Hiroshima e Nagasaki

[Jsebastião]

Partilho alguns trechos da obra "The Second World War", por Martin Gilbert, traduzida para português com o título "A Segunda Guerra Mundial"

Para esclarecer alguns factos, e questionar outros. Inicialmente a intenção era transcrever três ou quatro parágrafos referentes ao presidente Truman, mas decidi sacar a obra da net para simplificar o processo e acabei por não resistir a passar para aqui bastante mais mancha de texto.

Em algumas partes, é explicitamentre referido que o target tem de ser militar, embora essas intenções aparentermente perderam-se algures entre as reuniões/opiniões expressas e depois a concretização aquando dos lançamentos.

Também são apresentados os timings previstos para as invasões terrestres (Novembro, e Primavera do ano seguinte, conforme a ilha), ficando claro que não havia qualquer necessidade de terem lançado a primeira bomba com tanta pressa, nem de terem escolhido um alvo com tanta população civil (ou com qualquer população civil, para todos os efeitos), até porque o Japão já tinha expressado a sua intenção quanto a uma possível rendição, embora não incondicional. A intenção inicial dos EUA era "impressionar o mais possível" os japoneses com uma detonação. Mas aparentemente isso não chegava para algumas patentes militares - havia que vergar o opositor - reduzí-lo a nada.

Começa em Maio de 1945.

On May 31, those who had to decide on when and where — and if — the atomic bomb was to be dropped on Japan, met in the Pentagon. Speaking for the scientists, Robert Oppenheimer stated, as the official minutes of the meeting record, ‘that the visual effect of an atomic bombing would be tremendous. It would be accompanied by a brilliant luminescence which would rise to a height of 10,000 to 20,000 feet. The neutron effect of the explosion would be dangerous to life for a radius of at least two-thirds of a mile.’ There was a long discussion that day as to what the targets ought to be, and what effect the bomb might have on them. As the meeting came to an end, the Secretary for War, Henry Stimson, ‘expressed the conclusion’, as the minutes noted, ‘on which there was general agreement, that we could not give the Japanese any warning; that we could not concentrate on a civilian area; but that we should seek to make a profound psychological impression on as many of the inhabitants as possible’. At the suggestion of Dr Conant, Stimson agreed ‘that the most desirable target would be a vital war plant employing a large number of workers and closely surrounded by workers’ houses’.

It was James Byrnes, the American Secretary of State, who, that same day, took this decision to President Truman, for his approval. Byrnes noted, of their conversation, ‘Mr Truman told me he had been giving serious thought to the subject for many days, having been informed as to the investigation of the committee and the consideration of alternative plans, and that with reluctance he had to agree that he could think of no alternative and found himself in accord with what I told him the Committee was going to recommend’.

The alternative plan, to invade Kyushu Island in November, and the far larger Honshu Island in the following spring, had been judged so costly in the lives of the invading force as to make the use of the atomic bomb the preferable plan. If it led to Japan’s surrender before the November invasion, so the argument went, as many as a million American lives might be saved, and the war shortened by as much as a year.

Whether in a blood-bath, as at Okinawa, or with considerable slaughter, as on Luzon or Mindanao, or more easily, as in North Borneo, the Japanese were being driven slowly but relentlessly from their conquests. It was clear to the Japanese Government that the prospect of a heavy loss of American lives was not going to deter the continuing advance, or prevent new landings, including those clearly under preparation against mainland Japan. On June 20, Hirohito summoned his Prime Minister, Foreign Minister and military chiefs to an Imperial conference, at which he took an unusual initiative, urging them to make all possible efforts to end the war by diplomatic means. Even the War Minister and the Army Chief of Staff recognized the logic of their Emperor’s appeal.

In order to seek a negotiated peace, the Japanese Government decided to approach the Soviet Government, and to ask it to act as an intermediary. These approaches were made by the Japanese Foreign Minister, Togo, through his Ambassador in Moscow, Sato Naotake; unknown to Togo, his top-secret messages, sent by radio through Japan’s apparently unbreakable Magic system, were read by American Intelligence. Unfortunately for Japan, these intercepts made it clear to the Americans that, while Japan did want to negotiate peace with the United States, it was not prepared to accept unconditional surrender. Knowing this, the Americans were all the more determined to force Japan to its knees.

At half past five in the morning of 16 July 1945, the first atomic bomb was successfully tested at Alamogordo, New Mexico, in the United States. ‘The sun can’t hold a candle to it!’ was the reaction of one of the physicists as he watched the light of the explosion dazzle with its reflection on the surrounding hills. At Ground Zero, the temperature at the moment of explosion had been three times hotter than the interior of the sun, and ten thousand times the heat of the sun on its surface. As had never happened before, the steel scaffold on which the experimental bomb had stood had been transformed into gas by the intense heat, and had dispersed. Within a mile radius of the explosion, all plant and animal life had vanished.
It was immediately clear that something quite extraordinary had happened. As far away as two hundred miles, windows had been blown out. A hundred and fifty miles away, bewildered citizens reported that the sun had come up and then gone down again. Many of the measuring devices and instruments set up in the desert had been swept away. Most of the film in the scientists’ cameras had been completely fogged — by radiation. That same day, in Berlin, the Allied leaders were gathering for their final conference on the future of the defeated Germany; that day, Churchill was given a guided tour through the ruins of Hitler’s Chancellery.

The Big Three conference opened at Potsdam on July 17, to discuss the continuing war against Japan, and the post-war settlement in Europe. As the conference began, Allied bombers, taking off from American and British ships, attacked military installations and airfields around Tokyo, while other American bombers hit at the industrial towns of Mito and Hitachi, on Honshu Island. But it was the news of the successful testing of the atomic bomb which led to the most dramatic information sent to Potsdam that day. ‘Operated on this morning,’ a top-secret telegram informed the American Secretary for War, Henry Stimson, and it continued: ‘Diagnosis not yet complete, but results seem satisfactory and already exceed expectations.’

It was also necessary, Stimson was told, for a local press release to be issued, ‘as interest extends great distance’. The local press release stated that an ammunition dump had exploded, ‘producing a brilliant flash and blast’, which had been observed more than two hundred miles away.

At noon that day, Stimson, at lunch with Churchill, handed him a sheet of paper on which was written: ‘Babies satisfactorily born.’ Churchill had no idea what the message meant. ‘It means’, Stimson explained, ‘that the experiment in the Mexican desert has come off. The atomic bomb is a reality.’

Later that day, Churchill and Stalin held a private conversation, during which Stalin told the British Prime Minister that, when he was leaving Moscow for Berlin, a message had been delivered to him through the Japanese Ambassador. ‘It was from the Emperor of Japan,’ Stalin explained, who had ‘ — stated that “unconditional surrender” could not be accepted by Japan but that, if it was not insisted upon, “Japan might be prepared to compromise with regard to other terms”.’ According to the message, Stalin added, ‘the Emperor was making this suggestion “in the interests of all people concerned”.’

