao foram os argentinos
Podem deixar de aceitar a seu belo prazer: são soberanos... há um risco extra associado a qualquer contrato com uma entidade soberana, porque esta pode decidir unilateralmente não o cumprir e tu não podes fazer grande coisa quanto a isso.
Les fonds vautour sont des fonds d'investissements spéculatifs qui se spécialisent dans l'achat à bas prix de dettes émises par des débiteurs en difficulté ou proches du défaut de paiement, qu'il s'agisse de dettes d'entreprises ou de dettes souveraines, avec pour objectif de réaliser une plus-value soit lors de la phase de restructuration de la dette, soit en refusant la restructuration et en obtenant par action en justice le remboursement de leur créance à une valeur proche de la valeur nominale plus intérêts et éventuels arriérés de retard .
Bem como chatices legais similares às que estão a ocorrer.
Em todo o caso não se deve perder de vista que quem incumpriu em alguma coisa, quem fez algo de errado aqui, foi a Argentina.
A definição não podia ser mais clara:CitarLes fonds vautour sont des fonds d'investissements spéculatifs qui se spécialisent dans l'achat à bas prix de dettes émises par des débiteurs en difficulté ou proches du défaut de paiement, qu'il s'agisse de dettes d'entreprises ou de dettes souveraines, avec pour objectif de réaliser une plus-value soit lors de la phase de restructuration de la dette, soit en refusant la restructuration et en obtenant par action en justice le remboursement de leur créance à une valeur proche de la valeur nominale plus intérêts et éventuels arriérés de retard .
Podem deixar de aceitar a seu belo prazer: são soberanos... há um risco extra associado a qualquer contrato com uma entidade soberana, porque esta pode decidir unilateralmente não o cumprir e tu não podes fazer grande coisa quanto a isso.
Tens razão quando dizes que os estados são soberanos, por isso não está prevista a protecção contra credores, como no caso das sociedades comerciais. Agora segundo o artigo que deixo, quando a dívida é emitida sob jurisdição norte-americana o contrato passa a ser comercial, tal como o das vulgares sociedades comerciais. Ora neste caso o estado alegadamente perde a imunidade soberana e, por ser soberano, não pode pedir protecção contra credores, não pode falir. É aqui que os fundos oportunistas jogam.Mas se não pagarem vão penhorar o quê ? É essa a diferença entre uma pessoa/empresa e um país.
"Eventually, something other than litigation may be
the answer to sovereign debt defaults. But until that day comes, [ ]"
([url]http://http://scholarship.law.duke.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1586&context=lcp[/url])
fundos abutres que, obviamente, subornaram o juiz para tomar essa decisão.;D
nao entendo o conceito de fundos abutres, qual eh a diferenca para fundos normais ?É o logotipo, os normais geralmente é um leão dourado, os abutres o logo é ou um abutre ou uma hiena...
nao entendo o conceito de fundos abutres, qual eh a diferenca para fundos normais ?
nao entendo o conceito de fundos abutres, qual eh a diferenca para fundos normais ?
Fundos normais são aqueles que se estão a borrifar se o credor paga ou não. Não paga, paciência, registam a perda e livram-se dos titulos.
Fundos abutres são os que insistem em que lhes paguem por todos os meios legais possíveis.
É engraçado alguém ser apelidado de abutre por querer receber o que emprestou. :D
Eles compram dívida aos compradores que se querem livrar da mesma e que não querem entrar em litígio.
No caso da Argentina, eles compraram dívida que se rege pela lei americana, aceite pelo estado argentino e por isso mesmo teve possibilidade de obter uma menor taxa e um maior n.º de compradores.
A lei americana não permite que dívida mais recente seja paga antes da dívida mais antiga seja liquidada. É só isso que aconteceu e simples de compreender.
Pagas a totalidade a quem não chegou a acordo de corte
4 — Na realização dos pagamentos aos fornecedores deve ser respeitada a ordem cronológica das dívidas.
Claro que tem risco mas o que gerou a confusão é chamarem fundos abutres. Desde quando é que um credor querer receber o dinheiro o torna um abutre ?
Se não chegar a acordo terá que receber por inteiro. Mas engraçado é que foi o governo argentino que não quis encontrar-se com esses fundos.
E para comprovar o que digo:
Art.º 67.º da Lei n.º 73/2013 de 3 de setembroCitar4 — Na realização dos pagamentos aos fornecedores deve ser respeitada a ordem cronológica das dívidas.
É engraçado alguém ser apelidado de abutre por querer receber o que emprestou. :D
Creio que esses fundos não se chamam abutre por essa razão. Fundos abutre são aqueles que compram a dívida de credores iniciais já depois de o país ter incumprido para com os primeiros. A designação abutre advém do facto de estes fundos se interessarem por algo que à partida morreu (incumpriu), da mesma forma que os abutres se alimentam dos restos que os outros deixam ou esperam que algum animal morra para o poder comer.
Tanto quanto sei esses fundos compram a dívida aos credores iniciais por uma bagatela e depois usam outros mecanismos (que não o mercado) para espremer e obrigar o emitente a pagar.
