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Autor Tópico: Krugman et al  (Lida 605861 vezes)

Zel

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Re: Krugman et al
« Responder #2400 em: 2015-09-13 12:17:31 »
esse corbyn eh do bloco de esquerda? ehhe

Lark

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Re: Krugman et al
« Responder #2401 em: 2015-09-13 16:34:06 »
esse corbyn eh do bloco de esquerda? ehhe

há um tópico do corbyn e do sanders aberto na política.

então agora fica tudo em mercados e no krugman?

L
Be Kind; Everyone You Meet is Fighting a Battle.
Ian Mclaren
------------------------------
If you have more than you need, build a longer table rather than a taller fence.
l6l803399
-------------------------------------------
So, first of all, let me assert my firm belief that the only thing we have to fear is...fear itself — nameless, unreasoning, unjustified terror which paralyzes needed efforts to convert retreat into advance.
Franklin D. Roosevelt

Lark

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Re: Krugman et al
« Responder #2402 em: 2015-09-13 19:23:31 »
How Corbynomics could work

This policy's fatal flaw is the left-winger's belief that government money should be spent on his pet schemes
by Anatole Kaletsky   / September 8, 2015 / Leave a comment

Whatever you may think of Jeremy Corbyn, he has a point about economic policy. Actually he has two good points and one bad one. Corbyn has been right about what he called People’s Quantitative Easing, a potentially transformative idea for restoring economic prosperity that was proposed years ago by several radical economists but has never taken seriously in Britain until it became the centrepiece of Corbynomics.

Corbyn has also been right about the problem to which PQE is a convincing response—the fallacy that government can do nothing more to strengthen Britain’s pitifully slow post-crisis recovery because “there is no money,” in the fateful words of Liam Byrne. In fact, there is more money available to the British government today than ever in history, since the Bank of England has been printing the stuff like wallpaper.

The problem, and the fatal flaw of Corbynomics, has been Corbyn’s belief that the government money which is easily available should, or even could, be spent on his pet schemes to nationalise industries, create public sector jobs, eliminate student fees, increase social spending and generally build a Workers’ Paradise.

Corbyn is right to maintain that the Bank could create more money out of thin air and channel it into the economy more effectively and equitably than it has through its misguided policy of what might be called “conventional” Quantitative Easing (QE). But the moment that Corbyn suggests that this newly created money should be used as a political slush fund for government to spend on whatever it fancies, the conjured-up wealth turns to dross and a coherent economic policy turns into a recipe for the next Labour financial disaster.

This paradox arises because monetary policy does not affect the economy directly, but only through the actions of consumers, businesses, workers and investors. QE can stimulate growth and employment, or merely create inflation, or have not much effect at all, depending on how newly-created money is channelled from the Bank into the bank accounts of the people and businesses who make decisions on spending and investment.

Conventional QE works mainly by making the rich richer. The Bank buys bonds in financial markets, thereby transferring newly-created money to banks, hedge funds and other investors and boosting the prices of bonds, shares and other assets. The Bank then crosses its fingers and waits for a “wealth effect” to stimulate the economy, as the investors who have been enriched by selling assets at high prices to the Bank of England spend some of their profits on shopping in the high streets or employing servants or investing in new businesses and machines. To some extent, this has happened, and has helped to pull Britain out of deep depression. But despite the £375bn distributed to investors by the Bank of England, Britain has experienced the slowest economic recovery on record in the seven years since the global financial crisis.

Now consider a variant of this policy which I think I was the first to describe as “QE for the People” in a Reuters blog. Imagine that the BoE, instead of spending £375bn on buying bonds from banks and hedge funds had sent cheques of £20 per week to every man, woman and child in Britain, in a sort of reverse poll-tax, and promised to continue this until one of two things happened: either the British economy returned to its pre-crisis growth trend or the inflation rate exceeded 2 per cent consistently for a year.

Since £375bn is roughly £6,000 per head when equally divided among by the 64m people of Britain, this weekly income support could have continued for over five years before requiring the BoE to print more money than it did through conventional QE.

A weekly income boost of £20 for every citizen, or £80 for a typical family, would have worked very quickly to stimulate economic activity or inflation—more so than indirect distribution of money through bond markets and wealth effects. That, incidentally, was one of the few points of agreement between Milton Friedman and John Maynard Keynes in their analysis of economic depressions. Both argued persuasively that universal distributions of “free” paper money was a sure-fire weapon against depression, with the sole difference that Friedman proposed dropping money from helicopters, while Keynes was more Puritanical, suggesting money could be buried in disused coal-mines so that people would have to do hard work to dig it up.

But wouldn’t it be irresponsible simply to create money out of thin air and give it out to people? The intuitive objections to printing money have been theoretically refuted by many economists since Keynes and Freidman, most recently and comprehensively by Adair Turner in his recently published book, Between Debt and the Devil. In practice the prophecies of doom provoked by successive rounds of QE from 2009 onwards—that printing money would cause hyper-inflation or the collapse of sterling or the insolvency of the Bank of England—have all proved wrong.

Why then does almost no serious thinker support Corbyn’s proposals? Apart from sheer conservatism and lack of imagination, the problem is that PQE will work only if there is reasonable confidence that the money printing will stop as soon as deflationary conditions are lifted and additional money starts merely to push up prices instead of stimulating economic growth. The fatal flaw of Corbynomics lies in the conditions required for the printing presses to stop.

If newly created money is used to finance public spending instead of per-capita cash payments, this process cannot be stopped when it begins to do more harm than good. Infrastructure investment projects obviously cannot be suddenly stopped when the economy returns to full employment. This is equally true of government programmes to redress inequality, improve education, help the disabled or achieve other desirable social goals. If such programmes are permanent responsibilities of government they have to be financed by permanent sources of revenue, not used to provide a one-off injection of spending power to revive stagnant growth.

If the Bank of England prints money and spends it on buying bonds or issuing monthly cheques to all citizens, these programmes can be stopped as soon as inflation accelerates or the economy returns to adequate growth. But if QE is used to finance infrastructure investment or permanent social programmes, as proposed by Corbyn, the printing of money is bound to continue indefinitely, even when a tightening of monetary policy is required—and the outcome is bound to be severe inflation. Since this risk would be apparent from the very start of Corbyn’s version of QE, the result would be immediate financial panic, a collapse of sterling, a steep rise in interest rates and a financial crash: in other words, exactly the outcome to be expected from a throwback to the policies of 1970s Old Labour.