Churchill pointed out to Stalin that, while Britain shared America’s aim ‘of achieving complete victory over Japan’, at the same time people in America ‘were beginning to doubt the need for “unconditional surrender”. They were saying: was it worth while having the pleasure of killing ten million Japanese at the cost of one million Americans and British?’
The Japanese realized the Allied strength, Stalin commented, and as a result they were ‘very frightened’. They could see what unconditional surrender meant in practice ‘here in Berlin and the rest of Germany’.

On July 22, at Potsdam, Henry Stimson brought Churchill a detailed account of the effect of the atomic bomb test at Alamogordo. Inside a one-mile circle, Stimson reported, the devastation had been absolute. Churchill went at once to see Truman. ‘Up to this moment,’ Churchill later recalled, ‘we had shaped our ideas towards an assault upon the homeland of Japan by terrific air bombing and by the invasion of very large armies’. Churchill added: ‘We had contemplated the desperate resistance of the Japanese fighting to the death with Samurai devotion, not only in pitched battles, but in every cave and dug-out. I had in my mind the spectacle of Okinawa Island, where many thousands of Japanese, rather than surrender, had drawn up in line and destroyed themselves by hand-grenades after their leaders had solemnly performed the rite of hara-kiri. To quell the Japanese resistance man by man and conquer the country yard by yard might well require the loss of a million American lives and half that number of British — or more if we could get them there: for we were resolved to share the agony’.

Now, Churchill recalled ‘all this nightmare picture had vanished. In its place was the vision — fair and bright indeed it seemed — of the end of the whole war in one or two violent shocks. I thought immediately myself of how the Japanese people, whose courage I had always admired, might find in the apparition of this almost supernatural weapon an excuse which would save their honour and release them from their obligation of being killed to the last fighting man’.

On July 24, while still at Potsdam, Churchill, Truman, and the representatives of China agreed to send a message to Japan, offering her ‘an opportunity to end the war’. What had happened in Germany, the message read, ‘stands forth in awful clarity as an example to the people of Japan’. The ‘full application’ of Allied military power, ‘backed by our resolve, will mean the inevitable and complete destruction of the Japanese forces, and just as inevitably the utter devastation of the Japanese homeland’. It was now for Japan to decide ‘whether she will continue to be controlled’ by those who had brought her ‘to the threshold of annihilation’, or whether she would follow ‘the path of reason’.

The Big Three then set out their ‘terms’, adding that there were no alternatives, and that ‘We shall brook no delay.’ The influence and authority of those who had ‘deceived and misled’ the people of Japan would have to be ‘eliminated for all time’. The Japanese forces would have to be ‘completely disarmed’. Japanese sovereignty would be limited to the four main islands of Japan ‘and such minor islands as we determine’. Freedom of speech, of religion and of thought, ‘as well as respect for fundamental human rights’, would be established. In return, Japan would be allowed to maintain ‘such industries as will sustain her economy’ and would be permitted ‘eventual participation in world trade relations’. The message ended: ‘We call upon the Government of Japan to proclaim now the unconditional surrender of all the Japanese armed forces, and to provide proper and adequate assurances of their good faith in such action. The alternative for Japan is complete and utter destruction.’

The Japanese had failed to involve the Russians as peace-makers. They had also failed to undermine the Russian pledge, made five months earlier at Yalta, to enter the war against Japan within two to three months of the end of the war in Europe.

Hardly had this call for unconditional surrender been agreed to between America, Britain and China, than Truman approached Stalin, to tell him privately that the United States had just tested a bomb of extraordinary power. During that same day, Truman also discussed with Stimson when this new bomb was to be dropped, and on what sort of target. ‘The weapon is to be used against Japan between now and August 10th,’ Truman wrote in his diary on July 24, and he added that he had instructed Stimson ‘to use it so that military objectives and soldiers and sailors are the target and not women and children. Even if the Japs are savages, ruthless, merciless and fanatic, we as the leader of the world for the common welfare cannot drop this terrible bomb on the old capital or the new’.

Truman went on to confide to his diary that he and Stimson were ‘in accord’ about the use of the atomic bomb on a military target, and he explained that: ‘The target will be a purely military one and we will issue a warning statement asking the Japs to surrender and save lives. I’m sure they will not do that, but we will have given them the chance. It is certainly a good thing for the world that Hitler’s crowd or Stalin’s did not discover this atomic bomb. It seems to be the most terrible thing ever discovered, but it can be made the most useful’.

On July 30, in connection with the plans for the dropping of the atomic bomb on the four target cities earlier agreed, General Carl Spaatz telegraphed to Washington that Hiroshima, ‘according to prisoner-of-war reports’, was the only one of the four ‘that does not have Allied prisoner-of-war camps’. He was told, by return of signal, that it was too late now to change the targets, ‘however, if you consider your information reliable, Hiroshima should be given first priority among them.'

On the night of August 5, seven groups of American bombers set off to bomb mainland Japan. Thirty of the bombers flew through the night to drop mines on the Inland Sea; sixty-five were on their way to bomb Saga; 102 were on an incendiary raid on Maebashi; 261 were to strike at the Nishinomiya–Mikage area; 111 were on their way to Ube; sixty-six were flying against Imabari; and one was flying, with two back-up planes, to Hiroshima.

This seventh mission was Operation Centreboard. It began at a quarter to three in the early hours of August 6, when the B-29 bomber, the ‘Enola Gay’, which had been especially adapted to carry an atomic bomb, took off from Tinian Island in the Marianas. Five and a half hours later, at a quarter-past eight in the morning Japanese time, it dropped its atomic bomb on the Japanese city of Hiroshima. Among the messages scrawled on the bomb was one which read: ‘Greetings to the Emperor from the men of the Indianapolis.’

Captain Robert A. Lewis, the aircraft commander on the ‘Enola Gay’, saw the massive, blinding flash of the explosion, his fellow crewmen heard him call out: ‘My God, look at that son-of-a-bitch go!’ In that instant, 80,000 people were killed, and more than 35,000 injured.

Of the 90,000 buildings in Hiroshima when the bomb fell, 62,000 were destroyed. Of the two hundred doctors in the city, 180 were killed or badly injured. Of the city’s fifty-five hospitals and first aid centres, only three could still be used. Of the city’s 1,780 nurses, less than 150 could attend to the sick. Several American prisoners-of-war being held in Hiroshima castle since they had been shot down over the city eight days earlier were also killed. The city burned: ‘I am starting to count the fires,’ Staff Sergeant Caron recorded as he looked back. ‘One, two, three, four, five, six . . . fourteen, fifteen . . . it’s impossible. There are too many to count.’

