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Autor Tópico: Guerra Comercial  (Lida 2780 vezes)

D. Antunes

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Guerra Comercial
« em: 2018-04-06 11:05:21 »
Guerra Comercial China -EUA

1ª ronda:
EUA: aço e alumínio
Chineses: vinho, porco e tubagem

2ª ronda:
EUA: eletrónica
China: soja, carros e químicos

Total: 50 mil milhões para cada lado.




“Price is what you pay. Value is what you get.”
“In the short run the market is a voting machine. In the long run, it’s a weighting machine."
Warren Buffett

“O bom senso é a coisa do mundo mais bem distribuída: todos pensamos tê-lo em tal medida que até os mais difíceis de contentar nas outras coisas não costumam desejar mais bom senso do que aquele que têm."
René Descartes

D. Antunes

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Re: Guerra Comercial
« Responder #1 em: 2018-04-06 11:06:01 »
As guerras comerciais são fáceis de ganhar, afirmou Trump.

Mas economia americana está muito dependente de fornecedores chineses. Além disso, a China tem meios centralizados para subsidiar setores afetados e procura contra-atacar dando golpes onde possa ter maior efeito político, nomeadamente nas fatias do eleitorado que apoiaram Trump. Para não falar da maior racionalidade e o pensar a longo prazo dos chineses vs. a imprevisibilidade e o processo de decisão mais isolado e por impulso de Trump.
De qualquer modo, os americanos exportam 130 mil milhões para a China, os chineses 505 mil milhões. Após a 2ª ronda de rataliações, os chineses já estão a atingir mais de um 1/3 das exportações americanas.
Trump ameaça agora taxar mais 100 mil milhões de exportações chinesas. Onde conseguirão os chineses encontrar tantas expostações americanas para taxar?  Os chineses podem disparar rápido e com boa pontaria, mal o colete de munições é bem mais curto. Quererão gastar as balas todas?
“Price is what you pay. Value is what you get.”
“In the short run the market is a voting machine. In the long run, it’s a weighting machine."
Warren Buffett

“O bom senso é a coisa do mundo mais bem distribuída: todos pensamos tê-lo em tal medida que até os mais difíceis de contentar nas outras coisas não costumam desejar mais bom senso do que aquele que têm."
René Descartes

D. Antunes

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Re: Guerra Comercial
« Responder #2 em: 2018-04-06 11:09:45 »
Consequências:

A curto prazo, a economia mundial poderá arrefecer muito (os mercados acionistas nem vale a pena referir).

A longo prazo, se os EUA assinassem a parceria com os países da Ásia-Pacífico, poderiam isolar um pouco a China e atenuar/retardar a futura hegemonia chinesa. Mas o Trump parece estar é a isolar os EUA.
“Price is what you pay. Value is what you get.”
“In the short run the market is a voting machine. In the long run, it’s a weighting machine."
Warren Buffett

“O bom senso é a coisa do mundo mais bem distribuída: todos pensamos tê-lo em tal medida que até os mais difíceis de contentar nas outras coisas não costumam desejar mais bom senso do que aquele que têm."
René Descartes

vbm

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Re: Guerra Comercial
« Responder #3 em: 2018-04-06 11:13:52 »
Insisto, uma bela guerra comercial
permite rejuvenescer a teoria do comércio internacional
e sacudir todas as balanças de pagamento! Creio mesmo
o desequilíbrio USA-China poder beneficiar a Europa e o UK.

A ver vamos. E era assim que se esgrimia no séc. XVII, XVIII e XIX.
No séc. XX optou-se pela guerra militar. No XXI, é melhor regressar
ao  combate comercial do que começar a lançar bombas nucleares.
Será que os chineses e os norte-americanos vão passar a comerciar
pelo entreposto da Coreia do Norte e do Sul?

