Direitos humanos

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é aqui.

L

EDIT: alterei o cabeçalho para apenas direitos humanos.
Não são só os da China que interessam.
o tópico está aberto para tudo o que sejam atropelos dos direitos humanos na china, na coreia, na rússia, em cuba, em portugal, nos estados unidos, na hungria...

no mundo todo!

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Laogai

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia (o mesmo que gulag)

Laogai, the abbreviation for Láodòng Gǎizào (勞動改造/劳动改造), which means "reform through labor," is a slogan of the Chinese criminal justice system and has been used to refer to the use of penal labour and prison farms in the People's Republic of China (PRC) which takes up more than half of the world's slaves. Laogai is distinguished from laojiao, or re-education through labor, which is an administrative detention for a person who is not a criminal but has committed minor offenses, and is intended to reform offenders into law-abiding citizens. Persons detained under laojiao are detained in facilities that are separate from the general prison system of laogai. Both systems, however, involve penal labor.

In 1990 China abandoned the term laogai and started classifying the facilities as "prisons" instead. China's 1997 revised Criminal Procedure Law brought an end to open laogai policy. The existence of an extensive network of forced-labor camps producing consumer goods for export to Europe and the United States became classified. Publication of information about China's prison system by Al Jazeera English resulted in its expulsion from China on May 7, 2012.

History

During the 1950s and 1960s, Chinese prisons, similar to organized factories, contained large numbers of people who were considered too critical of the government or "counter-revolutionary." However, many people arrested for political or religious reasons were released in the late 1970s at the start of the Deng Xiaoping reforms.

In the 21st century, critics have said that Chinese prisons produce products for sale in foreign countries, with the profits going to the PRC government.[7] Products include everything from green tea to industrial engines to coal dug from mines. According to the researchers James D. Seymour and Richard Anderson, the products made in laogai camps comprise an insignificant amount of mainland China's export output and gross domestic product.

They argue that the use of prison labor for manufacturing is not in itself a violation of human rights, and that most prisoners in Chinese prisons are serving time for what are generally regarded as crimes in the West. The Western criticism of the laogai is based not only on the export of products made by forced labor, but also on the claims of detainees being held for political or religious violations, such as leadership of unregistered Chinese House Churches.

While the laogai has attracted widespread criticism for the poor conditions in the prisons, Seymour and Anderson claim that reports are exaggerated, stating that "even at its worst, the laogai is not, as some have claimed, 'the Chinese equivalent of the Soviet gulag.'"

The downfall of socialism has reduced revenue to local governments, increasing pressure for local governments to supplement their income using prison labor. At the same time, prisoners usually do not make a good workforce. The products manufactured by prison labor in China are of extremely low quality and have become unsalable on the open market in competition with products made by non-imprisoned paid labor.

Harry Wu has written books, including Troublemaker and Laogai, that describe the system from the 19(?)0s to the 1990s. Wu spent nineteen years, from 1960 to 1979, as a prisoner in these camps, for having criticized the government while he was a young college student. Almost starving to death, he eventually escaped to the US.

In Mao: The Unknown Story, the Mao biographer Jung Chang and historian Jon Halliday estimate that perhaps 27 million people died in prisons and labor camps during Mao Zedong's rule.

They say that inmates were subjected to back-breaking labor in the most hostile wastelands, and that executions and suicides by any means (like diving into a wheat chopper) were commonplace.

Jean-Louis Margolin writing in The Black Book of Communism, which describes the history of repressions by Communist states, claims that perhaps 20 million died in the prison system. Professor R.J. Rummel puts the number of forced labor "democides" at 15,720,000, excluding "all those collectivized, ill-fed and clothed peasants who would be worked to death in the fields." Harry Wu puts the death toll at 15 million.

In 2008, the Laogai Research Foundation, a human rights NGO located in Washington, DC, estimated that approximately 1,045 laogai facilities were operating in China, and contained an estimated 6.8 million detainees. The number of detainees is uncertain.

Conditions in Laogai camps

The conditions that Laogai prisoners live in have been under scrutiny as the world learns more about them. The Chinese government has stated

“Our economic theory hold the human being is the most fundamental productive force. Except for those who must be exterminated physically out of political consideration, human beings must be utilized as productive forces, with submissiveness as the prerequisite. The Laogai system's fundamental policy is 'Forced Labor as a means, while Thought Reform is our basic aim.’”

Clothing

Unlike Laojiao inmates, Laogai criminals are issued clothing. Depending on the locale and its economic situation, the quality of clothing can vary significantly. Some prisoners may receive black or grey while others wear dark red or blue. Also depending on location, the clothing is available in different thicknesses. Commonly stamped on the uniforms are the Chinese characters for fan and lao gai meaning "criminal" and "reform through labor," respectively.

Also issued to the prisoners are a pair of shoes made of rubber or plastic. These minimums do not meet the needs of the prisoners, who must purchase underclothes, socks, hats and jackets with their meager monthly earnings of 2.5–3 yuan ($0.37–$0.44 USD as of April 11, 2009).

Jackets were rare in the Mao era and were commonly made from patches of old blankets rather than from original cloth. Washing clothes was also rare, but clothing supplies in prisons have improved since the mid-Deng-Jiang Era.

Food

Food distribution has varied much through time, similar to its variation across the “over 1,155 documented laogai” camps. One camp near Beijing distributes between 13.5 and 22.5 kg of food per person per month. This is about average. The food consists of sorghum and corn, which are ground into flour and made into bread or gruel. The prisoners of the Beijing camp also receive three ounces of cooking oil per month. Every two weeks, the prisoners receive “a special meal of pork broth soup and white-flour steamed buns.” Important Chinese holidays, such as New Year’s, National Day, and the Spring Festival, are celebrated with meat dumplings, an exception in an otherwise meatless diet.

Food is distributed by one person per squad, which consists of about ten people. This prisoner, called the zhiban or ‘duty prisoner’, delivers the food to the rest of his group in large bowls on a cart. This often involves pushing the cart a great distance to the place where the others are working.[21] Each day prisoners receive gruel, bread, and a watery vegetable soup made from the cheapest vegetables available. Some camps have reported two meals a day while others allow three.[20][21] Food is rationed according to rank and productive output, which is believed to provide motivation to work.

During the Mao era, food in prisons was very scarce, partly because of a nationwide famine during the Great Leap Forward (1959–1962), but also because of the harsher rules[clarification needed]. Since little food was available, prisoners would scavenge anything they came across while working. Cases were documented of prisoners eating “field mice, crickets, locusts, toads, grapevine worms, grasshoppers, insect larvae and eggs, and poisonous snakes.”[20] Also, many inmates would steal produce from the fields they worked on, smuggling vegetables back to their barracks. In Jiabiangou, Gansu, around 2,500 out of 3,000 prisoners died of starvation between 1960 and 1962, with some survivors resorting to cannibalism.

Nutrition in the camps was a big problem, especially during the early 1950s through the 1960s, in the early years of the PRC (People’s Republic of China). Before the CCP (Chinese Communist Party) took control, hunger was rarely used to control prisoners.[20] Early leaders of the CCP realized the power of withholding food from rebellious prisoners and, until recently, this practice was very common. Since the early nineties, some camps in the coastal regions of Eastern China have improved the quality and amount of food.

Living quarters and sanitation

The living quarters, commonly referred to as barracks in most Laogai literature, are relatively primitive. Most have floors made of cement or wood, but some are of only straw and/or earth. The latrine is a bucket, and no furniture is provided. The prisoners sleep on the floor in a space 30 cm wide,[20] with ten people per room.[21] New prisoners are forced to sleep nearest to the latrine while more senior ones sleep near the opposite wall.[20]

Baths and showers are very rare, often not mentioned at all in memoirs. The only form of washing is the use of a water basin, which is only slightly less rare. This is ineffective, since the entire squad uses the same water. Basic essentials, such as a toothbrush and toothpaste, toilet paper, soap and towels, are not provided; prisoners must spend their wages to acquire them. Prisoners are known to have spread manure, both human and animal, and been required to eat immediately without being able to wash their hands.

The sleeping quarters are surrounded on all sides by a wall. This wall is about 20 feet high and topped with electrical fencing. There are also sentry towers on each corner. Outside this wall is forty feet of empty space, followed by another wall, similar to the first but larger.

Disease and pests

The Laogai camps are infested with many types of pests. Bed bugs are so numerous that at night they sometimes move in swarms. This behavior has earned them the Laogai nickname of tanks or ‘tanke’. They suck the blood of the prisoners, leaving little red welts all over their bodies. These welts itch, and severe cases have led to inmates scratching their skin raw, leading to dangerous infections. Another common pest is lice; some ‘convicts’ have been known to eat them to supplement their meager diet. No insecticide or pesticides are used in the camps. The prisoner Zhang Xianliang wrote that “the parasites on a single inmate’s underpants would be as numerous as the words on the front page of a newspaper.” He noted fleas would be so numerous that they would “turn his quilt purplish black with their droppings.” Roundworms are also a common threat to the prisoners' health, especially in laogai farms, where human excrement is used as fertilizer.

Along with a poor diet comes many diet-related diseases: beriberi, edema, and scurvy are the most common, due to lack of vitamins. Other health problems caused by the lack of healthy food include severe diarrhea or constipation from the lack of oil and fiber. These two are often left untreated and, added to the continuous strain of twelve hours of manual labor, weaken the immune system. Eventually, death follows many of these conditions. Two diseases rampant among the populations of these camps are tuberculosis and hepatitis. Highly contagious, these are also often left untreated until it is too late. Each morning, the cadre of the camp decides who is sick enough to stay in the barracks and miss the day of work. Many prisoners are forced to work when they are ill. Mental illness used to be very common during the Mao era, when prisoners had to spend two hours each evening being indoctrinated. The brainwashing that occurred over the amount of time people were imprisoned could be so intense that they were driven to insanity and, in many cases, suicide.

