Com um valor destes é para admirar como é que não vai fazer companhia ao Gupta e outros compinchas durante uns aninhos.
SAC still is accountable for 10% of daily NYSE volume
The government could seek to use Mr. Steinberg as a potential witness against Mr. Cohen if Mr. Steinberg ever were to cooperate, according to the people familiar with the probe and with the hedge-fund firm. During his 16 years at SAC, he built trust with Mr. Cohen as an arbiter of analysts, able to assess their sometimes contradictory views and reliably advise Mr. Cohen on investment decisions, say people close to the firm's operations.In email exchanges in August 2008 that were introduced as evidence at the trial of the two other traders last year, Messrs. Steinberg and Horvath discussed a coming earnings announcement for Dell. In the emails, Mr. Horvath referenced secondhand information from a company source about disappointing earnings that could drive down the stock.In the subject line of an email chain on Aug. 18, 2008, Mr. Horvath told Mr. Steinberg, "Pls keep the DELL stuff especially on the down low" because an analyst friend had asked him "to be extra sensitive with the info".On Aug. 26, 2008, Mr. Steinberg and Mr. Horvath corresponded by email with the second Sigma trader, who apparently had a more positive view of Dell.Mr. Steinberg wrote that he "was talking to Steve about DELL earlier today"—referring to Mr. Cohen, who wanted Mr. Horvath and the other trader to "compare notes" because of their opposing views, according to the email.Twenty-four minutes after an email from Mr. Horvath, the second portfolio manager began selling shares of Dell stock, the SEC's complaint said. By the time of the earnings announcement two days later that caused Dell's stock price to fall, the trader had reduced the holdings of Dell in his portfolio by 600,000 shares, saving SAC about $2 million, the complaint said.
The Real Cyprus Template (the one you're not supposed to notice)By: Charles Hugh Smith(April 8, 2013) http://www.oftwominds.com/blogapr13/Cyprus-template4-13.htmlThe Real Cyprus Template reveals the core-periphery Neocolonial-Financialization Model in all its predatory glory.Much has been said about "the Cyprus Template" (the so-called bail-in, where deposits are expropriated to recapitalize the insolvent banks), but virtually nothing has been written about the Real Cyprus Template.Longtime correspondent David P. (proprietor of Market Daily Briefing) charted some very interesting data that enables us to follow the money--specifically, Eurozone money in the "foreign deposit sources" (deposits in Cyprus banks that originated from outside Cyprus).It appears the key preliminary step of the Real Cyprus Template is that money-center banks in Germany and other "core" Eurozone nations pull their money out of the soon-to-implode "periphery" nation's banks before the banking crisis is announced.As David observed, "I think this explains a lot about something that has always puzzled me: why the delay in resolving Cyprus after the Greek haircut?" Here is David's explanation and two key charts: "The Cyprus situation had been simmering for at least a year when in March of 2013 it finally broke; Cyprus had a week to take care of its banking situation or else face a cutoff of access to the eurosystem by the ECB. This brought matters to a head; the Cyprus Bail-In was finally settled upon, where uninsured depositors in the two largest banks in Cyprus took major haircuts, and must wait for return of their money until the assets of the banks are run down.The banking problems in Cyprus had their roots in the Greek Sovereign Default, and were known by the general public for about a year prior to the recent default; a New York Times article dated April 11, 2012 lays out the particulars.Looking at Cyprus bank security assets in data provided by the ECB, the problems were visible earlier - right after the first Greek haircut in mid 2011, and a second haircut finalized in early 2012. This was a 11 billion euro hole in a system with 100 billion in assets total, centered upon two banks that held half the deposits in the system. You can see the effects of the increasing haircuts in the chart below. The chart lists all types of bonds owned by all the banks on Cyprus. The red line is the important one. It shows "all off-island Eurozone Government Bonds."Put more simply, that red line represents Greek Government debt owned by the two banks on Cyprus that failed. It went from a 12 billion euro value in mid 2011, down to a 1 billion euro value in early 2012. That's an 11 billion haircut - all due to the Greek Default. So why did the eurozone wait so long to resolve the problematic Cypriot banks with their 11 billion euro hole that was clearly serious in the middle of 2011, and becoming blindingly obvious by 2012? Therein lies a story - it has to do with banking, and how banks make money. The explanation is a bit complicated, but bear with me.Bank deposits are grouped into 3 primary categories: deposits from households, from corporations, and from other banks. Households and corporations typically have a long standing relationship with their bank; they only move their deposits slowly, and most of this sort of depositor uses time deposits to maximize their interest income. Deposits from other banks are what we might term "hot money." They arrive quickly, and depart just as fast. But why would a bank deposit money with another bank? The simple explanation is: interest rate spreads.Let's imagine you ran a German bank, and you paid very low rates