Automek

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Re: Guerra Comercial
« Responder #4 em: 2018-04-06 15:33:49 »
De qualquer modo, os americanos exportam 130 mil milhões para a China, os chineses 505 mil milhões. Após a 2ª ronda de rataliações, os chineses já estão a atingir mais de um 1/3 das exportações americanas.
Trump ameaça agora taxar mais 100 mil milhões de exportações chinesas. Onde conseguirão os chineses encontrar tantas expostações americanas para taxar?  Os chineses podem disparar rápido e com boa pontaria, mal o colete de munições é bem mais curto. Quererão gastar as balas todas?
Boa análise Antunes. É bom ter a perspectiva dos números. Pela simples troca comercial percebe-se que os chineses têm uma margem menor que os EUA.

A China tem, contudo, outra arma, além da comercial. A divida pública americana. Se o Trump compra uma guerra com a China e com outros grandes blocos, quem é que lhes vai financiar o défice ?

Incognitus

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Re: Guerra Comercial
« Responder #5 em: 2018-04-06 16:19:12 »
A China pode fazer coisas tipo espetar com impostos acrescidos em bens feitos por empresas Americanas em solo Chinês. Isso ultrapassa bastante a questão das importações e exportações. Isto não tem um fim.
"Nem tudo o que pode ser contado conta, e nem tudo o que conta pode ser contado.", Albert Einstein

Incognitus, www.thinkfn.com

Automek

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Re: Guerra Comercial
« Responder #6 em: 2018-04-06 16:36:35 »
Isso terá algum impacto no emprego chinês ou, sendo só companhias americanas, é irrisório ?

vbm

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Re: Guerra Comercial
« Responder #7 em: 2018-04-06 17:03:25 »
Posso estar a ser 'mau jogador de xadrez'
e nada antecipar à frente do nariz,
mas parece-me de imediato
que, para lá de animar
a produção interna,
os USA, comprarão
mais na Europa,
a China exportará menos,
a dívida americana tenderá a ser paga,
e o mundo ocidental reanima-se.

O Japão, a Indonésia, e o Sudeste Asiático também serão estimulados.
Finalmente, alguma coisa mexe diferente!

Incognitus

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Re: Guerra Comercial
« Responder #8 em: 2018-04-06 17:46:42 »
Isso terá algum impacto no emprego chinês ou, sendo só companhias americanas, é irrisório ?

Algum poderia ter, mesmo que fosse feito apenas para afectar as vendas na China.
"Nem tudo o que pode ser contado conta, e nem tudo o que conta pode ser contado.", Albert Einstein

Incognitus, www.thinkfn.com

Zel

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Re: Guerra Comercial
« Responder #9 em: 2018-04-07 02:23:15 »
A China pode fazer coisas tipo espetar com impostos acrescidos em bens feitos por empresas Americanas em solo Chinês. Isso ultrapassa bastante a questão das importações e exportações. Isto não tem um fim.

se fizerem isso destroiem o investimento estrangeiro, nao parece viavel

mais viavel eh atacarem os servicos

Zel

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Re: Guerra Comercial
« Responder #10 em: 2018-04-07 02:24:28 »
em todo o caso isto eh so bluff ate ao momento, nada que impeca o mercado de subir loucamente "porque acreditam que vao chegar a um entendimento"

D. Antunes

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Re: Guerra Comercial
« Responder #11 em: 2018-04-07 10:17:39 »
Se ficar o Dragão come, se fugir o Dragão pega:


U.S. and China Play Chicken on Trade, and Neither Swerves

By KEITH BRADSHERAPRIL 6, 2018
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/04/06/business/us-china-trade-endgame.html

SHANGHAI — At the heart of the intensifying trade dispute between the United States and China is a fundamental question: Which country is more willing to endure short-term pain for the long-term gain of playing a leading role in high-tech industries.

China has embarked on an aggressive and expensive plan to retool its economy for the future as it moves to dominate in robotics, aerospace, artificial intelligence and more. President Trump has said China’s approach relies on unfair and predatory practices, and on stolen American technology. And even as Chinese leaders say they want to avoid a trade war, they are staunchly defending their plans and showing little sign of backing down.

Mr. Trump’s threat to sharply escalate the administration’s tariffs on Chinese imports — a threat he reiterated on Friday — shows that neither side has yet gone far enough to persuade the other to compromise. Bigger and broader tariffs may be necessary to get China’s attention.