‘It’s pretty terrific,’ another of the crewmen, Jacob Beser, commented, and he added: ‘What a relief it worked.’

***

The scale and nature of the destruction of human life at Hiroshima was eventually to alter the whole nature of how mankind looked at wars, power, diplomacy and the relationships between states. In the days when its reality was only slowly becoming apparent, it was the terrifying human aspects which each survivor could not shake out of his or her nightmares. ‘Mother was completely bedridden,’ a nine-year-old boy later recalled of the days following the bomb. ‘The hair of her head had almost all fallen out, her chest was festering, and from the two-inch hole in her back a lot of maggots were crawling in and out. The place was full of flies and mosquitoes and fleas, and an awfully bad smell hung over everything. Everywhere I looked there were many people like this who couldn’t move. From the evening when we arrived mother’s condition got worse and we seemed to see her weakening before our eyes. Because all night long she was having trouble breathing, we did everything we could to relieve her. The next morning grandmother and I fixed some gruel. As we took it to mother, she breathed her last breath. When we thought she had stopped breathing altogether, she took one deep breath and did not breathe any more after that’.

That was thirteen days after the bomb had exploded over Hiroshima; by then, the death toll had risen by a further twelve thousand, reaching 92,233. It was to rise still further in the following years from the illnesses resulting from radiation. In 1986, the number of identified victims was given on the Cenotaph in Hiroshima as 138,890. People were still dying from the effects of radiation, nearly half a century after the bomb was dropped

The Americans had planned to drop a second atomic bomb on Japan on August 11, if, after the Hiroshima bomb, the Japanese did not surrender unconditionally. Because of predicted bad weather, however, that date was brought forward by two days. Thus it was, that at four minutes before two o’clock on the morning of August 9, as several hundred American bombers set off on a massive air raid over military targets on Honshu Island, a second specially adapted B-29 bomber, ‘Bock’s Car’, took off from Tinian Island with a second atomic bomb. Bock was the name of the bomber’s usual commander, Frederick Bock. But on this flight its pilot was Major Charles W. Sweeney. His target was to be the city of Kokura, but, if Kokura was obscured by cloud, an alternative target, Nagasaki, had been set. Reaching Kokura, ‘Bock’s Car’ found the city covered in industrial haze. As Sweeney’s orders were that he could drop the bomb only on a visual target, he flew on to Nagasaki. At two minutes after eleven o’clock, nine hours after the bomb had left Tinian, it was released, exploding 1,650 feet above the city.

In a few moments, more than 40,000 people had been killed. Five thousand were to die before the end of the year; thirty years later, the full death toll at Nagasaki was calculated at 48,857.

Among those who looked down on Nagasaki as the bomb exploded was the British pilot, Leonard Cheshire, present as an observer. He was later to recall the writhing cloud, ‘obscene in its greedy clawing at the earth, swelling as if with its regurgitation of all the life that it had consumed’.

At the very moment when the Nagasaki bomb exploded, the Japanese Supreme War Direction Council was meeting in Tokyo. News of the bomb led to a renewed discussion as to whether Japan should accept unconditional surrender. The Council was evenly divided; three generals were for surrender, three for continuing the war. The Foreign Minister, Shigenori Togo, cast his vote for surrender, as did the Prime Minister, Admiral Suzuki. But the Minister of War, General Anami, was emphatic that there should be no surrender. ‘It is far too early to say that the war is lost,’ he told his colleagues, and he added: ‘That we will inflict severe losses on the enemy when he invades Japan is certain, and it is by no means impossible that we may be able to reverse the situation in our favour, pulling victory out of defeat. Furthermore, our Army will not submit to demobilization. And since they know they are not permitted to surrender, since they know that a fighting man who surrenders is liable to extremely heavy punishment, there is really no alternative for us but to continue the war.’

The impasse was complete; but Togo and Suzuki were determined to end the war at once, and, in a secret meeting with Hirohito, prevailed upon him to summon a further meeting of the Supreme War Direction Council, and to preside over it himself.

The meeting took place shortly after midnight, in the Emperor’s underground bomb shelter. First, Suzuki read out the Potsdam Declaration. Then, Togo urged its acceptance, provided that the position of the Emperor and the throne could be respected. Suzuki supported Togo, General Anami opposed him. For nearly two hours, the discussion continued. Then Hirohito spoke. ‘Continuing the war’, he said, ‘can only result in the annihilation of the Japanese people and a prolongation of the suffering of all humanity. It seems obvious that the nation is no longer able to wage war, and its ability to defend its own shores is doubtful.’

The time had come, Hirohito told the council, ‘to bear the unbearable’. He therefore gave his sanction to Togo’s proposal that Japan should accept unconditional surrender. The message to that effect, a formal acceptance of the Potsdam Declaration, was sent out from Tokyo, early on August 10, to the Japanese ambassadors in Switzerland and Sweden, for transmission to the Allies. ‘The Japanese Government’, read the message, ‘are ready to accept the terms enumerated in the Joint Declaration which was issued at Potsdam on 26 July, 1945, by the heads of government of the United States, Great Britain, and China, and later subscribed to by the Soviet Government, with the understanding that the said Declaration does not comprise any demand which prejudices the prerogatives of His Majesty as a sovereign ruler’.

***

On the morning of August 10, President Truman and his advisers discussed whether the proviso about the Emperor negated the acceptance of ‘unconditional’ surrender. A formula was devised, drafted by Secretary of State Byrnes, whereby Japan would have to agree that, from the moment of surrender, ‘the authority of the Emperor and the Japanese Government to rule the State shall be subject to the Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers’. That morning, as the diplomatic exchanges began, Truman gave orders for the atomic bombing to stop. ‘He said’, noted Secretary of Commerce Henry Wallace in his diary, that ‘the thought of wiping out another 100,000 people was too horrible. He didn’t like the idea of killing, as he said, “all those kids”?

---- Acrescentado 11/01/2016 ----

Os trechos seguintes foram retirados do relato do historiador Antony Beevor, na sua obra "The Second World War". É um registo mais conciso, mais sóbrio e de alguma forma mais perturbante que o de Gilbert, porque vai dando conta de algumas atrocidades de guerra cometidas no terreno que normalmente não acompanham o escopo dos eventos de maior dimensão.

By the time Japanese resistance on Okinawa had ended, American commanders in the Pacific turned to re-examining the next phase, the invasion of the home islands. The kamikaze attacks and the refusal of the Japanese to surrender, combined with the knowledge of their biological warfare capability, made it a sobering task. The plan had been agreed by the joint chiefs of staff as early as 1944. It estimated that Operation Olympic to take the southern island of Kyushu in November would cost 100,000 casualties, and Operation Coronet in March 1946 to invade the main island of Honshu 250,000. Admiral King and General Arnold preferred to bomb and blockade Japan, to starve it into surrender. MacArthur and the US Army complained that that would take years and cause unnecessary suffering. It would also mean the death by starvation of most Allied prisoners of war and forced labourers. And since the bombing of Germany had not achieved victory, the army won the navy round to the idea of an invasion.