Suppose, on the other hand, that QE were not used to finance government spending, as proposed by Corbyn, nor wasted on buying bonds, as in the present conventional approach. Imagine instead that newly printed money was distributed equally across the entire population to create additional spending power in a truly egalitarian manner. That really would be a “People’s QE” and it would powerfully simulate economic growth.

prospectmagazine
Be Kind; Everyone You Meet is Fighting a Battle.
Ian Mclaren
------------------------------
If you have more than you need, build a longer table rather than a taller fence.
l6l803399
-------------------------------------------
So, first of all, let me assert my firm belief that the only thing we have to fear is...fear itself — nameless, unreasoning, unjustified terror which paralyzes needed efforts to convert retreat into advance.
Franklin D. Roosevelt

Zel

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Re: Krugman et al
« Responder #2403 em: 2015-09-13 19:40:02 »
lark, ja concordas que o QE aumenta as desigualdades?


Lark

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Re: Krugman et al
« Responder #2404 em: 2015-09-13 20:37:02 »
lark, ja concordas que o QE aumenta as desigualdades?

tenho que estudar isso.
gostava de ver uma coisa científico/económica que descrevesse minuciosamente o processo.
mas à partida até posso admitir que sim.
tendo é a ter dificuldade a comprar coisas quando mas enfiam pela goela abaixo em nome de uma agenda ideológica.
o zero hedge anda a dizer o mesmo há que séculos. nunca vi um artigo a demonstrá-lo. ou não é bem verdade ou são preguiçosos.
da tua parte também só vi 'bocas'. porque que é que não levantas o teu rabo gordo intelectual, investigas e me explicas como se eu tivesse 5 anos?

L
Be Kind; Everyone You Meet is Fighting a Battle.
Ian Mclaren
------------------------------
If you have more than you need, build a longer table rather than a taller fence.
l6l803399
-------------------------------------------
So, first of all, let me assert my firm belief that the only thing we have to fear is...fear itself — nameless, unreasoning, unjustified terror which paralyzes needed efforts to convert retreat into advance.
Franklin D. Roosevelt

Lark

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Re: Krugman et al
« Responder #2405 em: 2015-09-13 20:50:35 »
o artigo que postei é do Anatole Kaletsky do GaveCal. não é propriamente um progressista. postei porque é um ponto de vista interessante e gosto de ver o outro lado da moeda.
não quer dizer que subscreva cada palavra.
posto muita coisa que é contrária à minha opinião.
o único critério é eu achar interessante.

L
Be Kind; Everyone You Meet is Fighting a Battle.
Ian Mclaren
------------------------------
If you have more than you need, build a longer table rather than a taller fence.
l6l803399
-------------------------------------------
So, first of all, let me assert my firm belief that the only thing we have to fear is...fear itself — nameless, unreasoning, unjustified terror which paralyzes needed efforts to convert retreat into advance.
Franklin D. Roosevelt

Zel

  • Visitante
Re: Krugman et al
« Responder #2406 em: 2015-09-13 22:09:54 »
o artigo que postei é do Anatole Kaletsky do GaveCal. não é propriamente um progressista. postei porque é um ponto de vista interessante e gosto de ver o outro lado da moeda.
não quer dizer que subscreva cada palavra.
posto muita coisa que é contrária à minha opinião.
o único critério é eu achar interessante.

L

porque sou preguicoso?

o anatole ate eh um pouco nabo, mesmo antes da crise de 2008 ele cantava amanhas duma nova economia. eu na altura era trader e lia a research dele do gavekal de graca e o gajo nao viu nada do que iria acontecer.
mas por exemplo alguem menos nabo, o steve keen, diz o mesmo. ou seja que o QE aumenta as desigualdades. e o gajo apoia o corbyn. ehhehe...
« Última modificação: 2015-09-13 22:16:36 por Neo-Liberal »

Lark

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Re: Krugman et al
« Responder #2407 em: 2015-09-13 22:14:05 »
The Fed’s Policy Mechanics Retool for a Rise in Interest Rates

It’s easy to take for granted the Federal Reserve’s ability to raise interest rates. Even among the legions who doubt that Fed officials will pick the ideal moment to start increasing rates for the first time since 2008, few question the Fed’s technical competence. The central bank has a long history. The engine is known to work.

So it may come as a surprise to learn that the old engine is broken. When the Fed decides that it’s time to “lift off” — perhaps this week, but more likely later this year — it will be relying on a new system, assembled from spare parts, to make interest rates rise.

There is a general agreement among economists and market analysts that the Fed’s plans make sense in theory. A team led by Simon Potter, a former academic who now heads the Fed’s market desk in New York, has been testing and fine-tuning the details by moving billions of dollars around the financial system.

But markets have a long history of scrambling the best-laid plans.

The Federal Reserve has held short-term interest rates near zero for almost seven years. Officials are now debating whether the economy is strong enough to start raising rates. When the Fed does move, the cost of borrowing and the return on savings are likely to start climbing too.

The stakes are huge. The Fed is in charge of keeping economic growth on an even keel: minimal unemployment, moderate inflation. It tends to operate conservatively and to change very slowly because when it errs, the nation suffers.

Yet the Fed has found itself forced to experiment. The immense stimulus campaign that it started in response to the 2008 financial crisis changed its relationship with the financial markets. It has pumped so many dollars into the system that it cannot easily drain enough money to discourage lending, its traditional approach. Instead, the Fed plans to throw more money at the problem, paying lenders not to make loans.

The Fed, embedded in the banking system, has also concluded that working through the banks is no longer sufficient to influence the broader economy. It plans to strengthen its hold by working directly with an expanded range of lenders.

Fed officials have repeatedly expressed confidence that the plan will work. “The committee is confident that it has the tools it needs to raise short-term interest rates when it becomes appropriate to do so,” Janet L. Yellen, the Fed’s chairwoman, told Congress earlier this year, referring to its policy-making body, the Federal Open Market Committee.

And if the new approach does not work at first, Mr. Potter said in a recent speech, then his team of monetary mechanics “stands ready to innovate” until it does.