“Reform[ing] through labor”

Forced labor defines Laogai prison camps. The following is a description of an average day in the prison camp Tuanhe Farm by Harry Wu. He spent nineteen years in a Laogai prison camp like this one.

“Prisoners are roused from bed at 5:30 am, and at 6:00 the zhiban from the kitchen wheels in a cart with tubs of corn gruel and cornbread … at 7:00 the company public security cadre (captain) comes in, gathers all the prisoners together, and authorizes any sick prisoners to remain in the barracks. Once at the worksite, the captain delegates production responsibilities …

At lunchtime the zhiban arrives pulling a handcart with a large tub of vegetable soup, two hunks of cornbread for each prisoner, and a large tube of drinking water … after about thirty minutes, work is resumed until the company chief announces quitting time in the evening. Generally the prisoners return to the barracks at about 6:30 pm. Upon return it is once again a dinner of cornbread, corn gruel, and vegetable soup. At 7:30, the two-hour study period begins… At 9:30, no matter what the weather, all prisoners gather together outside the barracks for roll call and a speech from the captain. At around 10:00 everyone goes to bed.

During the night no lights are allowed and no one is allowed to move about. One must remain in one’s assigned sleeping place and wait until 5:30 the next morning before getting up, when the whole cycle begins again.”
Quota filling is a big part of the inmates’ lives in Laogai camps. Undershooting or overshooting the target productivity governs their quality of life. Not making the number may result in solitary confinement or loss of food privileges. Generally, food rations are cut by 10–20% if a worker fails to meet the standard. Some prisoners excel and are able to do more than what is required of them. They sometimes receive extra or better quality food. It has been argued that this extra food is not worth the extra calories burned to be more productive, so many prisoners choose to do the minimum with minimum effort, thereby saving as much energy as possible.

Working conditions in Laogai camps are sub-standard.

“Investigators from the Laogai Research Foundation have confirmed sites where prisoners mine asbestos and other toxic chemicals with no protective gear, work with batteries and battery acid with no protection for their hands, tan hides while standing naked in vats filled three-feet deep with chemicals used for the softening of animal skins, and work in improperly run mining facilities where explosions and other accidents are a common occurrence.”

Career preparation has historically been used to justify forced labor prison systems around the world. In China, although this argument was used, career preparation was minimal until recently. Following release, the skills acquired within the Laogai prison (i.e. ditch-digging or manure-spreading) do not often lead to desirable employment. Inmates who entered the Laogai system with marketable skills were often assigned jobs utilizing these skills within the prison complex. Doctors, for example, were doctors within the Laogai camp often receiving preferential treatment, larger amounts of food, similar to the cadre, and a bed. “Inmates rarely leave with any new skills unless the training fits the camp's enterprising needs.” More recently however, programs have been introduced to train prisoners in useful trades.

While there are many types of Laogai complexes, most enterprises are farms, mines or factories. There are, according to the Chinese government, “approximately 200 different kinds of Laogai products that are exported to international markets.”

“A quarter of China’s tea is produced in Laogai camps; 60 percent of China’s rubber-vulcanizing chemicals are produced in a single Laogai camp in Shengyang … one of the largest steel-pipe factories in the country is a Laogai camp … ” One Camp alone, Ziangride, harvests more than 22,000 metric tons of grain every year.[24] Dulan County prisoners have planted over 400,000 trees.

The conditions in these camps are considered extremely harsh by most of the world's cultures. However, the Chinese government considers Laogai to be effective in controlling prisoners and furthering China’s economy. According to Mao Zedong, "The Laogai facilities are one of the violent component parts of the state machine. Laogai facilities of all levels are established as tools representing the interests of the proletariat and the people's masses and exercising dictatorship over a minority of hostile elements originating from exploiter classes."

Activist Harry Wu has catalyzed the debate on the issue of Laogai, which is now becoming a more visible issue worldwide.

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No end to China's notorious re-education camps

China formally abolished its controversial "re-education through labor" camps last year. But the police are still allowed to detain people in other camps without a trial or the possibility to appeal.

The Standing Committee of the National People's Congress confirmed in December 2013 what had already been decided by the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China (CPC) during its third plenary session in November: the immediate abolition of the so-called "re-education through labor" camps where the police were allowed to send minor offenders and other "undesired" people for up to four years - without access to a lawyer or the possibility to appeal.

Many analysts hailed the move as step towards a more just rule of law in China. However, people in China are still sent to labor camps without a trial. The reason for this is that the "re-education through labor" camps were just one part of China's prison camp system.

Prostitutes and drug addicts
And other parts of the system are still in place. For instance, drug offenders - either drug users or small time dealers - get sent to so-called "drug rehabilitation centers."

Inmates can be imprisoned for several years in Chinese camps

Nicholas Bequelin, Senior Asia Researcher at Human Rights Watch, puts the number of people detained in such camps at around 100,000. Bequelin told DW these centers are not very different from labor camps. "You just change the sign at the entrance of the camp and instead of being called labor camp it is called drug rehabilitation center," the expert said.

There is another set of camps designed for prostitutes and another one - though in smaller scale - for their customers. An estimated 20,000 people are currently imprisoned in camps euphemistically called "custody and education" centers. "There are no exact figures because the government doesn't release any," Shen Tingting, analyst at the US-based non-governmental organization Asia Catalyst, told DW. Shen co-authored a recently published study about the arbitrary detention of female sex workers in China.
The expert explains that police panels determine how long people are held in such centers, with sentences ranging from six months to two years. For the study, Asia Catalyst interviewed 30 sex workers in two Chinese cities, 24 of whom had already served time in the camps.

Life in a laogai camp

The study found that - unlike what the camps' name suggests - prostitutes receive no education in the camps. On the contrary, unpaid forced labor is the rule of the day. As a result, none of the women surveyed gave up prostitution after their imprisonment. On top of that, says Shen Tingting, the women are forced to pay for their stay in the camp.
They are not only charged for board and lodging, but also for mandatory tests for HIV and other sexually transmitted diseases, the results of which are mostly kept secret from the women. This is why a sex worker named Yi is quoted in the Asia Catalyst report as saying: "I think it's all for money. Any talk of remolding or ideological education is bogus. It's just a way of extorting money in the name of the government and the law enforcement organs."

Human Rights Watch expert Bequelin says prostitution is pervasive in China. "The real policy is actually to let the sex trade proceed without much hindrance," he says, adding that there is no real intent from the state to stamp out sex work in China. However, he states, to keep up appearances there are regular sweeping "yellow campaigns" - yellow being the color for sex in China - that lead to hundreds of thousands of arrests.

Psychiatric hospitals
Bequelin mentioned yet another system that allows the police to detain people without due process: the psychiatric hospital. Chinese police run its own psychiatric clinics which are independent from private clinics and those ran by the Ministry of Health. "They can put in there pretty much anyone they like if they have the approval of the psychiatric doctors, who are mostly made up of police doctors," said Bequelin.

Meng Jianzhu, who became secretary of the Political and Legal Affairs Committee in November, said at a national law and order work conference that the re-education through labour, or laojiao, system would be halted after the move was rubber-stamped by the National Peoples Congress in March. The remarks were first reported by the bureau chief of the Legal Daily, the Justice Ministrys official mouthpiece, and were picked up by state media outlets. An official who attended the event confirmed Mengs comments. But state media sent mixed signals about the policy.

There are still prison camps for prostitutes in China

While a law was recently passed providing guarantees against involuntary commitment to psychiatric facilities, the reality is that if the police want to put someone behind the walls of a mental hospital, they can do it, Bequelin explained. "And they do it very frequently for short periods of time, sometimes a few weeks or a few months for petitioners."
Although Bequelin considers the abolition of the "re-education" camps as a step in the right direction, he points out that it will take a while until China abolishes long prison sentences passed without a trial and without access to lawyers or the possibility to appeal. The Human Rights Watch expert also states that even if the country achieved this, the question remains about how fairness of trials can be guaranteed in China in light of a judiciary which hinges on party guidelines.

fonte

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China Ends One Notorious Form Of Detention, But Keeps Others
FEBRUARY 05, 2014

After more than a half-century and the imprisonment of millions of people without trial, China officially moved to abolish its re-education through labor camp system at the end of last year.

When the Communist Party makes such sweeping policy statements, it pays to be a little skeptical. Last decade, the government abolished one detention system — and then secretly created another.

So, recently I headed out on a re-education through labor camp road trip to try to find out what the government is doing with its labor camps and what is happening to all those prisoners.

My assistant, Yang, drew up an itinerary based on addresses he found online. Once shrouded in secrecy, many camps are now pretty easy to find, thanks to inmates' attorneys, who have posted their locations so relatives can track down loved ones who are inside.

On a cloudless day, I rented a Buick and made my way along the Yan'an expressway, one of Shanghai's main elevated roads. After an hour or so, we exited the highway and passed a new outlet mall with a Gucci anchor store that looked as if it had been plucked out of an American suburb.

Ten minutes after that, we were driving past empty fields dotted with labor camps and prisons with 30-foot-high walls and watch towers.

The juxtaposition of luxury and authoritarianism might seem surreal elsewhere, but in China it's pretty normal and emblematic of the country's mix of repression and hypercapitalism.

I pulled up to the austere, gray stone entrance of a labor camp for juveniles and approached a pair of guards and asked if the camp was still open.

"It isn't now," said one guard. "The sign was taken down."

When I asked what the facility is used for these days, the guard opened his mouth to answer, only to have the other elbow him in the ribs to shut him up.

"At the moment, we're not too clear," the second guard said.

Such claims of official ignorance are pretty normal in China, too.