to your overnight depositors. You have a great deal of really cheap money on your hands. What are your options to make money? You can either loan money to German homeowners one by one, but there are only so many German homeowners, and they only want to borrow so much money. So after loaning all you can loan, you search the world to try and find another bank that is advertising high rates for deposit money, and you stumble on the banks in Cyprus. Now then, if the Bank of Cyprus doesn't go under, this is free money. How much are we talking about? Subtract the rate for the overnight deposit in Germany from the time deposit on Cyprus (4.9 - 0.55) then multiply by 60 billion euros. That ends up being 2.61 billion euros in profit. Per year! Cost? One guy at a computer hitting the "transfer" button on his keyboard in Dusseldorf!This sure beats trying to loan money to a bunch of German homeowners one by one! But the key to this free money is, your bank must be able to get its money out of Cyprus prior to any trouble.And the barrier to getting the bank's money back is those Time Deposits (the deposits paying the most interest) are stuck in Cyprus for a year. So in order to avoid loss, you have to see into the future one year and stop rolling your bank's time deposits one year before those Cyprus banks go under. Otherwise you will have collected that 4.9%, then suffered a 30-60% uninsured depositor haircut. And a haircut is not a good way to ensure your banker bonus for the year.So with this hypothetical strategy in mind and being mindful of the dangers of default and the timeline of when things occurred, take a look at the following chart of "foreign deposit sources" (deposits in Cyprus banks that originated from outside Cyprus) and see for yourself how well each foreign participant did in anticipating the eventual banking system crisis. Black: Eurozone [German & French] BanksRed: Cyprus people and businessesBlue: Cyprus BanksGreen: Banks outside the EurozoneOrange: Russian "Mobsters" & BritsLooking at the timeline, even as late as the end of 2011, when it was clear Greece would default and the banking regulator had to know the banks in Cyprus were doomed, the amount of Eurozone-bank derived deposits in Cyprus was over 20 billion euros, a good portion of which would be subject to massive losses if the Cyprus Template were to be applied at that moment.[Note that 20 billion euros was - at that time - the same size as the "Russian Mobster" Money.]But at that moment, as a result of the "collecting the spread" strategy, some big chunk of that money were likely in time deposits, unable to be withdrawn. That money couldn't flee, not just yet.But as time passed, those Eurozone bank deposits were slowly reduced down to 10 billion euros, a reduction of 50%. Presumably, as the time deposits expired, the money was brought back to the fatherland.And then suddenly the President of Cyprus was informed he had 1 week to solve the banking situation that had been pending for more than a year.In looking at the movement of capital prior to the default, we can give a grade to each participant, as a result of their apparent ability to assess the the danger to their deposits. The clear winner: Eurozone Banks. Those guys were geniuses. They were the only participant to seriously reduce holdings prior to the default. So it is expected (and a bit sad) that households and businesses don't leave their banks readily, so its not surprising they stayed on board right up until the end.What is fascinating to me is that the banks that were NOT in the eurozone clearly had no idea what was coming, and the banks actually ON Cyprus only had an inkling, and that only at the last minute. Given both the timing and the form of the Cyprus bank resolution was in the hands of the ECB, as well as French and German politicians, is this astounding ability of the Eurozone banks to avoid losses truly a surprise? One question that might be asked is, if the Eurozone banks knew what was going to happen, why not withdraw all their money from the banks on Cyprus?First, only half the banking deposits on Cyprus were involved in the bail-in. Perhaps the 10 billion euros in remaining Cyprus-EZ bank deposits are in other healthy Cyprus banks. Another explanation is that only a subset of the eurozone banks were well-connected enough to receive advance information.One last point. Since now we understand how perfectly the well-connected eurozone banking establishment identifies issues in member nation's banks, and how adept it is at avoiding uninsured depositor haircuts, we might find it useful to watch deposit flows of these Eurozone banks going forward.They might well provide us insight as to where the next set of banking issues might arise, and perhaps more importantly, what the timing of these issues."Thank you, David, for sharing your finding with us. We can now see there are two Cyprus Templates:1. The public-relations/propaganda model2. The real one, that enables "core" eurozone banks to pull their deposits out of periphery banks before the deposit expropriation and capital controls kick in.Why are we not surprised the entire charade and expropriation is rigged to benefit the core banks? For more on the core/periphery structure of the Eurozone, please read The E.U., Neofeudalism and the Neocolonial-Financialization Model (May 24, 2012)To fully understand the Eurozone's financial-debt crisis, we must dig through the artifice, obfuscation and propaganda to the real dynamics of Europe's "new feudalism," the Neocolonial-Financialization Model.