The Imperial Japanese Army was resolved to fight to the end, partly out of an imagined fear of a Communist uprising, and partly out of bushid pride. Its leaders felt that they could never consent to surrender when General Tj’s Instructions for Servicemen had declared: ‘Do not survive in shame as a prisoner. Die, to ensure that you do not leave ignominy behind you.’ Civilian politicians of the ‘peace party’ who wanted to negotiate would have been arrested, or even assassinated, if it had not been for the Emperor’s own indecision over what to do next. The former prime minister Prince Konoe Fumimaro later pointed out that ‘the army had dug themselves caves in the mountains and their idea of fighting on was to fight from every little hole or rock in the mountains’. The Japanese army also intended that civilians should die with them. A Patriotic Citzens Fighting Corps was being formed, many of whose members would be armed with nothing more than bamboo lances. Others were to have bombs strapped to them which they would detonate as they threw themselves against tanks. Even young women were pressured into volunteering to sacrifice themselves.

Japanese military leaders rejected the idea of unconditional surrender because they also believed that their conquerors intended to depose the Emperor. Although an overwhelming majority of the American public wanted exactly that, the State Department and the joint chiefs of staff had come round to the idea of retaining him as a constitutional monarch and softening the terms. The Potsdam Declaration on Japan, published on 26 July, made no mention of the Emperor to avoid a political backlash in the United States. The Japanese government had already approached the Soviet government, hoping that it would act as mediator, unaware that Stalin was redeploying his armies to the Far East to invade Manchuria.
The successful test of the first atom bomb in July appeared to offer the Americans a way of shocking the Japanese into surrender, and avoid the greater horrors of an invasion. After many studies and considerable debate, Tokyo and the ancient capital of Kyoto were rejected as targets. Hiroshima, which had not been as badly destroyed as other cities by LeMay’s bombers, was chosen as the first target, and Nagasaki as a follow-up objective if the Japanese had still not indicated acceptance.

On the morning of 6 August three B-29 Superfortresses appeared over Hiroshima. Two of them carried cameras and scientific equipment to record the effect. The third, the Enola Gay, opened its bomb doors at 08.15 hours, and less than a minute later most of the city of Hiroshima disinte-grated in a blinding light. Around 100,000 people were killed instantly, and many thousands more died later from radiation poisoning, burns and shock. President Truman’s staff in Washington issued a warning to the Japanese that if they failed to surrender immediately, ‘they may expect a rain of ruin from the air, the like of which has never been seen on this earth’.

Two days later, Red Army forces surged across the Manchurian frontier. Stalin did not intend to miss out on the territorial spoils he had been promised. On 9 August, when nothing had been heard from Tokyo, a second atomic bomb was dropped on Nagasaki killing 35,000 people. The Emperor was deeply moved by the terrible fate of those who had died, and requested as much information as possible. It is quite clear that without the atomic bombs he would not have mustered the quiet resolve which he showed later to end the war.

The fire-bombing of Tokyo and the decision to drop the atomic bombs were driven by the Americans’ urge to ‘get this business over with’. But the threat of kamikaze resistance, perhaps even with biological weapons, threatened a far worse battle than that on Okinawa. On the basis that approximately a quarter of Okinawa’s civilians had died in the fighting there, a similar scale of civilian casualties on the home islands would have exceeded many times over the numbers killed by the atomic bombs. Other considerations, most notably the temptation of demonstrating US power to a Soviet Union then ruthlessly imposing its will in central Europe, played an influential, although not decisive, part.

It is true that several civilian members of the Japanese regime were keen on negotiation, but their fundamental insistence–that Japan be allowed to keep Korea and Manchuria–could never have been acceptable to the Allies. Even this peace faction refused to accept any notion of Japanese guilt for having started the war, or international trials for crimes committed by the Imperial Army dating back to the original invasion of Chinese territory in 1931.

A few hours before the second atomic bomb fell on Nagasaki, the Supreme Council for the Direction of the War had met to consider whether it should accept the Potsdam Declaration. Representatives of Imperial General Headquarters were still firmly opposed. On the evening of 9 August just after the Nakasaki bomb had fallen, the Emperor summoned the Supreme Council’s members again. He said that they should accept the terms, providing that the imperial house and its succession was preserved. This proviso was transmitted to Washington the next day. There were mixed feelings during the discussions at the White House. Some, including James Byrnes, argued that no qualifications should be allowed. Stimson, the secretary for war, argued more persuasively that only the Emperor’s authority could persuade the Japanese armed forces to surrender. This would save the Americans countless further battles, and would give the Soviet armies less time to rampage across the region.

The American reply, which emphasized again that the Japanese would be allowed to choose the form of government which they desired, reached Tokyo via the Japanese embassy in Switzerland. The military leaders still refused to accept defeat. While American bombers continued their campaign, although no more atomic weapons were used on Truman’s orders, the arguments continued for several days. Eventually on 14 August the Emperor stepped in and announced that he had decided that they should accept the Potsdam Declaration. Ministers and military leaders alike began to weep. He also said that he would record a broadcast to the nation, an unprecedented event.

That night army officers attempted a coup to prevent the broadcast of the Emperor’s announcement. Having persuaded the 2nd Imperial Guard Regiment to join them through trickery, they entered the Imperial Palace to destroy the message recorded by the Emperor announcing the country’s capitulation. The Emperor and Marquis Kido, the court chamberlain, managed to hide. The rebels found nothing, and when loyal troops arrived, Major Hatanaka Kenji, the main leader of the coup, knew that he had no alternative but suicide. Other military leaders took the same course.
At noon on 15 August Japanese radio stations broadcast the Emperor’s recorded message, calling on all his forces to surrender because the war situation had evolved ‘not necessarily to Japan’s advantage’. Officers and soldiers listened to his words on the radio with tears streaming down their faces. Many were on their knees bowing towards the voice of the divine Mikado, whose voice they had never heard before. Some pilots set out on a final mission of gyokusai or ‘glorious self-annihilation’. Most were intercepted and shot down by American fighters. The self-image of the Yamato race bore a number of similarities to that of the Nazi Herrenvolk. In an attitude reminiscent of the German army after the First World War, many Japanese soldiers continued to persuade themselves that ‘Japan lost the war but we never lost a battle.’