A couple of minutes away, down a two-lane country road, lies the Shanghai No. 3 Re-education Through Labor Camp. It's not what you might expect. Looking through the bars of a side gate, you can see a long boulevard with street lamps and rows of what look like freshly painted townhouses with balconies.

It looks like a suburban housing development. There's even an outdoor basketball court and running track.

There are dozens of cars inside, and a temporary wooden sign says the camp now operates as a drug rehabilitation center.

A nearby convenience store owner, Xu Jinhui, says inmates began pouring out of the camp last summer.

"They were liberated," he says happily. "No more re-education through labor! The government has a new policy. They had to let them out."

Most Chinese would refuse to discuss a politically sensitive subject like this, but Xu, a gregarious 38-year-old, warms to the topic. He says most of the camp's inmates weren't from Shanghai and came to his store looking for help.

"I took them to the bus station," recalls Xu, who adds that the labor camp had given them some traveling money. "They didn't know where they were. They had spent too many years inside the camp, and when they were released all of a sudden, they became disoriented."

Increased Public Scrutiny

Like most Chinese, Xu didn't like the re-education through labor camp system, because there was no due process and it was prone to abuse by police.

"If I don't like you, I can put you in a camp tomorrow," Xu says. "I can lock you up for six months, a year or even a few years. There's no legal basis. This violates people's human rights."

Some former prisoners of re-education through labor camps and their supporters hold signs in Beijing declaring, "No Re-education Through Labor." Popular opposition to the camps has grown as China's state-run media has highlighted particularly egregious cases.

It's estimated that thousands of Chinese lodging protests against the government are illegally detained in secret sites such as this one, even though the government says they don't exist.

Over the decades, the party used the camps to warehouse political critics, gadflies as well as petty criminals, drug addicts and prostitutes. As recently as 2007, China's Ministry of Justice estimated there were about 400,000 people in the country's 310 camps.

In the past few years, though, journalistic exposes on torture inside the camps and examples of gross injustice doomed the system, says Corinna-Barbara Francis, who studied the camps as Amnesty's China researcher.

For instance, in 2012, police in Hunan province locked up a woman because she publicly criticized them for protecting a brothel owner who had trafficked her 11-year-old daughter into prostitution.

"There were a number of cases that absolutely enraged the Chinese public," says Francis, who called the camps' closure "an amazing step."

"We are seeing a very interesting shift in China toward greater sensitivity on the part of authorities to domestic pressure and domestic opinion," she says.

For Some, Release Then Re-Incarceration

That doesn't mean Chinese people are now safe from extrajudicial detention.

Francis says the government still uses mental institutions and secret jails — often converted motels — to dispatch people it doesn't like.

"So, essentially, while they're closing the camps down, what we're seeing on the ground is that many of the sensitive groups that have always been targeted are continuing to be targeted," Francis says.

Among those targets is Falun Gong, the banned spiritual meditation group, which the Communist Party sees as a political threat. Some Falun Gong practitioners say that as they were being released from labor camp last year they were abducted again and taken to other detention sites.

"Actually, they didn't want to let us go," says a man surnamed Zhou, who served about a year in a re-education through labor camp in northeastern China's Heilongjiang province.

Zhou says on the day he was scheduled for release, government officials drove a car inside the camp and told him they would take him home. He became suspicious when he asked them to stop the car by the side of the road so he could urinate and two officials accompanied him.

Eventually, they took Zhou to a so-called Legal Education Center — really an empty office — where he was forced to watch Communist Party videos and pressured to renounce his beliefs.

"When my little sister tried to get into the brainwashing center to see me, the cops tasered her," Zhou recalls.

Zhou was allowed to leave after more than 40 days and returned home to look after his father, who is in his 80s and in poor health.

Another Falun Gong practitioner named Zuo was more fortunate. On the day of her release, police tried to nab her outside the camp's gates, but her mother, who had come to meet her, grabbed her left hand and wouldn't let go.

"Then the head of the local police station grabbed my right hand and dragged me in the direction of his car," Zuo recalls. "My mother was trying to drag me to her cab. It went on like this — no one was letting go."

Zuo says during the tug-of-war, her mother's lips turned purple and she began to twitch, but the police persisted. Finally, when Zuo's mother suggested they would both rather commit suicide than allow Zuo to be taken away again, the authorities let them go.

npr

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World Report 2015: China

China remains an authoritarian state, one that systematically curbs fundamental rights, including freedom of expression, association, assembly, and religion, when their exercise is perceived to threaten one-party rule.  Since a new leadership assumed power in March 2013, authorities have undertaken positive steps in certain areas, including abolishing the arbitrary detention system known as Re-education through Labor (RTL), announcing limited reforms of the hukou system of household registration that has denied social services to China’s internal migrants, and giving slightly greater access for persons with disabilities to the all-important university entrance exam.

But during the same period, authorities have also unleashed an extraordinary assault on basic human rights and their defenders with a ferocity unseen in recent years—an alarming sign given that the current leadership will likely remain in power through 2023. From mid-2013, the Chinese government and the ruling Chinese Communist Party (CCP) have issued directives insisting on “correct” ideology among party members, university lecturers, students, researchers, and journalists. These documents warn against the perils of “universal values” and human rights, and assert the importance of a pro-government and pro-CCP stance.

Rather than embrace lawyers, writers, and whistleblowers as allies in an effort to deal effectively with rising social unrest, the government remains hostile to criticism. The government targets activists and their family members for harassment, arbitrary detention, legally baseless imprisonment, torture, and denial of access to adequate medical treatment. It has also significantly narrowed space for the press and the Internet, further limiting opportunities for citizens to press for much-needed reforms. 

The Chinese government’s open hostility towards human rights activists was tragically illustrated by the death of grassroots activist Cao Shunli in March. Cao was detained for trying to participate in the 2013 Universal Periodic Review of China’s human rights record at the United Nations Human Rights Council (HRC) in Geneva. For several months, authorities denied her access to adequate health care even though she was seriously ill, and she died in March 2014, just days after authorities finally transferred her from detention to a hospital.

The government continued its anti-corruption campaign, taking aim at senior officials, including former security czar Zhou Yongkang, as well as lower-level officials. But the campaign has been conducted in ways that further undermine the rule of law, with accused officials held in an unlawful detention system, deprived of basic legal protections, and often coerced to confess. The civic group known as the New Citizens Movement, best known for its campaign to combat corruption through public disclosure of officials’ assets, has endured especially harsh reprisals.

In response to the Chinese government’s decision on August 31 denying genuine democracy in Hong Kong, students boycotted classes and launched demonstrations.    Police initially tried to clear some demonstrators with pepper spray and tear gas, which prompted hundreds of thousands to join the protests and block major roads in several locations.

While senior Hong Kong government officials reluctantly met once with student leaders, they proposed no changes to the electoral process. Hundreds remained in three “Occupy Central” zones through November, when courts ruled some areas could be cleared and the government responded, using excessive force in arresting protest leaders and aggressively using pepper spray once again.

Protests continued in other areas, some student leaders embarked on a hunger strike with the aim of re-engaging the government in dialogue, while other protest leaders turned themselves in to the police as a gesture underscoring their civil disobedience. Despite the waning of street protests, the underlying political issues remained unresolved and combustible at time of writing.

Human Rights Defenders

Activists increasingly face arbitrary detention, imprisonment, commitment to psychiatric facilities, or house arrest. Physical abuse, harassment, and intimidation are routine.

The government has convicted and imprisoned nine people for their involvement in the New Citizens Movement—including its founder, prominent legal scholar Xu Zhiyong—mostly on vaguely worded public order charges. Well-known lawyer Pu Zhiqiang and journalist Gao Yu, among others, were arrested around the 25th anniversary of the Tiananmen Massacre in June 2014. Many activists continue to be detained pending trial, and some, including lawyers Chang Boyang and Guo Feixiong, have been repeatedly denied access to lawyers. Virtually all face sentences heavier than activists received for similar activities in past years. The increased use of criminal detention may stem from the abolition of the RTL administrative detention system in late 2013.

China has 500,000 registered nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), though many are effectively government-run. An estimated 1.5 million more NGOs operate without proper registration because the criteria for doing so remain stringent despite gradual relaxation in recent years. The government remains suspicious of NGOs, and there are signs that authorities stepped up surveillance of some groups in 2014.

In June, a Chinese website posted an internal National Security Commission document that announced a nationwide investigation of foreign-based groups operating in China and Chinese groups that work with them. Subsequently, a number of groups reportedly were made to answer detailed questionnaires about their operations and funding, and were visited by the police. In June and July, Yirenping, an anti-discrimination organization, had its bank account frozen and its office searched by the police in connection with the activism of one of its legal representatives.

Xinjiang

Pervasive ethnic discrimination, severe religious repression, and increasing cultural suppression justified by the government in the name of the “fight against separatism, religious extremism, and terrorism” continue to fuel rising tensions in the Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region (XUAR).

In March, at least 30 people were killed when Uighur assailants attacked people with knives at the train station in Kunming, Yunnan Province. In May, 31 people died when a busy market in Urumqi was bombed. In August, official press reports stated than approximately 100 people died in Yarkand (or Shache) County in XUAR when assailants attacked police stations, government offices, and vehicles on a road. The Chinese government has blamed “terrorist” groups for these attacks.

Following the Urumqi attack, the Chinese government announced a year-long anti-terrorism crackdown in Xinjiang. Within the first month, police arrested 380 suspects and tried more than 300 for terror-related offenses. Authorities also convened thousands of people for the public sentencing of dozens of those tried. In August, authorities executed three Uighurs who were convicted of orchestrating an attack in Beijing’s Tiananmen Square in October 2013. Fair trial rights remain a grave concern given the lack of independent information about the cases, the government’s insistence on expedited procedures, the fact that terror suspects can be held without legal counsel for months under Chinese law, and China’s record of police torture.