“The administration, if it’s serious, better be prepared for much more,” said Derek Scissors, resident scholar at the American Enterprise Institute.


China’s $300 billion plan for government assistance, Made in China 2025, calls for helping cutting-edge industries by providing low-interest loans from state-controlled banks, guaranteeing large market shares in China and offering extensive research subsidies. The goal is to help Chinese firms acquire Western competitors, develop advanced technology and construct immense factories with considerable economies of scale.
 

It is an agenda that China would probably go to great lengths to protect. “We will not start a war — however, if someone starts a war, we will definitely fight back,” Gao Feng, the commerce ministry spokesman, said at a news conference in Beijing on Friday. “No options will be ruled out.”

For the United States, victory in such a war would be difficult to verify, much less achieve.

China could say it plans to ease back on government support. But that could be difficult to quantify because of the country’s opaque political system and the state’s control of information.

China could back off from rules that favor local competitors and require American companies to share technology if they want access to the Chinese market. For example, foreign automakers face pressure to transfer electric-car technology to their local partners, and foreign technology companies are increasingly required to submit to security reviews. Foreign businesses have long complained that many of the rules they must follow are unwritten.

China’s government-financed campaign is already paying off in some ways. Drive into downtown Shanghai from Pudong International Airport and you pass a seemingly endless series of huge hangars and vast, glass-walled design centers, all part of the country’s effort to create a commercial aircraft manufacturing giant to rival Boeing or Airbus. Travel to factory districts in Shanghai and on the outskirts of many other Chinese cities and you see enormous, newly built factories ready to churn out electric cars, the batteries they use and other components.

Proving that the Chinese government unfairly supports the effort could be difficult, however.

The United States could press its argument with the World Trade Organization, which oversees global trading rules and prohibits big loans from government-controlled banks at artificially low interest rates. But the W.T.O. requires many contracts and government documents to prove cases, evidence that can be hard to get in a tightly controlled country like China.

Even when the W.T.O. rules against China, persuading the country to comply can be challenging. One such ruling, involving China’s restrictions on foreign electronic payment systems, was issued nearly six years ago. China is still mulling how it will comply — despite numerous complaints from the Obama administration and more recent nudges from the Trump administration.

American companies want a level playing field with their Chinese counterparts. China wants to build its industries into sophisticated global competitors. This week, both countries demonstrated a willingness to escalate trade tensions to defend their positions.
 
So the United States has turned to tariffs. That means it is using a 1980s tool to address an industrial policy issue that is already shaping the 21st century.

Mr. Trump’s top trade official, Robert Lighthizer, was a deputy United States trade representative under President Ronald Reagan. The tariffs that Mr. Lighthizer threatened against Japan in those days are among the same ones he is wielding now. But the two periods differ in two big ways.

One is that Japan depended on the United States in the ’80s for military protection from the Soviet Union. China, by contrast, is an increasingly assertive global rival, sending naval vessels to the Baltic Sea and building a naval base in East Afric

The second major difference between then and now is that the European Union deeply resented the tariffs of the 1980s, and Mr. Trump’s use of them could make it difficult to persuade European officials to present a united front. In response to American tariffs, Beijing could simply shift business from American companies like Boeing and Ford to European rivals like Airbus and Daimler.

Chinese officials dispute the American accusations about their unfair trade practices. They say Mr. Trump’s tariffs violate W.T.O. rules, and they dispute claims that China forces American companies to hand over technology. As for Made in China 2025, Chinese officials say the plan is only guidance, not a government directive — and that foreign companies are free to participate, too.

In China’s current industrial policy, the Trump administration sees an extension of how the country has already come to dominate one major industry of the future: solar power.
 
Mr. Trump himself is no fan of solar panels. He has spoken enthusiastically about coal, not renewable energy, throughout his campaign and his presidency. But the solar power industry is one of the biggest success stories so far in China’s efforts involving advanced industries.