Agora que se fala tanto sobre Espanha, alguém está ao corrente sobre este tipo de informação relativo à banca espanhola?
EU External Banking DepositsWatching Smart MoneyIn Cyprus, one group of depositors seemed to have the inside track on the danger of remaining as an "uninsured depositor" in the two big Cypriot banks. That group, for Cyprus, is classified by the ECB's statistics group using a long and incomprehensible ECB series name - BSI.Q.CY.N.A.L20.A.1.U5.1000.Z01.E. Here's a link if you are interested in the raw data. Translated into English, this is basically "Eurozone Banks outside Cyprus." Or more succinctly put, Smart Money.So what is that group is doing in other eurozone nations? We are not going to monitor every nation, rather, only the ones where Smart Money could conceivably make a decent profit by being there. This is quantified by the interest rate differential.In the charts below, the black line represents the percentage of total deposits in that country that come from Smart Money. The lower the percentage, the lower the damage to Smart Money from any default. And one thing we've learned since 2008 is, core nation politicians will not hesitate to throw any peripheral nation under the bus in order to avoid any losses to Smart Money. The red line is the interest rate spread - the higher the number is above 0, the more profitable it is for Smart Money to remain. So if its profitable, and Smart Money is for some reason fleeing, you might want to pay attention! Regardless, if Smart Money is mostly gone, that means the people in charge of the Eurosystem can pull the plug on the country's banking system at any time without fear of loss to their own banking system.First is Cyprus, to provide an example of what a deposit situation looks like when the core system political class feels comfortable torpedoing a banking system.Rates update monthly, deposit totals update quarterly.
EU Bond Deposit RatioIt appears that governments in many regions are preparing for bail-ins, using the recent Cyprus case as a template for future bank "rescues." One little mentioned fact of this template involves bank bondholders. Negotiations are currently underway within the eurozone to try and establish whether or not Depositor Preference will be established as a condition of any future bail-in. Depositor Preference means, when it comes time to take losses, bondholders get hit first, wiped out completely, and only then will depositors be called upon to take losses. If this passes, its good news for depositors - bad news for bondholders. This is currently the way things work in the United States.If Depositor Preference is established, bondholders suddenly become much more interesting to depositors, since they will be there to cushion any losses from bail-ins. In Cyprus, bondholders were a relatively small group; compared to the total deposit base, bondholders were about 7% of that size. So when loss-taking time came, there were not enough bondholders to take any substantial portion of the losses.But that's not true everywhere. Generally speaking, in the eurozone core, bondholders are a much larger group than in Cyprus, but the further you go out to the periphery, the smaller the bondholder group becomes. Thus, the concept of a bond/deposit ratio, which can provide some idea of just what sort of cushion the depositors in a given region have if a bail-in with Depositor Preference were to be applied to that region. The higher the ratio, at least theoretically, the safer the depositor. Assuming depositor preference passes.
se o ECB aceitar as obrigacoes dos bancos como garantia (nao sei se aceita, mas voces devem saber) isso nao quer dizer que a almofada eh menor do que estimado nesses numeros ?