The markets desk at the New York Fed has put monetary policy into practice since the mid-1930s. In the decades before the Great Recession, the desk exercised its remarkable influence over the American economy through its control of an odd little marketplace in which banks could come to borrow money for a single night.

The Fed requires banks to set aside reserves in proportion to the deposits the banks accept from customers. The reserves can be kept in cash or held in an account at the Fed. Banks that need reserves at the end of a given day can borrow from banks that have a surplus. Before the crisis, the Fed controlled the interest rate on those loans by modulating the supply of reserves: It lowered interest rates by buying Treasury securities from banks and crediting their accounts, increasing the supply of reserves; it raised rates by selling Treasuries to banks and debiting their accounts.

As the crisis hit in 2008, the Fed pressed this machine to its limits. It bought enough securities and pumped enough reserves into the banking system to drive interest rates on short-term loans to nearly zero. The federal government now pays about a dime to borrow $1,000 for one month. Companies with good credit pay about a dollar to borrow $1,000 from money market funds and other investors.

But the Fed didn’t stop there. It kept buying Treasuries and mortgage bonds to eliminate safe havens, forcing money into riskier investments that might generate economic activity. As a byproduct, the Fed kept expanding the supply of reserves.

One result is a banking system almost comically awash in money. In June 2008, banks had about $10.1 billion in their Fed accounts. The total is now $2.6 trillion. Picture all of the money in June 2008 as a single brick; the Fed has added 256 bricks of the same size. On top of that first brick, there is now a stack five stories tall.

Bank of America, for example, had $388 million in its Fed account at the end of June 2008. Seven years later, at the end of June 2015, it had $107 billion. The bank could double in size and double again and still have more reserves than it needs.

To switch metaphors, the old monetary-policy machine sits at the bottom of a lake of excess reserves. The Fed would need to sell most of the securities it has accumulated before short-term rates would start to rise. Selling quickly could roil markets; selling slowly could allow the economy to overheat. So the Fed decided to find another way.

Instead of draining all that excess money, the Fed decided to freeze it.

Paying Banks Not to Lend

For the last seven years, the Fed has encouraged financial risk-taking in the service of its campaign to increase employment and economic growth. By starting to raise interest rates, the Fed intends to gradually discourage risk-taking.

The straightforward part of the plan is persuading banks not to make loans.

In a serendipitous stroke, Congress passed a law shortly before the financial crisis that let the Fed pay interest on the reserves that banks kept at the Fed. Written as a sop to the banking industry, it has become the new linchpin of monetary policy.

Say the Fed wanted to raise short-term interest rates to 1 percent, meaning that it did not want banks to lend at lower rates. Because the glut of reserves is so great, the Fed could not easily raise rates by reducing the availability of money. Instead, the Fed plans to pre-empt the market, paying banks 1 percent interest on reserves in their Fed accounts, so banks have little reason to lend at lower rates. “Why would you lend to anyone else when you can lend to the Fed?” Kevin Logan, chief United States economist at HSBC, asked rhetorically.

This is not a cheap trick. Since the crisis, the Fed has paid banks a token annual rate of 0.25 percent on reserves. Last year alone, that cost $6.7 billion that the Fed would have otherwise handed over to the Treasury. Paying 1 percent interest would cost four times as much. The Fed has sent roughly $500 billion to the Treasury since 2008. As the Fed raises rates, some projections show that it may not transfer a single dollar in some years. Instead, the Fed will pay banks tens of billions of dollars not to use the trillions it paid them previously.

At first, Fed officials thought that paying interest to banks would establish a minimum rate for all short-term loans, exerting the same kind of broad influence as the old system. It soon became clear, however, that rates on most such loans remained lower than 0.25 percent. Even banks that needed overnight loans found they could borrow more cheaply. The average rate in July was 0.13 percent — about half of the Fed’s new benchmark rate.

The rest of the financial system is also awash in cash, and lenders — like money market mutual funds — put downward pressure on interest rates as they fight to attract borrowers.

And here’s where the Fed’s plans got a little less orthodox.

The Fed lacks the legal authority to pay these lenders a minimum interest rate on deposits, as it does to the banks. But two years ago, Lorie Logan, one of Mr. Potter’s top aides, suggested the Fed could achieve the same goal by borrowing from these companies at a minimum interest rate.

The resulting deals, known as overnight reverse repurchase agreements, signal a significant break from the Fed’s history of working through only the banking industry.

“We’re pushing more activity out of the regulated banking sector, and so monetary policy has to take account of the unregulated sector,” said Jon Faust, an economist at Johns Hopkins University who until recently served as an adviser to Ms. Yellen, and before that to her predecessor, Ben S. Bernanke. “The world is changing, and I think the bigger risk is not changing along with it.”

When liftoff arrives, however, the Fed plans to place this machinery inside the familiar language of the old system. It is likely to announce that it is raising the federal funds rate, the interest rate that banks pay to borrow reserves, from its current range of 0 to 0.25 percent to a new range of 0.25 to 0.5 percent. The Fed does not plan to emphasize that this rate is now a stage prop or that the real work of raising rates will be done outside the limelight by its new tools.

Mission Control

On weekdays at about 12:45 p.m., the New York Fed’s trading portal, known as FedTrade, plays three musical notes — F-E-D — signaling that Mr. Potter’s shop is open for business. So begins another day of training camp, another test of the Fed’s plans to borrow money from nonbank financial companies.

The Fed’s traders sit at terminals in a converted conference room. Along one wall are five chairs and five sets of computer monitors beneath five historical photographs of the trading desk: men answering phones, men writing bids in chalk on a long board and, in the most recent photograph, from the 1980s, a glimpse of a woman in the background. On another wall is a screen that links the room in New York by videoconference with a backup trading room at the Chicago Fed.

Potential lenders — a preapproved group of 168, including a bevy of money market funds and the housing finance companies Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac — have 30 minutes to offer the Fed up to $30 billion each. At 1:13 p.m., a warning message starts blinking red. At 1:15 p.m., the Fed closes the auction and accepts up to $300 billion in loans at an interest rate of 0.05 percent.

During two years of experiments, the Fed team has adjusted the rates it pays, the amounts it accepts and the time it enters the market, among other variables. Mr. Potter and his lieutenants have also held lunch meetings with investors on the other side of the portal to solicit advice and complaints.