On 30 August US forces landed at Yokohama to begin the occupation of Japan. Over the next ten days there were 1,336 cases of rape reported in Yokohama and the surrounding region of Kanagawa. Australian troops apparently also committed many rapes in the area of Hiroshima. This had been expected by the Japanese authorities. On 21 August, nine days before the arrival of Allied troops, the Japanese government had summoned a meeting of ministers to establish a Recreation and Amusement Association, to provide comfort women for their conquerors. Local officials and police chiefs were told to organize a nationwide network of military brothels staffed by existing prostitutes, but also by geishas and other young women. The intention was to reduce the incidence of rape. The first opened in a Tokyo suburb on 27 August and hundreds followed. One of the brothels was run by the mistress of General Ishii Shirö, the head of Unit 731. Some 20,000 young women were recruited, with varying degrees of coercion by the end of the year to appease their conquerors.

The formal surrender of Japan did not take place until 2 September. General MacArthur, accompanied by Admiral Nimitz, took it at a table placed on the deck of the battleship USS Missouri, anchored in Tokyo Bay off Yokohama. They were watched by two emaciated figures just released from captivity: General Percival, who had conducted the British surrender at Singapore, and General Wainwright, the American commander on Corregidor.

[Jsebastião]

Se for possível provocar 1 milhão de baixas perdendo 0, essa cenário na 2ªGG era usado sobre sofrer 10,000 baixas a provocar 500,000. A contabilidade na guerra para as mais variadas coisas é entre as perdas que se infligem e as perdas que se sofrem, e o rácio quanto maior, melhor (isto não se aplica só a soldados, aplica-se a tanques, a aviões, a tudo).

Eu não contesto nada disto. O que contesto é a decisão de provocar 100.000 vítimas civis sem que isso traga qualquer ganho por consequência. Tendo naturalmente como alternativa provocar "apenas" 20.000 ou 30.000 baixas militares garantindo os mesmos objectivos. Eu sei que não é tão simples quanto isto, porque as variáveis são muito mais do que estas frases podem sugerir, mas o facto de haver um número elevado baixas civis serviu aparentemente como factor coadjuvante na escolha das cidades, pelo efeito de desmoralização geral previsto. Não é algo que consiga conceber de ânimo leve, olhando apenas para números, e fazendo balanços dessa forma.

Mas a ideia é que teria uma consequência e ganho: o fim da guerra. Que teve.

Que as bombas fizeram terminar a guerra é factual e incontestado.

Leste a minha terceira frase?

Resumindo:

A tua tese é a de que a detonação das bombas (que terminaram a guerra fazendo capitular o Japão) poupou muito mais vidas humanas do que se não tivessem sido lançadas. E, dessa forma, justificou-se por larga margem o seu lançamento (correcto?)

A minha tese é a de que se poderiam ter poupado ainda mais vidas humanas se não tivessem sido lançadas sobre Hiroshima nem Nagasaki, mas sim sobre alvos apenas militares, longe de grande agregados populacionais. Seriam demonstrações tão poderosas quanto as que ocorreram, levariam o Japão a capitular à mesma, e não teriam feito 200.000 vitimas civis. É tão simples quanto isto.

A fórmula usada, retaliar, humilhar o Japão matando centenas de milhares de civis através dos dois engenhos, configura para mim um horrível crime de guerra. Não posso obviamente sustentar o argumento, mas tenho ideia de que o Roosevelt teria optado por uma solução completamente diferente - nem Hiroshima, nem Nagasaki.

[Incognitus]

Não creio, até nessas descrições do livro se nota que já se tinha entrado numa fase de bombardeamentos maciços e contínuos, mesmo sem bombas nucleares. Essa fase continuaria. As mortes civis no Japão foram 1/5 a 1/2 provocadas pelas bombas nucleares, o resto foi devido a bombardeamentos (que continuariam). Não existe praticamente perspectiva nenhuma que não acabasse com muito mais vítimas, até mesmo sem invasão. Vitimas tanto Japonesas como aliadas. As mortes civis Japonesas foram uma pequena fracção das Alemãs, com a Alemanha sujeita tanto a bombardeamento como a invasão terrestre.

Outra coisa, não faz sentido pensar que se teria obtido uma rendição sem as bombas nucleares, quando mesmo com elas obter a rendição foi difícil tal como descrito. Mais, regra geral os alvos militares em muitos casos estavam misturados com a cidade, e mesmo antes de se usar as bombas nucleares os bombardeamentos já tinham passado de "precisão" a firebombing por os ataques de precisão serem pouco eficazes.

A probabilidade de o número de vítimas ser mais baixa sem bombardeamentos nucleares é ínfima. O sofrimento das populações civis na Europa foi muito maior devido à falta de tais meios expeditos para terminar a guerra, também. E os Japoneses não eram menos determinados que os Alemães -- tudo indica o contrário.

[Jsebastião]

Não creio, até nessas descrições do livro se nota que já se tinha entrado numa fase de bombardeamentos maciços e contínuos, mesmo sem bombas nucleares. Essa fase continuaria. As mortes civis no Japão foram 1/5 a 1/2 provocadas pelas bombas nucleares, o resto foi devido a bombardeamentos (que continuariam). Não existe praticamente perspectiva nenhuma que não acabasse com muito mais vítimas, até mesmo sem invasão. Vitimas tanto Japonesas como aliadas. As mortes civis Japonesas foram uma pequena fracção das Alemãs, com a Alemanha sujeita tanto a bombardeamento como a invasão terrestre.

Sem números concretos, ainda que aproximados, não podes deduzir essas conclusões. Estou a falar de média mensal/diária de baixas nos 3 ou 4 meses finais da guerra, na frente oriental, i.e., guerra entre US e Japão. Quantos soldados americanos morriam por dia, ou por mês, em média neste período? Eu procurei, mas não consegui dar com nada remotamente aproximado.

Mais uma vez, e quanto a civis, não contesto que as "mortes civis Japonesas foram uma pequena fracção das Alemãs, com a Alemanha sujeita tanto a bombardeamento como a invasão terrestre." Mas não são estas atrocidades na europa que retiram qualquer sentido de pertinência à avalição, como vergonha, do uso das bombas atómicas no Japão. Sabes bem que essas comparações não são válidas dessa maneira.

Outra coisa, não faz sentido pensar que se teria obtido uma rendição sem as bombas nucleares, quando mesmo com elas obter a rendição foi difícil tal como descrito. Mais, regra geral os alvos militares em muitos casos estavam misturados com a cidade, e mesmo antes de se usar as bombas nucleares os bombardeamentos já tinham passado de "precisão" a firebombing por os ataques de precisão serem pouco eficazes.

Inc. há não sei quantos posts que estou a insistir no mesmo, mas tu ainda não reparaste, ou não não quiseste reparar: o cenario que coloco prevê o uso de bombas atómicas. Em nenhuma altura eu disse que a melhor alternativa seria não aos usar.

Sim, é verdade que a rendição incondicional estava difícil, e que só foi desbloqueada no momento em que se soube de Nagasaki (foi imediato, aí), mas continuo a dizer que as detonações teriam produzido o mesmo efeito sobre alvos menos densamente preenchidos com população civil. Alvos com características mililtares de relevo e pouca população civil - alvos que serviriam para dar um exemplo suficientemente poderoso - devia haver aos milhares.