7 July 2011 - ECB announces change in eligibility of debt instruments issued or guaranteed by the Portuguese governmentThe Governing Council of the European Central Bank (ECB) has decided to suspend the application of the minimum credit rating threshold in the collateral eligibility requirements for the purposes of the Eurosystem’s credit operations in the case of marketable debt instruments issued or guaranteed by the Portuguese government. This suspension will be maintained until further notice.The Portuguese government has approved an economic and financial adjustment programme, which has been negotiated with the European Commission, in liaison with the ECB, and the International Monetary Fund. The Governing Council has assessed the programme and considers it to be appropriate. This positive assessment and the strong commitment of the Portuguese government to fully implement the programme are the basis, also from a risk management perspective, for the suspension announced herewith.The suspension applies to all outstanding and new marketable debt instruments issued or guaranteed by the Portuguese government.
Ainda tenho esperança que sejam os americanos a engavetarem alguém da PT
Hackers ganharam milhões com acesso a comunicados de empresas cotadasPÚBLICO 11/08/2015 - 16:06Rede infiltrou-se nos sites de firmas norte-americanas que divulgam informação empresarial. REUTERS/KACPER PEMPELAs autoridades norte-americanas anunciaram, esta terça-feira, o desmantelamento de um crime organizado por um grupo de hackers que tinha como função roubar os comunicados de imprensa de grandes empresas antes de serem publicados e, em seguida, vender a informação, de acordo com fonte ligada ao caso.O cibercrime suspeito de ter base na Ucrânia, e possivelmente na Rússia, divulgava e vendia a informação ainda por revelar sobre fusões ou aquisições que envolviam grandes firmas, a cúmplices nos Estados Unidos da América. Por sua vez, estes usavam a informação confidencial para venda ou compra de acções das empresas cotadas em bolsa, como a Hewlett-Packard e a Caterpillar, através de contas em corretoras. A rede conseguiu espionar a informação de mais de 150.000 comunicados das companhias, conseguindo assim antecipar-se aos movimentos do mercado financeiro.O esquema de passagem de informação acerca de negócios que ainda não se tinham tornado públicos rendeu aos criminosos, pelo menos, 30 milhões de dólares. O dinheiro angariado era enviado para contas offshore na Estónia, de acordo com as informações da Bloomberg. Segundo a mesma fonte, o esquema de troca de informação durou alguns anos, acabando há relativamente pouco tempo. Os oficias da justiça em Brooklyn, New York e New Jersey acusaram nove pessoas ligadas ao crime digital que, segundo a fonte, se infiltraram nos servidores da PRNewswire Association, da Marketwired e da Business Wired, agências de informação ligadas a negócios (detidas pela Berkshire Hathaway, dal qual Warren Buffett é o presidente).Esta manhã, nos Estados da Pensilvânia e Geórgia, agentes federais prenderam já cinco dos nove acusados de fazerem parte do crime. Desde 2014 que uma operação policial internacional conseguiu detectar onde e como estava a ocorrer a fraude. A investigação teve início quando as promotorias destas três regiões e o FBI receberam um aviso da Comissão de Valores Mobiliários dos EUA sobre negócios suspeitos por parte dos envolvidos no caso o que causou numa investigação individual a cada um dos suspeitos.Estando pelo menos três países envolvidos na fraude, não é ainda conhecida a identidade do responsável pela ideia. No lote de presos está apenas um nome conhecido neste tipo de crime: Vitaly Korchevsky, descrito como um profissional nas estratégias dos mercados e que já trabalhou em Wall Street.Depois de um elevado número de crimes cibernéticos nos últimos tempos, que abalaram empresas como a Sony e a JPMorgan Chase, a Bloomberg destaca que esta descoberta é uma vitória para as identidades norte-americanas, ligada ao primeiro grande caso de uma grande rede de roubo de informação.http://www.publico.pt/economia/noticia/identificado-esquema-que-roubava-informacao-sobre-grandes-empresas-norteamericanas-1704671