While there is reason for the government’s concern with violence, discriminatory and repressive minority policies only exacerbate the problem. In January, police took into custody Ilham Tohti, a Uyghur professor at Beijing’s Minzu University critical of the Chinese government’s Xinjiang policy. Tohti remains detained and is charged with “separatism,” which can result in life imprisonment. In August, Uighur linguist Abduweli Ayup was given an 18-month sentence for “illegal fundraising” after trying to raise money for Uighur-language schools.

Tibet

A series of self-immolations by Tibetans protesting Chinese government repression appeared to have abated by early 2014. The authorities punished families and communities for allegedly inciting or being involved in these protests; punishment of individuals included imprisonment, hefty fines, and restrictions of movement.

Authorities were intolerant of peaceful protests by Tibetans, harshly responding with beatings and arrests to protests against mines on land considered sacred and against detention of local Tibetan leaders. According to press reports, in June, police beat and detained Tibetans for protesting against copper mining in southwestern Yunnan province.  In August, police in the Ganzi prefecture of Sichuan province fired into a crowd of unarmed protesters demonstrating against the detention of a village leader. Also in June, Dhondup Wangchen, who had been imprisoned for his role in filming a clandestine documentary in Tibetan areas, was released after six years in prison.

China’s mass rehousing and relocation policy has radically changed Tibetans’ way of life and livelihoods, in some cases impoverishing them or making them dependent on state subsidies. Since 2006, over 2 million Tibetans, both farmers and herders, have been involuntarily “rehoused”—through government-ordered renovation or construction of new houses—in the TAR; hundreds of thousands of nomadic herders in the eastern part of the Tibetan plateau have been relocated or settled in “New Socialist Villages.”

Hong Kong

In January 2013, Hong Kong professor Benny Tai first proposed the “Occupy Central with Love and Peace” movement, designed to pressure Beijing to grant genuine democracy to Hong Kong in accordance with the Basic Law, Hong Kong’s quasi-constitution, which applies the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) to the territory. The ICCPR requires that people should have equal rights to vote and to stand for election. In June 2014, nearly 800,000 voted in favor of democracy in an unofficial “referendum” organized by Occupy Central; in July, at least 510,000 people marched for democracy.

On August 31, China’s top legislature announced it would impose a stringent screening mechanism that effectively bars candidates the central government dislikes from nomination for chief executive. In response, students boycotted classes in late September and held a small peaceful protest outside government headquarters. The police responded by dispersing the students with pepper spray and arrests.

These tactics prompted hundreds of thousands to join the students. Organizers of the Occupy Central movement announced that they were officially launching their planned demonstrations and joined the student protest. On September 28, Hong Kong police declared the protest illegal and cordoned off the government headquarters grounds. This decision prompted more protesters to gather in the areas near government headquarters, demanding that police reopen the area. The two groups of protesters—those corralled in the government headquarters and their supporters on the other side—eventually walked out onto the major thoroughfares between them and effectively blocked the roads.

The protests eventually occupied several large key areas in Hong Kong’s business and government centers. After several incidents of excessive force on the part of police against the overwhelmingly peaceful protests, including continued aggressive use of pepper spray and several beatings recorded on video, the government adopted a passive stance, waiting for private groups to win injunctions before moving to clear out protest sites in a strategy of waiting for public opinion to turn against the demonstrators.

When courts handed down the injunctions, police cleared two areas and later thwarted an effort to block access to government offices, but two other smaller sites in the city remained occupied at time of writing with students considering whether to abandon “occupation” as a tactic.

The underlying political issues, however, remained unresolved, with both Chinese and Hong Kong authorities standing firm on Beijing’s August 31 decision. Benny Tai and other Occupy Central leaders tried to turn themselves in to police to underscore both respect for rule of law and their stance of civil disobedience, while student leaders held peaceful hunger strikes in an effort to persuade the government to reengage in dialogue.

Although media has greater freedom in Hong Kong than elsewhere in China, journalists and media owners, particularly those critical of Beijing, came under increasing pressure in 2014. In February, a prominent editor, Kevin Lau, was stabbed by unidentified thugs; in July, HouseNews, a popular independent news website known for supporting democracy in Hong Kong, was shuttered by its founder, who cited fear of political retaliation from China; throughout 2014, Jimmy Lai and his media businesses, known for critical reporting on China, were repeatedly threatened.

Freedom of Expression

The Chinese government targeted the Internet and the press with further restrictions in 2014. All media are already subject to pervasive control and censorship. The government maintains a nationwide Internet firewall exclude politically unacceptable information.

Since August 2013, the government has targeted WeChat—an instant messaging app that has gained increasing popularity—by closing popular “public accounts” that report and comment on current affairs. Another 20 million accounts were shuttered for allegedly soliciting “prostitutes.” Authorities also issued new rules requiring new WeChat users to register with real names. In July and August 2014 , it suspended popular foreign instant messaging services including Kakao Talk, saying the service was being used for “distributing terrorism-related information.”

Authorities also tightened press restrictions. The State Administration of Press Publication, Radio, Film, and Television issued a directive in July requiring that Chinese journalists sign an agreement stating that they will not release unpublished information without prior approval from their employers and requiring that they pass political ideology exams before they can be issued official press cards.

In July, the CCP’s disciplinary commission announced that researchers at the central Chinese Academic of Social Sciences had been “infiltrated by foreign forces” and participated in “illegal collusion” during politically sensitive periods. The party subsequently issued a rule that would make ideological evaluation a top requirement for assessing CASS researchers; those who fail are to be expelled.

Freedom of Religion

Although the constitution guarantees freedom of religion, the government restricts religious practices to officially approved mosques, churches, temples, and monasteries organized by five officially recognized religious organizations; any religious activity not considered by the state to be “normal” is prohibited. It audits the activities, employee details, and financial records of religious bodies, and retains control over religious personnel appointments, publications, and seminary applications. In 2014, the government stepped up its control over religion, with particular focus on Christian churches.

Between late 2013 and early July, the government removed 150 crosses from churches in Zhejiang Province, which is considered to be a center of Christianity. In July, the government handed down a particularly harsh 12-year sentence to Christian pastor Zhang Shaojie. Also in July, Zhuhai authorities raided the compound of Buddhist leader Wu Zeheng and detained him and at least a dozen followers, although no legal reason was given for doing so. The Chinese government also expelled hundreds of foreign missionaries from China, according to press reports, and it failed to publicly respond to Pope Francis’s mid-August statement that the Vatican wishes to “establish full relations with China.”

The government classifies many religious groups outside of its control as “evil cults.” Falun Gong, a meditation-focused spiritual group banned since July 1999, continues to suffer state persecution. In June, authorities in Inner Mongolia detained 15 members of what it called another “evil cult” called the “Apostles' Congregation" for dancing publicly and “tempting” people to become new members.

Women's Rights

Women’s reproductive rights and access to reproductive health remain severely curtailed under China’s population planning regulations. That policy includes the use of legal and other coercive measures, such as administrative sanctions, fines, and coercive measures, including forced insertion of intrauterine devices and forced abortion, to control reproductive choices.

In September and October, female protestors in Hong Kong alleged that assailants sexually assaulted them, and that police at those locations did little to intervene.

China was reviewed under the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) in October. The committee expressed concerns over the lack of judicial independence and access to justice for women and retaliation against women rights activists. Chinese authorities prevented two activists from participating in the review: Ye Haiyan, China’s most prominent sex worker rights activist, was placed under administrative detention, while HIV-AIDS activist Wang Qiuyun's passport was confiscated.

In November, the government released for comment the long-awaited law against domestic violence. While a step in the right direction, it falls short of international standards and good practices. The definition of domestic violence is overly narrow, and the protection orders that women can seek are poor and are tied to victims subsequently filing a court case against the abuser.

Disability Rights

Although China ratified the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD) in June 2008, persons with disabilities face a range of barriers, including lack of access to education and forced institutionalization (including as a form of punishment).

In China, one in four children with disabilities is not in school because of discrimination and exclusion. Official guidelines even allow universities to deny enrollment in certain subjects if the applicants have certain disabilities. In April, the Chinese Education Ministry announced that it would allow Braille or electronic exams for national university entrance, but in a landmark case to test this initiative, blind activist Li Jincheng was not provided with the electronic exams he had requested, but a Braille version which he did not know how to read.  Li’s case highlights the difficulties people with disabilities have in being provided with reasonable accommodation, a right that is still not recognized under Chinese law.  New regulations on access to education for people with disabilities drafted in 2013 were not adopted in 2014.

The Mental Health Law, which came into effect in 2013, stipulates that treatment and hospitalization should be voluntary except in cases where individuals with severe mental illnesses pose a danger to, or have harmed, themselves or others. In an important step in November, a patient currently held in a psychiatric hospital invoked the law in a lawsuit brought in Shanghai challenging his confinement. According to Chinese Human Rights Defenders (CHRD), central government rules require local officials to meet a quota of institutionalizing two out of every 1,000 people who allegedly have “serious mental illnesses.”

Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity

Homosexuality was decriminalized in 1997, but was remained classified as a mental illness until 2001. To date there is no law protecting people from discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation or gender identity. There is no legal recognition of same-sex partnership.

Despite this lack of legal protection, individuals and organizations brought cases to court to try to better protect their rights. In February, an activist sued the government after the Hunan Province Civil Affairs Department refused to register his organization focused on lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender (LGBT) issues, stating that homosexuality had no place in Chinese traditional culture and “the building of spiritual civilization.” The court dismissed the case in March on the ground that the government had not defamed homosexuals.

LGBT groups continue to document the phenomenon of “conversion therapy,” in which clinics offer to “cure” homosexuality. In March 2014, a man who calls himself Xiao Zhen filed a lawsuit against a clinic in Chongqing, which he said had administered electroshock therapy to him. It was the first time a court in China heard a case involving “conversion therapy.”