The United States played a central role in developing solar panels and manufacturing them until a decade ago. Around then, the Chinese government decided to finance a lavish expansion of the sector. State-controlled banks lent tens of billions of dollars at low interest rates despite the high-profile bankruptcies of solar manufacturers.

Chinese firms now produce three-quarters of the world’s solar panels. Most American and European companies have closed factories, and many have become insolvent. China’s success in producing solar panels has given Beijing a blueprint for seizing the lead in a long list of other high-tech industries.

Many foreign companies are caught between China’s industrial ambitions and Washington’s efforts to stop them, including major aerospace companies and carmakers. The conflict may spread: Made in China 2025 could create major competitors to General Electric and Intel, and to companies outside the United States like Siemens and Samsung.

Tariffs could hurt such companies if the United States and China follow through on their plans. They also risk losing their competitiveness if Beijing succeeds in subsidizing the creation of large Chinese rivals in their industries.

Boeing, for example, could be hit by American tariffs on civilian aircraft parts it buys from Avic, a state-controlled Chinese military and aviation company — required purchases if the company, which is based in Chicago, wants to sell planes in China. China, in turn, is pushing a consortium that includes Avic to become a Boeing rival. Boeing, like other multinational companies, has refrained from endorsing or criticizing the tariffs.

“Although our members are unhappy with retaliatory tariffs being used,” said Kenneth Jarrett, the president of the American Chamber of Commerce in Shanghai, “there is a belief that greater pressure has to be brought to bear on China.”
“Price is what you pay. Value is what you get.”
“In the short run the market is a voting machine. In the long run, it’s a weighting machine."
Warren Buffett

“O bom senso é a coisa do mundo mais bem distribuída: todos pensamos tê-lo em tal medida que até os mais difíceis de contentar nas outras coisas não costumam desejar mais bom senso do que aquele que têm."
René Descartes

vbm

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Re: Guerra Comercial
« Responder #12 em: 2018-04-07 11:27:29 »
De facto, pensem o que quiserem, o desequilíbrio bilateral
de um para cinco no que os USA exportam para a China
versus do que lá importam e o endividamento
estratosférico dos USA pagável em moeda-papel

esse é o staus quo insustentável
que tem de dissolver-se por si, o que
implica a China conter-se
na autarcia que foi e é.

Reg

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Re: Guerra Comercial
« Responder #13 em: 2018-04-07 11:58:33 »
isto antigamente era mais serio

A Índia e a China, países mais populosos da Ásia, despertavam grande atenção por parte da burguesia britânica. Ao passo que o mercado indiano se encontrava aberto ao comércio estrangeiro, a China, produtora de seda, porcelana e chá (os britânicos compraram 12.700 toneladas em 1720 e 360 mil toneladas em 1830; itens que alcançavam bons preços no mercado europeu), não mostrava interesse nos produtos europeus, o que acarretava défices ao comércio britânico.



Apenas um produto, em particular, parecia despertar o interesse dos chineses: o ópio, uma substância entorpecente, altamente viciante, extraída da papoula que causa dependência química em seus usuários, introduzido ilegalmente na China por comerciantes ingleses e norte-americanos. Produzido na Índia, e também em partes do Império Otomano no início do século XIX, os comerciantes britânicos traficavam-no ilegalmente para a China e muitas vezes forçavam os cidadãos a consumir as drogas, provocando dependência química, auferindo grandes lucros e aumentando o volume do comércio em geral.[1]

Em 18 de março de 1839, o imperador lançou um novo decreto, com um forte apelo à população. Através de um panfleto, advertiu do consumo de ópio. As firmas estrangeiras foram cercadas pelos militares chineses, que em poucos dias apreenderam e queimaram, na cidade de Cantão, mais de 20 mil caixas da droga.