The size of the program poses the most obvious risk. Fed officials limited daily borrowing to $300 billion because they didn’t want to freeze more money than necessary. They also worry about exacerbating market downturns by giving investors a new place to flee. These concerns were heightened by reports that some investment companies were interested in creating money market funds that would be advertised as the safest place to park money — because the money would be parked at the Fed.

Last year, at the end of September, shortly after the cap was imposed, lenders offered the Fed $407 billion on a single day. Demand was so high that instead of asking for interest, some lenders offered to pay the Fed to take the money. The Fed ended up borrowing at zero percent and turning away $107 billion in loans.

A cardinal rule of central banking is that you don’t starve financial markets during panics, and the Fed has been leaning in the direction of doing more. It has already announced that it is willing to borrow at least $200 billion through a parallel program at the end of September this year, for a total of $500 billion. It has also suggested that it may raise the cap during liftoff. “My sense is we’re better off making sure we can maintain control,” James Bullard, president of the St. Louis Fed, said in a recent interview.

Unpredictable Reactions

“This is where the nutty people on the bond-trading desks have control,” joked Alan Blinder, a former Fed vice chairman, when asked if the Fed’s plan would work.

When it comes to raising or lowering interest rates, what the Fed is really trying to do is balance growth and inflation. But they have a limited set of tools to accomplish their goal.

Mr. Blinder’s point was that markets ultimately determined the cost of borrowing money, particularly for longer-term loans like mortgages and corporate bonds. The Fed can be precise in its planning, but the market is unpredictable in its reactions.

Fed officials have emphasized that they do not want the liftoff to surprise investors. “This has probably been the most telegraphed 25-point rate hike in history,” said Wayne Schmidt, chief investment officer at Gradient Investments in Arden Hills, Minn. “I think when they actually do something, it will be more of a nonevent.”

But there are at least three reasons markets are becoming less predictable.

The rise of an interconnected global financial system has weakened the Fed’s influence over interest rates. When the Fed last raised short-term rates, beginning in 2004, officials were surprised that long-term rates failed to rise because foreign money was pouring into the housing market and other domestic investments. This time, there are plenty of warnings that the weaknesses of other developed economies could once again make it harder for the Fed to raise domestic interest rates.

“Financial market conditions have come to depend increasingly not only on developments at home but also on developments abroad,” William C. Dudley, the president of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, said in a February speech in which he cautioned the Fed’s control over those conditions had been “loosened.”

The Fed’s audience also increasingly consists of computer programs that will start buying and selling securities before people have time to read the first words of the Fed’s policy statement, creating the potential for new kinds of chaos.

On Oct. 15, for example, automated trading programs drove up the price of 10-year Treasuries in a burst of buying so intense that a government report later found the machines bought more than 10 percent of the securities from their own firms. Then, just as quickly, the computers turned around and drove prices back down.

The 12-minute spree was among the largest price movements ever seen in one of the world’s most liquid markets, yet the government report found no clear cause.

Finally, investors say regulatory changes are keeping some large traders on the sidelines, making it harder to buy and sell, even in the highly liquid market for Treasuries. That can exacerbate market movements because when people are in a hurry to buy or sell, they tend to chase the best available offers. “The depth of the market is not what it used to be,” said Tad Rivelle, chief investment officer for fixed income at TCW, a Los Angeles investment firm that manages some of the world’s largest bond funds. “You can get the same trades done, but it takes more time.”

Other observers, however, urge a broader perspective.

“People are very concerned about those 12 minutes last year,” said Mr. Cecchetti, now a professor of finance at the Brandeis International Business School. “I’m very reassured by the fact that there were only 12 minutes.”

Moreover, Mr. Cecchetti said that removing some liquidity was a good thing because much of that liquidity was a result of public subsidies for the banking system that had encouraged undue risk-taking.

“Does it mean that there’s going to be more high-frequency volatility? Sure,” he said. “It means the Simon Potters of the world are going to have to be much more careful about what they’re doing. But that seems to me to be kind of O.K.”

Volcker’s Messy Lesson

Mr. Potter has worked at the New York Fed since the late 1990s, but he spent most of his career there in the research department before taking over the markets desk in 2012. He became more involved in the practical side of the Fed’s work during the financial crisis. In a 2012 speech at New York University, Mr. Potter said the experience — particularly during a four-week period at the peak of the crisis — had impressed upon him the limits of theory, the need to understand what investors are thinking and the value of flexibility in policy making.

“For economists who did not have the opportunity to observe the panic up close as I and most of my colleagues had, the developments in this four-week period must have been bewildering, given how widely events on the ground and theory diverged,” he said.

That perspective may come in handy. The last time the Fed shifted the basic mechanics of monetary policy was in the early 1980s, when Paul Volcker was its chairman. That campaign is remembered as a triumph of central banking. Mr. Volcker succeeded in driving inflation down toward modern levels, ending a long period in which governments had floundered helplessly to prevent rising prices.

But Mr. Faust, the Johns Hopkins economist, says the messiness of Mr. Volcker’s triumph is often overlooked. The Fed’s initial plans did not work and were revised and did not work and were revised again — and still didn’t work.

He said the Volcker episode was a reminder that monetary policy is not figure skating. The Fed is likely to flail, he says, but it will be measured by its success in getting interest rates to rise, not by the grace of its performance.

“If you’re into the internal plumbing, I suspect there will be times when that looks messy because this is new,” Mr. Faust said. “But central banks can raise interest rates, and they will. And as long as that happens, from the standpoint of the broader economy, everything is fine and the rest will be forgotten or become a footnote of history.”

nyt
Be Kind; Everyone You Meet is Fighting a Battle.
Ian Mclaren
------------------------------
If you have more than you need, build a longer table rather than a taller fence.
l6l803399
-------------------------------------------
So, first of all, let me assert my firm belief that the only thing we have to fear is...fear itself — nameless, unreasoning, unjustified terror which paralyzes needed efforts to convert retreat into advance.
Franklin D. Roosevelt

Lark

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Re: Krugman et al
« Responder #2408 em: 2015-09-13 22:15:05 »
ou li este artigo depressa demais ou comi alguma coisa que me fez mal.
fiquei com a cabeça à roda e com vertigens...