In November, a man filed a lawsuit in Shenzhen alleging discrimination on the grounds of sexual orientation; if the court accepts the case it will be the first such case heard in China.

During China’s October CEDAW review, a state representative noted that: “the rights of all Chinese citizens [are] protected by Chinese law, regardless of their sexual orientation.”

Key International Actors

Even as China has taken major steps backwards on human rights under Xi Jinping, most foreign governments have muted their criticisms of its record, opting to prioritize economic and security issues or trying to win Chinese co-operation on issues like climate change. Few bilateral human rights dialogues were held in 2014, and few governments that had pointed to such dialogues as centerpieces of their human rights strategy developed effective, alternative long-term strategies, such as elevating their engagement with Chinese civil society. 

Foreign governments also largely failed to mark the 25th anniversary of the Tiananmen massacre, or to speak up for Hong Kong when China ruled out true universal suffrage for the territory, though several noted the harsh sentences handed down to high-profile human rights defenders and the release of Gao Zhisheng, who, however, remains under heavy surveillance. For the third time in recent years, South African authorities indicated they would not grant a visa to the Dalai Lama.

United Nations Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon similarly failed to criticize the Chinese government’s deteriorating rights records during his August visit, instead praising the government for  “its contributions to the promotion of … human rights.”

Foreign Policy

China’s 2013 leadership change has not yielded fundamental changes in its foreign policy, though it has more aggressively advanced its territorial claims in parts of Asia.

While China engages with various UN mechanisms, it has not significantly improved its compliance with international human rights standards nor pushed for improved human rights protections in other countries, such as North Korea. There are eight outstanding requests by UN special rapporteurs to visit China, and UN agencies operating inside China remain tightly restricted, their activities closely monitored by authorities.

As a member of the UN Human Rights Council, China regularly votes to prevent scrutiny of serious human rights situations around the world. In 2014, China voted down resolutions spotlighting abuses in North Korea, Iran, Sri Lanka, Belarus, Ukraine, as well as Syria.

China repeated its calls for “political solutions” in Syria, Sudan, and South Sudan in 2014, but took steps that prolonged human rights crises in all three. Particularly noteworthy was its veto of a Security Council resolution referring the situation in Syria to the International Criminal Court. The latter was its fourth veto, alongside Russia, of Security Council action to address human rights violations in Syria since 2011.

In September 2014, however, a Chinese embassy official in Juba claimed that Chinese weapons sales to South Sudan had been halted; the change in policy had not been independently verified at time of writing. China also continued to pressure governments to forcibly return Chinese asylum seekers and to deny visas to individuals it dislikes, such as the Dalai Lama.

fonte

[Incognitus]

Sim, a China ainda comete bastantes atentados aos direitos humanos. Mas nada que se pareça com os que cometia quando era puramente socialista/comunista. Idem para praticamente qualquer outro país que tenha uma fase puramente socialista/comunista, e uma onde já permita capitalistmo e uma economia de mercado. Basicamente os recursos que uma economia de mercado gera levam a que seja possível suavizar a repressão.

Antes a China matava aos milhões, via violência e fome. Agora emprisiona milhares. Pode argumentar-se que eliminou 99% da agressividade socialista para com o povo. É uma variação considerável. Idem para URSS, a Cuba também está a melhorar, etc. A única que não melhora é a Coreia do Norte, simplesmente porque ainda não se afastou do socialismo puro.

[Zel]

PCP: o partido dos campos de concentracao !

[Zel]

uma reportagem sobre os campos de concentracao da coreia do norte

! No longer available

[Lark]

China Is Complicit in North Korea’s Human Rights Abuses

Wherever you are vacationing this summer, chances are you will encounter someone with his nose buried in David Baldacci’s latest best-seller, "The Target." One of "The Target’s" villains is from North Korea, and the novelist doesn’t have to use his imagination to describe the depredations of life in that totalitarian country. The human-rights horrors he describes are all too real.

Among the abuses recounted is the punishment for North Koreans who are repatriated after having escaped to China. Beijing’s longstanding policy is to deny refugee status to the North Koreans. Rather, Chinese authorities track down, arrest and send back North Koreans who are hiding there. Since the late 1990s, Beijing has forcibly returned tens of thousands of refugees to North Korea. Their only crime was to have sought a better life outside of the repressive country, and many seek to live across the border in South Korea, one of Asia’s most vibrant and prosperous democracies.

The fate of North Koreans whom Beijing repatriates is documented in a new publication: the 2014 report of the United Nations Commission of Inquiry on North Korea. The commission was tasked with investigating the "systematic, widespread, and grave" human rights violations of North Korea against its own people. Its 400-page report implicates China, which, in the words of chairman Michael Kirby, could be "aiding and abetting crimes against humanity" by forcibly repatriating North Koreans who flee to that country as well as allowing North Korean security agents to operate on Chinese soil.

According to the report, the majority of the North Koreans who have fled to China in recent years are women, including many who were pressed into sexual slavery as prostitutes, Internet porn workers and, "brides" of Chinese men. If Beijing repatriates a woman who is pregnant, North Korea either forces her to undergo an abortion, or, if the baby is allowed to be born, it is killed. The father is presumed to be Chinese, which North Korea’s regime considers to be "bad seed."

Returnees who are suspected of having met with Christians, South Koreans, or Americans while in China also face harsh treatment. Ji Seong Ho escaped to China with his brother in 2008 by swimming across the Tumen River. He recalls: "If North Korea discovers that a person … has been exposed to a religion such as Christianity, then their punishment [should they be returned] would be a prison camp or public execution," he said. "I prayed desperately not to get arrested in China."

In China, Ji went into hiding. He eventually hooked up with the underground railroad that ferries North Koreans to safety in neighboring countries. "During that journey, I realized how big a country China was," he said. "I moved in secret from one place to another and fled at the sight of the police. It was quite a challenge. I think it took almost one month crossing the Chinese countryside before I could enter a Southeast Asian country." Named cases like Ji’s are hard to come by. The Chinese prefer to keep the practice out of the public’s eye, sending North Koreans back at night on buses veiled with curtains. Nameless and faceless statistics are much less likely to raise international ire.

The underground railroad that helps North Koreans escape from China is operated by brokers, who are in it for the money, and Christians, both international missionaries and local believers, and other humanitarian organizations like Liberty in North Korea who are more often motivated by compassion. It is against Chinese law to help North Korean refugees and Americans have gone to jail for doing so.

China’s repatriation policy is contrary to its obligations as a signatory to the International Refugee Convention. In addition, it refuses to allow the office of the U.N. High Commissioner on Refugees to interview or assist North Koreans who are hiding in China. Beijing likes to defend its repatriation policy by comparing it with the U.S. policy on Mexicans who are in this country illegally. This is absurd. Mexico doesn’t imprison, torture, or execute citizens whom the United States sends back.

North Korea is the worst human-rights offender here. But China is an enabler. One way the United States can pressure Pyongyang is to pressure Beijing. Washington needs to remind its counterpart that continuing to repatriate North Koreans is harmful to its relations with South Korea and the United States, and is unbefitting of China’s aspirations to be a great power. Name and shame Beijing unconditionally for its egregious and shameful negligence.

foreign policy

[Lark]

China opposes talks on North Korea’s human rights record at UN Security Council

China has said it would be a bad idea for the United Nations Security Council to revive discussions on human rights in North Korea, which has been accused by a UN inquiry of abuses comparable to Nazi-era atrocities.

UN diplomats, speaking on condition of anonymity, have said the council could hold another meeting on the human rights situation in North Korea next month when the United States is president of the 15-member body.

They say it is an idea that Western countries, Japan and South Korea would support.

“I heard the suggestion, I believe it’s a bad idea,” said China’s UN ambassador, Liu Jieyi. “The security council is not about human rights.”

The UN Security Council added human rights in North Korea to its agenda and held its first meeting on the issue in December last year, despite objections by China that led to a rare procedural vote. China is a strong ally of Pyongyang.

Asked if China would push for another procedural vote if a meeting was proposed, Liu said: “We’ll see what happens.”

The 193-member UN General Assembly urged the UN Security Council in December to consider referring North Korea to the International Criminal Court after a UN Commission of Inquiry detailed wide-ranging abuses in the hermit Asian state.

China is likely to veto any Security Council bid to refer North Korea to the court, diplomats said.

fonte

[Jsebastião]

http://www.rtp.pt/noticias/mundo/frente-a-frente-entre-embaixador-angolano-e-eduardo-agualusa_v871619

[D. Antunes]

é aqui.

L

EDIT: alterei o cabeçalho para apenas direitos humanos.
Não são só os da China que interessam.
o tópico está aberto para tudo o que sejam atropelos dos direitos humanos na china, na coreia, na rússia, em cuba, em portugal, nos estados unidos, na hungria...

no mundo todo!

Na Hungria aquilo é mesmo mau. Então para os húngaros que, como tu, adoram o ambiente do Martim Moniz, deve ser terrível.

[Lark]

é aqui.

L

EDIT: alterei o cabeçalho para apenas direitos humanos.
Não são só os da China que interessam.
o tópico está aberto para tudo o que sejam atropelos dos direitos humanos na china, na coreia, na rússia, em cuba, em portugal, nos estados unidos, na hungria...

no mundo todo!

Na Hungria aquilo é mesmo mau. Então para os húngaros que, como tu, adoram o ambiente do Martim Moniz, deve ser terrível.

sim, tens razão. na hungria está bastante mau para os direitos humanos.
e não é só para os direitos dos refugiados. está mau para os próprios húngaros.
ah 'pera...
'tavas a brincar...

L

[Lark]

Dispatches: Hungary’s Anti-Migrant Fence Is an Insult to Its History

The country that helped tear down the Iron Curtain in 1989 is building a new one. On June 17, Prime Minister Viktor Orban’s government announced its plans to construct a four-meter-high fence on its 175 kilometer border with Serbia.