Esses factos serviram de pretexto para que a Grã-Bretanha declarasse guerra à China, na chamada Primeira Guerra do Ópio
Mais uma vez, a China saiu derrotada e, em 1858, as potências imperialistas ocidentais exigiram que a China aceitasse o Tratado de Tianjin. De acordo com este tratado, onze novos portos chineses seriam abertos ao comércio de ópio com o Ocidente


vale tudo quando guerra comercial  sao valer  !
« Última modificação: 2018-04-07 11:59:26 por Reg »
Democracia Socialista Democrata. igualdade de quem berra mais O que é meu é meu o que é teu é nosso

vbm

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Re: Guerra Comercial
« Responder #14 em: 2018-04-07 12:09:52 »
Quer a China, quer a Índia,
assim como a América católica,
a Ásia muçulmana e a África bantu

têm de controlar o seu crescimento demográfico.


A China já fez um esforço meritório,
que começa a dar frutos, mas não pode descontrolar-se.

Os restantes são uma miséria inadmissível e condenável.
E disto, ninguém fala,  o que é um absurdo.

Smog

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Re: Guerra Comercial
« Responder #15 em: 2018-04-07 12:30:14 »
No tempo de Salazar, tempo de miséria, também não havia controlo da natalidade.
A ignorância sempre esteve associada a elevada procriação.

 ;D
wild and free

Reg

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Re: Guerra Comercial
« Responder #16 em: 2018-04-07 13:29:16 »
nos USA o boom  demografico foi depois segunda guerra mundial

As explosões demográficas são observadas em duas situações:

a introdução de novas tecnologias que reduzam a mortalidade (aumento na produção de alimentos ou cura de doenças importantes);
em períodos de guerra ou grandes calamidades, em que a sobrevivência da sociedade está ameaçada, registra-se importantes aumentos das taxas de natalidade. Neste caso, a "explosão" também é chamada de baby boom.


neste caso  a sabedoria permitiu  ter terra  com  7 bilhões de pessoas

porque antes salazar ( anos 60)  morriam muito mais  eram so 2  bilhões de pessoas

« Última modificação: 2018-04-07 13:33:39 por Reg »
Democracia Socialista Democrata. igualdade de quem berra mais O que é meu é meu o que é teu é nosso

Smog

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Re: Guerra Comercial
« Responder #17 em: 2018-04-07 16:48:58 »
Sempre dentro do contexto! 8)
wild and free

D. Antunes

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Re: Guerra Comercial
« Responder #18 em: 2018-04-08 23:09:47 »
How to Win a Trade War With China
Hint: Don’t fight it.

By ZACHARY KARABELL April 07, 2018

Donald Trump is right—the United States is not in a trade war with China.

At least, not yet. As the rhetoric has flown back and forth between Washington and Beijing, breathless news coverage has made it seem as though the war of tariffs has already begun. It has not—hardly any new duties have been levied. At most, the world is in its July 1914 moment, with the clouds of trade war gathering but shots not yet fired. We’ll know soon enough whether that is indeed the correct historical analogy. For now, the war is just words, and it would be best for the planet if that’s as far as it goes, because the only way to win a trade war is not to fight it.

For many, the line between words and actions has dissolved into nothingness. Beginning with Trump’s early March Twitter bravado (“trade wars are good, and easy to win”), continuing with the announcement of tariffs first against steel and aluminum, and then against approximately $50 billion in imports from China, and then on Thursday with a possible further round on $100 billion more, financial markets have sold off sharply with each new salvo, keying off everything from tweets to detailed lists published by first the U.S. government and then by the Chinese government of exactly which products would be subject to what duties.

Here’s a reality check: The announcement of levies against global steel and aluminum imports in early March led to the implementation of those levies on March 23, except that a full 50 percent of all U.S. steel imports (from Brazil, South Korea, Mexico, Canada and others) were then exempted from those tariffs. China then announced retaliatory tariffs as high as 25 percent on $3 billion of U.S. goods. Here too, the reporting has often been fuzzy: 25 percent tariffs on $3 billion of goods amounts to $750 million. What has actually happened? The U.S. is levying perhaps an additional $5 billion of tariffs on global steel and aluminum, which China is responding with less than $1 billion of its own. As a proportion of the nearly $19 trillion U.S. economy, that amounts to less than 0.0003 percent. As a proportion of the combined U.S. and Chinese economies, the number is insignificant.