A probabilidade de o número de vítimas ser mais baixa sem bombardeamentos nucleares é ínfima. O sofrimento das populações civis na Europa foi muito maior devido à falta de tais meios expeditos para terminar a guerra, também. E os Japoneses não eram menos determinados que os Alemães -- tudo indica o contrário.

Concordo em tudo. E em tudo os meus argumentos continuam válidos.

Usar as bombas na europa teria prevenido muitas mortes civis e militares, certo, mas só se tivessem sido usadas de forma sensata, e não indiscriminadamente, como sucedeu com os bombardeamentos que arrasaram cidades inteiras.

[Reg]

as cidades sao sempre o alvo....ciência provou o quanto pode ser terrível quando orientada para a violência. Forçada pela urgência da guerra, a tecnologia deu um salto enorme, infelizmente, aperfeiçoando máquinas de matar seres humanos. as cidades e onde estao fábricas de aeronaves , a fábrica de tanques, também importantes fábricas de  motores e de materiais  .


exemplo,: Quando os americanos chegaram em Kassel cidade com grande capacidade  industrial, em abril de 1945, havia apenas 50 mil habitantes, em 1939 eram 236.000.

cidade de Kassel, na região de Hesse, no centro-oeste da Alemanha, foi alvo de uma campanha de bombardeio contínua, que começou no início de 1942 e durou quase até o fim da Segunda Guerra Mundial, em 1945.

a política da RAF de  bombardear apenas edifícios de importância militar direta, foi lentamente suplantada pela nova estratégia de "bombardeio de área" - isto é, o bombardeio de casas e centros civis. Embora a morte de civis nunca foi explicitamente reconhecida como o objetivo, os resultados do bombardeio de área foram inevitáveis


isto e resumo que mostra  foi pior que  bomba atomica foram anos de bombardiamentos

[Jsebastião]

as cidades sao sempre o alvo....ciência provou o quanto pode ser terrível quando orientada para a violência. Forçada pela urgência da guerra, a tecnologia deu um salto enorme, infelizmente, aperfeiçoando máquinas de matar seres humanos. as cidades e onde estao fábricas de aeronaves , a fábrica de tanques, também importantes fábricas de  motores e de materiais  .


exemplo,: Quando os americanos chegaram em Kassel cidade com grande capacidade  industrial, em abril de 1945, havia apenas 50 mil habitantes, em 1939 eram 236.000.

cidade de Kassel, na região de Hesse, no centro-oeste da Alemanha, foi alvo de uma campanha de bombardeio contínua, que começou no início de 1942 e durou quase até o fim da Segunda Guerra Mundial, em 1945.

a política da RAF de  bombardear apenas edifícios de importância militar direta, foi lentamente suplantada pela nova estratégia de "bombardeio de área" - isto é, o bombardeio de casas e centros civis. Embora a morte de civis nunca foi explicitamente reconhecida como o objetivo, os resultados do bombardeio de área foram inevitáveis

isto e resumo que mostra  foi pior que  bomba atomica foram anos de bombardiamentos

Porventura poderei ter dado uma ideia errada acerca do que penso desses bombardeamentos pelo facto de ter isolado a minha argumentação em torno da questão da bomba atómica (a ponto de ter criado este tópico). Não é assim. Condeno tanto esses bombardeamentos indiscriminados sobre cidades inteiras como o uso das bombas.

[Jsebastião]

Retiradas de um artigo de opinião, as opiniões de algumas personalidade e altas patentes de relevo que participaram  na WWII:


Dwight Eisenhower:

“I had been conscious of a feeling of depression and so I voiced to [Stimson] my grave misgivings, first on the basis of my belief that Japan was already defeated and that dropping the bomb was completely unnecessary, and secondly because I thought that our country should avoid shocking world opinion by the use of a weapon whose employment was, I thought, no longer mandatory as a measure to save American lives. It was my belief that Japan was, at that very moment, seeking some way to surrender with a minimum loss of ‘face.’ ”

“In the councils of government, we must guard against the acquisition of unwarranted influence, whether sought or unsought, by the military industrial complex. The potential for the disastrous rise of misplaced power exists, and will persist. . . . Only an alert and knowledgeable citizenry can compel the proper meshing of the huge industrial and military machinery of defense with our peaceful message and goals.”

Deputy Director of the Office of Naval Intelligence, Ellis Zacharias:

Just when the Japanese were ready to capitulate, we went ahead and introduced to the world the most devastating weapon it had ever seen and, in effect, gave the go-ahead to Russia to swarm over Eastern Asia.

Washington decided that Japan had been given its chance and now it was time to use the A-bomb.

I submit that it was the wrong decision. It was wrong on strategic grounds. And it was wrong on humanitarian grounds.

Admiral Leahy, Chief of Staff to presidents Roosevelt and Truman:

It is my opinion that the use of the barbarous weapon at Hiroshima and Nagasaki was of no material assistance in our war against Japan … The Japanese were already defeated and ready to surrender because of the effective sea blockade and the successful bombing with conventional weapons … My own feeling was that in being the first to use it, we had adopted an ethical standard common to the barbarians of the Dark Ages. I was not taught to make war in that fashion, and wars cannot be won by destroying women and children.

[Incognitus]

as cidades sao sempre o alvo....ciência provou o quanto pode ser terrível quando orientada para a violência. Forçada pela urgência da guerra, a tecnologia deu um salto enorme, infelizmente, aperfeiçoando máquinas de matar seres humanos. as cidades e onde estao fábricas de aeronaves , a fábrica de tanques, também importantes fábricas de  motores e de materiais  .


exemplo,: Quando os americanos chegaram em Kassel cidade com grande capacidade  industrial, em abril de 1945, havia apenas 50 mil habitantes, em 1939 eram 236.000.

cidade de Kassel, na região de Hesse, no centro-oeste da Alemanha, foi alvo de uma campanha de bombardeio contínua, que começou no início de 1942 e durou quase até o fim da Segunda Guerra Mundial, em 1945.

a política da RAF de  bombardear apenas edifícios de importância militar direta, foi lentamente suplantada pela nova estratégia de "bombardeio de área" - isto é, o bombardeio de casas e centros civis. Embora a morte de civis nunca foi explicitamente reconhecida como o objetivo, os resultados do bombardeio de área foram inevitáveis

isto e resumo que mostra  foi pior que  bomba atomica foram anos de bombardiamentos

Porventura poderei ter dado uma ideia errada acerca do que penso desses bombardeamentos pelo facto de ter isolado a minha argumentação em torno da questão da bomba atómica (a ponto de ter criado este tópico). Não é assim. Condeno tanto esses bombardeamentos indiscriminados sobre cidades inteiras como o uso das bombas.