The proposed fence is the culmination of a several month long anti-migrant campaign by the government, which includes a national consultation on “migration and terrorism,” delivered through a questionnaire addressed to eight million Hungarian citizens that contains leading questions suggesting that everyone crossing into Hungary is an economic migrant, a terrorist – or both. The European Parliament adopted a resolution on June 10 condemning the national consultation and the questionnaire, calling on the Hungarian government to withdraw it.

The government has also launched an anti-migrant billboard campaign with messages, in Hungarian, saying things like, “If you come to Hungary, you can’t take the jobs of Hungarians” and “If you come to Hungary you must respect our culture.” Since few refugees and migrants understand Hungarian, these messages appear to be aimed more at Hungarian voters.

The move comes at a time of increased asylum applications in Hungary: double in 2014 compared to 2013, putting it in second place behind Sweden for the most asylum applicants per capita among European Union member states. Half came from Kosovo, followed by Afghans and Syrians. But they are not particularly welcome: only 9 percent of applications for asylum are accepted on the first attempt – the lowest rate in the EU.

Building fences is not the way to address Europe’s immigration and refugee demand. It will have no impact on the conflicts, human rights abuses, and poverty that drive people to try to reach EU territory. But it risks trapping people in Serbia, where Human Rights Watch documented serious abuses against migrants and asylum seekers by Serbian police and flaws in the asylum system. UNHCR, the United Nations refugee agency, has described the fence as a “barrier to asylum” a statement echoed by the UN high commissioner for human rights who in a June 19 press briefing note said that the fence “may prevent asylum seekers … from accessing Hungarian territory.” The Council of Europe commissioner for human rights tweeted that the fence is “ill-advised.”

It’s also tragically hypocritical that Hungary, from where about 200,000 Hungarians were forced to flee in 1956 to obtain protection from Western countries, is currently closing its borders to those fleeing their countries for similar reasons.

Hungary should honor its human rights obligations and indeed its own history and keep its borders open to allow people to present their claims for asylum in a fair and transparent procedure.

human rights watch

[Lark]

Hungary: Outstanding Human Rights Concerns

Since the ruling party Fidesz won its first two-third majority term in April 2010 and renewed in the April 2014 election win, it has used its supermajority in the country’s unicameral parliament to adopt far reaching legal changes including a new constitution and over 1000 laws in parliament with limited or no meaningful public consultation.

Legal changes and other policies by the government since 2010 have weakened checks on the executive and had a detrimental effect on the situation of human rights and rule of law in Hungary. The government has made political appointments to key positions in public institutions such as the Media Authority, National Judicial Office, and the Constitutional Court. Media freedom has been significantly curbed. The constitution enshrines discrimination against people with disabilities, women, and LGBT people. Religious freedom has been undermined. Homelessness has been criminalized.

Since its second two-third majority win in the April 2014 election, the Fidesz government has stepped up its pressure on media and civil society.

After taking office in May 2010, the government pushed through a media law package in parliament consisting of three new media laws without adequate public consultation. The media laws specify new content regulations for all media platforms, outline the authorities of the new media regulatory body, and set out sanctions for breaches of the laws. Among other things, the laws contain a vague provision on balanced content requirement that may have a chilling effect on media freedom.

Despite international concerns, including by the Council of Europe’s Venice Commission, Secretary General and Commissioner for Human Rights, as well as the European Commission, the government has made only few and piecemeal amendments to the media laws.

The government has transferred the power to appoint the president of the Media Authority and Media Council (the same person) from the prime minister to the president of the republic, based on nomination by the prime minister. But this is a cosmetic change to the previous arrangement since the president of the republic is a member of the ruling party. The current structure does not remove the risk of political bias since the nominee will be appointed by the president of the republic save in cases where the person does not meet the formal criteria for the post (relevant education, work experience).

The members of Media Council are nominated by a parliamentary committee composed of delegates of each parliamentary faction, where votes are weighted according to the proportion of each faction’s representation in parliament. Candidates selected by the nominating committee are elected by a two-thirds parliamentary majority where the ruling party Fidesz has a supermajority. Effectively, this means that the ruling party is solely responsible for appointing the president of the Media Authority as well as the members of the Media Council.

Since the government’s re-election, there has been renewed pressure against media in general and certain media outlets in particular.

In May 2014, the Constitutional Court, in which the majority of judges were appointed by a Fidesz controlled parliament, ruled that website operators are responsible for any comments to blog posts or news commentary that may violate the media law, which may hamper free speech, public debate, and internet freedom. Violations can result in disproportionally high fines.

In June 2014, the Supreme Court ruled that ATV, a TV station critical of the government, had violated the media law’s restrictions on commentary by describing the far-right Jobbik party as “far-right” in a news cast. The court’s rationale was that since Jobbik does not refer to itself as a “far-right party,” describing it as such expresses an opinion and may leave viewers with a negative impression.

Also in June 2014, the editor-in-chief of Origo, an independent news website, was fired after publishing a story on alleged misuse of public funds by the state secretary at the Prime Minister’s Office. In response to his dismissal, hundreds of media workers demonstrated in Budapest and 30 journalists resigned from Origo in protest.

The same month, parliament passed a law imposing taxes on advertising in the media which primarily affects commercial broadcaster RTL Klub, one of the few remaining independent TV channels in Hungary.

In October, the parliament announced a new internet tax which triggered large scale demonstrations in Hungary and drew international criticism. As a result, the government withdrew its legislative proposal.

The Hungarian government should be urged to:

Establish a multiparty parliamentary nomination system for the president and other members of the Media Authority and Council in order to ensure their independence from government;
Remove the vaguely defined “balanced content” requirement in the media legislation that may increase the risk of journalists of accruing high fines for breaches of the media
laws.

Clampdown on Civil Society

Since June, the Hungarian government has put pressure on nongovernmental organizations that receive foreign funding in ways that implicate freedom of association and expression.

In June, the Hungarian government conducted surprise financial inspections on three nongovernmental organizations that administer foreign donor money, and smeared 13 other fund recipient NGOs, including leading human rights organizations, as “left-leaning” and “problematic.” The raids were linked to an ongoing dispute between the Hungarian and Norwegian governments, which provides the funds in question under the Norway Grants scheme. The US government has expressed concern about pressure on independent civil society groups in Hungary.

During a July speech in which he declared the end of liberal democracy in Hungary, Prime Minister Orban also branded civil society as “foreign agents.”

In August, investigations were launched against Okotars, one of the fund administering NGOs, on suspicion of alleged mismanagement of funds and in September, police raided two fund distributing NGOs, Okotars and Autonomia, seizing laptops, documents, and servers of both NGOs.

By the end of September, all four NGOs that distribute Norway Grants in Hungary had had their tax numbers suspended by the government, rendering them unable to issue invoices or to benefit from a scheme that allows tax payers in Hungary to donate 1 percent of their income to the civil society and religious organizations of their choice.

The Hungarian government should be urged to:

Cease arbitrary inspections and legal action against civil society organizations that administer or receive foreign funds and to publicly acknowledge the importance of independent civil society in a European democracy.
Independence of the Judiciary

Since 2012, when the new constitution entered into force, a series of legal and constitutional changes have undermined the rule of law and the independence of the judiciary. Despite some positive changes to the laws regulating the administration of the courts, the president of the National Judicial Office, a post appointed by the parliament for a body responsible for the administration of the courts, retains the power to block candidates nominated by the National Judicial Council for judicial appointments by declaring the process void and restarting it.

The constitution, its March 2013 Fourth Amendment, and related laws have restricted the powers of the constitutional court undermining its ability to serve as a check on the executive authority. According to the fourth constitutional amendment, the court can no longer review laws pertaining to the central budget and taxation issues and is not able to hear actio popularis cases brought by NGOs and others to litigate issues of broader public concern. The court is also prevented from consulting its own case law prior to January 2012. The Fourth Amendment restricts the court from ruling on the substance of constitutional amendments, a measure which allowed the government to reintroduce via a constitutional amendment the power to criminalize homelessness despite a law doing so having been previously struck down by the court as unconstitutional (discussed in more detail below).

The restructuring of the constitutional court in 2011, adding four new posts to the existing 11, and subsequent new appointment of judges to the bench has resulted in a majority of judges on the bench appointed by the ruling party.

The Hungarian government should be urged to:

Restore all of the powers of the constitutional court and respect and implement its rulings;
Implement the recommendation of the Council of Europe Venice Commission in relation to judicial appointments to remove the National Judicial Office president’s effective veto on such appointments.

Criminalization of Homelessness

The Constitutional Court in November 2012 struck down a national law criminalizing homelessness. In March 2013, rather than repeal the discriminatory law, the government through the Fourth Amendment, restricted the Constitutional Court from reviewing substantive changes to the constitution (as noted above) and amended the constitution to allow parliament and local governments to enact legislation banning homeless from residing habitually in public spaces and to prevent the court from striking it down for a second time.

In September 2013, the Hungarian parliament adopted a law enabling local governments to ban homeless people from residing habitually in public spaces. The city of Budapest in November 2013 adopted a municipal decree banning homeless people from public areas in most of central Budapest. By December 2014, at least 420 homeless people had been charged with a misdemeanour for infringing the ban. Repeated offenses may lead to imprisonment or community work. In January 2015, the Supreme Court struck down the parts of the decree outlining public areas banning the homeless as unlawful as the City could not identify the reasons for their “protected value.” The ruling does not prevent the local government from adopting a future decree and identifying the “protected value” of public areas from where authorities aim to ban homeless people.

The Hungarian government should be urged to:

Reverse the constitutional amendment permitting criminalization of homeless people and repeal the national legislation with the same effect.
Persons with intellectual and psychosocial disabilities

According to the constitution, people with certain disabilities are ineligible to vote which is in violation of Hungary’s international obligations, including the International Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities which Hungary ratified in 2007.