Even the larger figures recently threatened, on $50 billion of Chinese goods including consumer items such as flat screen televisions—and China’s proposed retaliation on an equivalent dollar amount of U.S. exports including pork and soybeans—represent perhaps $25 billion tax on a reciprocal trade relationship that last year amounted to nearly $700 billion. Let’s say that goes even higher based on recent escalating rhetoric and threats. The numbers are still modest in the greater scheme. If this is July 1914, it is a July where the third cousin once-removed of the Archduke of Austria-Hungary was assassinated, three battalions of Austrian and Serbian troops were dispatched to the border and the rest of the continent enjoyed its summer holidays.

The words just now are a shadow of the actions that most of us rightly fear, and it is vital that we all take a deep breath and make a concerted effort to distinguish threats, bluster and modest action from a global trade war that echoes the retrenchment of the 1930s. The infamous Smoot-Hawley Act of 1930 levied duties of close to 60 percent on nearly 20,000 products, leading U.S. trade with the world to plunge nearly 75 percent. That was a trade war. What we are seeing today might be the first signs of one, but we are a long way from real conflict.

That makes it an opportune time not to go any further. It may be, of course, that the Trump White House has in this arena found an ideal outlet for its tendency to speak loudly and carry a small stick. China’s response to the threat of broad tariffs has been to immediately threaten its own measures, while agreeing that now is the time to revise many past practices. One of the main goals of these announced tariffs is to retaliate against China for years of forced intellectual property transfer and dubious requirements that companies setting up production lines or business in China must have a joint venture partner with a significant stake and then transfer IP to that partner.

While China released its own list of possible tariffs, high-level government officials have also signaled their willingness to review its past mercantile trade practices.

Thus, it might be that, as new economic adviser Larry Kudlow said several times this week, there will be no tariffs, and hence no trade war. If indeed that is how the next few months unfold (and by law it will be months before any of the nonsteel and aluminum tariffs are actually put in place), then the White House will have succeeded in using the threat of tariffs as an effective tool to force some changes in the U.S.-Chinese bilateral economic relationship. That undoubtedly will be treated as a victory.

And yet, ending years of Chinese infringement of American intellectual property will not do much to ensure U.S. competitiveness or prosperity in the years to come. Nor will a somewhat more open Chinese market for American goods. China is becoming a domestic economic powerhouse, making much of what it needs for itself and spending tens of billions on artificial intelligence research, clean energy innovation and next-generation telecommunications, along with the trillions it intends to invest in global and domestic infrastructure. U.S. tariffs may annoy China, and they might dent the $700 billion in U.S.-China trade, but the endgame is not a glorious recreation of the 1950s with America a global powerhouse and the rest of the world struggling to catch up.

Trade statistics are highly problematic—we tend to fixate on the hundreds of billions of dollars of U.S deficits, when in fact a large percentage of that is U.S. companies assembling items nominally “made in China” and then selling them in America. The iPhone is perhaps the best example. It is treated as a U.S. import from China at its announced import price of more than $200, but as many economists have shown, only a fraction of that goes to China. The rest is distributed among global suppliers and Apple itself, but arcane “country of origin rules” make it seem otherwise. That is true for almost all products others than commodities and agricultural goods. Our current trade numbers reflect supply chains of the 1950s but how goods are actually made in the 21st century.

That is in part why China’s possible tariffs against U.S. commodities could hurt more than U.S. tariffs against Chinese goods: Our pork and soybeans are basically all-American, whereas a goodly portion of Chinese imports have parts from countries around the world sourced by American companies domiciled in the U.S.

The final problem with the tariffs is that China is the fastest-growing export market for American goods and perhaps the largest potential market for U.S. services. Those services include Chinese tourism to the United States and Chinese students studying here, whose economic ripple effects are surely under-reported (a Chinese student paying rent shows up in no trade number, for instance). And those numbers don’t include China investing tens of billions in the U.S. to buy companies with its surplus dollars, nor its trillion-dollar investment in U.S. bonds.

