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Autor Tópico: UberGeek  (Lida 950 vezes)

Jérôme

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UberGeek
« em: 2013-09-27 03:27:57 »
Um projecto para ganhar o concurso do UberGeek:

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DukePad by Oracle

The DukePad is a Do-It-Yourself, make-at-home tablet computer based on the Raspberry PI and JavaSE Embedded 8. The plans and instructions for building the DukePad are available here, and we're working with suppliers to make available pre-made kits that can be more easily assembled. The software on the DukePad uses Raspbian Linux as the operating system, and an OSGi-based JavaFX environment. Within this DukePad environment, apps are simple JavaFX OSGi Modules.

The DukePad is not a product, it is an open source, freely available set of plans and software for assembling your own tablet using off the shelf components. As such, the quality of the DukePad software environment is demo-quality (although we did strive to write as much real functionality as we could, the realities of demo presentations requires sacrificing time on parts of the applications that are not going to be shown, in favor of smoothing out those parts that will be shown). The code is hosted in the OpenJFX repositories under apps/experiments/DukePad. We hope to see forks of this code (GitHub, BitBucket, whatever you like best) and lots of experimentation and improvement that can be shared.

This guide assumes that your Raspberry PI has "dukepad" as the host name, although of course you can use anything (including the raw IP address). The real work starts with step 3, building the DukePad software. One thing to keep in mind, is that although the Raspberry PI can run X11, we will not normally use it, since JavaFX is going to take over the entire screen. When downloading software to the PI, you can choose either to start up X (startx), or you can choose to download onto your desktop system and sftp / scp the files over the PI. This guide assumes you know how to get files onto the PI (and if not, a quick lesson on sftp / scp should do the trick).



Mais detalhes em: https://wiki.openjdk.java.net/display/OpenJFX/DukePad


este é um exemplo de um excelente projecto de oficina para estudantes de electrónica.
« Última modificação: 2013-09-27 04:52:36 por Kerviel »

Jérôme

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Re:UberGeek
« Responder #1 em: 2013-12-19 00:17:47 »
Mais um forte concorrente ao prémio UberGeek, desta vez numa tese de doutoramento por estudantes Israelitas, desenvolveram um método que consegue extrair chaves criptográficas de um outro computador através da análise do som que o computador faz quando desencripta os ficheiros.  :o

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RSA Key Extraction via Low-Bandwidth Acoustic Cryptanalysis


Many computers emit a high-pitched noise during operation, due to vibration in some of their electronic components. These acoustic emanations are more than a nuisance: they can convey information about the software running on the computer, and in particular leak sensitive information about security-related computations. In a preliminary presentation, we have shown that different RSA keys induce different sound patterns, but it was not clear how to extract individual key bits. The main problem was that the acoustic side channel has a very low bandwidth (under 20 kHz using common microphones, and a few hundred kHz using ultrasound microphones), many orders of magnitude below the GHz-scale clock rates of the attacked computers.

Here, we describe a new acoustic cryptanalysis key extraction attack, applicable to GnuPG's current implementation of RSA. The attack can extract full 4096-bit RSA decryption keys from laptop computers (of various models), within an hour, using the sound generated by the computer during the decryption of some chosen ciphertexts. We experimentally demonstrate that such attacks can be carried out, using either a plain mobile phone placed next to the computer, or a more sensitive microphone placed 4 meters away.

Beyond acoustics, we demonstrate that a similar low-bandwidth attack can be performed by measuring the electric potential of a computer chassis. A suitably-equipped attacker need merely touch the target computer with his bare hand, or get the required leakage information from the ground wires at the remote end of VGA, USB or Ethernet cables.


Não tarda muito temos dispositivos a injectar ruído no ar e na massa do sistema para prevenirem ataques deste género...


JoaoAP

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Re:UberGeek
« Responder #2 em: 2013-12-19 00:25:24 »
Upa!!
Já os som das teclas, distância ... etc ...era antigo este método... mas este...!!!