The Hungarian government should be urged to:

Ensure that all citizens are entitled to vote regardless of disability and amend the constitution to reflect this.

Freedom of Religion

The 2011 Church Act deregistered hundreds of churches and introduced a system where some religious groups benefit from state subsidies while others do not. The decisions as to what groups are recognized as “churches” and therefore benefit from state subsidies are made by a parliamentary committee. Changes to the Church Act in September 2013, which allow all religious organizations to label themselves as “churches,” do not address the problem of differential treatment of religious groups, as only churches recognized by parliament are eligible for state subsidies. The European Court of Human Rights in September confirmed its April 8 2014 ruling that Hungary’s Church Act violates freedom of religion and association, rejecting Hungary’s appeal. The Hungarian government has yet to implement the ruling.

The Hungarian government should be urged to:

Implement the European Court of Human Rights ruling and ensure that eligibility for state subsidies by religious groups is determined by an independent body and subject to appeal in courts.

Inadequate State Response to Domestic Violence

Despite the 2013 domestic violence law, victims of domestic violence still face obstacles in receiving protection, including negligent and hostile police responses, ineffective protection orders, victim blaming attitudes among police, prosecution and judiciary, and a lack of number of shelter spaces and social workers trained to deal with domestic violence victims. While the government signed the Council of Europe Convention on Preventing and Combating Violence against Women and Domestic Violence in May 2014, it has to date not ratified it.

The Hungarian government should be urged to:

Ratify the Council of Europe Convention on Preventing and Combating Violence against Women and Domestic Violence;
Take further specific steps to improve the protection of women victims of domestic violence, in particular by extending the protection under the new law to noncohabitating couples and removing the requirement that violence must occur more than once before the domestic violence provision applies;
Establish specialized police units on domestic violence and violence against women;
Increase the number of shelter spaces for domestic violence victims;
Adopt national guidelines for medical professionals and social workers on how to identify and effectively combat domestic violence.

Roma Rights

Hungary’s Roma face daily harassment and widespread discrimination, including in the fields of housing, education, and health care. In 2014, forced evictions took place in Hungary’s third largest city Miskolc where the local government has led a campaign to evict hundreds of Roma. Romani children are subject to segregation in education either in segregated classrooms in mainstream schools or in special needs schools that have a disproportionate number of Romani children enrolled. Officials from the far-right party Jobbik often use anti-Roma and anti-Semitic rhetoric in public speeches and statements. Vigilante groups have on numerous occasions organized violent marches through Roma neighborhoods, threatening and intimidating residents.

The Hungarian government should be urged to:

Take concrete steps to tackle violence and discrimination of Roma and ensure the protection of the rights of the Roma minority, especially in light of the rising popularity of the overtly anti-Roma, far-right Jobbik party;
Make strong and clear public condemnations at the highest levels of anti-Roma and anti-Semitic speech;
End segregation of Romani children in mainstream schools and ensure that all children are provided education in an inclusive setting.

human rights watch

[D. Antunes]

Dispatches: Hungary’s Anti-Migrant Fence Is an Insult to Its History

The country that helped tear down the Iron Curtain in 1989 is building a new one. On June 17, Prime Minister Viktor Orban’s government announced its plans to construct a four-meter-high fence on its 175 kilometer border with Serbia.

The proposed fence is the culmination of a several month long anti-migrant campaign by the government, which includes a national consultation on “migration and terrorism,” delivered through a questionnaire addressed to eight million Hungarian citizens that contains leading questions suggesting that everyone crossing into Hungary is an economic migrant, a terrorist – or both. The European Parliament adopted a resolution on June 10 condemning the national consultation and the questionnaire, calling on the Hungarian government to withdraw it.

The government has also launched an anti-migrant billboard campaign with messages, in Hungarian, saying things like, “If you come to Hungary, you can’t take the jobs of Hungarians” and “If you come to Hungary you must respect our culture.” Since few refugees and migrants understand Hungarian, these messages appear to be aimed more at Hungarian voters.

The move comes at a time of increased asylum applications in Hungary: double in 2014 compared to 2013, putting it in second place behind Sweden for the most asylum applicants per capita among European Union member states. Half came from Kosovo, followed by Afghans and Syrians. But they are not particularly welcome: only 9 percent of applications for asylum are accepted on the first attempt – the lowest rate in the EU.

Building fences is not the way to address Europe’s immigration and refugee demand. It will have no impact on the conflicts, human rights abuses, and poverty that drive people to try to reach EU territory. But it risks trapping people in Serbia, where Human Rights Watch documented serious abuses against migrants and asylum seekers by Serbian police and flaws in the asylum system. UNHCR, the United Nations refugee agency, has described the fence as a “barrier to asylum” a statement echoed by the UN high commissioner for human rights who in a June 19 press briefing note said that the fence “may prevent asylum seekers … from accessing Hungarian territory.” The Council of Europe commissioner for human rights tweeted that the fence is “ill-advised.”

It’s also tragically hypocritical that Hungary, from where about 200,000 Hungarians were forced to flee in 1956 to obtain protection from Western countries, is currently closing its borders to those fleeing their countries for similar reasons.

Hungary should honor its human rights obligations and indeed its own history and keep its borders open to allow people to present their claims for asylum in a fair and transparent procedure.

human rights watch

[/size]

A barreira impede a entrada de requerentes de asilo, tal como as multas às companhias aéreas por transporte de passageiros sem visto, que todos os países fazem, impedem a entrada de requerentes de asilo. Com a diferença que, no caso do transporte aéreo, os candidatos podem estar num país muito mau, enquanto os que querem entrar na Hungria pela fronteira terrestre estão já em países sem grandes pronlemas.

[Incognitus]

Grosso modo o maior gerador de atentados aos direitos humanos é o socialismo, seguido eventualmente de ditaduras simples.

[Lark]

This map provides a snapshot of the human rights violations identified by Human Rights Watch (HRW) in their 25th annual review.

link para consulta do mapa: http://razmazz.cartodb.com/viz/b4529364-a99e-11e4-a2e8-0e018d66dc29/embed_map

The analysis of more than 90 countries is undertaken with human rights activists in the respective countries and this year, Kenneth Roth, HRW director, said human rights violations were fuelling the rise of groups like Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant, Boko Haram and others.

“Human rights violations played a major role in spawning or aggravating many of today’s crises,” Mr Roth said as the report was published on Friday. “Protecting human rights and ensuring democratic accountability are key to resolving them.”

The organisation welcomes the recent report into torture in the US but highlights that Barack Obama has "refused to investigate, let alone prosecute, those who ordered the torture detailed in the Senate report".

HRW also expressed concern about France's reaction to the Charlie Hebdo attacks - which led to 17 people killed by terrorists Said and Cherif Kouachi as well as Amedy Coulibaly - amid fears the government will use counterterrorism laws "to prosecute speech that does not incite violence... and encourage other governments to use such laws to silence their critics".

The several hundred page report can be read here, and country chapters are available here.


telegraph

[D. Antunes]

Hungary: Outstanding Human Rights Concerns

Since the ruling party Fidesz won its first two-third majority term in April 2010 and renewed in the April 2014 election win, it has used its supermajority in the country’s unicameral parliament to adopt far reaching legal changes including a new constitution and over 1000 laws in parliament with limited or no meaningful public consultation.

Legal changes and other policies by the government since 2010 have weakened checks on the executive and had a detrimental effect on the situation of human rights and rule of law in Hungary. The government has made political appointments to key positions in public institutions such as the Media Authority, National Judicial Office, and the Constitutional Court. Media freedom has been significantly curbed. The constitution enshrines discrimination against people with disabilities, women, and LGBT people. Religious freedom has been undermined. Homelessness has been criminalized.

Since its second two-third majority win in the April 2014 election, the Fidesz government has stepped up its pressure on media and civil society.

After taking office in May 2010, the government pushed through a media law package in parliament consisting of three new media laws without adequate public consultation. The media laws specify new content regulations for all media platforms, outline the authorities of the new media regulatory body, and set out sanctions for breaches of the laws. Among other things, the laws contain a vague provision on balanced content requirement that may have a chilling effect on media freedom.

Despite international concerns, including by the Council of Europe’s Venice Commission, Secretary General and Commissioner for Human Rights, as well as the European Commission, the government has made only few and piecemeal amendments to the media laws.

The government has transferred the power to appoint the president of the Media Authority and Media Council (the same person) from the prime minister to the president of the republic, based on nomination by the prime minister. But this is a cosmetic change to the previous arrangement since the president of the republic is a member of the ruling party. The current structure does not remove the risk of political bias since the nominee will be appointed by the president of the republic save in cases where the person does not meet the formal criteria for the post (relevant education, work experience).

The members of Media Council are nominated by a parliamentary committee composed of delegates of each parliamentary faction, where votes are weighted according to the proportion of each faction’s representation in parliament. Candidates selected by the nominating committee are elected by a two-thirds parliamentary majority where the ruling party Fidesz has a supermajority. Effectively, this means that the ruling party is solely responsible for appointing the president of the Media Authority as well as the members of the Media Council.

Since the government’s re-election, there has been renewed pressure against media in general and certain media outlets in particular.

In May 2014, the Constitutional Court, in which the majority of judges were appointed by a Fidesz controlled parliament, ruled that website operators are responsible for any comments to blog posts or news commentary that may violate the media law, which may hamper free speech, public debate, and internet freedom. Violations can result in disproportionally high fines.

In June 2014, the Supreme Court ruled that ATV, a TV station critical of the government, had violated the media law’s restrictions on commentary by describing the far-right Jobbik party as “far-right” in a news cast. The court’s rationale was that since Jobbik does not refer to itself as a “far-right party,” describing it as such expresses an opinion and may leave viewers with a negative impression.