L
Be Kind; Everyone You Meet is Fighting a Battle.
Ian Mclaren
------------------------------
If you have more than you need, build a longer table rather than a taller fence.
l6l803399
-------------------------------------------
So, first of all, let me assert my firm belief that the only thing we have to fear is...fear itself — nameless, unreasoning, unjustified terror which paralyzes needed efforts to convert retreat into advance.
Franklin D. Roosevelt

Lark

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Re: Krugman et al
« Responder #2409 em: 2015-09-13 22:16:12 »
o artigo que postei é do Anatole Kaletsky do GaveCal. não é propriamente um progressista. postei porque é um ponto de vista interessante e gosto de ver o outro lado da moeda.
não quer dizer que subscreva cada palavra.
posto muita coisa que é contrária à minha opinião.
o único critério é eu achar interessante.

L

porque sou preguicoso?

o anatole ate eh um pouco nabo, mesmo antes da crise de 2008 ele cantava amanhas duma nova economia. eu na altura era trader e lia a research dele do gavecal de graca e o gajo nao viu nada do que iria acontecer.
mas por exemplo alguem menos nabo, o steve keen, diz o mesmo. ou seja que o QE aumenta as desigualdades. e o gajo apoia o corbyn. ehhehe...

o steve keen apoia o corbyn?
ainda me deixa com mais vertigens

L
Be Kind; Everyone You Meet is Fighting a Battle.
Ian Mclaren
------------------------------
If you have more than you need, build a longer table rather than a taller fence.
l6l803399
-------------------------------------------
So, first of all, let me assert my firm belief that the only thing we have to fear is...fear itself — nameless, unreasoning, unjustified terror which paralyzes needed efforts to convert retreat into advance.
Franklin D. Roosevelt

Zel

  • Visitante
Re: Krugman et al
« Responder #2410 em: 2015-09-13 22:18:35 »
o artigo que postei é do Anatole Kaletsky do GaveCal. não é propriamente um progressista. postei porque é um ponto de vista interessante e gosto de ver o outro lado da moeda.
não quer dizer que subscreva cada palavra.
posto muita coisa que é contrária à minha opinião.
o único critério é eu achar interessante.

L

porque sou preguicoso?

o anatole ate eh um pouco nabo, mesmo antes da crise de 2008 ele cantava amanhas duma nova economia. eu na altura era trader e lia a research dele do gavecal de graca e o gajo nao viu nada do que iria acontecer.
mas por exemplo alguem menos nabo, o steve keen, diz o mesmo. ou seja que o QE aumenta as desigualdades. e o gajo apoia o corbyn. ehhehe...

o steve keen apoia o corbyn?
ainda me deixa com mais vertigens

L

eh um doidao de esquerda. e ate eh amigo pessoal do varoufakis.

Lark

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Re: Krugman et al
« Responder #2411 em: 2015-09-13 22:33:38 »
The Times They Are A Changin'

! No longer available


L
Be Kind; Everyone You Meet is Fighting a Battle.
Ian Mclaren
------------------------------
If you have more than you need, build a longer table rather than a taller fence.
l6l803399
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So, first of all, let me assert my firm belief that the only thing we have to fear is...fear itself — nameless, unreasoning, unjustified terror which paralyzes needed efforts to convert retreat into advance.
Franklin D. Roosevelt

Lark

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Re: Krugman et al
« Responder #2412 em: 2015-09-13 22:45:28 »
ou li este artigo depressa demais ou comi alguma coisa que me fez mal.
fiquei com a cabeça à roda e com vertigens...

curioso. o artigo mostra um Mr. Potter a dirigir o barco. E também um Mr. Faust...

L
Be Kind; Everyone You Meet is Fighting a Battle.
Ian Mclaren
------------------------------
If you have more than you need, build a longer table rather than a taller fence.
l6l803399
-------------------------------------------
So, first of all, let me assert my firm belief that the only thing we have to fear is...fear itself — nameless, unreasoning, unjustified terror which paralyzes needed efforts to convert retreat into advance.
Franklin D. Roosevelt

tommy

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Re: Krugman et al
« Responder #2413 em: 2015-09-15 18:35:58 »
Citar
Why the Fed Should Raise Rates Now
3 Sept 15, 2015 7:00 AM EDT
By Brad Brooks

    a A

Now that U.S. stock markets have experienced their first 10 percent correction since 2011, investors are again looking to the Federal Reserve to bail them out. Although the Fed hasn't raised interest rates in almost 10 years, sympathetic pundits say it's still too soon to raise them now. The economist Larry Summers, runner-up for the top spot at the Fed a few years ago, says raising rates would risk "tipping some parts of the financial system into crisis."

How did our financial system weaken to the point where a quarter of a percent increase in rates is more than it can handle?

The process started a dozen years ago, when Alan Greenspan -- then chairman of the Fed -- decided to lower rates to 1 percent after the country had emerged from the mild recession that followed the popping of the tech bubble. Then, when the Fed began to tighten policy, it did so with agonizing slowness -- raising rates just a quarter of a percent at a time, so as not to upset the financial markets.

This set the table for the subprime housing debt mess in a way that neither Greenspan nor his successor, Ben Bernanke, could foresee. Everyone assumed real estate was too diverse an asset class to ever be in a bubble. Despite credible warnings about the potential problems starting in 2005, the Fed and Treasury were still blindsided in 2008 by the enormous losses at Bear Stearns, Lehman and AIG. Suddenly, the emergency 0 percent overnight lending rate was required and, almost seven years later, it's still deemed necessary. Meanwhile, three rounds of quantitative easing have added roughly $3.5 trillion in purchases to the Fed's balance sheet.

What we have to show for this is a more concentrated financial system, in which the top five banks control nearly half of all U.S. financial assets. Even more troubling is evidence that, this time around, asset bubbles have formed in multiple arenas. Earlier this year, the economist Robert Shiller, who predicted the tech and real estate bubbles, warned that the U.S. now faces a potential bubble in the bond market. The high-end housing and art markets also seem to be in bubbly territory, but before they can cause too much trouble we're likely to see a serious correction in the U.S. equity market.

The trigger is likely to be the hundreds of billions of dollars worth of bad debt in the energy sector -- loans that were made to finance the fracking frenzy. Even when the price of oil was twice what it is today, many of the borrowers involved were not cash-flow positive, and few adequately hedged their exposure. While the experts like to talk about how quickly the price of oil rebounded after the financial crisis, the current oversupply makes today's situation more akin to what happened in the 1980s. That took years to correct, as desperate companies and governments kept producing more crude.