Os bombardeamentos a cidades também tiveram uma lógica militar. Como os bombardeamentos de precisão não tinham precisão, utilizaram-se os bombardeamentos incendiários para:
* Demover o apoio político (mas isto não se pode dizer que tenha funcionado).
* Dar cabo da mão de obra (isto funcionou).
* Fazer com que o esforço militar se dividisse por mais frentes -- era necessário proteger as cidades, isso exige armamento, pilotos, aviões, etc, que de outra forma seriam usados nas frentes (isto funcionou).

Além de, claro, a moralidade da altura ser diferente da de hoje. Os bombardeamentos de hoje (pelo menos por parte de países Europeis, EUA e Israel) fazem muito menos vítimas devido à precisão. Sauditas, Russos, Ucranianos, etc, não se preocupam tanto com essas coisas.

[Incognitus]

Retiradas de um artigo de opinião, as opiniões de algumas personalidade e altas patentes de relevo que participaram  na WWII:


Dwight Eisenhower:

“I had been conscious of a feeling of depression and so I voiced to [Stimson] my grave misgivings, first on the basis of my belief that Japan was already defeated and that dropping the bomb was completely unnecessary, and secondly because I thought that our country should avoid shocking world opinion by the use of a weapon whose employment was, I thought, no longer mandatory as a measure to save American lives. It was my belief that Japan was, at that very moment, seeking some way to surrender with a minimum loss of ‘face.’ ”

“In the councils of government, we must guard against the acquisition of unwarranted influence, whether sought or unsought, by the military industrial complex. The potential for the disastrous rise of misplaced power exists, and will persist. . . . Only an alert and knowledgeable citizenry can compel the proper meshing of the huge industrial and military machinery of defense with our peaceful message and goals.”

Deputy Director of the Office of Naval Intelligence, Ellis Zacharias:

Just when the Japanese were ready to capitulate, we went ahead and introduced to the world the most devastating weapon it had ever seen and, in effect, gave the go-ahead to Russia to swarm over Eastern Asia.

Washington decided that Japan had been given its chance and now it was time to use the A-bomb.

I submit that it was the wrong decision. It was wrong on strategic grounds. And it was wrong on humanitarian grounds.

Admiral Leahy, Chief of Staff to presidents Roosevelt and Truman:

It is my opinion that the use of the barbarous weapon at Hiroshima and Nagasaki was of no material assistance in our war against Japan … The Japanese were already defeated and ready to surrender because of the effective sea blockade and the successful bombing with conventional weapons … My own feeling was that in being the first to use it, we had adopted an ethical standard common to the barbarians of the Dark Ages. I was not taught to make war in that fashion, and wars cannot be won by destroying women and children.

Bem, entre milhares de oficiais existirão sempre várias opiniões, mas:
* A ideia de que estavam já prontos a capitular não parece sequer consistente com a descrição das duas reuniões após o uso da bomba atómica, que resultaram na capitulação. Se foi difícil com a bomba, era improvável sem ela.
* A capitulação se demorasse levaria ao aumento de vítimas mesmo que por bombardeamento convencional.
* A batalha de Inglaterra dá a ideia que só bombardeamento convencional não convenceria ninguém a capitular. A da Alemanha também. Ou seja, mesmo depois de se matar uma série de gente usando bombardeamento convencional, poderia MESMO ASSIM ser necessária uma invasão terrestre.

[Jsebastião]

Bem, entre milhares de oficiais existirão sempre várias opiniões, mas:

Sim, sem dúvida. Haverá, neste como noutros casos, opiniões para todos os cenários. Nota contudo a importância e o cargo/patente dessas três personalidades. Não são uns coitadinhos quaisquer que estão a mandar uns bitaites. Em teu abono, tens a hipótese provável de não estarem na pose de todas as informações na altura em que disseram aquilo, e apesar de o estarem a dizer convictamente, à luz do que sabiam na altura, novos dados mais completos sobre a história vieram a público em anos mais recentes. Mas em todo caso, não sabemos ao certo o que sabiam ou não.
 

* A ideia de que estavam já prontos a capitular não parece sequer consistente com a descrição das duas reuniões após o uso da bomba atómica, que resultaram na capitulação. Se foi difícil com a bomba, era improvável sem ela.

Tem em atenção que houve os tais contactos via Rússia, antes da primeira bomba, que tinham por intenção sondar os Americanos para um início de rendição - nessa altura sem ser incondicional. Portanto, a coisa não era assim tão simples e tão directa como apontas, mesmo apesar dos impasses nas reuniões.

* A capitulação se demorasse levaria ao aumento de vítimas mesmo que por bombardeamento convencional.

Sem dúvida. Não contesto. Faltam é os números para podermos saber de que é que estamos a falar. Tenho pena de não ter esses números (vítimas mensais/diárias de ambos os lados ao longo de 1945), porque penso que no final a minha tese sairia fortalecida.

* A batalha de Inglaterra dá a ideia que só bombardeamento convencional não convenceria ninguém a capitular. A da Alemanha também. Ou seja, mesmo depois de se matar uma série de gente usando bombardeamento convencional, poderia MESMO ASSIM ser necessária uma invasão terrestre.

Concordo. Como referi anteriormente em praticamente todas as intervenções, a bomba seria provavelmente necessária para evitar uma invasão. Era de resto esse o principal objectivo (haveria outros menos claros, mas esse foi o principal).

O que não era necessário era Hiroshima e Nagasaki. Aqui tenho imensa curiosidade em conhecer o fio dos acontecimentos que levaram de uma primeira intenção de atacar um alvo puramente militar até ao lançamento que ocorreu em Hiroshima. Curiosidade em saber como se chegou de uma coisa à outra. Que alternativas foram realmente consideradas, e por que razão foram descartadas outras zonas para o lançamento. Quais foram os argumentos utilizados e quem foram as pessoas/entidades que orientaram o processo. Não sei se essa informação existe, ou se é pública, até porque não procurei, mas com esta discussão toda fiquei curioso. Há muita coisa que não bate certo - a começar pelas palavras contraditórias do próprio Truman.

[Incognitus]

Bem, entre milhares de oficiais existirão sempre várias opiniões, mas:

Sim, sem dúvida. Haverá, neste como noutros casos, opiniões para todos os cenários. Nota contudo a importância e o cargo/patente dessas três personalidades. Não são uns coitadinhos quaisquer que estão a mandar uns bitaites. Em teu abono, tens a hipótese provável de não estarem na pose de todas as informações na altura em que disseram aquilo, e apesar de o estarem a dizer convictamente, à luz do que sabiam na altura, novos dados mais completos sobre a história vieram a público em anos mais recentes. Mas em todo caso, não sabemos ao certo o que sabiam ou não.
 