Also in June 2014, the editor-in-chief of Origo, an independent news website, was fired after publishing a story on alleged misuse of public funds by the state secretary at the Prime Minister’s Office. In response to his dismissal, hundreds of media workers demonstrated in Budapest and 30 journalists resigned from Origo in protest.

The same month, parliament passed a law imposing taxes on advertising in the media which primarily affects commercial broadcaster RTL Klub, one of the few remaining independent TV channels in Hungary.

In October, the parliament announced a new internet tax which triggered large scale demonstrations in Hungary and drew international criticism. As a result, the government withdrew its legislative proposal.

The Hungarian government should be urged to:

Establish a multiparty parliamentary nomination system for the president and other members of the Media Authority and Council in order to ensure their independence from government;
Remove the vaguely defined “balanced content” requirement in the media legislation that may increase the risk of journalists of accruing high fines for breaches of the media
laws.

Clampdown on Civil Society

Since June, the Hungarian government has put pressure on nongovernmental organizations that receive foreign funding in ways that implicate freedom of association and expression.

In June, the Hungarian government conducted surprise financial inspections on three nongovernmental organizations that administer foreign donor money, and smeared 13 other fund recipient NGOs, including leading human rights organizations, as “left-leaning” and “problematic.” The raids were linked to an ongoing dispute between the Hungarian and Norwegian governments, which provides the funds in question under the Norway Grants scheme. The US government has expressed concern about pressure on independent civil society groups in Hungary.

During a July speech in which he declared the end of liberal democracy in Hungary, Prime Minister Orban also branded civil society as “foreign agents.”

In August, investigations were launched against Okotars, one of the fund administering NGOs, on suspicion of alleged mismanagement of funds and in September, police raided two fund distributing NGOs, Okotars and Autonomia, seizing laptops, documents, and servers of both NGOs.

By the end of September, all four NGOs that distribute Norway Grants in Hungary had had their tax numbers suspended by the government, rendering them unable to issue invoices or to benefit from a scheme that allows tax payers in Hungary to donate 1 percent of their income to the civil society and religious organizations of their choice.

The Hungarian government should be urged to:

Cease arbitrary inspections and legal action against civil society organizations that administer or receive foreign funds and to publicly acknowledge the importance of independent civil society in a European democracy.
Independence of the Judiciary

Since 2012, when the new constitution entered into force, a series of legal and constitutional changes have undermined the rule of law and the independence of the judiciary. Despite some positive changes to the laws regulating the administration of the courts, the president of the National Judicial Office, a post appointed by the parliament for a body responsible for the administration of the courts, retains the power to block candidates nominated by the National Judicial Council for judicial appointments by declaring the process void and restarting it.

The constitution, its March 2013 Fourth Amendment, and related laws have restricted the powers of the constitutional court undermining its ability to serve as a check on the executive authority. According to the fourth constitutional amendment, the court can no longer review laws pertaining to the central budget and taxation issues and is not able to hear actio popularis cases brought by NGOs and others to litigate issues of broader public concern. The court is also prevented from consulting its own case law prior to January 2012. The Fourth Amendment restricts the court from ruling on the substance of constitutional amendments, a measure which allowed the government to reintroduce via a constitutional amendment the power to criminalize homelessness despite a law doing so having been previously struck down by the court as unconstitutional (discussed in more detail below).

The restructuring of the constitutional court in 2011, adding four new posts to the existing 11, and subsequent new appointment of judges to the bench has resulted in a majority of judges on the bench appointed by the ruling party.

The Hungarian government should be urged to:

Restore all of the powers of the constitutional court and respect and implement its rulings;
Implement the recommendation of the Council of Europe Venice Commission in relation to judicial appointments to remove the National Judicial Office president’s effective veto on such appointments.

Criminalization of Homelessness

The Constitutional Court in November 2012 struck down a national law criminalizing homelessness. In March 2013, rather than repeal the discriminatory law, the government through the Fourth Amendment, restricted the Constitutional Court from reviewing substantive changes to the constitution (as noted above) and amended the constitution to allow parliament and local governments to enact legislation banning homeless from residing habitually in public spaces and to prevent the court from striking it down for a second time.

In September 2013, the Hungarian parliament adopted a law enabling local governments to ban homeless people from residing habitually in public spaces. The city of Budapest in November 2013 adopted a municipal decree banning homeless people from public areas in most of central Budapest. By December 2014, at least 420 homeless people had been charged with a misdemeanour for infringing the ban. Repeated offenses may lead to imprisonment or community work. In January 2015, the Supreme Court struck down the parts of the decree outlining public areas banning the homeless as unlawful as the City could not identify the reasons for their “protected value.” The ruling does not prevent the local government from adopting a future decree and identifying the “protected value” of public areas from where authorities aim to ban homeless people.

The Hungarian government should be urged to:

Reverse the constitutional amendment permitting criminalization of homeless people and repeal the national legislation with the same effect.
Persons with intellectual and psychosocial disabilities

According to the constitution, people with certain disabilities are ineligible to vote which is in violation of Hungary’s international obligations, including the International Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities which Hungary ratified in 2007.

The Hungarian government should be urged to:

Ensure that all citizens are entitled to vote regardless of disability and amend the constitution to reflect this.

Freedom of Religion

The 2011 Church Act deregistered hundreds of churches and introduced a system where some religious groups benefit from state subsidies while others do not. The decisions as to what groups are recognized as “churches” and therefore benefit from state subsidies are made by a parliamentary committee. Changes to the Church Act in September 2013, which allow all religious organizations to label themselves as “churches,” do not address the problem of differential treatment of religious groups, as only churches recognized by parliament are eligible for state subsidies. The European Court of Human Rights in September confirmed its April 8 2014 ruling that Hungary’s Church Act violates freedom of religion and association, rejecting Hungary’s appeal. The Hungarian government has yet to implement the ruling.

The Hungarian government should be urged to:

Implement the European Court of Human Rights ruling and ensure that eligibility for state subsidies by religious groups is determined by an independent body and subject to appeal in courts.

Inadequate State Response to Domestic Violence

Despite the 2013 domestic violence law, victims of domestic violence still face obstacles in receiving protection, including negligent and hostile police responses, ineffective protection orders, victim blaming attitudes among police, prosecution and judiciary, and a lack of number of shelter spaces and social workers trained to deal with domestic violence victims. While the government signed the Council of Europe Convention on Preventing and Combating Violence against Women and Domestic Violence in May 2014, it has to date not ratified it.

The Hungarian government should be urged to:

Ratify the Council of Europe Convention on Preventing and Combating Violence against Women and Domestic Violence;
Take further specific steps to improve the protection of women victims of domestic violence, in particular by extending the protection under the new law to noncohabitating couples and removing the requirement that violence must occur more than once before the domestic violence provision applies;
Establish specialized police units on domestic violence and violence against women;
Increase the number of shelter spaces for domestic violence victims;
Adopt national guidelines for medical professionals and social workers on how to identify and effectively combat domestic violence.

Roma Rights

Hungary’s Roma face daily harassment and widespread discrimination, including in the fields of housing, education, and health care. In 2014, forced evictions took place in Hungary’s third largest city Miskolc where the local government has led a campaign to evict hundreds of Roma. Romani children are subject to segregation in education either in segregated classrooms in mainstream schools or in special needs schools that have a disproportionate number of Romani children enrolled. Officials from the far-right party Jobbik often use anti-Roma and anti-Semitic rhetoric in public speeches and statements. Vigilante groups have on numerous occasions organized violent marches through Roma neighborhoods, threatening and intimidating residents.

The Hungarian government should be urged to:

Take concrete steps to tackle violence and discrimination of Roma and ensure the protection of the rights of the Roma minority, especially in light of the rising popularity of the overtly anti-Roma, far-right Jobbik party;
Make strong and clear public condemnations at the highest levels of anti-Roma and anti-Semitic speech;
End segregation of Romani children in mainstream schools and ensure that all children are provided education in an inclusive setting.

human rights watch

Existe de facto alguma limitação da liberdade de opinião dos media.
Curiosamente, tu que és adepto de que a maioria deve mandar e os outros obedecer às leis, aqui pareces defender que as leis devem ser negociadas com as minorias e que estas devem ter representantes na Autoridade para a Comunicação Social.

Relativamente às mulheres, parece que não existe discriminação legal. Apenas existe violência doméstica, como em Portugal, e se pretende mais proteção.
Relativamente aos ciganos, o mesmo. Eu não concordo que sejam atacados. Mas também não concordo que sistematicamente pratiquem crimes contra os outros. Terem turmas especificas para eles nas escolas é discutível. Como sabes, tem vantagens e inconvenientes.
Deficientes não poderem votar, depende da deficiência. Se forem deficientes mentais profundos parece lógico.
Relativamente à religião, não conheço com pormenor suficiente. Não sei se é um mecanismo para impedir seitas desonestas de ter apoio estatal ou algo diferente.

Todos os países têm problemas de direitos humanos. A Hungria está bem melhor do que a média.

[Lark]

Curiosamente, tu que és adepto de que a maioria deve mandar e os outros obedecer às leis, aqui pareces defender que as leis devem ser negociadas com as minorias e que estas devem ter representantes na Autoridade para a Comunicação Social.

dizeres isso num tópico dedicado aos direitos humanos é cómico.
os direitos humanos não podem ser atropelados por nenhuma maioria. nem simples, nem absoluta, nem qualificada, nem... total.

99 elementos em cem não podem abusar de 1 elemento.
isso é algo mais que sabido e o que fizeste não foi mais do que a enésima repetição da falácia libertária contra a democracia.

as democracias defendem os direitos humanos contra a ditadura da maioria, obedecendo a códigos muito claros: a bill of rights norte americana e a declaração universal dos direitos do homem.

you should know better...

L