All of those promising, fast-growing economic avenues are threatened not just by U.S. tariffs but by a plethora of White House policies that make the United States less welcoming to foreign capital and business. Those include more onerous restrictions on student visas and more limitations on foreign investment, such as the recently nixed $100 billion semiconductor deal, which would have seen Qualcomm acquired by a Singapore company with deep business in China. Yes, as the administration is fond of reminding, the United States remains a global market like no other, but with multiple economic centers emerging, the U.S. is not nearly as central as it was. Foreign countries and businesses have more options and more markets than ever, and the more friction the U.S. creates, the more attractive those options become.

Starting a trade war with a series of pallid actions is, therefore, the ultimate mistake. It interferes with one of the fastest-growing import and export markets in the world for the United States without generating nearly enough actual revenue to make a difference except to the already vulnerable domestic American industries and consumers that are purportedly protected. It does little to halt China’s future trajectory as a domestic innovator with its own intellectual property that relies less on the United States than in the past, and punishes China for acts already committed that cannot be retroactively reversed.

Trump’s hot rhetoric may prove successful in the very modest sense of preventing some of the past abuses. Given the changed nature of China’s economy, that won’t matter nearly as much going forward even if the abuses continue, but some adjustment on China’s part would at least restore some level of trust between the two countries. That would certainly be for the best. It would also be a small step for such a large threat, compared with the much greater harm that might result. If, on the other hand, we do plunge into an actual trade war, the U.S. is unlikely to emerge stronger and China is unlikely to weaken. The only way for Trump to win his trade war is if it is never fought.
“Price is what you pay. Value is what you get.”
“In the short run the market is a voting machine. In the long run, it’s a weighting machine."
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“O bom senso é a coisa do mundo mais bem distribuída: todos pensamos tê-lo em tal medida que até os mais difíceis de contentar nas outras coisas não costumam desejar mais bom senso do que aquele que têm."
René Descartes

D. Antunes

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Re: Guerra Comercial
« Responder #19 em: 2018-04-09 22:42:44 »
E a Europa como fica no meio disto?

Este artigo tenta analisar. A meu ver, foca-se pouco na futura concorrência que os chineses poderão fazer às empresas europeias.

Europe Caught in the Middle as Trump Threatens China

By JACK EWINGAPRIL 9, 2018

One is a good customer, a military ally and an old friend, although lately its behavior has been erratic.

The other is also a good customer, and despite a few spats and some lingering mistrust, it’s getting to be a more lucrative and dependable business partner all the time.

Which side would you choose?

That more or less sums up the dilemma confronting Europe as it watches the escalating conflict between its two biggest trading partners, the United States and China.

The United States is Europe’s biggest market for exports like cars and other goods, not to mention a NATO ally. But China is big, too — and getting ever bigger.

The Trump administration has also threatened the institutions that govern global relationships, calling NATO obsolete and stoking trade tensions. So China no longer automatically seems like the less reliable partner.

European leaders were largely silent after President Trump threatened to impose another $100 billion in tariffs on Chinese goods. But watching from a safe distance as China and the United States argue is not an option for Europe. Its economy is too deeply entwined with both.

“What can they do in terms of staying out of the crossfire?” said Adam Slater, lead economist at Oxford Economics in Britain. “Not a lot.”

Although Mr. Trump’s threats are aimed at China, Europe is certain to suffer collateral damage if the president follows through. A spiraling war of tariffs and counter-tariffs would interfere with the global flow of raw materials and components for manufactured goods, disrupting the European economy. And some European companies, like the German carmaker BMW, manufacture in the United States and export to China. Such companies would see their sales suffer if China were to slap tariffs on American goods.

The mere threat of a trade war has already unsettled financial markets and made it more difficult for companies to raise money, Benoît Coeuré, a member of the executive board of the European Central Bank, said Friday. “None of this supports growth and employment,” Mr. Coeuré said at a conference in Cernobbio, Italy.

The disruption to world trade comes at an unfortunate time for Europe. Recent economic indicators suggest that the Continent’s recovery, after a decade of crisis, is losing momentum. Industrial production in Germany shrank 1.6 percent in February, according to official data published last week.