Essa lógica de que "querem receber o que emprestaram" não me parece correcta, visto que, na prática, não emprestaram nada a ninguém.
Claro que tem risco mas o que gerou a confusão é chamarem fundos abutres. Desde quando é que um credor querer receber o dinheiro o torna um abutre ?
Mek acho que estás a olhar para o nome "abutre" e a atribuir-lhe algum sentido pejorativo. Sinceramente, acho que "abutre" aqui não tem nenhuma conotação má. Julgo que seja só uma analogia com o animal que se alimenta de carne putrefacta, que já mais nenhum outro animal quer. Estes fundos "abutre" compram especificamente o que já ninguém mais quer deter. Penso que é apenas e só isso.
Provavelmente os totós são quem aceitou emprestar dinheiro à Argentina sem que o processo de default anterior tenha terminado.
Os credores são uma coisa má, e aqueles que não aceitam comer as perdas são ainda piores que os maus.
LOL Ri-me muito agora.
Não acho que seja saudável demonizar os credores (como muita gente faz) mas também é preciso dizer que eles sabem de antemão que há risco de incumprimento do emitente. Como é que isto se desenvolve e se enquadra na legislação de cada país, já é algo que a mim me ultrapassa.
nao entendo o conceito de fundos abutres, qual eh a diferenca para fundos normais ?
Fundos normais são aqueles que se estão a borrifar se o credor paga ou não. Não paga, paciência, registam a perda e livram-se dos titulos.
Fundos abutres são os que insistem em que lhes paguem por todos os meios legais possíveis.
nao entendo o conceito de fundos abutres, qual eh a diferenca para fundos normais ?
Fundos normais são aqueles que se estão a borrifar se o credor paga ou não. Não paga, paciência, registam a perda e livram-se dos titulos.
Fundos abutres são os que insistem em que lhes paguem por todos os meios legais possíveis.
No entanto, esta situação é quase única. A regra durante décadas de incumprimentos de países do 3º mundo é que os credores aceitavam as perdas e partia-se para outra. Novos credores poderiam aparecer e emprestar de novo ao país após este ter incumprido, e esses novos credores tinham a segurança de estar a emprestar a um país pouco endividado (por ter incumprido).
Esta decisão judicial é uma novidade muito preocupante, pois vai tornar todo esse ciclo de incumprimento / reestruturação dos países fracos muito mais difícil. Quais são os novos credores que vão querer emprestar após um incumprimento? Os países arriscam-se assim a ficar de vez de fora do financiamento internacional. Isto tem implicações gravíssimas.
O que eu estou a dizer acima foi expressamente dito por Joseph Stiglitz, prémio Nobel, que considerou este novo desenvolvimento alarmante, e também utilizou a expressão fundos abutres.
Mas em principio, as obrigações novas, que não têm este problema de uma antiga reestruturação vão ser pagas calmamente..ou não?
Quais são os novos credores que vão querer emprestar após um incumprimento? Os países arriscam-se assim a ficar de vez de fora do financiamento internacional. Isto tem implicações gravíssimas.Podemos ver pelo outro prisma que é os países terem, finalmente, de viver em função do que produzem, o que não parece um mau princípio em vez do ciclo habitual de divida - calote - nova divida - novo calote.
Claro que tem risco mas o que gerou a confusão é chamarem fundos abutres. Desde quando é que um credor querer receber o dinheiro o torna um abutre ?
Mek acho que estás a olhar para o nome "abutre" e a atribuir-lhe algum sentido pejorativo. Sinceramente, acho que "abutre" aqui não tem nenhuma conotação má. Julgo que seja só uma analogia com o animal que se alimenta de carne putrefacta, que já mais nenhum outro animal quer. Estes fundos "abutre" compram especificamente o que já ninguém mais quer deter. Penso que é apenas e só isso.
Não tenhas dúvida que quem usa esse termo o quer aplicar de forma pejorativa.
Os credores são uma coisa má, e aqueles que não aceitam comer as perdas são ainda piores que os maus.
nao entendo o conceito de fundos abutres, qual eh a diferenca para fundos normais ?
Fundos normais são aqueles que se estão a borrifar se o credor paga ou não. Não paga, paciência, registam a perda e livram-se dos titulos.
Fundos abutres são os que insistem em que lhes paguem por todos os meios legais possíveis.
Eleição de Mauricio Macri põe fim ao kirchnerismo na Argentina
Publico.pt
Mauricio Macri, 56 anos, um candidato da oposição de centro-direita que provém de uma das famílias mais ricas da Argentina, será o próximo Presidente do país. O seu adversário na segunda volta das eleições, Daniel Scioli, já reconheceu a derrota.
"O povo argentino elegeu um novo Presidente, Mauricio Macri, a quem acabei de dar os parabéns", disse Scioli, por volta das 21h30 de domingo (0h30 desta segunda-feira em Portugal continental). Com os votos quase todos contados, Macri vence com 51,5%, contra os 48,5% de Daniel Scioli.
Este resultado marca o fim de um período de 12 anos que ficou conhecido como kirchnerismo, numa viragem à direita da terceira economia da América Latina.....