* A ideia de que estavam já prontos a capitular não parece sequer consistente com a descrição das duas reuniões após o uso da bomba atómica, que resultaram na capitulação. Se foi difícil com a bomba, era improvável sem ela.

Tem em atenção que houve os tais contactos via Rússia, antes da primeira bomba, que tinham por intenção sondar os Americanos para um início de rendição - nessa altura sem ser incondicional. Portanto, a coisa não era assim tão simples e tão directa como apontas, mesmo apesar dos impasses nas reuniões.

* A capitulação se demorasse levaria ao aumento de vítimas mesmo que por bombardeamento convencional.

Sem dúvida. Não contesto. Faltam é os números para podermos saber de que é que estamos a falar. Tenho pena de não ter esses números (vítimas mensais/diárias de ambos os lados ao longo de 1945), porque penso que no final a minha tese sairia fortalecida.

* A batalha de Inglaterra dá a ideia que só bombardeamento convencional não convenceria ninguém a capitular. A da Alemanha também. Ou seja, mesmo depois de se matar uma série de gente usando bombardeamento convencional, poderia MESMO ASSIM ser necessária uma invasão terrestre.

Concordo. Como referi anteriormente em praticamente todas as intervenções, a bomba seria provavelmente necessária para evitar uma invasão. Era de resto esse o principal objectivo (haveria outros menos claros, mas esse foi o principal).

O que não era necessário era Hiroshima e Nagasaki. Aqui tenho imensa curiosidade em conhecer o fio dos acontecimentos que levaram de uma primeira intenção de atacar um alvo puramente militar até ao lançamento que ocorreu em Hiroshima. Curiosidade em saber como se chegou de uma coisa à outra. Que alternativas foram realmente consideradas, e por que razão foram descartadas outras zonas para o lançamento. Quais foram os argumentos utilizados e quem foram as pessoas/entidades que orientaram o processo. Não sei se essa informação existe, ou se é pública, até porque não procurei, mas com esta discussão toda fiquei curioso. Há muita coisa que não bate certo - a começar pelas palavras contraditórias do próprio Truman.

As vítimas civis Japonesas foram uns 200,000-400,000 em 5 meses (ex-bombas), mas a cadência iria aumentar pois os meios disponíveis para bombardear estavam a aumentar. Os militares iria depender muito de existir ou não uma invasão -- sem invasão era uma guerra maioritariamente marítima e aérea. Quando começaram a invadir ilhas, porém, as vítimas militares aumentaram bastante.

[Incognitus]

O artigo da Wikipedia tem mais detalhes sobre a selecção de alvos:

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Atomic_bombings_of_Hiroshima_and_Nagasaki

[Reg]

eu sou muito ceptico quando dizem que uma ilha vai capitular..  sem uma invasao dificil

o alemao bem se enganou  com bombardiamento inglaterra..e o Napoliao tambem  com o seu bloqueio a ilha

[Reg]

O artigo da Wikipedia tem mais detalhes sobre a selecção de alvos:

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Atomic_bombings_of_Hiroshima_and_Nagasaki

tudo o que fosse industrial  era alvo ,  onde ha industria ha grandes cidades
" only person deserving credit for saving Kyoto from
destruction is Henry L. Stimson, the Secretary of War at the time, who had known and admired Kyoto ever since his honeymoon there several decades earlierivis"

[Jsebastião]

O artigo da Wikipedia tem mais detalhes sobre a selecção de alvos:

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Atomic_bombings_of_Hiroshima_and_Nagasaki

Por incrível que pareça, ainda não tinha consultado a wiki a propósito disto.

Ainda não li o artigo todo com atenção, mas logo no início apresentam outro link para a questão da necessidade efectiva do uso destas bombas.

--

Entretanto descarreguei um outro livro sobre a Segunda Guerra Mundial que também se vende por cá - uma obra do historiador Antony Beevor - e que tem um relato mais curto e menos "emotivo" sobre as bombas atómicas.

Esta historiador notabilizou-se, entre outras coisas, por apresentar uma denúncia dos crimes cometidos pelos japoneses no decorrer da 2ª Grande Guerra, no que respeita ao canibalismo, mostrando-os não como incidentes isolados, mas como uma prática regular e continuada que era levado a cabo sobre presos de guerra (e não só).  Vou ver se encontro esses trechos também para transpor para aqui. Não que tenham directamente a ver com as bombas, mas para mostrar o outro lado da moeda: as atrocidades vegonhosas cometidas pelo Japão.

[Jsebastião]

Acrescentei um trecho do livro do Beevor à mensagem inicial, e que foca o período que se inicia após a conquista de Okinawa.

---

A respeito das informações contidas nos links da wiki, apesar de bastante detalhadas, nunca poderiam ir ao nível de profundidade que eu desejaria, mas sugerem uma ou outra obra que poderá ter o que procuro.

Em todo o caso, não fiquei minimamente convencido da necessidade do uso das bombas nos contextos anunciados, tendo em conta que as suas finalidades eram: 1 - evitar a invasão terrestre das duas ilhas maiores, 2 - dar um exemplo de supremacia/poderio suficientemente claro que permitisse terminar logo ali a guerra, e 3 - enviar uma indirecta à Rússia, a dizer "temos a bomba e ela faz isto que estão aqui a observar".

Embora estes objectivos tenham sido atingidos, no question about it, continuo a achar que os danos que causou a nível de vítimas podiam ter sido significativamente menorizados. Parece-me que havia a consciência de que poderiam ter optado por não limparem duas cidades, mas que pretenderam de facto testar deliberadamente as duas bombas em cenários densamente povoados, e que ao abrigo da guerra tinham as desculpas perfeitas para o justificarem. As declarações de Truman (e já agora de Churchill) soam a falso por todos os lados. São para a opinião pública engolir e calar. Esta, em particular, faz afirmações bastante específicas, contrariadas depois pela realidade:

This weapon is to be used against Japan between now and August 10th. I have told the Sec. of War, Mr. Stimson, to use it so that military objectives and soldiers and sailors are the target and not women and children. Even if the Japs are savages, ruthless, merciless and fanatic, we as the leader of the world for the common welfare cannot drop that terrible bomb on the old capital [Kyoto] or the new [Tokyo]. He and I are in accord. The target will be a purely military one.

Em toda a argumentação a favor e contra que vejo na wiki, considero estranho haver apenas o 0 e o 1, o lançar VS não lançar as bombas, e praticamente zero considerações sobre cenários de lançamento que não fossem Hiroshima nem Nagasaki (torno a referir, devia haver milhares de locais que teriam servido à mesma para mostrar o poder de destruição dos engenhos, que serviriam à mesma os intencionados propósitos, e que teriam feito incomensuravelmente menos vítimas civis). Mas não. Tinham de ver na prática quanta gente ia morrer se fossem lançadas sobre cidades.