Whatever the catalyst, a handful of indicators suggest that since the beginning of this year, the U.S. equity market has been significantly overvalued. The ratio of gross domestic product to market cap, as well as Shiller's CAPE ratio (stock price divided by 10-year average of earnings divided by inflation), demonstrate that the market has been stretched to extremes not seen since 2007. The amount of margin interest being used is at a record high, as is merger and acquisition activity. Earlier this summer, PEG ratios (price to earnings growth expectations) by analysts of the companies in the Standard & Poor's 500 were at 1.7 -- the highest in 20 years, and 30 percent higher than average.

Perhaps the most disturbing statistic is that American corporations have announced dividends and share buybacks for this year that total more than a trillion dollars -- more than all their projected profits combined. This is happening at the expense of long-term capital investment, as corporations seem to care more about share prices -- upon which so much executive compensation is based -- than about prospects for long-term growth.

Another area for concern is the burgeoning private market for investments, where companies are finding it relatively easy to raise capital. Uber, for example, a not-yet-profitable car-service company, got two new rounds of such funding -- and saw its valuation jump to $50 billion, from $20 billion, in a little more than a year. As billionaire Mark Cuban, who sold his company Broadcast.com at the peak of Internet mania, said, "The bubble today comes from private investors who are investing in apps and small tech companies."

This is why the Fed has to finally take away the punch bowl. The economy may not be in top shape, but it's strong enough to handle an equity correction of 20 percent to 25 percent. (Stocks are still up 200 percent from the previous bottom.) Another mild recession would not be the end of the world; given how long it takes to revise economic data, it may turn out we've already been through one.

Fixed-income investors are subsidizing irresponsible lending, and getting too little return for it. Moreover, it makes no sense to try to solve a debt crisis by lending more money (a reality that seems to have eluded Europe, Japan and China). Writedowns can be painful, but they instill a sense of responsibility -- the kind that hasn't existed in the bond market for more than a decade, as investors have learned to count on government bailouts.

If the Taylor Rule -- a practical recommendation on setting nominal interest rates -- were taken more seriously, the Fed would have lifted overnight rates back up to the 2.5 percent range years ago. This would generate at least a trillion dollars annually, if not more, for fixed-income investors -- and a possible boost of 6 percent to GDP. The average American wouldn't likely suffer, because credit-card interest rates still average 13 percent and, given a likely flattening of the yield curve, mortgage rates would barely increase.

And while some people will worry that higher interest rates could exacerbate trade problems, a 2 percent differential is not all that relevant to currency fluctuations. Even without a change in overnight lending rates over the past few years, the dollar-to-euro exchange rate has varied by 10 percent to 20 percent annually.

So let's end the era of the "Greenspan put" and Bernanke's quantitative easing, and return to basics. The Fed should raise rates 0.25 percent this September and 0.50 percent thereafter. Already this century, the Fed has helped enable two bubbles that resulted in equity corrections of 40 percent and 50 percent. Investors would be wise to remember that if the Fed doesn't raise rates now.

This column does not necessarily reflect the opinion of the editorial board or Bloomberg LP and its owners.

To contact the author of this story:
Brad Brooks at

To contact the editor responsible for this story:
Mary Duenwald at mduenwald@bloomberg.net

http://www.bloombergview.com/articles/2015-09-15/why-the-fed-should-raise-rates-now

Thunder

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Re: Krugman et al
« Responder #2414 em: 2015-09-16 12:18:24 »
Lark, já li as tuas réplicas, mas ainda não consegui ler os artigos.
Mal tenha tempo para escrever algo de jeito respondo.
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Thunder

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Re: Krugman et al
« Responder #2415 em: 2015-09-18 15:02:33 »
Por exemplo em relação à questão da % de reserva, penso que foram países como a Alemanha que queriam maiores %s de reserva (Basileia III ? 12% ? ... não sou expert na matéria) e que queriam ver portadores de bonds a arder. Isto mais ou menos em 2009 salvo erro. Seria uma posição desfavorável para rentiers, banksters, status quo ... mas levam porrada forte e feio da imprensa com veia mais anglo-saxônica.

Em relação a posição dele em relação aos banksters, do que eu me lembro ele tinha uma posição bastante ácida. No fundo tinha uma posição de repulsa, asco.
Assim sendo não entendo como ele não aborda o facto de como o plano Paulson (TARP ?), QE, ZIRP terem literalmente salvo quantidades enormes de patrimônio a esses mesmos banksters.


a 'obrigatoriedade' do bailout dos bancos, sem queimar os bondholders tem uma razão. No contexto em que os US se encontravam, com a massa monetária a contraír a uma velocidade impressionante, queimar os bondholders só aceleraria essa contração. Seria mais dívida destruída.

Se a crise foi muito séria, se se tivesse feito o que advogas, teria sido uma catástrofe maior que a dos anos trinta.
A última coisa que se quer fazer no contexto de um golpe deflacionário brutal como foi, é destruír mais massa monetária.

É justo? Não. Mas é o menor dos males.
Premeia os banksters? Sim. Mas é o menor dos males.

A prioridade era sair da espiral deflacionária. A seguir logo se trataria de evitar que os banksters fizessem outra golpada no futuro.
E tratou-se. A lei aprovada pelo congresso - Dodd-Frank  - é terrivelmente penalizadora para futuras manigâncias do género da bolha imobiliária.
O problema com a lei, é que tem que ser regulamentada, isto é têm que ser postos em marcha regulamentos para as diversas agências reguladoras - SEC, FDIC, FED etc etc, baseados nos pressupostos da lei.
A Dodd-Frank foi aprovada ainda com uma maioria democrata, anti-filibuster no congresso.
A partir do momento em que essa maioria desapareceu e se tornou numa minoria, a aprovação dos regulamentos passou a ser permanentemente obstaculizada pelos republicanos. Se o Obama soubesse na época o que sabe hoje, tinha enfiado os regulamentos pela goela abaixo dos republicanos, com executive orders.
Mas não sabia e não enfiou. Por isso a regulamentação tem saído a conta-gotas. Os republicanos, que publicamente falam mal de wall street e dos bailouts, privadamente no congresso, defendem wall street com unhas e dentes. É um mega acto de hipocrisia. Digno de se ver. Pode ser que a coisa mude nas eleições de 2016.