But European leaders’ biggest fear may be that Mr. Trump’s belligerent approach to trade will destroy the postwar system for resolving conflicts, which involved getting all the parties together in one room. Mr. Trump has already succeeded in forcing countries to beg for individual exemptions to steel and aluminum tariffs, bypassing the World Trade Organization, the usual forum for trade disputes.

“He has created an environment to divide countries,” said André Sapir, a senior fellow at Bruegel, a research organization in Brussels. “Maybe we will remember that 2017 was the last year of the functioning of the multilateral system.”

It’s possible Europe might enjoy a few short-term benefits as China and the United States duke it out. If, for example, China were to raise tariffs on Boeing airliners, Boeing’s European rival, Airbus, could take advantage. But positive effects of that sort are not likely to outweigh the risks.

European companies have invested far more in the United States over the years than they have in China. But increasingly, China is where the action is. Germany’s total trade with China, exports and imports together, is already bigger than it is with the United States. And China is the biggest single market for companies like Volkswagen, Europe’s largest carmaker.

China is also where more German companies are putting their money.

In a poll published Thursday, 39 percent of German companies questioned said they planned to invest in China this year, up from 37 percent in 2017. The number that said they planned to invest in North America dropped to 35 percent, from 37 percent, according to a survey, by the Association of German Chambers of Commerce and Industry.

Even so, Europe remains wary of China’s intentions. Though European leaders use tamer language, they share some of Mr. Trump’s concerns about unfair competition from Chinese companies that receive government subsidies. They worry that Chinese companies are stealing European technology, and accumulating too much economic power.

In recent years, Chinese investors have snapped up European assets including Greek ports, German machinery companies and a 10 percent stake in the automaker Daimler. The Chinese government’s “Made in China 2025” campaign, a plan to dominate cutting-edge industry, is a threat to German companies that supply precision machinery that the Chinese companies are not yet able to manufacture themselves.

Leaders in Brussels, Berlin and Paris have called for tighter scrutiny of Chinese acquisitions in Europe, though it is unclear how tough they will be.

At the same time, Europe and the United States have been through a lot together, most notably the Cold War. Both are multiparty democracies with free market economies, unlike China’s one-party autocracy. And European and American historical and cultural ties go back centuries.

Still, a trade war could push Europe closer to China.

Europe’s most immediate preoccupation is to resolve its own trade disputes with Mr. Trump. Cecilia Malmstrom, the European commissioner for trade, is negotiating with Wilbur Ross, the United States commerce secretary, about winning a permanent exemption from tariffs on steel and aluminum imports. A temporary exemption to the tariffs expires May 1.

Ms. Malmstrom and other European leaders have also made plain their unhappiness with what they see as Mr. Trump’s crusade to undermine the World Trade Organization as the arbiter of trade conflicts. They may see China as a potential ally in efforts to preserve the W.T.O., of which China is also a member.

“The E.U. believes that measures should always be taken within the World Trade Organization framework which provides numerous tools to effectively deal with trade differences,” a representative for the European Commission said in a statement.

For the moment, there is little Europe can do but hope that Mr. Trump’s bluster is just a tactic to win concessions from China, and that no trade war will break out. There are few other good options.

Mr. Sapir of Bruegel argues that, longer term, Europe should push for reforms of the trade body to respond to American criticism that the organization is too slow moving, and has failed to curb unfair competition by China. Mr. Trump is unlikely to take much interest in fixing the global trade regime rather than ignoring it, Mr. Sapir said, but it’s still worth a try.

“That is the only structural solution,” Mr. Sapir said. “Otherwise, we will always be caught in between.”
“Price is what you pay. Value is what you get.”
“In the short run the market is a voting machine. In the long run, it’s a weighting machine."
Warren Buffett

“O bom senso é a coisa do mundo mais bem distribuída: todos pensamos tê-lo em tal medida que até os mais difíceis de contentar nas outras coisas não costumam desejar mais bom senso do que aquele que têm."
René Descartes