....À frente da Argentina desde 2007, depois de ter sucedido ao seu marido, a Presidente de esquerda Cristina Kirchner não podia candidatar-se a um terceiro mandato. Acaba por ser a herança do kirchnerismo a ser posta em causa nestas eleições.
Nestor e Cristina Kirsnher, políticos peronistas, construíram um sistema baseado em programas de subsídios para os mais pobres, de aumento das tarifas sobre as importações e apostaram na nacionalização da petrolífera YPF.
Cristina Kirchner não vai dar posse ao novo presidente da Argentina
Ao fim de quatro dias de disputa pública sobre onde seria realizada a posse de Maurício Macri, eleito nas últimas presidenciais na Argentina, a atual presidente Cristina Kirchner desistiu de comparecer à cerimónia, prevista para esta quinta-feira, que marca o fim de 12 anos de governos Kirchneristas.
“Não existem condições para que a presidente compareça ao Congresso Nacional”, afirmou o seu assessor Oscar Parrili, esta terça-feira à noite.
A decisão ocorreu após um dia tenso que marcou o acirramento da disputa entre Kirchner e o futuro presidente da Argentina, opositor de Cristina. Para seguir uma tradição criada pelo falecido marido, Cristina Kirchner defende que a transmissão do cargo seja realizada no Congresso Nacional e não na Casa Rosada, sede da Presidência, como defende Macri - e determina a Constituição.
Macri entrou esta terça-feira com uma ação na Justiça, pedindo à ainda presidente que “se abstenha de continuar a cumprir as suas funções” a partir de meia-noite desta quinta-feira, o dia da posse. Assim, seria Macri, e não Kirchner, quem teria a palavra final sobre o local da realização da transmissão de cargo, ou seja, a entrega da faixa e do bastão presidencial.
Segundo Parrilli, a acontecer o que o novo presidente defende, a Argentina ficará sem presidente durante 12 horas: “Entre isso e um golpe de Estado não há muita diferença”, afirmou.
“Mais perto dos representantes do povo”
Oficialmente, quase todos os ex-presidentes do período democrático, iniciado em 1983, receberam a faixa presidencial na Casa Rosada. Isto só mudou quando, em 2003, o bastão e a faixa presidenciais foram passados por Eduardo Duhalde a Nestor Kirchner no Congresso.
Nestor Kirchner teve apenas 22% dos votos na primeira volta, mas foi declarado presidente após a desistência do seu oponente na segunda volta, o ex-presidente Carlos Menem. Kirchner preferiu receber a faixa presidencial no Congresso, para “estar mais perto dos representantes do povo”.
Cristina resolveu manter a tradição. Quando já era viúva de Nestor, que morreu em 2010, a presidente recebeu os símbolos presidenciais da filha, Florencia, no Congresso, quando foi reeleita em 2011.
A disputa veio à tona quando Cristina e Macri começaram a expor publicamente as suas diferenças sobre o local onde o presidente eleito receberá a faixa e o bastão presidenciais.
Num programa de televisão no sábado, Macri contou que tinha telefonado à presidente para falar sobre a cerimónia de tomada posse, dizendo que optava pela Casa Rosada porque é o que determina o Cerimonial da Presidência.
“Foi assim com outros presidentes”, afirma Macri, que afirmou no programa de TV que, caso Cristina não comparecesse, ele receberia a faixa presidencial do presidente do Supremo Tribunal de Justiça, na Casa Rosada.
BBC
https://g1.globo.com/mundo/noticia/2018/08/23/cadernos-das-propinas-entenda-o-escandalo-pelo-qual-cristina-kirchner-e-investigada-na-argentina.ghtml
Bem estão à espera do dinheiro do resgate do FMI e entretanto subiram a taxa de juro para 60%, e a moeda derrete todos os dias.
A Venezuela é um buraco negro, a Argentina está de rastos, vamos a ver se o Brasil sobrevive.
É tirar uma semana e ir para Mar del Plata...Eu ir à América Latina nem que me pagassem, tenho mulher Brasileira mas desde 2013 (quando fui conhecer os meus sogros) que vou conseguindo arranjar desculpas para não meter lá os pés. :)
8)
É tirar uma semana e ir para Mar del Plata...Eu ir à América Latina nem que me pagassem, tenho mulher Brasileira mas desde 2013 (quando fui conhecer os meus sogros) que vou conseguindo arranjar desculpas para não meter lá os pés. :)
8)
P.S: Quanto à Argentina é um país esquerdista peronista perdido e sem futuro (se fosse ao FMI nem lhes emprestava dinheiro porque é um buraco sem fundo), pelo menos o Brasil sendo um país corrupto (como os restantes) ainda é de centro embora tenha a mentalidade estadista também.
O novo presidente do Banco Central da Argentina já adiantou que a abordagem atual ortodoxa de combate à inflação está errada. Pesce quer uma redução significativa das taxas de juros e, para reduzir os preços em alta, vai propor um pacto social.
Será mais uma tentativa frustrada?
Na linguagem dos argentinos, pacto social para combater a inflação significa descer os juros na marra, proporcionar aumento de renda/salário e fazer um acordo para que os agentes não subam seus preços.