L

continua...

Eu entendo que na altura a situação era caótica e dramática. Os mercados estavam completamente paralisados. Esteve tudo prestes a colapsar.
Se os activos tóxicos ardessem seria terrível, não tenho ilusões quanto a isso.
Se bonds de tudo quanto era instituições (estatais e privadas) ardessem, seria dramático. E haveria efeito dominó.
Não coloco isso em causa.
E para ser-te 100% sincero, nem sei bem o que advogaria numa situação dramática como a que correu entre o verão de 2007 e algures perto de Março de 2009 se fosse eu o decisor.
O problema é deixar-se as situações escalarem para dimensões tão loucas (os TBTF), com tanta importância sistêmica, que basicamente fica-se refém da situação. E os níveis de alavancagem eram loucos, as autoridades foram completamente irresponsáveis em deixarem tais situações acontecerem.
Mas se isso é tão básico de se ver, porque tal acontece? Porque o interesse da população em geral, é algo de secundário. Os governantes, o legislador e as entidades fiscalizadoras preocupam-se muito mais é com quem lhes enche a gamela. E os TBTF enchem gamelas.
A maneira como o Citi foi levado ao colo, como o FED apoiou a JPM na aquisição da WaMu, para mim são indicadores de que não há interesse governamental nenhum em desmantelar instituições TBTF. Em reduzir o seu poder de chantagem.
Se esse poder não é reduzido, mais cedo ou mais tarde o público será chamado para apagar novos incêndios.

Logo, por aqui podes ver que eu tenho pouca fé na regulação e que esta será realmente aplicada no terreno.
Para mim era essencial para evitar problemas futuros, que as percentagens de reserva fossem maiores. E nesse aspecto a tão criticada Alemanha, parece-me que fez alguma pressão. E por isso leva tanto chumbo da impressa mais anglo-saxônica.
Mas deveriam ser também instituições de menor porte, com menos facturação. Para que a falência duma instituição não seja catastrófica, não implique risco sistêmico tão significativo. Para que a falência possa ocorrer, o mercado operar.

Por isso é que eu não alinho na visão de que os BCs e principalmente o FED foram os actores menos maus no meio disto tudo. É verdade que preveniram a implosão do sistema, mas por outro lado deram um privilégio brutal a portadores de quantidades gigantescas de capital que iriam arder. E esta parte é muito pouco referenciada.
E, pode ser apenas especulação da minha parte ... mas quem recebeu inside info sobre o QE que iria arrancar em 2009, para além de poder evitar que bonds e outros investimentos ardessem, ainda teve o privilégio de poder fazer uma rotação de activos. Para além de serem salvos de uma má alocação de capital que tinham realizado, ainda tiveram o prêmio de poder aplicar esse mesmo capital em activos que iriam disparar. Para mim isto é nojento e inaceitável.
E na minha singela opinião é uma das maiores fontes do crescimento dos rendimentos dos 0,0001% (plutocracia). O Piketty referiu numa entrevista que vi, que um dos factores será taxas sobre o rendimento das empresas como as expostas no Lux Leaks. Algo que é indecente, e das coisas mais abomináveis a acontecer na Europa neste momento. Concordo com ele.
Mas que a actuação dos BCs que tanto ele, como o Krugman incentivam e muitas vezes dizem que é insuficiente, contribuíram em muito para o escalar nas diferenças, quer de rendimento, quer de patrimônio.

Por tudo isso que referi, penso que apenas legislação, não resolverá nada (ou pouco resolverá).
Enquanto tiveres instituições com tamanho poder, indivíduos com tamanha riqueza, o seu poder de lobbie junto ao decisor político, e de litigar se tal for necessário é muito difícil algo mudar em concreto.

Quanto ao Obama, não punha as minhas mãos no fogo por ele. Rodeou-se de gente de calibre duvidoso. Muita gente ligada aos tais banksters.
A ligação dele ao Tim Geithner por exemplo, parece que já vem da juventude ...


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Divide et Impera
Não há almoços grátis
Facts do not cease to exist because they are ignored
Bulls make money, bears make money.... pigs get slaughtered

Thunder

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Re: Krugman et al
« Responder #2416 em: 2015-09-18 15:36:53 »
No artigo sobre a Austrália (aqui), a opinião dele sobre o CHAFTA tem questões pertinentes, que podem colocar-se também em relação à entrada de migrantes na Europa.

No artigo sobre o Japão ele diz:

"Well, the answer currently being tried in much of the world is so-called quantitative easing. This involves printing a very large amount of money and using it to buy slightly risky assets, in the hope of doing two things: pushing up asset prices and persuading both investors and consumers that inflation is coming, so they’d better put idle cash to work."

Não concordo que as pessoas e os investidores fiquem convencidos que a inflação virá se virem os preços dos activos envolvidos nos QEs subirem. Alias tal já aconteceu. A Siemens irá investir mais porque viu o preço das bonds da Coca-cola subirem, ou das obrigações Us 10Y subirem?
Acho que irá investir se vir demanda pelos seus produtos. Se vir demanda, torrará dinheiro em R&D, em fábricas, etc. Mas se os consumidores em geral, por todo o mundo estão cada vez mais enterrados em dívidas, como irão consumir mais? Se o rendimento da maioria das pessoas está estagnado ou a cair, como irão consumir mais? Terão menos capacidade de assumir novos créditos (logo de fazerem consumo superior aos seus rendimentos) e terão maiores custos com os juros a pagar. Logo menos rendimento livre para consumir. Se está complicado manter ou expandir o consumo por parte dos consumidores, acho pouco interessante as impressas investirem em expansão da capacidade produtiva. Muito provavelmente ela é (neste momento) excessiva ...

"The result is that seven years after the financial crisis, policy is still crippled by caution. Respectability is killing the world economy."

Vendo os gráficos da dívida soberana e da dívida total a nível mundial, eu estou em total desacordo. Para mim a escalada dos níveis de dívida não alinham com a narrativa de que a "austeridade" é que está a atrofiar a economia mundial. Para mim um fenômeno de lastro na economia, por excesso de dívida (principalmente por indivíduos e pequenas empresas, os tais que não tem acesso aos QEs), conjugado com um bloqueio na possibilidade de destruição criativa (nos envolvidos em QEs), é que são os maiores culpados por esta estagnação.


« Última modificação: 2015-09-18 16:35:48 por Thunder »
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Facts do not cease to exist because they are ignored
Bulls make money, bears make money.... pigs get slaughtered

Thunder

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Re: Krugman et al
« Responder #2417 em: 2015-09-18 16:17:18 »
Em relação as infraestruturas.
Como eu disse em relação aos USA eu não faço a mínima noção.
Em relação à Alemanha não vi essa situação de "colapso". Antes pelo contrário. Mas podem ser situações pouco visíveis, admito essa hipótese.
Agora, acho estranho, um país ser uma potência industrial, um país excelente em R&D, em engenharia, com tamanhas lacunas.

Em relação tanto ao US, quanto à Alemanha. Vamos admitir que sim, que realmente ambos têm infraestruturas que são um nojo e que é preciso um plano massivo de obras públicas.
Porque raio é que as obras tem que ser feitas "à bruta", em pacotes de mega investimento? Porque não fazer as obras faseadamente, à medida que são necessárias?
Grandes orçamentos, normalmente atraem corruptores como moscas ...
E há outra questão. No imediato um investimento grande é excelente. Mas se construirmos em larga escala, com certeza nos próximos anos as necessidades nessa área serão bastante baixas. E se precisarmos de novos estímulos? Faz-se as obras em duplicado? Não será melhor fasear as obras ao longo do tempo? As pessoas do mercado de trabalho dos próximos 10 ou 20 anos não terão tanto direito ao trabalho e ao rendimento quanto nós?

Em relação à contração dos gastos em obras vs GDP eu acho normal. Um aeroporto, uma barragem, uma boa AE, um grande hospital tem grande custos de construção. Mas depois de feitos duram muito tempo. Exigem manutenção, mas o impacto orçamental é diferente de estar a fazer n obras de raiz. E a Alemanha no início da década de 1970 ainda deveria ter muitas necessidades fruto da "tábua rasa" resultante da WWII

Se pensarmos bem, num país continental como os USA, haverá sempre onde construir infraestruturas, onde investir. Mas será tal investimento rentável? O que as gerações futuras retirarão de tais investimentos?
Se for apenas para um boost de curto prazo, acho egoísta pedir tais soluções para resolver os problemas actuais. Lembra aquela expressão, quem vier a seguir que feche a porta.

O artigo do FMI parece mais na linha de promover o investimento como mecanismo para resolver as questões citadas no artigo (principalmente o desequilíbrio das balanças), e não por uma questão de necessidade real das estruturas.

Lark, em relação ao teu post, acho que para colocar 300k pessoas a trabalhar teria que ser algo mesmo em grande. E quando acabasse essa fase de construção de infraestruturas? O que se faria na fase de ressaca nessa franja do mercado de trabalho?
E um investimento de tal escala seria um chamariz para trabalhadores de toda a Europa. Iria-se rejeitar esses trabalhadores?
Não quero entrar na questão dos migrantes (nem tenho participado no tópico próprio) porque é uma questão em que não tenho dados suficientes e opinião totalmente formada. Estou em cima do muro.



« Última modificação: 2015-09-18 16:23:55 por Thunder »
Nullius in Verba
Divide et Impera
Não há almoços grátis
Facts do not cease to exist because they are ignored
Bulls make money, bears make money.... pigs get slaughtered

Thunder

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Re: Krugman et al
« Responder #2418 em: 2015-09-18 16:28:33 »
Em relação aos outros artigos e ao Corbyn ainda queria escrever um bocado, mas não quero massacrar o fórum com intervenções.
Amanhã ou depois debito qq coisa.
Desculpem lá os testamentos  :)
Nullius in Verba
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Facts do not cease to exist because they are ignored
Bulls make money, bears make money.... pigs get slaughtered

Kin2010

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Re: Krugman et al
« Responder #2419 em: 2015-09-19 00:55:55 »
No artigo sobre a Austrália (aqui), a opinião dele sobre o CHAFTA tem questões pertinentes, que podem colocar-se também em relação à entrada de migrantes na Europa.

No artigo sobre o Japão ele diz:

"Well, the answer currently being tried in much of the world is so-called quantitative easing. This involves printing a very large amount of money and using it to buy slightly risky assets, in the hope of doing two things: pushing up asset prices and persuading both investors and consumers that inflation is coming, so they’d better put idle cash to work."

Não concordo que as pessoas e os investidores fiquem convencidos que a inflação virá se virem os preços dos activos envolvidos nos QEs subirem. Alias tal já aconteceu. A Siemens irá investir mais porque viu o preço das bonds da Coca-cola subirem, ou das obrigações Us 10Y subirem?
Acho que irá investir se vir demanda pelos seus produtos. Se vir demanda, torrará dinheiro em R&D, em fábricas, etc. Mas se os consumidores em geral, por todo o mundo estão cada vez mais enterrados em dívidas, como irão consumir mais? Se o rendimento da maioria das pessoas está estagnado ou a cair, como irão consumir mais? Terão menos capacidade de assumir novos créditos (logo de fazerem consumo superior aos seus rendimentos) e terão maiores custos com os juros a pagar. Logo menos rendimento livre para consumir. Se está complicado manter ou expandir o consumo por parte dos consumidores, acho pouco interessante as impressas investirem em expansão da capacidade produtiva. Muito provavelmente ela é (neste momento) excessiva ...

"The result is that seven years after the financial crisis, policy is still crippled by caution. Respectability is killing the world economy."

Vendo os gráficos da dívida soberana e da dívida total a nível mundial, eu estou em total desacordo. Para mim a escalada dos níveis de dívida não alinham com a narrativa de que a "austeridade" é que está a atrofiar a economia mundial. Para mim um fenômeno de lastro na economia, por excesso de dívida (principalmente por indivíduos e pequenas empresas, os tais que não tem acesso aos QEs), conjugado com um bloqueio na possibilidade de destruição criativa (nos envolvidos em QEs), é que são os maiores culpados por esta estagnação.


No entanto, ele é coerente. Ele advoga um QE de um tipo que cause de facto inflacção e não o que foi feito até aqui. Se causar inflacção, isso erode o volume da dívida, sem se necessitar de austeridade. Não estou a dizer que é um plano sem defeitos. Apenas que constitui um plano coerente.